

Foundations of Guidance

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U.S. Office of Education



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*To my
pioneer parents*

CONTENTS

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION	xi
PREFACE	xiii
1. GUIDANCE, A COAT OF MANY COLORS	1
The Interdisciplinary Basis of Guidance. Shifting Emphases. <i>Vocational Guidance. Education as Guidance. Guidance for Adjustment. Guidance for Development. Guidance as Personnel Service. Guidance and Manpower.</i> A Note on Terms. A Forward Glance.	
2. A CHANGING WAY OF LIFE	18
American Backgrounds. American Life in Transition. The Schools and Cultural Transition.	
3. CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CULTURE	35
American Cultures. <i>Ethnic Groups. Rural and Urban Cultures.</i> Cultures and the Individual. The Concept of Values. Values of General American Culture. Social Class Values. <i>Values of Ethnic Groups. Negroes. Japanese Americans. American Indians. Hispanos and Mexican Americans. Jews and Judaism. A Note on European Immigrants.</i> Acculturation. Guidance and Acculturation.	
4. STRATIFICATION, MOBILITY, AND PRESTIGE	80
Some Basic Concepts. Studies of Social Class. <i>Characteristics of Social Classes. Subjective Class Memberships. Social Classes as Reference Groups.</i> Occupational Mobility. Mobility of Teachers. Occupational Prestige.	

5. FORESHADOWINGS OF GUIDANCE 120
 John Amos Comenius. The Commonwealth Educators.
Samuel Hartlib. The Old and New: Milton and Petty.
John Dury. John Locke. Englishmen Away from
Home. Thomas Jefferson. Benjamin Franklin. Some
Basic Concepts and Questions.
6. THE GUIDANCE MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 144
 Frank Parsons and the Boston Vocation Bureau. Guidance in the Schools. The Impact of Testing on Guidance. The Depression Years. The Federal Government and Guidance. Progressive Education and Guidance. The Clinical Approach.
7. CONTEXT AND LIMITS 174
 Youth Groups and Youth Culture. Selective Aspects of Secondary Education. The Psychological Habitat. *Teachers in the Habitat. Other Youth in the Habitat. Limits and the Psychological Habitat.*
8. OCCUPATIONAL PREFERENCE AND CHOICE 216
 Preadolescent Foundations for Occupational Choice. *The Narrowing of the Field. Development of the Self Concept.* Preferences and Choices Within the Preparation Period. *Trends in Choices. The Stability of Choices. Factors Influencing Occupational Preference and Choice. Occupational Aspiration and Expectation. A Summary and Point of View.*
9. ABILITIES AND THE PROBABLE 275
 Some Basic Concepts and Questions. The Problem of Prediction. *Prediction Within the Elementary Level. Prediction for Secondary School. Prediction for College. Long-Range Predictions to Secondary School and*

College. Prediction of Success in Occupations. Identification of the Talented.

10. THE DESIRED AND THE DESIRABLE	329
<i>The Nature of Interests. Inventoried Interests. Expressed and Manifested Interests. The Nature of Values. Inventoried Values. The Response of Youth to Values of the Culture. Interests, Values, and the Self.</i>	
11. THE FRUITS OF GUIDANCE	400
<i>The Objectives of Guidance. The Search for Criteria. Program Evaluation by Survey and Self-Study. Evaluation of Effects Upon the Individual. Evaluation by Follow-up Studies. A Final Word.</i>	
12. GUIDANCE RECONSIDERED	439
<i>Retrospect. In Quest of a Synthesis. The Goals of Guidance. A Concept of Guidance.</i>	
INDEX OF NAMES	453
INDEX OF SUBJECTS	460

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

The concept of guidance and its importance in contemporary living, including all forms and levels of educational institutions, is one of the truly significant developments during recent years in the U.S.A. Special curricular programs in guidance have been established, bulwarked by certificates issued by state departments of education, officially indicating that the holders of such certificates are peculiarly qualified to engage in guidance. The myriad of varieties of tests given at all age levels furnishes powerful testimony that we have indeed become guidance-minded, interested in more effective learning and development among those who attend our schools. Machines that "think" and other breathtaking developments in the electronic treatment of data make available a basis for guidance heretofore seldom imagined possible.

Heartening and inspiring as are the circumstances just cited, these phenomena may raise a question concerning the foundations and depths of understanding of the background development and hence the ultimate potential of this activity which we term guidance. The volume hereby presented is truly well titled, *Foundations of Guidance*. It is an impressive intertwining of definition, variation, and possible result of the skillful effort called guidance. Past and contemporary scenes are viewed and probed for more valid indications of what the future may bring from this area of professional service.

The scholarliness of this work is refreshing and pleasantly matched by a literary distinction which is indeed unusual. This volume provides the basis for a deeper understanding of what guidance means; a clearer, firmer, and more valid concept of what the field holds; along with a realization of its inherent limitations. Dr. Miller holds a post of national leadership, and his contribution in the form of this book will be welcomed by all those interested in and concerned with guidance, not only in our educational institutions but wherever the development and/or training of people are matters demanding careful attention and deep concern.

JOHN GUY FOWLKES

PREFACE

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Students entering programs of counselor preparation are apt to come from a diversity of undergraduate backgrounds. Most of those who are preparing for counseling in the secondary schools probably are or have been teachers, or have at least qualified for a teaching certificate, and their undergraduate pursuits have involved many differing emphases. Some have prepared to teach science, some social science, some mathematics, some one or another of the fields of vocational education, some industrial arts, some physical education, for example. In all this diversity of background there is little common core, except, perhaps, in the professional education courses commonly required for certification, and even these differ from state to state. For a number of years the author was confronted with the problem of drawing together for first-year graduate students materials which might furnish some common background as a starting point for graduate study. It is, of course, not possible in any single course or book to furnish more than a small portion of the background that would be desirable, but almost any effort would seem to be worthwhile, however incomplete the results might be. This book grew out of an attempt to meet this need. It is believed that the experience of the author is not unique, and that others may find the results of his efforts helpful to them.

As guidance has developed toward maturity it has drawn more and more from a variety of disciplines, and there is need to help the beginning graduate student appreciate the range of sources which have some contributions to make. Training in techniques we must have, of course, but there is need also for a broader view if counselors and others concerned with guidance are to be more than technicians. The counselor needs to become sensitive to the possible implications for guidance of the broad developments of our national heritage, of some of the contemporary social setting, of some of the value patterns so interwoven with our basic culture and its variants, and of some of the roots in earlier educational developments which furnish background for current thinking about guidance. These materials we have sought to sketch in broad outline. Although some consideration is given to measurements of abilities, interests, and values, to the process of occupational choice, and to the problem of evaluation, the emphasis is

upon the concepts involved in these areas rather than upon specific techniques. Those who seek a "how-to-do-it" guide for immediate practice will be disappointed in the pages which follow, for such is not the purpose of this volume. But neither is the purpose a presumptuous one of offering a combined one-volume treatment of history, sociology, anthropology, and philosophy which can be quickly administered as a substitute for the broad background which the student may have failed to acquire as an undergraduate. If these chapters can provide a starting point for those who wish to explore some of the backgrounds out of which guidance grew, and some of the concepts which may be borrowed from various disciplines, the labor of the undertaking will seem well rewarded.

Those who are pursuing programs of preparation other than as counselors may, I trust, find some assistance in the following chapters. Those concerned with the broad view of guidance, whether as administrators, professors in related fields, laymen interested in guidance services, or those who are simply curious about this area of activity which is currently receiving so much attention, may find in these pages some foils for their own thinking. I have tried to express a point of view for whatever stimulation such expressions may have, but it is of course just that—a point of view. Perhaps eventually, out of the interchange of views and the interpretations of data now available and yet to be discovered, we can build a solid foundation for guidance.

It is of course completely impossible to acknowledge my debt to all the persons whose ideas and inspiration have helped in the writing of this book; certainly the list of authors and sources specifically cited is not and cannot be a full accounting of obligation. A complete listing of persons to whom I owe an intellectual debt would have to include many of my own teachers, beginning with my first undergraduate courses. But more specifically, during the early stages of the actual preparation of the manuscript, discussion with my former colleagues at Colorado State University was a constant source of stimulation. Dr. Donald L. Frick read the chapter on Abilities and the Probable and made helpful suggestions. My former graduate students were both accepting and helpful while I was trying out an early draft of some of the chapters in my classes. Later, Professor John W. M. Rothney of the University of Wisconsin read the entire manuscript, and I am especially indebted to him for both his encouragement and constructive criticisms.

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C. H. M.

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CHAPTER 1

Guidance, a Coat of Many Colors

Neither Tom Sawyer nor Huck Finn was exactly a model boy. But the warm, human portraits of them and their life in Hannibal afford us many insights into the dreams and trials and frustrations of boys of their time and in their particular part of the world. For they were products of their time and place. They would no longer be Tom and Huck if they had grown up in, say, a fishing village along the New England coast just before the turn of the century, or in a small town in rural Iowa during World War I. They cannot be separated from Hannibal and the world of their time as it impinged on Hannibal. Certainly we cannot find, in them, case studies of contemporary youth in other places, or even in modern Hannibal. They and their world are gone.

But it is interesting to speculate on differences in their characterizations as drawn by Mark Twain and as they might have been drawn by some imaginary teacher or counselor equipped with all the modern jargon and techniques of guidance. Almost certainly there would have been somewhere in the school files an IQ test score for Tom; Huck probably would have been absent on both the original testing day and the make-up day. But if Huck had taken the test he probably would have scored low, at least on the verbal type test. Tom's ingenuity in solving problems, even though not always in an entirely socially acceptable manner by adult standards, suggests at least a high average IQ score for him, and we have no way of guessing what a modern multi-factor test might have shown. Scores on a standardized achievement test would have been anything but encouraging for both boys; the low scores on both achievement and intelligence tests would have seemed to confirm a generally low level for Huck; but a counselor might have pondered the discrepancy of Tom's scores on intelligence and achievement tests. Sociometric results might have revealed a mutually ac-

cepting trio composed of Tom, Huck, and Joe Harper, but Huck's acceptance by others would probably have been meager. A sociologically oriented counselor would probably have labeled Tom as lower-middle class (by village standards), but Huck was surely lower lower. The broken home factor would have been appealed to as an explanation of some of Tom's behavior, and this same factor would have fairly creaked with the weight of explanation in Huck's case. Autobiographies might have been revealing—and could well have been the basis for suggesting that Huck be referred to the school psychologist. It is perhaps unfortunate that Mark Twain never got around to writing the follow-up story of the boys. The reader may well object that all of this is fiction. Of course. But somehow the insights of the novelist have made possible a more revealing picture of the boys than the techniques of guidance, taken alone, would probably have yielded.

THE INTERDISCIPLINARY BASIS OF GUIDANCE

We are in no sense suggesting that counselors should become novelists. But we do mean to suggest that guidance personnel in general and counselors in particular are confronted with flesh-and-blood individuals intimately interacting with their own worlds. No routine application of techniques can be adequate. No one discipline affords all the needed background of concepts. It is our thesis that guidance must rest on an interdisciplinary base. Psychology, cultural anthropology, sociology, education, biology, psychiatry, literature, philosophy—all have something to offer. If and when an adequate synthesis for a foundation of guidance is achieved, it will come by a process of integration of selected concepts and insights from all these disciplines, and probably others, in something of the manner of various efforts now being made to achieve integrated understandings of human development. Although guidance must rest solidly on the findings of the relevant disciplines, these disciplines cannot be the sciences alone, for the guidance process is an art. In the foreseeable future, guidance will be confronted with immediate and practical problems with which it must somehow deal and for which science has as yet no established answers; consequently, in this sense, guidance cannot be completely scientific. Moreover, guidance must operate within the value structure of a given society and culture, and values derive not so much from tested and testable scientific hypotheses as from the group's total experience of which science is only a part.

Each discipline has its own contribution to make. From psychology we can learn something of the measurement of abilities and of interests, something of personality structure and dynamics, and gain some insight into individual patterns of growth and development. Sociology can afford us an analysis of social structure and institutions in order better to understand the society in which the individual lives. Cultural anthropology and social psychology can lead us toward an understanding of the importance of culture in establishing norms and delineating the various roles the individual will assume, and toward an understanding of the impact of such factors as social class, whether in the Hannibal of Mark Twain's day, *Yankee City* (18), *Elmtown* (7), *Middletown* (12), or some metropolitan area. All these disciplines, along with psychiatry, can contribute to our understanding of the formation of patterns of values by which the individual lives and society is integrated. Literature, especially biography and drama, can yield illustrative insights regarding particular individuals in action in their own special worlds and, especially in the case of drama, can present highlighted interpretations. Philosophy can save us from becoming fixated in some one appealing but little area of our own special notions and interests and can help us to integrate more of the parts into a meaningful whole. These are of course only examples; a complete assessment of all of the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle and their final assembling into a completed picture can come only from the combined efforts and mature experience of many persons.

Guidance is a coat of many colors; but it is, after all, a coat, designed to serve the purposes which coats serve. The purposes which guidance serves center about the well-being of the individual. But the individual cannot exist apart from his social matrix. It follows, therefore, that although we ought to seek help from wherever it may be found, we should look especially to the social sciences—psychology, cultural anthropology, sociology—and to the accumulated record of experience to be found in the literature of education. The hazard of such an undertaking is obvious. We do not presume to assume the role of investigator in first one discipline and then another. We shall simply ask spokesmen of the various fields: What have you found that may be of value in our guidance tasks? From the replies received it may be possible to identify some of the stones which are suitable for building a foundation for guidance; the mortar to hold these stones together will have to come from the purposes, needs, and practices of guidance itself.

SHIFTING EMPHASES

It is a long road from guidance in the days of Frank Parsons to such divergent developments as the preparation of counseling psychologists at the doctoral level and the writing of Title V of the National Defense Education Act of 1958 (15), although the time span is only a half-century. In a later chapter we shall recount the story in more detail, but here our purpose is only to note briefly some of the various emphases which appeared and then faded, and occasionally reappeared at later times. There is, of course, no point in time at which one emphasis can be said definitely to have ended and another to have begun. Rather, most if not all have been present throughout the last 50 years or so, with one emphasis having become the figure for a time as others receded into the ground, and another having become the figure later. Barry and Wolf (1), in their penetrating analysis of issues in guidance, have identified eight views. The first seven of these agree in that the focus is upon the individual student (theoretically at least), while the last, the "integrated approach," would diffuse this focus to all members of the academic community and seek to break down faculty-student barriers. This view we shall pause to discuss. Another view among the eight identified is the "problem-centered view." Here the emphasis, at least in practice, is upon those students who have problems, rather than upon all students. As interpreted by Barry and Wolf, problem-centered programs harmonize with an educational system swayed by and receptive to societal needs and pressures. We shall not discuss further this view for it appears that the practice of guidance under whatever theory (except perhaps the integrative) might display such a preoccupation with problem cases. The other six views presented in the Barry and Wolf discussion correspond essentially to the shifting emphases we shall note, except for the topic of guidance and manpower. Our purpose, however, is to present a historical sketch with commentary, rather than to deal with the issues as such; our discussion will therefore differ from that of Barry and Wolf in terminology, in delineation of the various approaches, and in interpretations, unless specifically noted as those of Barry and Wolf.

Vocational Guidance

Guidance in the United States began as vocational guidance. It is difficult if not impossible to point to any one place as the cradle of vocational guidance, because the first efforts were made in scattered

schools and community agencies; but the basic statement is probably Parsons' book, *Choosing A Vocation* (14). Supporters of the movement came from many backgrounds, but all sought to help youth choose and prepare for suitable occupations. A social welfare motivation seemed to be common to many of the early promoters. For example, speaking of child laborers, Davis said, "The effort was made to guide them into the better occupations and to divert them in further training so that they might escape the fate of the misfit and the unskilled worker" (5, p. 420). Through it all was a sense of mission. As the movement developed, more and more of the efforts were taken over by the schools themselves.

We can catch something of the spirit and point of view of these earlier years in a report of the Committee on Vocational Guidance, functioning as part of the Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education. The committee consisted of 10 leaders in the field, under the chairmanship of Frank Mitchell Leavitt, and reported in 1918. In the words of the Committee, "Vocational guidance should be a continuous process designed to help the individual choose, to plan his preparation for, to enter upon, and to make progress in an occupation" (13, p. 9). A "reasonable and comprehensive vocational guidance program" would encompass the following:

1. A survey of the world's work
2. Studying and testing pupils' possibilities
3. Guidance in choice and rechoice of vocation
4. Guidance with reference to preparation for vocation
5. Guidance in entering upon work; that is, "placement"
6. Guidance in employment; that is, "employment supervision"
7. Progressive modification of school practices
8. Progressive modification of economic conditions (13, p. 16)

Some of these recommendations have a very modern ring, and a review of them should help us to avoid the judgment sometimes encountered that the concept of guidance during these early years was a very narrow and rigid one. The Committee recognized also the interdisciplinary nature of guidance. This can be seen in their description of a counselor: "Therefore the ideal vocational counselor will be something of a psychologist, but he will also be a sociologist, an economist, and, most of all, an educator in the best modern sense of the word" (13, p. 27). But this broadly trained counselor was in no sense to be regarded as a person having all the answers for all students. Rather, decision lay with the individual student. The Committee rejected the idea that

"in some mysterious way we can look into the future, determine what each child should be, and prepare him specifically for that ultimate end. This is a false conception, unsupported by psychology, and contrary to the principles of democracy. Vocational guidance, properly conceived, organizes school work so that the pupil may be helped to discover his own capacities, aptitudes, and interests, may learn about the character and conditions of occupational life, and may himself arrive at intelligent vocational decision" (13, p. 10).

Education as Guidance

As guidance activities came to be located more completely within the setting of schools, efforts were made to interpret much if not all of the educational enterprise as guidance. This of course required a broadening of the concept of guidance, and guidance became very broad indeed (2). We have seen that as early as 1918 the Committee on Vocational Guidance recognized the interrelationship of guidance and curriculum, as described above. In this view, the guidance program would provide information as to the needs of youth which would be useful in curriculum revision, and a revised curriculum would in turn make possible more effective guidance. But in the late 1920's and through the 1930's guidance was in danger of being so absorbed into curriculum revision in particular, and into the educational effort in general, that even a congressional investigating committee would not be able to recognize it as a function existing in its own right. Indeed, examples of this point of view can still be found. Guidance, according to this way of thinking, is simply an emphasis on the individual during the educational process.

A description of this outlook was presented in an article by Jones and Hand in 1938. Education, it was pointed out, is concerned with the development of life goals of students. While preparation for occupation is important, an occupation itself cannot furnish a satisfactory life purpose, and hence vocational guidance is too narrow a concept. Guidance is coming to be regarded as that inseparable aspect of the educational process that is peculiarly concerned with helping individuals discover their needs, assess their potentialities, develop their life purposes, formulate plans of action in the service of these purposes, and proceed to their realization. The total teaching process involves both guidance and instruction as these terms have commonly been employed in the past, and as inseparable functions. Neither can be delegated in any discrete manner to separate functionaries" (10, p. 26).

The authors pointed out that they did not imply that there could be no place for specialists such as counselors, school psychologists, mental hygienists, and vocational specialists, but they did insist that guidance and instruction could not be made the responsibilities of two separate groups of workers. The picture can be seen more clearly in their description of an ideal school situation:

Ideally, there would be no such thing as a separate or self-contained guidance program. Rather, guidance and instruction would be functioning as inseparable parts of a unitary educative process. The needs of students would constitute the stuff out of which a broadly defined scope would be formulated for the school curriculum. . . .

All the types of information and help formerly called "guidance" would be provided for along with other necessary or desirable learnings in the scope and sequence as thus co-operatively defined by the total faculty group, working in conjunction with parents and students. There would thus be no classes or courses set aside and labelled "life-career" or "group guidance"

The major responsibility for the diagnosing and the counseling, as well as for the instructing, of the students in question would thus fall to an adequately trained teacher-counselor aided by his co-operating "team" . . . (10, p. 27).

Guidance for Adjustment

The drive toward curriculum revision as a means of enabling the schools to meet the needs of youth more effectively led to many studies to determine these needs. Although much lip service was given to the needs of the individual, it is difficult to escape the impression that there was hope of somehow describing a generalized youth who presented a listable set of needs about which curriculum experiences might be built. In any event, the emphasis on needs was strong; Brink (4, p. 1) reported in 1953 that it was the consensus of the Yearbook Committee of the National Society for the Study of Education that the most pressing problem facing secondary schools was that of adapting their programs more specifically to the needs of youth. This was the time when the emphasis on life adjustment was strong. As a part of a summary of a conference held in 1945, Dr. Charles A. Prosser offered a resolution which has become famous as the "Prosser Resolution" (11). In its original wording this resolution said, in part,

It is the belief of this conference that, with the aid of this report in final form, the vocational school of a community will be better able to prepare 20 percent of the youth of secondary school age for entrance upon desirable skilled occupations; and that the high school will continue to prepare another 20 percent for entrance to college. We do not believe that the remaining 60

percent of youth of secondary school age will receive the life adjustment training they need and to which they are entitled until the administrators of public education with the assistance of the vocational education leaders formulate a similar program for this group" (10, p. 16).

Life adjustment education was defined later as "that which better equips all American youth to live democratically with satisfaction to themselves and profit to society as home members, workers, and citizens" (16, p. 1). In the midst of such considerations regarding secondary education, it was perhaps inevitable that guidance would be regarded as a means of aiding adjustment.

Emphasis on adjustment came also from quite a different source, the mental health movement. This movement had of course originated considerably earlier, but its impact was being felt strongly during this same period. Education in general and guidance in particular felt the force of the concepts of mental health, adjustment, and emotional maturity. These concepts, as White (19, p. 356) points out, have come to be ideals, though derived largely from the study of behavior disorders. They have become prominent in part because of the prestige currently accorded science and medicine, in part because of the decline of religion and ethics as guides to personal conduct, and in part from the confusion of secular values other than those derived from science. And as White further comments, mental health, adjustment, and maturity thus tend "to fill an ideological vacuum, expanding beyond their appropriate realm and becoming major goals and ethical values" (19, p. 357).

With the emphasis on adjustment in guidance coming from two such widely divergent contexts as the Prosser resolution and the mental health movement, the word *adjustment* might mean almost anything in discussions of guidance. Barry and Wolf (1) have suggested that the adjustment view of guidance-personnel, as contrasted with the counseling view, tends to be more external in that guidance-personnel services, so conceived, seek to help the individual fit into his group and society, and seek palliation rather than cure. Moreover, these authors continue, the adjustment view is antithetical to self-development and self-realization as goals of the process. Questions and issues such as these are still very much with us. Whether or not one agrees with the interpretation of Barry and Wolf, it is understandable that the adjustment view of the mental health variety has great appeal to practical educators in a hurry, for such a view permits viewing the counselor as a kind of trouble shooter to whom troublesome individuals can be referred,

presumably because they are "unadjusted." The counselor would then be expected to help these individuals satisfy their needs in a more socially acceptable manner and so become better adjusted and less troublesome.

Guidance for Development

Certainly it does not follow that taking the needs of youth as a major base from which to start in curriculum development or in seeking to delineate the functions of guidance necessarily results in the adjustment view as described above. That the use of needs as a starting point can be harmonized with a developmental view is illustrated in a statement by Strang, "The central need of adolescents is to grow toward maturity in their own best way. Other needs stem from this. To meet this need, guidance procedures in the context of the total educational program should be provided" (17, p. 214). On the level of practice, what is different in the adjustment and developmental views is the relative emphasis given to finding ways of helping the individual to "fit into" the situation, as against an emphasis on helping him to develop in his "own best way." On the level of conceptualizing guidance, however, some rather basic differences appear. Barry and Wolf (1) point out that the developmental view of guidance made its appearance after World War II along with the concept of developmental tasks. Let us pause to note briefly this concept.

The key element in the concept of developmental tasks seems to be that in the process of development there are certain critical times at which the individual is ready and needs to achieve particular kinds of learnings. In the words of Havighurst, "A developmental task is a task which arises at or about a certain period in the life of the individual, successful achievement of which leads to his happiness and to success with later tasks, while failure leads to unhappiness in the individual, disapproval by society, and difficulty with later tasks" (6, p. 2). For example, the first essentials of learning to talk are normally achieved during the second year, and the child who fails to achieve this developmental task at about that time will be handicapped in the learnings expected of him later. Each stage of development has its more or less distinctive developmental tasks. Havighurst identifies 10 such developmental tasks which occur during adolescence.

1. Achieving new and more mature relations with age-mates of both sexes
2. Achieving a masculine or feminine social role
3. Accepting one's physique and using the body effectively
4. Achieving emotional independence of parents and other adults

5. Achieving assurance of economic independence
6. Selecting and preparing for an occupation
7. Preparing for marriage and family life
8. Developing intellectual skills and concepts necessary for civic competence
9. Desiring and achieving socially responsible behavior
10. Acquiring a set of values and an ethical system as a guide to behavior
(6, pp. 33-71)

It seems clear that guidance in an educational situation in which the goals of education are conceived as furthering the accomplishment of developmental tasks will be quite different from guidance conceived as adjustment. If on the one hand we mean adjustment in the sense of life adjustment, then guidance is presumably expected to help especially the middle 60 percent (who are neither college bound nor candidates for the skilled occupations) toward adjusting to life. But what sort of life they are expected to adjust to is by no means clear, except that they are to be "home members, workers, and citizens" (16, p. 1). If on the other hand we think of adjustment in mental health terms, then the task of guidance seems to be to help the individual to learn to live in harmony with himself as well as with his world. As interpreted by Barry and Wolf (1, p. 50), the developmental view of guidance is predicated on the belief that individuals are capable of progressively developing self-understanding, self-appraisal, and self-direction. Since the achievement of developmental tasks is a continuous process, guidance also is a continuous process. To these comments we would add, with some slight reinterpretation of Barry and Wolf, that the developmental view of guidance is congenial to self-realization as a goal of guidance and carries no assumption such as seems implicit in the mental health adjustment concept, that one must accept and conform to the realities of a rather statically conceived society.

Guidance as Personnel Service

Thus far the various emphases in guidance which we have been discussing have differed as to the goals of guidance and the nature of the process. As we turn to guidance as personnel service we are viewing the matter from another angle. Here the emphasis is on organizational aspects, the guidance program. Yet even in this simple approach there are implications as to the nature of guidance, for if one adopts unqualifiedly the education-as-guidance view which we noted earlier, then there is no need for any special set of guidance services; and so merely to speak of guidance as a personnel service is to imply a nega-

tion of the education-as-guidance view. Acceptance of the personnel-service view of guidance, then, to some extent at least, implies a distinction between guidance and instructional activities. This separation occurred on the college level relatively early. In fact, Barry and Wolf comment that, "The services approach is basically a justification for the mélange of personal responsibilities that college personnel workers had acquired by 1930" (1, p. 42). In recent years, the concept of guidance as one of the personnel services has been gaining in favor at the secondary level. Along with this is coming an increasing specialization of personnel workers. As one indication of this we may note that by 1959, 34 of the 50 states had adopted mandatory certification provisions for counselors, 4 had established standards on an optional basis, and 12 had no certification requirements (3).

Viewing guidance as a personnel service seems to make for clarity as to program and organization; at least guidance thus conceived has a tangible home in the scheme of things, and distinctions between instruction and guidance functions can be drawn. But troubles develop when we ask what specific services are to be identified by the term *guidance*. Probably the most general agreement would be found on the proposition that the basic service is counseling. But who does the counseling? Is counseling done only by the person employed under that title, or is counseling also performed by the teacher, the school psychologist, the school social worker, the dean of boys or girls, and others? And what of other activities often regarded as guidance services? Are orientation activities, or career days, or assistance in finding scholarships, for example, all guidance activities? Obviously there is much need for clarification in defining what we mean by guidance services.

Guidance and Manpower

In very recent years there has been a revival of emphasis on the role of the schools in helping to meet the nation's manpower needs. This is of course nothing new in the thinking of American educators, or among citizens who are not themselves professional educators. Jefferson in 1817 proposed a plan for selecting promising boys and providing for their further education at public expense (8). Hoover in 1923 noted that "As a race we produce a considerable percentage of persons in each generation who have the intellectual and moral qualities for the moral and intellectual inspiration of others, for the organization and administration of our gigantic economic and intellectual machinery,

and for invention and creation" (9). But, continued Hoover, we lose many of these individuals because we fail to find and train them rightly, to create character in them, and to inspire them to effort. Teachers should therefore become the "army of inspectors" to find and stimulate these promising individuals. Through the years, however, there was only occasional recognition of the need for identifying able individuals and providing for their education, and even the infrequent recognition that was given was usually not specifically tied to guidance efforts in the modern sense. From time to time writers of textbooks on guidance discussed the conservation of human resources as related to guidance. But not until the National Defense Education Act of 1958 was there any nation-wide crystallization of a plan for action.

There are implications in this Act which pose a number of basic questions as to the nature of guidance. The intent of the total Act is very clearly to provide the trained manpower which the nation needs, and the part dealing specifically with guidance, Title V, is no exception. Specifically, in order to participate in the program, a state must submit a plan which (1) "sets forth a program of testing secondary students to identify those with outstanding aptitudes and ability . . ." and (2) "sets forth a program of guidance and counseling in its public secondary schools to advise students of courses of study best suited for them and to encourage outstanding students to complete high school, take the courses needed for admission to institutions of higher education, and to enter such institutions . . ." (15). In such language we find no recognition of guidance for adjustment or of development in the sense of self-realization. The implication of selective emphasis on the able is strong. Essentially, guidance seems to be conceived in the classic spirit of vocational guidance, but the motivation is that of national need rather than the social welfare motivation so noticeable in the time of Frank Parsons and shortly after. The contrast of the language of the Act with the sort of discussion commonly found in professional journals is inescapable. What, then, does this difference mean? Is it simply the difference in point of view of aroused and practical citizens who recognize a need, as against the somewhat starry-eyed idealism of educational philosophers who dream of the maximum development of every single student? Or is there really a shift of emphasis occurring which is departing from the individual as the first loyalty of guidance and going toward social need as the starting point? As yet answers to such questions are only incompletely discernible.

A NOTE ON TERMS

The word *guidance* has been used with such varied implications that to use the term without qualification or explanation is practically meaningless, and it has become incumbent upon anyone employing it to clarify his own intended meaning. There are two contexts in which we shall use the term, and in each of these guidance refers to different aspects of the total concept. The first of these is *guidance as process*. In this sense we shall mean by guidance that part of the total educational process which is concerned with helping the individual make plans and decisions to implement his development in accordance with his own emerging life pattern. The focus is upon the individual; but it is assumed that if such plans and decisions are to yield long-time satisfaction, they must be in harmony with but not necessarily in complete conformity to the values of the culture in which the individual lives. The second context in which we shall use the term *guidance* is that of the organizational program, or the guidance program. In this sense we shall speak of *guidance services*, which in turn are a part of the broader term *personnel services*. These are often divided according to level as *pupil personnel services* at the elementary or secondary levels, and *student personnel services* at the college level. *Counseling*, as a service, is a part of guidance services. In order of generality, then, personnel services becomes the inclusive term of which guidance services are a part, and counseling is one of the guidance services. Often no distinction is made between guidance services and pupil (or student) personnel work, but such a usage seems to confuse the matter. There are, after all, certain guidance services which may profitably be regarded as distinct from other personnel services. The broad term *personnel services* includes health service, housing service, financial assistance, and the like. By contrast, the key words of guidance services are plans, decisions, and development. It is difficult to see, for example, how a school hot-lunch program, however valuable it may be as a personnel service, contributes much toward helping the pupil make plans and decisions toward realizing his own unique developmental possibilities. Counseling, on the other hand, may contribute specifically to these purposes, and consequently counseling is a guidance service—probably the most distinctive one.

The adoption of any particular pattern of usages of terms reveals to some extent, of course, the biases and particular point of view of

the writer. In terms of the shifting emphases discussed earlier, the point of view which we shall present is probably most nearly in harmony with the developmental emphasis. This bent will emerge in our consideration of guidance as a process. But any process which operates in the schools has some organizational setting; hence the concept of guidance services is a useful one. By speaking of guidance services as occurring in schools we do not, of course, mean to imply that the guidance process is limited to schools. Just as much of education occurs outside the school situation, there are many settings in which guidance can and does occur—the home, the church, and various youth groups not connected with the schools, for example. Although we recognize freely the importance of guidance in such settings we shall not include such activities in our discussion here. Our attention will be directed solely to guidance in the school setting, and chiefly to guidance in the secondary school.

There are some further distinctions in terminology which must be drawn in the interests of clarity. If we are to regard guidance-as-process as a part of the total educational undertaking, we must somehow distinguish between the guidance process and other aspects of the total educational process. One of these other aspects is *curriculum*. If in the modern mood we conceive of the curriculum as the totality of experiences which the school provides for the student, then guidance might be regarded as a part but certainly not all of the curriculum. But this concept does not seem particularly helpful on a practical level. In the public schools, at least, there must always be some compromise between the ideal of providing experiences for meeting the unique needs of each individual and the necessity of providing experiences for meeting the common needs of groups. Guidance is most distinctively concerned with just those needs which cannot be reduced to a common basis: assistance to the individual in making his own plans and decisions and in realizing his own unique developmental possibilities. It is pleasant to speculate about curriculum planning which can provide for the unique needs of individuals, but in actual practice there is an ample vacuum for guidance services to minister to unmet needs.

Those devoted to the education-as-guidance emphasis which we discussed earlier have frequently felt no need for making another distinction, that between *guidance* and *instruction*. But the starting points of the two are different. The teacher of English, for example, may well believe that in our particular culture there are certain skills and appreciations which students should achieve. However carefully her ob-

jectives may be derived from an analysis of life needs of the students, and however individualized and flexible her teaching methods may be, the desired outcomes which are distinctive for the teaching of English are still the achievement of English-related objectives, and properly so. Guidance, on the other hand, starts with the individual—his own developmental needs—as distinct from instructional goals. Both instructional and guidance functions may be carried on by the same person, but this simply means that the same person is performing two functions, not that the functions are the same. Such a separation of guidance and instruction may perhaps suggest to some an implied characterizing of guidance as primarily concerned with nonintellectual development—a kind of anti-intellectualism in masquerade. Not at all. Intellectual development is certainly a part of the development of any individual, however vast the individual differences which may exist. But guidance is not concerned with instruction in any particular area. Instruction in mathematics, in English, in chemistry or the fine arts—these are functions of those in the role of teacher. To fail to recognize the legitimate functions of both instruction and guidance by some verbal hocus-pocus such as speaking of guidance in English, or in social studies, or in industrial arts—this is the kind of fuzziness of function which we mean to reject.

Still another source of confusion is that of identifying guidance with discipline. It may be that in some far-off time discipline problems will approach the vanishing point, but most experienced teachers do not expect to see this millennium. In the meantime, school must be kept, and instruction must go on. It need scarcely be said that discipline need not imply anything vindictive or punitive; perhaps control is a better word. Even in the millennium, however, we can scarcely expect that the values of children and adolescents (who are, after all, immature), will completely coincide with the values of adult teachers. But to fail to distinguish the different functions of guidance and control is to prepare the way for those impossible situations in which guidance efforts are hamstrung by foisting onto counselors control functions which are properly administrative in nature.

In summary, then, the concept which we wish to symbolize by the word *guidance* is one of assisting individuals to make plans and decisions and in implementing their development in accordance with their own emerging life patterns. Guidance is a function in its own right. Although a part of the educative process, it is not the same as instruction, or curriculum, or control. We are thinking of guidance as a

process in which many people will participate. The process must of course be implemented by some organizational plan in which the roles of the various persons are defined and their functions coordinated. Guidance is a continuing process, not something limited to certain grade levels, or to certain spots in the schedule. *Organization for guidance*, or a guidance program, is one part of personnel services.

A FORWARD GLANCE

As we proceed through the book we shall seek to explore some of the foundations upon which guidance rests. We shall be dealing with backgrounds rather than with principles and practices. We shall not seek to propose any program of guidance services, important as this consideration is on a practical level. First of all we shall seek to describe some of the changes which have come into our American way of life in the last half-century or so; we shall then look briefly at contemporary American culture and, in particular, at our value systems which lie back of many of the problems that confront us in our guidance efforts. The importance of stratification, mobility, and prestige in our contemporary society will warrant a somewhat detailed examination. Our emphasis will then shift from the contemporary to the historical as we trace some of the elements of educational thought which form the background for guidance; in somewhat more detail we shall examine the rise of the guidance movement in the United States. We shall then undertake to describe the context in which the individual lives, and some of the limits imposed upon him by his social milieu. Following these broad considerations of the social scene, we shall focus upon the individual in his development of occupational preferences and choices. Moving then to more detailed considerations of assessment, we shall consider abilities, interests, and values. Finally, we shall consider the matter of evaluation of guidance efforts and shall seek to present a point of view and a concept of guidance against the backgrounds developed through the book.

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CHAPTER 2

A Changing Way of Life

Surely one of the basic understandings needed in guidance is the understanding of the student himself. And if the student with whom we are concerned is attending a school in the United States, there are at least two aspects of his background which are of immediate importance. The first of these is his own story of development, his own experiences with his world as he has known it. This story is to a very considerable degree unique for each individual. But after making all due allowances for uniqueness of experience, there are many societal and cultural influences which are common to large groups of students. It is this second aspect of backgrounds upon which we shall focus in this and the following two chapters. Our approach is not historical; but in dealing with the larger picture of cultural influences it would be completely meaningless to try to restrict ourselves to the immediate present, for cultural influences have roots. We must try to see the broad picture of some of the forces operating in contemporary society in which the student lives. A student is not simply a student; he is part of a total context, and we must seek to understand him in terms of his context.

Later, we shall turn our attention to more definitely historical considerations, tracing some of the elements of educational thought which have gone into the making of guidance efforts as a part of the educational undertaking and presenting something of the story of the development of the guidance movement in the United States. But for this part of the story, too, we need some appreciation of context. It is possible, for example, to interpret the emphasis on testing as an expression of the American penchant for technology. And in its totality, the guidance effort is most certainly a reflection of democratic faith in the worth of the individual as an end in himself. But, of this, more later.

AMERICAN BACKGROUNDS

American experience has always been a blending of idealism and practical adjustment to hard fact, of dream and vigorous striving after more immediate objectives. The early English settlers in Virginia and Massachusetts were not at first so much concerned with new ideals of political freedom; rather, they were incensed because their rights as Englishmen were being disregarded—and those rights included practical matters such as taxes and property. However, "life, liberty, and property" of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, became "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" in the revised Declaration of Independence. Furthermore, the Founding Fathers were not so absolute about human equality. Jefferson's passage against slavery was deleted in the process of revision, and "all men are created equal" was added. In the Southwest, the Spanish padres were presumably little interested in political independence; they were, for the early years of the missions, at least, sojourners in a strange land and in due time were to return home.

But the line of growth was from the colonies westward, not eastward from the Spanish Southwest, and independence as a value went westward with the wagons. On the frontier, this independence became freedom of the individual. To this freedom the frontier added also a stark equalitarianism. Any man was as good as any other, and the questions about one's past were simply not asked. We see these qualities in their most esoteric form among the fur traders, the prospectors, and the mountain men of the far West. But as the settlers moved out across the Appalachians into Ohio they were only a little less the individualists; survival demanded self-reliance. These people sought homes of their own, and freedom, and room to live. They wanted their children to have better opportunities than they had had, and they placed high faith in education as the vehicle for such opportunities. Schools appeared almost as soon as the settlements were formed. And this frontier spirit found political expression in Jacksonian democracy.

It was while Jackson was in the White House that Alexis de Tocqueville (22), a young Frenchman of aristocratic background, came to America to observe democracy in action. Some of his observations regarding the developing American way of life were most penetrating, and they carry added interest simply because he was not himself an American. He noted the intensely practical temper of the people and felt that Americans were achieving and would continue to achieve in

the utilitarian, technological phases of science, but that they had little future in the more theoretical aspects. By the same token, with respect to the arts, he felt that Americans preferred the useful to the beautiful and that they required the beautiful to be useful. No country in the civilized world, he thought, paid less attention to philosophy than did the United States. By implication he questioned whether the exuberant self-reliance of Americans might not be a negative factor in religion, at least in a religious philosophy. Some of the utilitarianism he noted he attributed to the fact that nearly all Americans entered some occupation, often as early as the age of 15; the time which might be given to the study of science and the arts was thus practically eliminated. Tocqueville also opined that, whereas "a restless disposition, an unbounded desire for riches, and an excessive love of independence" might be regarded in Europe as dangerous to society, in America these very elements would ensure a peaceful future, since without these "unquiet passions" there would be a congestion of population in certain localities, with the rise of problems similar to those of the Old World.

Of "unquiet passions" there was no lack, both among those in this country who saw the West as a place of promise, and among those in other countries whose faith in the new land brought them here. Even a Tocqueville could hardly have been expected to foresee the surge of mixed peoples which gathered momentum within a decade or two after his visit. But there were a number of concrete events related to the increasing immigration. The great famine of Ireland in the 1840's sent many Irish to this country, and the revolution of 1848 did the same for many Germans. Chinese were brought in to help build the trans-continental railroads and to labor in the gold fields. Japanese, Filipino, and Hawaiian immigrants entered various parts of the West, and as the Southwest developed, Mexicans moved in there. Following 1850 came large numbers of Swedes, Norwegians, Danes, Finns, Lithuanians, Estonians, Poles, Bohemians, Russians, and Hungarians. French Canadians migrated into New England. By 1910 immigration was coming strongly from southern and southeastern Europe: the Italians, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Yugoslavs, Greeks, Armenians, and Portuguese. Jewish immigrants came from all parts of Europe.

After the first decade of the twentieth century the influx dropped sharply, due to World War I, the establishment of quotas, and the depression. But lest a distorted impression be left regarding immigration, it should be noted that, although in the period following the War Between the States from 15 to 16 percent of the total white popu-

lation was foreign born, by 1950 this percentage had dropped to 6.7 percent (17, pp. 141, 146). And so came the peoples to America, to be modified by and to modify the *American Tradition*. Out of their hopes which they brought and their experiences in the new land these immigrants helped form a dream which crystallized into a pattern of values—things important to them, things which ought to be.

Many changes came into the American scheme of things, but alongside the facts of these changes and often having little traffic with the facts, the dream of a Jacksonian democracy persisted. There were still the values of equality, of individualism, of freedom, and of opportunity limited only by the individual's willingness to work hard and merit success. The fantastically popular "Horatio Alger" books of about the turn of the century bear witness to the popular acceptance of the legend. In these stories the hero typically began as an office boy or bootblack, worked hard, saved his money, proved himself worthy of trust and responsibility, and eventually became president of or at least an officer in the company.

It happens that some factual evidence is available concerning the business elite of about this same period (1901–1910), and the facts afford a sharp and disconcerting contrast to the legend. The characteristics of 190 business leaders—the "elite"—were studied by Miller (13), and on the basis of his findings it appears that these leaders came largely from families of established status. Of their fathers, 86 percent were business and professional men; 12 percent were farmers; and only 2 percent were urban workers. Of the leaders themselves, 60 percent came from cities and towns over 2500 population, 40 percent from rural areas. In this period the general educational level was probably no higher than graduation from elementary school; yet 41 percent of these elite had attended college, and three out of four of those who attended also graduated. There were 37 percent whose educational level was that of high school graduation or equivalent, and only 22 percent terminated their educations at the close of elementary school. Immigrants were definitely underrepresented. Four out of five of these elite of business were sons of native-born parents, while in the general population at the time only slightly more than half of the 50-year-old white males were native born. There were no nonwhites among these elite, although 16.2 percent of the 50-year-old males in the general population were nonwhites.

The guidance literature of the second and third decades of the twentieth century showed an awareness of the contradiction of legend

and fact at levels definitely below that of the elite. Many studies of the occupational preferences or choices of adolescents reported that a far larger proportion of adolescents aspired to professional and managerial positions than could possibly find employment at this level. Two examples will be noted. Douglass (2) studied the vocational interests of 2844 boys and girls in the state of Washington. The sample comprised approximately half the seniors in the state in 1922. About 30 percent of the boys chose engineering, and another 13 percent looked toward other professions. Almost 37 percent of the girls planned to become teachers. Another study by Sears (20) was conducted at Oakland, California, a few years earlier, with 1039 seventh- and eighth-grade boys as subjects. This study not only reported choices of the boys, but also related them to occupations of their fathers. Among the 10 most frequent occupations of the fathers, 5 could be clearly identified as trades or clerical work; and these 5 occupations accounted for the employment of about 20 percent of the fathers. But only about 3 percent of their sons chose such occupations. On the other hand, while 3 percent of the fathers were engineers, 25 percent of the boys aspired to this vocation. A number of other studies reported somewhat varying actual percentages, but the findings were monotonously similar in indicating predominant choices of high-status occupations. Such findings were usually interpreted as lack of realism of adolescents. Unrealistic they no doubt were, just as many now are, but such an interpretation misses the whole point of the impact of the Jacksonian dream on boys and girls. Had they not learned that in this land of opportunity success could be achieved by their own individual efforts, that "anybody could become president," and that they should "hitch their wagons to a star"?

There is a curious ambivalence in all this striving for status through occupation, in the choosing of an occupation higher than that of one's father. True, both examples cited were of adolescents in far western states, states rather close to the frontier tradition. But this striving can hardly be explained by frontier influence alone; the white collar is scarcely indigenous to the frontier. Were these occupational choices, as many thought, simply the unrealistic fancies of youth? Or had youth accepted as their own the unrealized and projected parental dreams of status? There may be some truth in all of these—frontier, fancy, and projection—but none is a sufficient explanation. The larger truth seems to be that the American tradition is itself ambivalent. Before the turn of the century a distinguished visitor from England,

Sir James Bryce, commented: "The total absence of rank and the universal acceptance of equality do not however prevent the existence of grades and distinctions in society which, though they may find no tangible expression, are sometimes as sharply drawn as in Europe. . . . In some of the older cities society is as exclusive as in the more old-fashioned English counties, the 'best set' considering itself very selected indeed" (1, pp. 752-753). And recently Warner has said: "It is clear to those of us who have made studies in many parts of the United States that the primary and most important fact about the American social system is that it is composed of two basic but antithetical principles: the first, the principle of equality; the second, the principle of unequal status and of superior and inferior rank" (23, p. 104). Both are necessary, Warner goes on to point out, but they are contradictory. However much these boys and girls of California and Washington had been taught the "official" doctrine of equality in schools and in churches, their own observations had apparently led them to place high value upon upward mobility in this competitive society of ours. This cannot be dismissed as merely lack of realism; these students were simply Americans.

The contradiction in American values, however, is not limited to a single dimension of equality and unequal status. There are many inconsistencies in the values of the American tradition. Myrdal (16, p. xlvii) has described as *An American Dilemma* the conflict between the large, general values of the "American Creed" under the influence of "high national and Christian precepts" and the smaller, more specific values of personal and group living. Such differing valuations, he suggests, must be treated as on different planes. "They refer to different levels of the moral personality" and "correspond to different degrees of generality of moral judgment" (16, pp. 1027-1028). In somewhat similar fashion, but writing in a context of education, Getzels (5) has drawn a distinction between a core of "sacred" American values (democracy, individualism, equality, and human perfectability) and a group of existential, operating, down-to-earth beliefs, such as the work-success ethic, a future-time orientation, and Puritan morality. Although shifts and adaptations occur most easily in the lesser, operating values, the sacred values are also subject to some stresses and strains from the operation of such factors as regionalism, rural-urban differences, social class, and social change. Of these factors of stress, probably the most important is social change. Certainly if there is any one generalization on which students of society and education can

agree, it is probably the proposition that our society is in transition. We turn now to this matter of social change as reflected in our shifting pattern of values.

AMERICAN LIFE IN TRANSITION

Since the early years of this century—roughly the time since the beginning of the guidance movement—fundamental changes in the American way of life have appeared. The roots of these changes go back much farther, of course, but our concern here is with an impressionistic description rather than with an analysis of causes. If one were to seek one single phrase as a convenient label by which to identify this train of developments, some such rubric as "the growth of industrialism" would probably be as useful as any. The manifestations have come to be so familiar their significance often escapes us. Typical of these might be listed such developments as the application of machines to production with resulting mass production, the increased importance of money and credit, the growth of cities, the concentration of control, and the "revolution" in management.

Associated with these changes in the economy have been fundamental social developments and sometimes dislocations in the American pattern of living, in feelings and attitudes and outlook. For example, the passing of craftsmanship followed the development of the assembly line method of production. When it was possible for a workman to follow a product through the various stages to completion, he could achieve a certain feeling of accomplishment. He had something with which to identify. Moreover, the existence of the apprenticeship system with the master craftsmen at the top of the hierarchy provided a kind of "age-graded male fraternity" (24, p. 135); as the worker progressed through the various stages to master craftsman, he was able to develop respect for himself and his job, and achieve a sense of security. Warner (24) found that the passing of these things with the introduction of the factory system was an important factor in the strike at *Yankee City* and in the subsequent unionization of the shoe industry of that city. As a second example of changes which came with industrialization we might remind ourselves of some of the very obvious changes associated with a shift from rural to urban living. The easy interpersonal relations of individuals are no longer possible. Great numbers of barriers between various in-groups develop. Stratification appears in residential areas, in the schools, in the churches, within and between

various groups concerned with the business of earning a living, and especially in the social clubs. Business enterprise is necessarily large in some kinds of production and requires large capital. This large capital can no longer be supplied by a few leading citizens of a community, but must come from the sale of stocks owned by perhaps hundreds or even thousands of persons scattered over the country—persons who neither know nor have any interest in the residents of the particular city in which the industry is located.

Some illuminating pictures of these changes have come from social anthropologists who have turned from their interest in simple folk societies to apply their methods and insights to studies of contemporary living. Most of these studies have been conducted on the community level. A useful example is *Middletown* by the Lynds (10). Located in the eastern North Central States, *Middletown* was a small city of something over 35,000 population at the time of the study. It had begun as a pioneer community and had gone through a boom period following the discovery of gas near the city in 1886.

The purpose of the study was to gain "an understanding of the major functional characteristics of this changing culture." In order to afford historical perspective, the way of life as it was found in 1924 was related to conditions as they had existed in the city in 1890. Over a period of approximately a year and a half a research team conducted almost endless interviews; they examined records of the schools, the churches, the Chamber of Commerce, the service clubs, and others; and they observed various groups in action. The outstanding cleavage found was that between the "working class" and the "business class"—with the latter including both business and professional persons.

The mere fact of being born upon one or the other side of the watershed roughly formed by these two groups is the most significant single cultural factor tending to influence what one does all day throughout one's life; whom one marries; when one gets up in the morning; whether one belongs to the Holy Roller or Presbyterian church; or drives a Ford or a Buick; whether or not one's wife meets with the Sew We Do Club or with the Art Students' League; whether one belongs to the Odd Fellows or to the Masonic Shrine; whether one sits about evenings with one's necktie off; and so on indefinitely through the daily comings and goings of a Middletown man, woman, or child (10, pp. 23-24).

Some ten years later another study of *Middletown* was made. In broad outline, the findings were that little change had occurred in the basic texture of *Middletown's* culture (11). In the business class some

defensive, negative elaborations of existing values were found, and among the working class some "tenuous and confused new positive values" appeared around the possible role of social legislation in bolstering labor. But by and large the community was found to be living by the same values as in 1925, with no major new symbols or ideologies as rallying points.

The reports from *Middletown* seem to challenge the assertion with which we began this discussion, that during the last half-century fundamental changes in the American way of life have occurred. But *Middletown* is only one community, and 10 years is a relatively short time for changes in institutions, even though in this instance that time period included a depression. Moreover, we have thus far been focusing upon changes associated with industrialization as one important change in the business of getting a living. It would be easy to conclude from the material presented thus far that a kind of economic determinism is implied. Such is not the intention. Any attempt to explain the totality of changes which have occurred in American life by any one principle or concept must prove inadequate; life is just not that simple. The business of getting a living is certainly one of our chief concerns, but equally certainly not the only one. The economic pattern within which the individual works does define his roles, does influence the mores and ethos, and does impinge on personality, but as Murphy (15, pp. 773-816) has pointed out, there are reciprocal relations between all these factors. Any attempt to understand the changing way of life of a people must seek to penetrate the dynamic interrelationships of all factors involved.

An interesting approach to the problem of cultural change has been reported by Rose (19). The extensive listings of first happenings, discoveries, and inventions by Kane (7, 8) were analyzed for geographic differences and changes through time. Definite regional differences were found. During the nineteenth century, innovations were concentrated in New England and the Middle Atlantic States, and for the first three decades of this century the Middle Atlantic States were the center of productivity of change, with a lesser area along the Pacific Coast. Within these regional centers of innovation there were concentrations in certain states, notably New York and Massachusetts, and in certain cities, particularly New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Washington, up to the beginning of the present century. Recently, New York has assumed leadership, with Washington and San Francisco in secondary

places. In the analysis of changes through time, a three-phase classification was used: technology and economics, myth and belief, and political and social organization. From 1650 to 1799, changes in myth and belief seemed to predominate. The nineteenth century was not characterized by emphasis on any one phase, but in the twentieth century, changes in technology and economics predominated. In evaluating the study as a whole, Rose concluded that the record did not point to any situation "demonstrating the priority of economic and technological changes over other changes in culture" (19, p. 270). Such a conclusion is in harmony with the position taken in the paragraph just above.

Let us note briefly some rather random examples of reports given by other observers of the American scene, persons who differ greatly in background and experience and who therefore may be expected to perceive varied aspects, but who were perhaps less concerned with problems of social structure and intensive community investigations than were the observers of *Middletown* and *Yankee City*. Rather frequently we encounter among the reports of such spectators of the scene a feeling of confusion, of loss; although there may be an acute awareness of change sometimes there seems to be little satisfying meaning in the change. Just at the close of the turbulent 1920's, Lippmann (9) pictured for the boisterously uncertain moderns of that decade the dissolution of the ancestral order of mores and beliefs by "the acids of modernity." Pressey has furnished some fascinating details of change by repeating the X-O test at 10-year intervals from 1923 to 1953. This test contains three groups of items intended to sample moral codes, anxieties, and interests. Over the 30-year period, changes were found which could be "interpreted as involving a basic change in cultural point of view from what might be called a Puritanical to a rational or naturalistic moral philosophy—a less general condemnatory and more accepting and kindly point of view" (18, p. 499). Most clearly evident were changes in sex-social mores—a decrease in taboos and "warming social climate," but no lessening of social responsibility. The total number of anxieties, however, as judged by all "worries" items showed little change over the 30 years. Interests tended to broaden, especially for girls. Conservatism of individuals seemed not to increase with age; rather, the conservative judgments of older persons seemed to have been acquired in the more conservative times of their youth and just retained. Although emerging from a quite different context, some interesting agreements are reported by Spindler (21), who suggests that

some of the current attacks made upon the schools can be understood as related to changing American values. He points out as examples of shifts from traditional to new or "emergent" values such changes as those from a Puritan morality to sociability, from a work-success ethic to a relativistic moral attitude, and from an unbridled individualism to consideration for others.

From still a different orientation and experience come the observations of a psychiatrist, Erikson (3, p. 238) who has remarked on the change in the nature of the problems brought to psychoanalysts in Freud's time and in the present. Earlier patients suffered most under inhibitions which prevented them from being what they thought they knew they were, but patients of today suffer most under the problem of what they should believe in and who they should or might become. Somehow the assured sense of self identity of the rugged individualist of the American dream has turned out to be something of a will-o'-the-wisp—Has it been perhaps a casualty of "socialization"? Somehow, too, the Protestant ethic of the last century and earlier—which once so efficiently draped a religious vestment about the virtues of individualism, competition, property, hard work and thrift—is no longer an effective integrator for many individuals. Whyte (25, p. 7) has pointed to the rise of a "social ethic" which now makes "morally legitimate the pressures of society against the individual." Its major propositions are the beliefs that the group is a source of creativity, that "belongingness" is an ultimate need of the individual, and that science can be applied (through "human relations") to achieve this belongingness. Whyte describes the plight of "the organization man"—that rather rootless individual caught somewhere in the no man's land between top management and routine work, whether in industry, government, a corporation, clinic, or in a church or academic hierarchy. Whyte examines the problem largely in the context of business, but anyone with experience in the field of education is well aware of the obeisance paid in this area to group methods: committees, research teams, discussion methods, buzz sessions, group dynamics—well, anyway the name "group dynamics" is used. Sometimes in schools enthusiastically (and economically) addicted to group methods it is very difficult if not impossible to find the individual. However much various commentators on the changes in the American way of life may differ in their interpretations of causes and directions, most would probably agree that such changes are more than passing shifts of opinion; they represent fundamental restructurings of social Gestalten.

THE SCHOOLS AND CULTURAL TRANSITION

In our very brief pointing to the fact of cultural changes we have been chiefly concerned with recent changes—after the turn of the century—since this is roughly the period within which the guidance movement has developed. It is recognized, of course, that the roots of such changes lie well back in our own history, and still further back in the French Revolution, the Reformation, the industrial revolution, the renaissance, and beyond. Focusing on a recent half-century is an artificial procedure at best. To seek to discuss the role of the schools in a like recent period is equally artificial, and yet the part of the public schools most closely related to the development of guidance—the high school—has developed within this time.

There is a remarkable phenomenon in American education, however, which takes us back beyond the turn of the century and which merits our attention for purposes of contrast if nothing more. That phenomenon is the McGuffey readers. Since these famous readers were so widely used, they probably furnish a better index than any other single display of the attitudes and values being inculcated. Mosier (14) has provided us with an incisive analysis of their contents, interpreted against the context of contemporary events and currents of thought. Judging from the selections included in the readers, they were safely on the conservative side. Most of the political conceptions could probably be traced to Daniel Webster who served as a link with a Hamiltonian past, and back of Hamilton lingered notes of economic determinism from Harrington, Locke, and Blackstone. Property rights and Webster's constitutional nationalism were stressed. Jacksonian equalitarianism was suspect. Poor boys were shown as satisfied with their lot and not envious of the rich. As one boy in a story summed up the moral, "The poor, if they are good, may be very happy; indeed, I think that when I am good, nobody can be happier than I am" (14, p. 66). The West was seen as "a vast world set apart by nature for the prosperity and culture of the citizens who dared venture into her vast lands" (14, p. 34). There were no Mike Finks or Davey Crocketts in the readers. The rough individualism of the frontier was played down. Rather, the West needed religion and culture. And America as a whole "had a glorious destiny, a mission, which has been ordained by Providence," and symbolized by the flag, the constitution, and the church. It was not that the readers were consciously supporting any political cause, as Mosier recognizes, but nevertheless, "all the basic

ideas of the great conservative synthesis were there"—the synthesis, that is, of religion and property.

All the middle-class virtues were there on parade: industry, tact, perseverance, integrity, courage, economy, thoroughness, punctuality, decision, benevolence, and geniality. Honest work especially was virtuous. "By slighting your tasks you hurt yourself more than you wrong your employer. By honest service you benefit yourself more than you help him." (14, p. 86). The readers were truly an expression of the spirit of the time.

The great achievement of the McGuffey readers is the complete integration of the Christian and Middle-class virtue; and in that respect, they are the great textbook product of the American middle-class culture.

In the end, it is the body of belief in the Christian code of ethics which redeems the McGuffey readers from the charge of an overwhelming preoccupation with the ideals of the middle-class. Though interpenetrated with middle-class ideals, the McGuffey readers were unstinting in their insistence on Christian virtues in the conduct of life (14, pp. 164-165).

The system of values presented by the readers must have offered a comfortable and settled security in sharp contrast to the sense of loss and of being lost running through the period of change after the turn of the century. One is reminded of the comment of Erikson that "In this country especially, adult patients and the parents of prospective child patients hope to find in the psychoanalytic system a refuge from the discontinuities of existence, a regression and a return to a more patriarchal one-to-one relationship" (3, p. 239). It is at least a conceivable hypothesis that the individual's sense of lost orientation, or lack of unquestioned values, of insecurity resulting from a perhaps too sudden freedom, had something to do with the rise of guidance in the secularized public schools.

Three models of teachers found in various cultures have been described by Mead (12). One of these is that of the grandparent as teacher, as found among the plains Indians. The old men instructed the young in the accumulated wisdom, traditions, and ceremonies of the people. In our own culture, the counterpart would be schools emphasizing the classics and endeavoring to pass on to the young an understanding and appreciation of the accumulated culture of the past. Many private academies and probably most of the public high schools of the first several decades of the century could be identified with this group. A second model suggested by Mead is that of the child nurse, as seen among the Samoans for example. Here older children were delegated

much of the care and early education of younger brothers and sisters. In a sense, our preschools and kindergartens might be regarded as parallel. A third model is one in which parents or parent substitutes assume responsibility for education. The example suggested by Mead is that of middle-class Americans, and obviously this is the model most parallel to teachers in public schools today. For the most part, especially in the elementary schools, the teachers are unmarried women rather than parents; but they are at least representative of the actual parents in being members of the middle class, and so reflect rather closely the values and predilections of that group.

The story of changes in the public secondary schools during the last half-century is to a considerable extent a reflection of the dominance by the middle class and compromises with others, particularly the upper-lower class. Early in the century, the secondary schools served largely those who were preparing to enter college, and consequently the curriculum was quite logically focused upon that purpose. But as a larger and larger number of those completing elementary school continued into high school the enrollment in secondary schools became more nearly representative of the general population. The lower-middle class and the upper-lower class were increasingly represented. Many of these were not college-bound and quite obviously needed something other than college preparatory courses. Shop courses and commercial courses were added. More or less spontaneously, numerous "extra-curricular" activities found their places. Somewhat later, vocational education programs were added, aided by federal assistance to the states. Trade and industrial education, diversified occupations, distributive education, vocational agriculture, and homemaking entered the scene, bent upon preparing the student for actual occupational pursuits. It appeared then that some of the surviving subject matter courses did not adequately serve the needs of the vocational group, and so "related" subject matter courses appeared.

Parallel to the rise of vocational education, but not as a result of it, came vocational guidance. College entrance requirements maintained more or less stoutly by various institutions were attacked as dictating what the high schools must teach. And as the high schools became more aware of the great diversity of backgrounds and needs of the students in their midst they turned rather anxiously and perhaps a little guiltily to concern about teaching democracy. Here was one thing at least on which all could agree in principle; the subject was solidly founded in the American heritage. Progressive education staked its all on a demo-

cratic faith in the unfettered development of the individual, more or less implemented by curriculum revision in a child-centered school. But sometimes the parent substitutes moved too far or too fast for the actual parents, whose only norms for judgment were, after all, the shifting ones of their peers. The grandfather teacher with his traditions and certainties was long since gone.

Aiding and abetting this rather furious flight into reality was the dominant spirit of experimentalism. This, too, was a child of the times. The American faith in science and technology seemed fully validated by the impressive successes of the physical and biological sciences. True, the social sciences had not very fully realized the success part of the work-success ethic, but they just needed a little time. Hence Dewey and others sought to build an educational philosophy out of the experimental method. Absolutes were gone. New values were to be continuously recreated. The school should be a major if not *the* major force in social reconstruction. The avid response to this challenge is quite understandable. The world of McGuffey's readers was no more. There were no old anchorages to which to retreat; where else to go but ahead?

But the strain of continued middle-class mobility and a sustained frontier forward look are beginning to tell. There are suggestions from noneducators that a real freedom might not have been achieved after all. Too much of a kind of quasi-freedom proved threatening, so that now there is the danger, in the phrase of Fromm (4), of "escape from freedom." Some hesitant shifts in the intellectual winds can be sensed, even within educational philosophy. There seems to be a groping for something a little more resembling the absolutes once so disdainfully discarded. Or perhaps it is just a belated realization that we had not really discarded *all* manner of absolutes; implicitly in the philosophy of experimentalism, democracy and intellect had been taken as givens—as almost if not-quite-unquestioned values. But the schools are, after all, only part of the culture, and the culture contains many values in addition to democracy and intellect. Especially in a middle-class culture, intellect is hardly a prime value. Technology, yes, but not intellect. Although speaking in a context having nothing to do with social class, the challenge to intellect as a value has been expressed by Johnson: "My contention is that to make intelligence the *summum bonum* is to throw the educative process into confusion. For in practice we recognize that value attitudes are determined by the impact of the educational environment, and that all good education involves a de-

liberate setting of the stage to insure socially approved outcomes" (6, p. 399).

In this chapter we have noted some of the backgrounds of the American pattern of thought and living. Primarily we have sought to suggest changes in the pattern which are of importance as the context in which the meaning of guidance may be found. In the next chapter we turn to more specific aspects of the contemporary scene which are especially pertinent to any understanding both of the world in which the individual student lives and of the purposes and practice of guidance.

SUMMARY

The American way of life has developed from varied and sometimes contradictory elements. American values may be regarded as consisting of a basic core of democratic values and a lesser constellation of existential or practical values. Conflicts occur both between these basic and lesser values, and within the basic values. In particular, the conflict between beliefs in equality and in a status hierarchy seems characteristic of American values. During the past half-century some major changes have occurred in American life. One cluster of changes centers about the increase in industrialization, but the transition in American life is not to be explained by any one principle such as economic determination. The pattern of change is very complex, and includes many subtle factors. The McGuffey readers illustrate a fusion of Christian principles and middle-class values, and reflect a rather settled and secure outlook in contrast to the insecurities and uncertainties which appeared after the turn of the century. Changes in the schools in the last 50 years have come as a response to a number of factors, among which are the changing nature of the secondary school population, the spirit of experimentalism, and the breaking down of older values. There seems to be some indication now of a growing discontent with a completely relativistic view and more willingness at least to consider the problem of absolutes.

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CHAPTER 3

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Contemporary American Culture

Thus far we have been looking backward. We have sought to catch something of the spirit of the American heritage and the changes in outlook which have occurred. We turn now to a consideration of some portions of the contemporary scene which seem to be important as background for guidance, and for this purpose the concept of culture provides a useful context.

Everyone is born into some society, and hence into a culture, for no society is without some kind of culture, however simple. Some of the rudiments of social organization may be observed among animals other than man—as, for example, the simple hierarchy of a "pecking order" among chickens, or the more elaborate relations existing among the primates—but only man has developed culture. Earlier anthropologists often used the terms *culture* and *civilization* as synonyms: "Culture, or civilization taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society" (41, p. 1). This usage by Tylor in 1871 marked the introduction of the word into English in a modern, technical sense. Since then, there have been many definitions of culture, which we shall make no attempt to discuss. The reader interested in the history of the various statements of the concept is referred to the comprehensive summary by Kroeber and Kluckholm (26) of 164 definitions.

We shall use the term *culture* to mean the total way of life of a group. In the anthropological or sociological sense, there is of course no implication of good or bad, better or worse; there is no connotation of individual refinement, as in the popular usage. Neither is culture just a hodgepodge of elements; it is a coherent whole—a patterned way of life, we might say. And this way of life is a social product, developed out of the experiences of the group, and completely independ-

ent of biological inheritance. There are no genes for the transmission of culture. But a culture is not usually limited to elements developed within the group's own experiences; there is much borrowing and assimilation from other cultures. Once the outside elements have been assimilated, however, they are accepted as natural. To any group, its own culture seems natural, right, and proper. The great majority of persons accept their own cultural modes without question, and the young are instructed in these "right" ways or "nice" ways of doing things. And thus culture persists from generation to generation, though with some modification. Among modern groups in close contact with other groups, the modifications sometimes proceed with considerable rapidity. Rapid changes often create conflicts for individuals, particularly conflicts of attitudes and values. But students of culture in the modern sense will seek to examine the cultural elements involved in such value conflicts in the same manner as they study any other cultural trait, be it the making of axes from stone, or the naming of the newborn for the first animal seen after the birth, or the killing of aged parents, or the wearing of a shamrock.

There are various levels on which cultures may be described, depending in part on the size and nature of the group in which one is for the moment interested. One might, for example, seek to describe the culture of the people of the United States; or, in a more expansive mood, one might be concerned with all of western European culture; or, one might move away from the larger groups and examine the subcultures found within a larger culture. In the United States, one might study regional cultures, such as those of New England, or the deep South, or the high plains of the West. One might study the system of social class cultures, or those of various ethnic groups. In the sense in which a school is to some extent a society in its own right and develops its own mores and traditions, one might examine the culture of a particular school. In recent years we have heard much of "peer cultures"—the cultures of age-mates. Subcultures such as those of social class, ethnic groups, and peer groups have been aptly defined in a phrase credited to Arensberg (24, p. 143) as "cultural variants displayed by certain segments of the population." This is the concept of subcultures we shall use.

AMERICAN CULTURES

The description and interpretation of so complex a phenomenon as the culture of our country is certainly a Herculean task. For one

thing, there is the great diversity of historical roots which have fed American life. We cannot undertake to develop this topic, but a paraphrase of part of a description given by Kroeber (25, p. 258) may help us to sense something of the diversity of borrowings. Our religion is Palestinian, says Kroeber, though much of its denominational shaping and dogma developed in Rome, Germany, England, Scotland, and Holland. Our coffee originated in Ethiopia and was adopted into Arabia. Bread and beef come from plants and animals domesticated in Asia; potatoes, corn, and beans—as well as tobacco—were first used by the American Indians. We write an Etruscan-Roman variant of a Greek form of an alphabet invented by a Semitic people. And so on.

Or, rather than tracing historical derivations, we may seek to isolate cultural traits by which to distinguish American culture from others. One suggestion was made by Wissler (49, p. 5), who singled out mechanical invention, mass education, and universal suffrage as characteristic of the United States. It is interesting to note in passing that a recent factor-analytic study by Hofstoetter (17) extracted three factors, and one of these was "emphasis on education." However, Hsü (18) has criticized this study on a number of technical points, and so it seems that the Hofstoetter study can at best be regarded as only very tentative support for the belief-in-education trait suggested by Wissler. It might be helpful and perhaps satisfying if we could find among the fruits of anthropological research some concise listing of the traits of American culture, but that is asking too much. For one thing, culture is a changing thing, and one cannot simply catalogue the various traits like books to be filed away in a library. Contemporary writers are more apt to suggest possible categories, or perhaps just name examples of widespread traits. An illustration of the latter is the suggestion of Davis and Havighurst (10) that general American culture includes some form of the American language and "certain broad similarities" such as the wearing of clothing, living in houses, using machinery, the monogamous family, the prohibition of incest and murder, and "certain democratic ideals." But American culture is also a blend of the traits of general American culture and those of various subcultures. We shall limit our consideration of subcultures to those of groups which seem to hold particular implications for guidance; ethnic groups, rural-urban groups, and social classes.

Ethnic Groups

In recent years the term *ethnic group* has come into wide use as a convenient means of referring to those minority groups within a more

general society which differ substantially from the majority by reason of race, nationality, or religious background. Thus, Negroes, Norwegians, and Jews in our society may be considered ethnic groups. One advantage of such terminology is that the focus is placed upon cultural differences while leaving open the difficult question of race differences. For culture and race seem to have no causal relations. Culture, as noted before, is a social product. Race is a biological matter, and clarity demands that it be kept so. Since the classic study by Boas (4) of changes in bodily form of descendants of immigrants it has been clear that even certain morphological characteristics alleged to be racial in nature can be modified by interaction with a changed environment. Such findings give further point to the necessity of avoiding an easy resort to a racial explanation. Moreover, in the modern world and especially in the United States, really "pure" racial stock is difficult to find, if indeed it exists at all. There is perhaps less temptation to try to explain various forms of religious behavior as racial in origin, but the temptation is stronger in dealing with observed national differences. There have been, of course, deliberate attempts to exploit the notion of race, as in Hitler's weird claims based upon a mythical Aryan race. But even among the well-meaning, it is easy to feel that cultural differences among the French, Dutch, Mexicans, and Canadians, for example, are somehow to be explained by racial differences. The use of the term *ethnic groups* as a general descriptive term avoids commitments to genetic explanations, and yet affords a convenient general symbol for observed characteristics of such groups.

In our earlier discussion of American backgrounds we noted the great numbers of immigrants who came to this country. Those immigrants who came voluntarily, the only true natives—the American Indians, and the Negroes who were brought as slaves have given this country a tremendously diverse population. Ethnic groups are of great importance in our society and specifically in our schools if for no other reason than the very large numbers of individuals involved. According to a recent summary (16, pp. 285 ff.), in addition to the 60 million persons in the Anglo-Saxon majority group, there are 15 million Slavic, 5 million Italian, 4 million Scandinavian, 2 million French, 1 million each of Finns, Lithuanians, and Greeks, $\frac{1}{2}$ million Orientals, and $\frac{1}{3}$ million American Indians. Estimates of the number of persons of Mexican ancestry vary, but there are probably about $3\frac{1}{2}$ million (6). There is great diversity also in religious affiliation or background. The two major groups are 56 million Protestants and 30 million Roman

Catholics. But there are also 5 million Jews, 2 million Eastern Orthodox Catholics, $1\frac{1}{2}$ million Mormons, $\frac{1}{2}$ million Christian Scientists, and about 100 thousand Quakers, or Friends (16).

In current social science a great deal of attention is being given to the concept of caste. By a *caste* organization we mean a closed social system arranged in fixed layers of superiority and inferiority. The individual is born into a particular stratum, and there is no socially approved way by which he can leave the caste of his birth. The usual example is the social system of India in earlier times. In contrast, the system of social classes as we know it in this country is relatively open and fluid. Vertical mobility, both within a single generation and from one generation to another, is at least permitted and in some social classes is actively encouraged. It is not necessary that a caste system exist in its entirety for certain caste-like features of social organization to be evident. Thus, the situation of Negroes in this country is frequently interpreted as that of a caste. There are areas of interaction with whites, such as marriage, which are unavailable, barriers which cannot be crossed while retaining social approval. Anthropologists such as Warner (44) consequently speak of "color castes" as distinct from social classes, and Myrdal (33) in his extensive study of Negro-white relations employs such a concept of caste. Such use of the term *caste*, though currently prominent, is not universal. Cox (8), for example, regards the caste belief as a diseconomy, as obfuscating the most significant aspects of race relations, and as discouraging full consideration of the caste system of social organization. Our concern, however, is not with the broad question of race relations, but with a practical quest for concepts which can be applied toward the understanding of guidance. The use of the term *caste* in the interpretation of social relations displaying relatively fixed barriers to participation seems useful for our purpose, and we shall therefore use it. Nevertheless, the usage is not adopted wholly in a pragmatic spirit; after all, both caste and social class are abstractions—constructs—and it does not seem necessary that they correspond completely to a particular and concrete reality situation. Caste and social class represent the ideal cases.

Rural and Urban Cultures

Any teacher who has served in the schools of both rural and urban areas is well aware of differences in the two ways of life, though he may find it difficult to verbalize the differences in any systematic fashion. But it is just this problem of verbalizing differences in rural

and urban cultures which we must face. It will be evident at once that the problem is different from the same problem in relation to ethnic groups. In the ethnic groups there are sometimes "highly visible" differences, such as skin color, but even though the differences between various ethnic groups are not "visible" they are definite and identifiable. The German immigrant, for example, came specifically from Germany, not just from any country other than the United States, and his native language, if he uses it, is readily heard as German. The Jew attends the synagogue, not the Presbyterian or the Roman Catholic church. But neither rural nor urban people can be identified by such characteristics as skin color, language, national origin, or church affiliation. Consequently, if we are to speak meaningfully of rural and urban cultures, we must first achieve some working concept of differences between rural and urban society.

It is immediately apparent that a wide diversity exists within the rural pattern. The ways of life of the cotton plantation owner, the sharecropper, the migrant worker in the citrus belt or in the sugar beet area, and the members of the family on a family farm in the Midwest are vastly different; yet all are rural. Moreover, are businessmen and tradesmen in villages which serve primarily the needs of farmers to be considered rural? According to U.S. Census practice, communities of 2500 population or less are classified as rural, but this is a frankly arbitrary procedure. What, then, are the distinguishing features of the rural and the urban?

One way of conceptualizing the problem is to think of specific communities as lying on a continuum, one extreme of which is anchored in a completely "rural" folk society, and the other end in the ultimate of a modern urban society. The folk society end can be defined by constructing an imaginary model of what a "pure" folk society would be like. A description of such an ideal folk society has been given by Redfield (36). This ideal folk society would be small enough so that members would know each other well and remain in association for a long time. The community would be isolated, with no communication with outsiders; they would probably remain within their own small territory, but if they traveled, no real communication would be established with other groups. People would be much alike and would share a common stock of knowledge. The sense of belonging together would be strong. The group would be economically independent, producing what they consumed, and consuming what they produced, with little division of labor except on the bases of age and

sex. Life would be strongly traditional by reason of long intercommunication within the group, and the conventionalized ways would become interrelated to form a coherent and self-consistent system, or culture. The way of life defined by the culture would be followed simply because it seemed natural, not as a result of reflection or legislation. Relations would be personal and intimate rather than impersonal, and even animals and inanimate objects would seem personal. The way of life would be sacred, in the sense that traditional values would not be questioned, and activities would be ends in themselves rather than means to ends.

The urban end of the continuum can be defined largely by contrasts and opposites of the concept of folk society. Rather than drawing on a single statement of an ideal construct as we did with Redfield's description of the folk society characteristics, we shall simply note contrasting features of urban society. Two of the most obvious are great increase in division of labor and the breakdown of isolation by increased communication. The extremes to which division of labor are carried in modern urban industrial society can be typified by a large manufacturing plant, such as in the automobile industry. Communication becomes widespread by the printed page, movies, radio, and television, and the individual is consequently aware of what others are doing both in his own society and in others, and both at the present and in times past. Whereas in the folk society knowledge of the past is limited to what the old men can remember, urban society has access to a fantastic store of records. Increased communication, however, does not lead to unlimited participation by individuals in urban society, for sharp stratifications appear, based on caste, social class, ethnic differences, and so on. Living becomes more impersonal and more secular. More and more of the functions of primary groups are taken over by secondary groups. Science replaces magic and produces an elaborate technology.

All of this means, of course, that the educator or psychologist who seeks to understand the rural-urban elements influencing students in his school must seek such understandings in the context of his own community and in the experiences of students in this community or in the communities from which they came. Generalizations about the increasing urbanization of the country as a whole are scarcely relevant, however important they may be in understanding the social problems of the larger society. Here, for example, is Charles, son of the owner-manager of a large wheat farm, on which the work is carried on in a

highly mechanized fashion. The family lives in town, is active in the community, and is anything but isolated from the outside world. His older brother, who functions as a kind of assistant manager, is a graduate of the state agricultural college. And here is Zack, son of a farm family who rent a small farm located the other direction from town, over toward the river. They do diversified farming with a minimum of mechanized equipment. Zack is the only one of four brothers to attend high school. During the winter the boys gain a little additional income by trapping. The family has little intimate association with others except the two closest neighbors. Books and magazines are unknown in the home, although there is a radio. They affiliate with a highly traditional religious group. Both these boys might be called rural, but they would be far apart in any sort of a rural-urban continuum of social behaviors, beliefs, and values.

CULTURES AND THE INDIVIDUAL

The culture of the general American heritage and those of particular subcultures do not, of course, exist or function in separate compartments. Rather, they are closely and continuously in interaction. An appreciation of this interaction is of prime importance to guidance, for the individual does not respond today as a participant in rural culture, and tomorrow as a German, while delaying response as a member of general American culture until the day after tomorrow. Gordon has pointed out that subcultures are experienced as a "functioning unity which has an integrated impact on the participating individual" (13, p. 40). The same thing might be said regarding subcultures and general American culture. Thus, the Negro farm laborer in the South is not simply a member of the Negro race who lives in a rural area and who is also a member of the lower class; he experiences his subcultures as all of a piece; he is a southern-rural-lower-class Negro. And it is this unified world which establishes his outlook and "life chances." Or, the upper-lower class Mexican-American boy who lives in the city is not simply an urbanite who is also a member of an ethnic group. He experiences his world as a Mexican-American-urban-Catholic-upper-lower-class individual does, with all its traditions, values, and limitations on the kind of job he can get, on the people with whom he can form intimate friendships, and (probably) on the part of town in which he can live. This emphasis on unity of impact should not be taken to mean that all aspects are always in focus for the individual. In

a particular situation the values of some one subculture may emerge as the figure on the ground. At a high school party, for example, he may be acutely aware of being a Mexican-American, while in his home his participation in Mexican-American culture might well become a part of the ground and some other aspect become the figure.

There are two sides to this coin of the individual and his cultures. One is, as we have noted, his experiencing of cultures. The other is the attitudes of various cultural groups toward the individual who participates in other cultures. This second aspect constitutes a very large topic in social psychology, and we cannot attempt to deal with it here. We shall note only one example of a recent study which is particularly pertinent to the relation of social class and ethnic group attitudes. Hatt (14) noted that ideas regarding the relation of class attitudes and ethnic group attitudes tend to center about two general propositions. The first assumes that attitudes toward ethnic groups are positively correlated with attitudes toward the lower class. The second assumes that attitudes toward minority groups are a function of some universally applicable standard of ethical morality and are unrelated to class attitudes. Hatt administered scales of attitude toward six groups (upper class, middle class, lower class, Jewish persons, the foreign born, and Negroes) to groups of students in Wayne University, to middle-class high school students in a restricted Detroit area, and to upper-class adults. Factor analysis yielded six factors, the first two of which accounted respectively for 53 and 20 percent of the variance. The first factor included favorable attitudes toward the upper class and antagonism toward the lower class and ethnic minorities. The relation of this factor to attitudes toward the middle class varied considerably from one group of subjects to another; loadings ranged from .339 for the college students to .705 for the upper-class adults. The second, smaller factor at one end showed antagonism toward the upper class and favorable attitudes toward the minorities and lower class. At the other end the second, smaller factor showed a favorable attitude toward those minorities associated with a favorable attitude toward the upper class and a negative attitude toward the lower class. Loadings of attitudes toward the middle class were so small as to be negligible. The first factor, then, was in harmony with the first assumption, and the second factor tended to support the second hypothesis. This study illustrates the complex nature of the relationships existing between social class and ethnic attitudes.

If, as we have suggested, the existence of such attitudes is one

side of a coin of which the other is the experiencing by the individual of his varied cultures, our earlier proposition that the individual experiences culture in a unitary way would seem to need some supplementing. Ultimately, the individual's experiences hinge on his perception of the response of others to him. The Negro high school youth, for example, perceives that he is quite acceptable on the football field as defender of the honor of the school, but that he is not acceptable as guest in the homes of some of the boys with whom he plays. Both perceptions derive from the behavior and attitudes of others toward him. As has often been suggested of similar circumstances, he perceives the two situations differently. There is, however, an overall wholeness in his experiences, but conflict is built into the very nature of that wholeness, as the positive and negative poles are in the very structure of a battery. Ready-made conflicts are, so to speak, built into the very nature of the cultures in which he participates. Earlier we noted the changing nature of the American way of life, and the strains and stresses which occur even within the pattern of "sacred" values. We turn now to a further exploration of the relations of general American culture and some of the subcultures. Since our concern is with a background for the problems of guidance, we shall continue to center on the meaning of these relations in the experience of the individual.

THE CONCEPT OF VALUES

Perhaps the most integrating concept for an understanding of cultures is that of values. Angell (2, p. 15) has suggested that values afford the basic principle of integration for societies, and Kroeber and Kluckhohn have stressed the importance of this concept: "Values are important in that they provide foci for patterns of organization for the material of cultures. They give significance to our understanding of cultures. In fact values provide the only basis for the fully intelligible comprehension of culture, because the actual organization of all cultures is primarily in terms of their values" (26, p. 173).

Before defining more specifically what is meant by values it may be helpful to illustrate their concrete functioning. Two communities, Rimrock and Homestead, located about 40 miles apart in the mesa and canyon country of western New Mexico, were studied by Vogt and O'Dea (43) as a part of the Harvard project for the Comparative Study of Values in Five Cultures. Both communities are at an elevation

of 7000 feet in a similar natural environment. The only major difference in natural environment is that Rimrock's location close to the mountains made irrigation possible, while Homestead remained a dry-farming area raising largely pinto beans. Rimrock was established by the Mormons in the 1870's as a missionary outpost. The village experienced drought, crop diseases, and other pioneer difficulties. Later the emphasis shifted from missionary activities, and in spite of relative isolation, Rimrock became a rather typical Mormon farming community, with the church as the central core of a hierarchical social structure. Homestead was settled by immigrants from the South Plains of Texas and Oklahoma during the "Grapes of Wrath" movement in the 1930's. Each farm was operated by a nuclear family; there were no partnerships. Mechanical farming methods were introduced; the farms became larger; and in contrast to Rimrock, there was relatively high out-migration.

Both groups shared the common American value orientations of emphasis on achievement, success, an attitude of optimism, and beliefs in progress and the rational mastery over nature. But interpretations and emphasis of values differ. The Mormons had assimilated these values in the nineteenth century milieu of western New York, emphasized cooperative action, and reinterpreted the values theologically. The Homesteader group had originally been part of the migration westward from the hill country of the southern Appalachians, and their background of experience had been such as to emphasize a "rough and ready self-reliance and individualism, the Jacksonianism of the frontier West" (43). These differing value-orientations persisted into the time when the study was made, early in the 1950's. The investigators reported and described the different behavior of the groups in situations which seemed to call for cooperative action. For example, in 1951 the state offered both villages a plan for the construction of high school gymnasiums, whereby the state would provide the materials and certain skilled labor if the villages would provide the other labor needed for construction. Rimrock accepted and readily worked out arrangements for the labor. Homestead refused. Later, another offer was made to Homestead which included funds for hiring local labor at \$1.00 per hour. This was accepted, but before completion the funds were exhausted and construction stopped. No community action followed, and the investigators, writing in 1953, reported: "Today a partially completed gymnasium and stocks of some 10,000 adobe bricks disintegrating slowly with the rains stand as monuments to the individualism

of the homesteaders" (43, p. 650). A similar situation occurred in the graveling of the streets. A contractor working on a section of a highway nearby offered to gravel streets of the villages after completion of the road work, while his equipment was at hand. Rimrock accepted, and financed the project by contributions of \$20.00 per family. Homestead refused, although two stores, the bar, and the post office each had several loads of gravel dumped before their respective premises, leaving the rest of the village streets in the mud. Other incidents were reported in which comparable patterns of differences in the responses of the two communities were apparent. Such contrasting behavior of the two communities can hardly be explained by the fact that the natural environment permitted the development of irrigation in the case of Rimrock, and not in the case of Homestead. Situational facts do "set certain limits" as the investigators recognized, but it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the crucial factor was the differing value orientations of the two communities.

As our definition of values we shall adopt the following statement developed by the Harvard project for the Comparative Study of Values in Five Cultures: "A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences selection between available modes, means, and ends of action" (42, pp. 6-7). It should be noted that this definition is broad enough to include values whether or not verbalized, conscious or unconscious, "explicit or implicit." They may characterize either an individual or a group. "The desirable" implies an emphasis on the affective and conative—values are not only things of the intellect; they are not just cognitive. There is implied also an element of a norm, or standards, or a code. Values are not simply things desired; they are *desirable* by some norm. And as in the case of other terms such as *class*, or *caste*, or *culture*, the term *value* or *value orientation* refers to a logical construct, not to a "thing" in external reality.

VALUES OF GENERAL AMERICAN CULTURE

The basic values of general American culture cluster around the twin centers of democracy in social relations and man's mastery over nature by technology. In the democracy constellation we find beliefs in the rightness of equality, of liberty or freedom, and of individualism. It does not require a great deal of philosophical insight to appreciate that there are certain inconsistencies in this triumvirate of

goods. An unrestrained individualism, for example, in practice results in certain inequalities. But we are not attempting here to deal with values on a sophisticated philosophical level. Rather, our concern is with values as experienced by the individual unreflectively—in the experience of youth, especially, values are more often than not implicit rather than verbalized.

Although the adolescent probably gives lip service to the traditional or "official" doctrine of equality to which he is so often exposed on ceremonial occasions, he is well aware of inconsistencies. His culture has also thoroughly imbued him with a belief in the virtues of competition, for example. He has received grades in most of his schoolwork. He may even have been in a school in which it was expected that grades should fall into the kind of distribution which can be obtained by tossing pennies. In any event, it would have been unthinkable that all students would receive the same grade. He has been expected to compete in various activities. Out of school he knows of "the competitive world of business" and of all sorts of awards made on a competitive basis, from the Nobel prizes and Hollywood Oscars to civil service positions. Surely, then, people are not really expected to be equal in ability and achievement. Perhaps equality means equal rights. But he knows of some students who are able to "get away" with things, both in and out of school, by reason of the social positions of their parents. He would not verbalize his observations as social class differences, but he is aware of some kind of inequality of rights and privileges. And if he happens to be a Negro or an Oriental, he is well aware of limits on equality. When he comes to such an important decision as choice of vocation, then, it is to be expected that he will lay aside the value of equality in favor of more pressing and immediate values. If he happens to participate in middle-class culture, he is expected to strive for success and achieve a status at least as high as that of his parents. On the other hand, if he participates in lower-class culture, his prime vocational value may be security.

The other basic American values of individualism and freedom are subject to the same sort of modification by individual experience. Thus the values which actually function in decisions are not the democratic values of American culture in all their pristine purity; rather they are the basic concepts as modified by some degree of realistic individual experience and compromise with the values of the subcultures in which the individual also participates, as, for example, those of social class, ethnic groups, and regional cultures. Further-

more, the individual probably has little awareness of the process of modification.

The second cluster of American values centers about technology and progress. Man is expected to triumph over nature; he is never to submit. Engineers are to build bridges and aircraft and power plants. Physicians are eventually to conquer the weaknesses and ailments to which flesh is heir, as they have already conquered smallpox, yellow fever, and poliomyelitis. Even education, it was hoped, could be made a thing of science. America is proud of her science, not so much for the understanding which it gives as for the technology, the know-how, the control over nature which it makes possible. And in the school, the lives of heroes of technology—Ford, Edison, McCormick, Morse, Watt, Whitney, and the Wright brothers—are often taught with considerably more gusto than the lives of leaders in the arts, or government, or religion. Those who can afford to do so gather in their homes—especially in the kitchens—marvelous collections of gadgets. For this is progress, and we smile sympathetically at the crude devices of the pioneers.

There is less modification of the technology-progress values by subcultures than in the case of the democratic values. Rural culture has long since accepted the mechanization of farming, and, except in a few isolated areas, the farm family depends on the automobile rather than horses for transportation. With the coming of bottled gas and rural electrification, the farm home has become often indistinguishable from the urban home. Rural mail delivery, the telephone, the radio, and now television have all but eliminated the break in communication with the larger culture. A few groups, such as the Amish, struggle to maintain rural and ethnic values in conflict with the technological-progress pattern. Loomis and Beegle (29) have shown that the Amish show many characteristics of a folk society on a scale designed to permit the placing of groups along a continuum ranging from a *familis-ric-gemeinschaft* type of society at one end to a contractual-*gesellschaft* type at the other. The Negro apparently does not experience the same involvement in the technological-value area as with democratic values. Some American Indian groups whose values have emerged out of hunting or herding and out of primitive-agriculture complexes are apparently among those who find the technological-progress orientation least meaningful. But in spite of such groups which either reject or find no meaning in technology and progress, there seems to be reasonable justification for the generalization that the locus of conflict be-

tween American values and the values of subcultures is less in this area than in the cluster of democratic values.

SOCIAL CLASS VALUES

In our discussion of changes in the way of life in America we saw evidence of the rising importance of middle-class values, and noted the conservation and transmission of such values in the McGuffey readers. If there is one subculture which has succeeded in making its values more dominant than any other of the variant cultures, it is that of the middle class. In some ways middle-class culture is business culture, as has so often been remarked. Industry, thrift, success, orderliness, dependability, and a kind of basic business honesty have pragmatic value, and as a result are rather easily sustained. Yet there is in middle-class values something more than just these things—a kind of yearning for values not yet achieved, and these not-yet-realized values often take their pattern from the style of life of the upper classes as the middle class is able to perceive it. Upward mobility therefore becomes almost a value in itself. Education becomes a kind of instrumental value as a means to mobility. A strong future-time orientation is involved; one must accumulate means and prepare for remote enjoyments. This means, in part, the accumulation of capital goods, in contrast to the lower classes whose values are more present-time oriented (Table 1).

Possibly this forward looking, future-time orientation is simply the middle-class interpretation of the larger culture's value of progress. Or possibly, as suggested above, there is a middle-class mobility orientation toward the upper class. If so, what is perceived by the middle class in the upper-class pattern of living as worth so much stress and strain? Or put the other way around, what lacks in their own way of life are so felt that these things take on value? Prestige, perhaps, or power, or economic independence, or leisure, or a vague idea of gracious living? Ultimately the answer is an individual one, lying in the experience and perceptions of the individual; yet there are enough common elements for it to make sense to speak of middle-class values. Over against this future-time orientation is a traditionalism in things moral. Sex taboos are rigid, and there is much of Puritanism in middle-class values. There is strong inculcation in children of respect for law and order, for respectability, for success. In contrast to both the upper- and lower-class families, the middle-class family is child centered in the sense that strenuous efforts are made to groom the child to succeed—the

TABLE 1. The Social Class Values

Upper	Middle	Lower
<i>Family relations</i> Family lineage and background; family traditions	Child-centered in sense of preparing children to succeed	Child early thrown on own resources; expected to mature early
<i>Property</i> Old wealth assumed; not an end in itself	Stress on accumulating capital goods	Immediate spending the accepted pattern
<i>Law and order</i> Stable order supported; certain class immunities	Respect for law and order a part of the value of respectability	Opportunism a characteristic attitude
<i>Education</i> Transmission of traditional values and cultivation of individual taste; nonutilitarian	Utilitarian; related to success and mobility	Literacy desirable, but too much formal education suspect
<i>Aggression</i> Personal physical aggression taboo; social aggression bad taste	Control of physical aggression stressed; social mobility approved	Physical prowess encouraged; conspicuous social climbing ridiculed
<i>Industry</i> A moderate value; "man of leisure" accepted but not typical	A prime value; work for work's sake	Work a means to other ends, preferably immediate
<i>Cleanliness</i> Simply assumed	Stressed, in "white-collar" fashion	Not stressed; practical adjustments accepted
<i>Sex</i> Less traditional	Strict taboos	Sexual prowess permitted; immediate gratification accepted

SOURCES: Middle-class and lower-class values modified from J. W. Getzels. A stable identity in a world of shifting values. *Educ. Leadership*, 1957, 14, 237-240. C. Kluckhohn & F. Kluckhohn. American culture: generalized orientations and class patterns. In L. Bryson & others. (Eds.) *Conflicts of power in modern culture*. New York: Harper, 1947. Upper-class values have been added.

upper-class child has already succeeded by fortunate birth, and the lower-class child has too far to go for mobility to become a strong value.

Such generalized descriptions can easily lead us to forget that there is great diversity of value orientations within the middle-class groups, and that the middle classes themselves are changing. The old middle class consisted typically of farmers, businessmen, and independent professionals, while the new white-collar middle class as described by Mills (32, p. 65) consists of managers, salaried professionals, salespeople, and office workers. In 1870 the old middle class included 85 percent of the middle-class working population, and the new middle class only 15 percent. But by 1940 the old middle class accounted for 44 percent, and the new middle class had risen to 56 percent. Such a shift must surely have been associated with a change in the relative strength of middle-class values, and perhaps in the very nature of these values, but what the relationships are is by no means clear. One would expect at least some changes in the values centered about property, for this new middle class consists of dependent wage or salary earners, even though they may have professional status. Although some own their homes and may have some investments, they are not characteristically people of property. Their occupations are so diverse that it is difficult to find common denominators. Mills has suggested two, that they work with symbols and with other people. They are not farm owner-operators. They are not owners of businesses. They are not independent practitioners of the professions. They are dependent workers whose symbol is the white collar by which they are set apart from manual workers.

In contrast to the values of an aggressive, mobile middle class we have in the upper class the values of those who have arrived, a group freed from the problems of getting a living and able to turn more completely to the matter of living. Accumulation of capital goods is no longer a grim affair, although it may become a good game. But work for work's sake is hardly a value. The economic factor, however, is certainly not the only key to the style of life, and those who seek to open the door by this key alone find themselves in the dilemma of the *nouveau riche*. There are the traditional values of family background. The family is almost a value in itself, and marriages must be in harmony with the preservation of family values. In spite of the strong family structure, however, there is a certain permissiveness for the individual, resulting in part from not defining manners as traditional morals in the way the middle class is prone to do, and this the middle

class finds difficult to understand. Nor are manners something to be learned by reading a book on etiquette, but the unconscious good form absorbed in the very process of growing up. Good taste is a high value. Education does not have the instrumental value as a social elevator which it often has for the middle class; rather, education is a part of good breeding. Physical aggression is taboo, and social aggression is vulgar. Maintenance of a certain exclusiveness becomes a value. Self-expression is valued, if carried out in an approved area of endeavor. Traditional charity affairs manage to unite prestige and support of worthy enterprises. There is, however, a strong tradition of financial support of philanthropic enterprises over and beyond these charity affairs—a touch of *noblesse oblige*. Such activity is valued if proper decorum is observed so that there can be no suspicion of crass publicity or social climbing.

The values of lower-class culture are if anything more sharply differentiated from values of the middle class than from those of the upper class. We must start with the stubborn economic facts that the available jobs are typically those which command low wages, are often seasonal and interrupted by periods of unemployment, so that even though the mother finds work outside the home the total family income is often close to the poverty line. The struggle is to meet immediate needs. Accumulation of capital is too remote a possibility to be conceptualized as a value. Rather, the accepted pattern is one of immediate spending, and this applies both to immediate needs and to the prompt use of any temporary surpluses. In the words of an old folk saying, it is "feast or famine." It is difficult for the middle-class teacher to understand that the haunting fears of past deprivations would not result in the middle-class value of thrift, but such is *not the case*. Typically, there is a strong present-time orientation about lower-class values. Attitudes toward law and order are apt to be opportunistic, with focus on the here and now. More immediate gratifications of sex are permitted without loss of status. Personal conflicts may be settled by immediate physical aggression; the boy in the slum must fight if he is to survive. Undertaking vocational goals calling for eight or more years of schooling beyond the elementary grades places a high strain on the values of immediacy, even if economically possible. A basic literacy is deemed desirable, but the too-educated person is suspect. He no longer quite belongs. In contrast to middle-class individuals for whom work is often a value in itself, work for the lower class is a means to an end. After

all, the probable jobs are for the most part not such as to permit of much identification; the assembly line, however efficient, was not created to develop personality or allow self-expression. The luxury of prolonged childhood cannot be afforded. The child must early turn to his age peers in the neighborhood for social relations, and if possible must help in supporting the family. He must grow up fast. Personal habits of cleanliness are less stressed by the lower class, and this devaluation often seems offensive to the white-collar teacher. But lack of cleanliness is not so much a rejection of the value, as a realistic adaptation to conditions of work and living. One who is too clean is conspicuous, and seems to be rejecting his group, so the group in turn does not quite accept him. After all, which value is more important, being accepted by one's group or being clean according to the standards of someone else's group?

VALUES OF ETHNIC GROUPS

The cultures of ethnic groups carry somewhat different implications for guidance than do either social class or rural-urban cultures. Even in the very small rural communities such as *Plainville, U.S.A.* (47), some degree of social class differentiation will be found. And one may expect to find rural elements surviving in urban cultures in most communities (40). But it would be unusual to find in any one school situation representatives of all ethnic groups, or even of a large number. As an example of an exceptional case, Quigley (35) has cited a single classroom in Pittsburgh in which at least one parent of each child was foreign born, and the countries represented were Lithuania, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Germany, and Ireland. Even here we do not have included any Negroes, Orientals, or American Indians, not to mention various other national groups. The more usual situation is one in which one would find only a few ethnic groups represented in a given school at any one time. Now no counselor or other person concerned with guidance functions can be expected to be familiar with the value patterns of all ethnic groups. What can be expected, however, is that guidance personnel be sensitive to the differences in values of ethnic groups, and have enough background to observe with some comprehension what lies before them. Real understanding will have to come as a matter of in-service learning in a particular community. In the following brief review we can

hope only to raise some questions regarding differences in value patterns, and thereby contribute perhaps to the process of sensitizing to the values of ethnic groups.

Negroes

One of the most thoroughly studied groups happens also to be a racial group—the Negroes. Among the numerous studies are the modern classic by Myrdal (33) and the series of studies sponsored by the American Council on Education, summarized by Sutherland (39). One of the important points made in the summary has to do with the fact that many Negroes participate in two subcultures, the Negro and the lower class. In the words of Davis (9, p. 66), “. . . one cannot speak of ‘the problems’ or ‘the characteristics’ of ‘the Negro child.’ One must speak first in terms of the social class training of the child, and only secondarily of his caste training, . . .” for great differences in social class exist *within* the color caste. “The downward pressure of the white caste makes an overwhelming proportion of Negroes lower class in their social and economic traits. The lower-class society in which most Negro children live does not offer rewards for severe educational, economic, and social effort, and does not punish for sexual and aggressive indulgence. Moreover, since white society excludes Negroes from most white-collar, skilled, and professional jobs, the colored child has little stimulus to work hard in high school; . . . if there is one consistent response from colored students, it is that they place little value upon doing well in school” (9, p. 67), and a great part of this is lower-class motivation, found among all lower-class children. Here we have a clear statement of the interlocking effects of membership in a caste along with participation in a subculture. The importance of this interrelationship can hardly be overemphasized in any effort to understand the effects on the individual of participating in subcultures of ethnic groups.

Is there then no such thing as a Negro culture? Surely the individual learns the way of life of the group into which he is born, even though that way of life is the result of caste and several subcultures. The point is that the individual is born into a specific blend of cultures; he is not, as Davis says, just “the Negro child,” but the Negro child in a particular social class, and in a rural or urban setting. Johnson (21, p. 62) has given a description of the culture transmitted to the child by the southern, rural, lower-class Negro family. The language which he learns is flavored by folk psychology and places limits on ideas. Con-

ceptions of the world are learned which are primitive, lacking a rational basis in science. The skills transmitted are crude and approximate, suited to simple routine. The child learns social codes based on achieving security through dependency. The techniques of survival are contingent on tolerance by an outside group; he learns how to be a Negro. This picture of the lower-class, rural, southern Negro should be supplemented by description of the aspirations and struggles of Negroes in higher classes. Again, in the words of Johnson, "Whereas the middle-class rural Negro youth finds his tensions in the struggle to dissociate himself from the conspicuous status of the lower-class Negro, and to achieve the exclusive status and apparent immunities of the upper class, the youth of the upper classes find that they have reached the levels of tolerance in development in the area and, having neither hope nor incentive to higher status, lack the educational zest of the middle-class and some of the lower-class youth" (21, p. 67).

It is well to emphasize the importance of seeking to understand the individual Negro as one who participates in both caste and social class. But what difference does the fact of caste itself make in the experiences of the person? About this we know very little. Karon, in his study of personality characteristics of Negroes by means of projective techniques, concluded, "It has been clearly established that caste sanctions have an effect upon the personality structures of the people who feel them . . ." (22, p. 171). Most of the important characteristics centered about aggression, involving such feelings as strong but consciously repressed anger, or that "someone goes out of his way to make trouble for you," and similar feelings. "The fact that northern Negroes differ from southern Negroes on precisely the same characteristics and in the same way as do northern whites served to eliminate the possibility that these traits represented hereditary differences between Negroes and whites. Thus, the caste sanctions not only have an effect upon personality, but these effects are sufficient to account for the differences in personality between Negroes and whites" (22, p. 171). In commenting on the idea that inconsistencies of culture might be a source of emotional conflict he noted, "However, the caste sanctions are an example of an *increase* in the inconsistency of the culture leading to a *decrease* in emotional problems" (22, p. 174). Caste sanctions seemed to result in no apparent problem for the northern Negro who lived all his life in the north, in an inconsistent culture, but the southern Negro who migrated north was more apt to experience disturbance.

Japanese Americans

We have seen in the Negroes an ethnic group whose values are strongly interrelated with social class values and further complicated by caste restrictions. We turn now to another group, the Japanese-Americans, in order to illustrate a quite different situation. Here again we have a group subjected to some caste-like restrictions, but whose values, while different from those of the middle class, are nevertheless quite compatible. During World War II, when the Japanese were being evacuated from the Pacific Coast, some 20,000 reached Chicago from the various relocation centers. The cultural and personality adjustment of 342 families to life in Chicago was studied by an interdisciplinary team from the University of Chicago. Caudill and DeVos (7) studied the value systems of these people with special reference to achievement. The actual facts of their occupational adjustment are striking.

Approximately three years after coming to Chicago, the number who had achieved employment in middle-class occupations was impressive. As might be expected, there were considerable differences as between the issei (first-generation immigrants), and the nisei (second generation). Among the issei, 24 percent were domestic and service workers, 56 percent were semiskilled workers, and 2 percent were white-collar workers. But among the nisei there were only 7 percent in domestic and service work, 32 percent in semiskilled work, and 35 percent in white-collar jobs. White American employers of these Japanese-Americans were well satisfied, and praised their speed and efficiency, and their character traits of honesty, punctuality, willingness to work overtime, personal appearance, and general moral standards. An analysis was made by means of projective techniques. No very brief statement can do justice to this material, but in general it was found that the values and adaptive mechanisms of the Japanese-Americans and the white American lower-middle class were highly compatible, while the white American upper-lower class differed from both these groups and represented a different psychological adjustment. The issei placed high value on such long-range goals as higher education, professional success, and building a spotless reputation, and passed these goals on to their children, the nisei. The middle-class employers saw mirrored in the neat, well-dressed and efficient nisei some of their own ideals.

Apparently something of the same sort happened as between

middle-class teachers and nisei children in the schools back on the Pacific coast in prewar days, for earlier studies (38) had found that Japanese pupils in Los Angeles had about the same IQ as other groups and made about the same scores on educational tests, but received strikingly better grades. Moreover, the fact that many of the issei had a background of rural, peasant, subsistence farming in Japan, while the nisei more characteristically grew up in urban settings, suggests the possibility of rural-urban factors, but such a possibility awaits further exploration. The point with which we are presently concerned is that the Japanese Americans, although coming from a culture commonly thought of as alien, were able to make impressively adequate adjustment to middle-class culture, and in this adjustment were apparently greatly aided by the fact that their own cultural values were compatible with those of the American middle class. In contrast, the rural Negro has typically grown up in the lower class and has developed values which have impeded rather than assisted his acculturation to the middle class.

American Indians

Various American Indian groups provide illustrations of still another kind of situation. Here we have groups of people with cultures of their own of which they are strongly conscious, whose society has been broken by force of conquest, and whose cultures have been under constant pressure by their conquerors for change to the white man's way. Moreover, the pressure has been a changing and frustrating one. As Linton has remarked, "One of the most tragic features of our own dealings with the American Indians has been the constant changes of policy which, together with tribal removals, have rendered the adaptations which they successively developed successively unworkable" (28, p. 519).

Beginning about 1890 the second ghost dance swept over many of the western tribes. The dancers fell in trances and believed that they visited with the dead who urged them to return to the old ways. There were expectations that the dead would return in bodily form, that there would be a great whirlwind, and that the whites would perish or be driven out so that the land once again would belong to the Indians. It is significant, as Lesser notes, that the spread of this second wave of the dance came at a time when the final destruction of native culture was well advanced, and a feeling of desolation spread among the tribes, so that they were "ripe for any message of hope" (27, p. 109).

Among the southern Colorado Utes, the dance leader Yunitckwo'on set the date for the return of the dead within the year, and when nothing happened the dance was discontinued and became the butt of jokes. A parody was introduced, called "Dance for Making Medicine in Daytime on a Sick Person" (34, pp. 188-191), with such hilarious sexual implications that it would probably have been censured in the old vaudeville days. But the Utes apparently found in the parody some relief from the tensions of hope gone sour, for, as Lesser comments (27, p. 115), the roots of the dance lay deep in the cultural destruction which preceded it.

Opler quotes an unidentified southern Colorado Ute who concluded a story thus: "Then the people moved camp to a new site. Those camps and that life are now gone. Everything moves on and is lost. That is why the Ute says: 'It is bad luck to plan ahead.' For nothing can stop. Nothing is left of those days but my story and your words. Nothing remains behind" (34, p. 119). Whether or not the feelings expressed by this one man are typical is relatively unimportant. The objective facts of white and Indian relations are such as to make understandable these feelings on the part of many and to prepare us for quite different systems of values than those found among the whites, especially the middle-class whites. We shall not find that the values of Indians are complicated by lower-class values in the same way as among Negroes; nor shall we find compatible values as in the case of the Japanese Americans.

Most certainly it is impossible to discover a detailed value pattern representative of all Indian groups. The great diversity of values ranges from those of the very group-conscious and ceremonial Navaho and Hopi, to the competitive and prestige-ridden Kwakiutl who afford us a caricature of middle-class American culture. It is probably fair to say, however, that American Indian groups participate less in the values of general American culture than do most other ethnic groups. Instead of emphasizing mastery over nature, Indian values are more apt to stress accepting nature as it is, although there are numerous elements of magic for manipulating some aspects of nature, often by way of traditional ceremonies. Surely the technological stress is lacking. Most Indian groups have little truck with the white man's time-counting and efficiency values, and still less with the middle-class strivings for the future. Profits may give way to social contacts in business. Woods (50, p. 99) tells of a traveler who wished to buy all of the handiwork displayed by an Indian in the market place. "I can't

do that," protested the Indian, "because then I'd have nothing left for the rest of the day." A money economy did not exist before the white man came, and even today is a little suspect among the more traditional. Banks are frequently not trusted. Tourists in the Southwest are often impressed with the amount of silver jewelry worn by the Navaho, and the more skeptical are apt to dismiss it as a part of the tourist show. There may be an element of truth in this in the setting of a gift shop. But what many fail to appreciate is that jewelry may be a symbol of wealth and prestige more meaningful than money or a bank account. Attempting to translate the general American pattern of democratic values into Indian terms would be merely an academic exercise, for Indian values exist in their own right, and were not derived from American values. Impossible as the task may be for an alien to the cultures, any real understanding of Indian values must come from looking from the inside out—not as a tourist. And they must be seen in the concrete context of particular Indian cultures.

Perhaps a brief comparison of the Navaho and Sioux may help. The basic good for the Navaho is one of harmony or balance, both between man and the supernaturals, and between man and nature. The elimination of friction in human relationships is part of this pattern. Since the universe is also a fearful place to live (nature is to be endured rather than controlled), security has high value. There is a strong "this worldly" orientation, and no sense of personal immortality. Right or wrong depend on traditions laid down by the Holy People, something external to individuals and yet of the people, not the white man's internalized conscience which punishes with guilt (42). A study of Navaho children at Navaho Mountain showed "relatively little development of conscience but high external moral restraint" (15, p. 199). In contrast to the harmony valuing and (externally, at least) noncompetitive Navaho are the modern Sioux, once proud buffalo hunters and professional warriors of the plains, who spoke of the "strong life." Of the Ogalala subtribe on the Pine Ridge reservation in South Dakota, Erikson comments: "Where once the Indian was a man wronged, he is now comparable to what in psychiatry is called a 'compensation neurotic'; he receives all his sense of security and identity out of the status of one to whom something is owed" (11, p. 103). Taken alone this seems like a rather severe estimate on the part of the white man's doctor, and more of the context should be noted. The Sioux culture has placed high value on a leveling-of-wealth concept, and high prestige has been attached to generosity. Perhaps

such virtues originally had high utility value in a seminomadic hunting mode of life in which survival often depended upon a sharing by all in the food gained by the hunters. But, as usual, values once established outlived the situation of origin. Erikson tells of a boy in school who was not accepted by his age peers, apparently because "his father had money." The complaints and problems of white teachers and social workers brought to an interracial seminar included such items as truancy; stealing, and other disregard of property rights; apathy, ranging from lack of interest to passive resistance; and least frequent of all, impertinence. Most mystifying of all seemed to be the apathy and lack of initiative. Teachers said, "You cannot get to them" (11, p. 109). Erikson was particularly interested in the apathy, and was impressed with the ability of Indian children to live for years in the conflict of two cultures without open rebellion or signs of inner conflict. He found little evidence of inner tensions and neuroses, but rather a cultural pathology, manifested sometimes as alcoholic delinquency, or mild thievery. Mostly there was simply a passive resistance against further impact of white standards on the Indian conscience. The average Sioux Indian child, he found, did not have a "bad conscience" in practicing such resistance. Only among "white man's Indians" were neurotic tensions found.

These findings by Erikson were not altogether supported by another study of the Sioux reported by Havighurst and Neugarten (15). Both studies were made on the Pine Ridge reservation, and data were gathered about the same time. The Havighurst and Neugarten study employed a test method rather than the psychoanalytic approach. A cluster of characteristics appeared in the test responses which could be interpreted as "moral concern over hostile impulses, regard for others, aggression toward peers, relations to authority, stealing and care of property, self-gratification." There was evidence also of a high "guilt-shame ratio, indicating a considerable degree of internalized conscience as to the source of moral authority" (15, p. 202). This finding is in sharp contrast to the absence of internalized conscience but high external control found characteristic of the Navaho in another part of the same study, and it is especially significant since the Sioux are considerably more acculturated to the white man's way than are the Navaho. An evaluation of the rather different findings of the two studies of the Sioux would immediately involve us in technical questions of method, and into these we shall not go. Perhaps enough material has been pre-

American Indians exists from group to group. And we repeat the suggestion that these value patterns, if they are to be understood at all, must be seen from the inside out, and not viewed externally through the white man's own value system.

Hispanos and Mexican Americans

Mexican culture derives from the Aztec and the Spanish. This is one of those easy generalizations which, though historically true, seems to tell us relatively little about the problems of Mexican Americans. Many of these problems are economic and intimately related to shifting fortunes on both sides of the border; in the United States there have been pressures in the railroad and mining industries, in the citrus fruit business, and in sugar beets, winter vegetables, and cotton. Basic as are such considerations, we shall not attempt to deal with them. An extensive literature has developed about Mexican immigration, and an excellent brief summary has been given by Burma (6).

We shall seek to explore only the more intangible value aspects of the cultures in which the Mexican participates or does not participate. Problems of prejudice and discrimination must be bypassed also in the interests of brevity, except for one consideration: the too-common practice of thinking of all Mexicans as belonging to one single, uniform category. Bogardus (5) has reported a comparison of social distance attitudes in 1926 and in 1946. In 1926 Mexicans ranked twenty-seventh among the 36 ethnic groups included in the instrument. In 1946 two names were used, "Mexicans" and "Mexicans, American," but the division made little difference; the former were ranked twenty-ninth, and the latter twenty-sixth. Bogardus commented that many persons in the United States either do not know Mexicans at all, or know them only as peon laborers on the ranches or railroads, or as manual laborers in the cities. Higher-class Mexicans are seldom known. And very little has happened in the United States in the last 20 years, Bogardus continued, to bring about any substantial understanding of Mexican culture. McDonagh and Richards (31, p. 175) have noted in the findings of Bogardus the curious relationship between the rankings of the culturally hybrid Mexicans, and the two stocks from which they came. American Indians were rated twenty-fourth in 1926, and twenty-first in 1946, while the Spanish were ranked twelfth and sixteenth in 1926 and 1946 respectively. Thus, the stereotype of "the Mexican" seems to evoke attitudes of greater social distance than that of either of his ancestral cultural groups. If we are to understand the values of

Mexicans we must make the necessary discriminations, for Mexicans are certainly not just Mexicans. First of all, there are the descendants of the Spanish colonists and the original Indians living in the land annexed to the United States after the Mexican War of 1846. These are the Spanish Americans, or *Hispanos*. A second group consists of immigrants who have become citizens, the Mexican Americans. There are also the "wetbacks" making illegal entry, and the Mexican Nationals who make temporary legal entries under work contracts. With these last two groups we shall not be concerned.

The *Hispanos* are concentrated in New Mexico, particularly about Taos and Las Vegas, with lesser concentrations about Santa Fe, Albuquerque, Gallup, Las Cruces, and Carlsbad (6:6). Some are found also in California and Colorado. Old colonial patterns persist, with strong elements of rural culture. The economic base was and still is stock raising and subsistence agriculture. The principle for settlement of estates was equal division of land among all heirs, and this, along with population increase, has produced many small farms. The average farm is 10 acres, and 80 percent are less than 15 acres—in a land where 40 to 50 acres are needed for one cow-unit—and as a result 90 percent of rural families get less than subsistence from farming. The rural values of neighborliness and mutual aid are strong. Although there is no communal ownership, there is much borrowing. The family is extended, and the authority of the father is strong, even to influencing the decisions of married sons. The man is expected to support his family and to aid his parents and near relatives when in need. Unquestioned faithfulness is demanded of the wife, but the moral life of the man is pretty much his own business. The wife is expected to set the example for the family (6, pp. 11-13). In contrast to American urban culture in which the aged find it difficult to retain a place, old persons among the *Hispanos* are loved and esteemed (50, p. 331).

Practically 100 percent of *Hispanos* are Roman Catholic. They are a devout people, and institutionalized religion represents a stronger value than in much of America. Religion permeates many aspects of life, even the recreational, and rites of passage are all religious (50, p. 347). Though certainly not typical of the *Hispanos*, there has survived in the more remote regions of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains of northern New Mexico and southern Colorado medieval rites of flagellation, carried out sometimes with whips of cactus, and perpetuated by the sect of *Los Hermanos de los Penitentes* as a re-enactment of the crucifixion. The sect still survives, though the actual bloodletting has offi-

cially been abandoned. The rural pattern finds expression in a leisurely pace. Hard work is common, is accepted, and is done—but because it is a necessary means to an end; industry is not a value in itself. Leisure is the good, not work. Education in the tradition of the Hispanic village is an informal affair of the family, and formal schooling is not a value—it is simply not important in the village way of life. Under pressure of the severe economic life some young men and some whole families leave the villages to earn money in the seasonal harvests, but their loyalties are apt to remain at home (6, p. 11). Some of these younger men who have been out, and especially the returned veterans, are more aware of the outside world. But, by and large, Hispanic culture and values are first of all rural, against a background blend of Spanish culture with some Indian elements. "This Hispano is truly at ease only in his own village" (6, p. 11).

Taking Hispanos and immigrants together, probably 90 percent of the total group live in the western states, (31, p. 174), with the greatest single concentration found in Texas. In 36 counties in Texas, more than 50 percent of all white school children are of Mexican descent (6, p. 36). Other states having considerable numbers are California, Arizona, and Colorado. Hispanos, as we have noted, are concentrated in New Mexico. Although some Hispanos are migrant workers, the great majority of these migrants are from those who have immigrated into this country, the Mexican Americans. There has been some moving of Mexican population toward urban centers; Chicago, Detroit, Gary, and Kansas City have sizable populations. In the last 20 years, Mexicans have found increasing employment in industry. In Chicago, for example, they have entered the steel mills, packing plants, and tanneries. Burma has noted that "Much of this urban residence consists in using the city as a winter home which is left in the spring and summer for migratory agricultural labor" (6, p. 37).

For the most part, the Mexican American is an agricultural worker, and he shares many of the values of a rural culture. In contrast to the Hispanos, however, his rural culture is that of Mexico rather than one modified through long years of colonial settlement on soil now American. His roots are not in the land on which he now lives. Because of this fact, one of the most interesting approaches to the culture of Mexican Americans is a study of the part of Mexico from which he came. Such a study was reported by Humphrey (19). Many immigrants are known to have come from the region in and about Jalisco, and because of this the town of Tecolotlan was selected for study.

Tecolotlan is located 117 kilometers approximately southwest of Guadalajara. The population of the town in 1940 was 4,266 persons, and of the entire *municipio*, 10,900. Of this latter number, only 4,100 could read and write. There is no high school in the town, the nearest being in Guadalajara. Only the wealthy could afford to send students to school in Guadalajara. As among the Hispano, education is not highly valued, and "Little book-learning is deemed necessary for the average person" (19, p. 251). Teachers have little prestige; those in state schools in 1944 were paid 70 pesos per month—less than a tourist pays for a hotel room in Mexico City for one night. The economy is closely bound to agriculture, both for the farmers themselves and for the merchants of the town. There is some light industry, such as making *huaraches* for the tourist trade in Tijuana. Agriculture is primitive; there were 10 times as many all-wood plows as iron-tipped ones, and only one tractor was found in all of the *municipio*.

Kinship is of great importance and family control strong. The father as an authority figure is accorded great respect, and the role of the mother is confined to the home. Sibling rivalry is less evident than in American culture. Social class distinctions are sharp, and marked deference can be seen. Little cross-class marriage occurs. Class differences are symbolized in manner of dress, as in the wearing of jackets and shoes as opposed to blankets and sandals. According to the 1940 Census figures for the *municipio*, there were 10,916 Catholics, 6 Protestants, and 17 persons without religion. Humphrey was inclined to believe that there may have been more Protestants and unbelievers, but that "it is impolitic to be either." There was reason to believe that those townspeople who had emigrated to the United States were not the poorest element in the population, but more often the independent farm laborer group, and sometimes the sons of upper-class merchants. We have summarized here only some of the cultural picture reported by Humphrey, but the parts noted are perhaps enough to give some general idea of the culture of the community and, to the extent that Tecolotlan is representative, of the background from which Mexican Americans have come.

Much more completely than in the case of the Negroes, the culture in which both Hispanos and Mexican immigrants live is rural, and a quite primitive rural culture at that. Mexicans, like the Negroes, experience caste or caste-like restrictions. The Negroes, however, have not been isolated in the same way as have those of Mexican descent. The dilemma of the Negroes, as Myrdal (33) has pointed out, has been rendering participation in ambivalent democratic values. The Mexican citizen,

on the other hand, has been isolated by language and by values incompatible with the dominant American pattern. Altus (1) has called attention to the striking persistence of Spanish among men in an Army Special Training Center. All men of Mexican ancestry spoke Spanish regardless of the number of generations their ancestors had lived in the United States. Quite a number could also read and write Spanish, usually without having studied it in school. And one in eight of the group, although born in the United States and having lived all their lives here, could speak only Spanish. The language difficulties of Spanish-speaking children in schools have frequently been stressed. Spanish speaking doubtless reflects isolation and contributes to further isolation.

But we must remember also that, like the American Indians, the Hispanos have their own culture, developed at least in part on American soil. Will Rogers once remarked that his ancestors did not come over in the Mayflower; they met it when it arrived. The Hispanos justifiably might make a similar remark regarding the Anglo-Americans in the Southwest. The values of Japanese Americans happen to be compatible with dominant middle-class values; those of American Indians are only slightly so; and those of Mexicans only moderately so. The rural, family-oriented, deference-to-authority pattern of social values characteristic of the majority of Mexican immigrants would have been more compatible with seventeenth-century American values than with present urban, democratic concepts with emphasis on mobility. Again, the rural orientation is alien to the notions of technological progress. The kind of individual craftsmanship the Mexican does value finds little place in modern factories. Mexican values are changing, but one can hardly expect in one or two generations a metamorphosis which required two or three centuries among American Anglos. And if and when Mexican values do come to approximate more closely the dominant American pattern, let us hope that the best of Mexican values can somehow survive.

Jews and Judaism

We found the values of Negroes to be strongly colored by the fact that Negroes are predominantly members of the lower class, especially those in rural areas. The situation of Jews is quite different. McDonagh and Richards (31, p. 170) report unpublished data of Coleman and Wolchin which seem to show that in Los Angeles considerably higher percentages of Jewish persons than of non-Jewish are employed in clerical, managerial, and professional occupations. These are occupations

commonly associated with the middle classes. The study was based on a limited sample drawn from the telephone directory on the basis of surnames. But even after all due caution urged by McDonagh and Richards is observed, the differences are still impressive. In the study of *Yankee City*, Warner and Srole (46, p. 73) found that there was definite upward mobility of Jews from parent to first filial generation, so that in the second generation none was in the lower class, about 40 percent in the upper-lower, and 60 percent in the middle classes. We cannot, of course, generalize from these two cities to the country as a whole, but there seems to be considerable consensus (although often resting on sheer opinion) that Jews are predominantly white-collar workers and middle class. There is no doubt that Jews in America are characteristically urban. As of a 1949 report (31, p. 163), 75 percent of the Jewish population lived in five large cities (New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Detroit), while these cities accounted for only one-eighth of the general population. On the basis of these considerations, then, we would expect Jewish values to reflect strong middle-class and urban elements and consequently to show marked similarities to the dominant American pattern. Woods concluded from her review of Jewish values that "Of all ethnic groups, the Jews most closely approximate the Americans—recent Jewish immigrants and some of the early twentieth-century immigrants excepted" (50, p. 349).

Jews are able to accept and share most of the basic democratic values. The individualism of the Jew is no less rugged than is traditional for non-Jewish white Americans, though the individualism developed from a different background. Democracy expressed as policy making by voting is perhaps more foreign to the Jewish than to the American tradition, since Jewish culture tends to be tribal rather than civil in its political conceptions (3, p. 252). The Jewish family, like that of other white Americans, is a small conjugal unit, but with stronger obligations of child to parent, for family life is thoroughly interwoven with religion. Religious ceremonial rites of passage are much more in evidence than in the middle-class Protestant family. The equality value has a sex-based modification not typical of general American values. Greater value is placed upon the boy than the girl, for the boy becomes the spiritual heir of the father, and, among the more orthodox at least, religious leadership is reserved for men. It is the son who says the *kadish* after the death of his parents. On the economic side of the picture the Jew readily participates in middle-class American values of saving for the future, neatness, orderliness, efficiency, and active partici-

pation in community affairs. Progress as a value causes no difficulty for the Jew, but technology as such is a minor interest. Adaptation to the money economy, so difficult for the American Indian, has long been a historical accomplishment of the Jew in Europe, where at one time he was not permitted to own land and was excluded from the guilds. Jewish financial aptness in America has given rise to stereotypes and to the myth of financial domination which survives in spite of evidence to the contrary (31, p. 169).

One of the strong and characteristic values of Jews is the emphasis placed on education, but this value has a different meaning than it does for Americans at large, a strongly religious meaning which can be understood more clearly against the background of tradition. A seminar at Columbia University which was part of a larger project for Research in Contemporary Culture, studied giving among East European Jews. The value placed upon education was shown to be related to beliefs about giving. As reported by Joffe (20), the giving of goods, or of learning, or of services is considered a blessed deed, a *mitsvah*—the word can mean either a divine command, or the merit which accrues to one's heavenly account through fulfillment of such a command. One's lot in the after life depends in part on the *mitsvahs* recorded for him. A good Jew is a "pitying" man who will always help. But in addition to the accumulation of *mitsvahs*, there is immediate satisfaction in giving. "Giving is both a duty and a joy; it is a source of heavenly approval and also a source of earthly prestige" (20, p. 238). Proper giving is downward, as the giving of knowledge from age to youth. Gifts between equals cannot be accepted without loss of prestige, unless an equal gift is returned. Even aged parents are reluctant to accept support from children.

Now a major kind of giving is the transmission of knowledge, especially the religious tradition. But learning is an end in itself; it is not a means to social mobility. The giving of knowledge is a *mitsvah*, a high service, not a means of earning a living. Consequently, the village teacher who depends for his living upon the teaching of children has little prestige. He is commonly regarded as something of an incompetent who is unable to earn his living otherwise and who must therefore resort to his learning—and not a very high level of learning at that. The picture as developed in the seminar was regarded as applicable to East European Jews in the late prewar period. Again, we cannot generalize from this one study to the education values of Jews in America; much acculturation has taken place. But the sharp etching of this one part of Jewish tradition by Joffe at least helps to make the point

that education as a value for Jews has quite a different background than the faith in education developed in America at first in a tradition of religious republicanism, and later against the background of the settlement of the West, and now as a symbol of class status.

Not only the value placed upon education but many other Jewish values must be understood against the background of Judaism. The sharpest differences in values are found, as might be expected, between the Judaic tradition and those parts of the American culture which are Christian. We have noted that, with the exception of the American bent for technology, Jewish values are rather easily compatible with the secular basic American values. But the Christian strain in the American heritage places high value on the virtues of self-sacrifice, and this finds no counterpart in Jewish culture (3, p. 257). The Jewish ideal is more nearly the fullest development of all men, including one's self. Historically, however, it does not appear that the Christian ethical ideal of self-sacrifice has been much of an inhibition in the development of aggressive middle-class values among gentiles, and it is an interesting hypothesis that the Jewish ethical orientation has made it relatively easy for the Jew to accept the values of aggressive middle-class mobility.

A Note on European Immigrants

Suppose that you were asked to write a single composite character sketch of all the people you know. Doubtless you would protest that such a task is impossible, as indeed it is. It would be almost equally impossible to describe in any composite way the value patterns of European immigrants, for the diversity is great. All that can be done in a brief space is to note in a very general manner some ways in which these people differ from the ethnic groups thus far described. For one thing, European immigrants do not become castes in our society, whereas Negroes, Orientals, and American Indians are often if not typically reacted to as members of color castes. To a lesser extent, Hispanos and Mexican immigrants are also subjected to caste-like restrictions. Like the Negroes, however, first-generation immigrants rather typically find themselves in the lower social classes. In urban areas the jobs available to them are commonly in manufacturing and mechanical industries and in trade and service occupations (31, p. 311), and are for the most part unskilled and semiskilled. The housing and other living conditions in which many of the foreign born find themselves also contribute to a lower-class manner of living. Later generations, however, experience much greater mobility than do Negroes. In *Yankee City*

(46), mobility was found to be the usual pattern of most white, European immigrant groups in the first-filial generation. While *Yankee City* may not be representative of other parts of the country in any detailed way, such mobility does seem to be quite general, at least up to recent years. The general background of culture from which most European immigrants come is usually such as to permit considerable sharing of general American values, but here a distinction should probably be made. It has been customary to differentiate between "old" and "new" immigrants. The former group is composed of those who came approximately before the turn of the century, and largely from the northern and western Europe. There were the Swedes, Norwegians, Germans, Danes, Irish, Scotch, English, Dutch, and others. These peoples were the ancestors of most of the present population of the United States, and they rather easily shared the basic patterns of values found here. The "new" immigrants included larger numbers of persons from southern and eastern Europe, including the Poles, Czechoslovakians, Russians, Italians, Greeks, Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Armenians. It has commonly been felt that these peoples come from cultural backgrounds less similar to the culture of the United States. In evaluating such a generalization, however, we must keep in mind that the cultural background of the immigrant need not be similar in order for values to be compatible with those found here, as we saw in the case of the Japanese Americans. This possibility deserves much more study than it has thus far received.

The great majority of the foreign-born white population live in urban centers, and since many came from rural or semirural environments in Europe, a part of the process of readjustment is that of replacing rural values with those more urban. Doubtless the whole matter of assimilation has been retarded by the tendency of national groups to congregate in certain sections of the cities, causing the appearance of "little Italies" and "Germantowns," often with their own foreign-language newspapers, churches, and the like. Schools located in such areas naturally reflect this kind of segregation. A most illuminating picture of an Italian settlement has been given by Whyte (48) in his *Street Corner Society*; here one can become acquainted with flesh-and-blood individuals and the world in which they lived, and sense something of the values which had meaning for the group. In the rural areas, the same sort of segregation occurred. Throughout the Middle West one could find rural communities predominantly German, or Swedish, or Norwegian, and to a lesser extent this is still true. The local church was often dominated by a particular ethnic group, so that the church became

in effect a sect perpetuating not only doctrine but ethnic values. Such a situation in *Jonesville* was studied by Wray (51). For the most part the foreign-born white population has concentrated in the northern states, particularly the more northerly states along the eastern seaboard and in middle-western states such as Michigan, Illinois, and Minnesota, although many are found also in California. But statistics are cold things. Even the casual tourist can sense something of the indelible imprint made by some of these national groups: the French in New Orleans and on up to St. Louis, the Norwegians and Swedes in Minnesota and eastern South Dakota, the Dutch in some communities in Iowa and Pennsylvania, and the Germans in many communities in the Mid west, and others. But counselors and other guidance personnel cannot be merely tourists; what they need to do is to sense and really to understand the values of cultural groups important in their own communities.

ACCULTURATION

We have been discussing the interrelationships among the value systems of certain subcultures with each other and with general American culture, and have sought to stress the principle that the individual experiences the impact of differing values of the cultures in which he participates as one continuous though sometimes conflicting experience. We turn now to the matter of the acquisition of values of a culture differing from that into which one is born. This is one aspect of acculturation. As stated by the Subcommittee on Acculturation: "Acculturation comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous firsthand contact, with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups" (28, p. 464). Obviously, acculturation may be studied on either or both of two levels: that of society, or that of the individual. Since our focus is upon guidance, we shall be most concerned with the level of the individual. On the level of the group, though, some of the variables important to acculturation should be noted. Davis (9, p. 268) has given a useful list:

1. The complexity of the two cultures
2. The relative prestige of the two cultures
3. The average social class position of the two groups
4. The relative length of residence of the two groups
5. The relative size of the two populations

6. The intensity of contact, that is, the degree of isolation or participation
7. The degree of urbanization

Probably most of the above are self-explanatory, but several comments may be helpful. Usually one will find a stronger motivation to acquire a culture felt to have greater prestige than one's own, rather than vice versa; in fact, unless such a feeling exists, acculturation is apt to be on a superficial imitative level rather than one of real internalization. The first-generation immigrant, for example, may accept some of the outward forms of American ways while retaining first loyalty to the old and "really better" ways, while the second generation, more impressed with the prestige of the new, may really internalize American values. We have seen the "average social class position" factor illustrated in the situation of the Negroes who find themselves predominantly in the lower class, while white culture appears middle class. If the situation were reversed, it would be difficult to imagine many middle-class Negroes seeking to acquire a culture seen as lower class. Still on the level of the group, but with more specific reference to school situations, there are certain conditions which seem to make for more successful acculturation of minority groups. Again Davis (9, p. 272) has given a helpful analysis. Acculturation proceeds effectively when the minority group of pupils: (1) is approximately the same level as the dominant group, (2) is relatively small—25 percent or less of the total, (3) comes from middle-class homes, (4) has lived in America a relatively long time, and (5) comes from a community approximately as rural or urban as the new. In more general terms, these conditions suggested by Davis seem to reduce to the statement that acculturation is most successful when the differences between dominant and minority groups are not too great, but the list is helpful in specifying *what* differences are important. One last word regarding the concept of acculturation: we shall use the word as referring not only to learning of a majority culture by an ethnic group, but also the learning of a new social class culture, such as the learning of middle-class culture by lower-class individuals.

Acculturation has both positive and negative sides. There is of course the learning of new cultural elements, but as Linton (28, p. 470) has noted, "This is only one-half the picture." There is also the negative side of learning to inhibit old patterns. Since both the dropping of the old and the acquisition of the new are slow and often conflicted processes, there is frequently a kind of in-between stage in which

old values are gone or ineffective, and new ones not yet firmly established. It has been found true in a number of situations that crime rates are higher among second- than among first-generation immigrants. Another commonly observed situation is that of the American Indian who, after graduation from college, is no longer able to return as a "blanket Indian," is not genuinely accepted into white American society, and consequently remains suspended between the two as a "marginal man."

The process of transition from one culture to another often has poignant meaning for the individual, and especially for the adolescent who by very reason of his age is already a kind of marginal man between childhood and maturity. Teachers frequently observe the second-generation immigrant youngster who—although he or she has learned to speak Polish, or German, or Norwegian at home—is a bit embarrassed by his ability to do so and avoids any reference to the language of his parents. Not so obvious are the cases of adolescents who strenuously resist carrying a lunch to school and insist on eating in the school cafeteria or at a restaurant, because they are aware that the lunch from home will be conspicuous as foreign food, or farm food. The easy explanation that the adolescent places high value on being like his age-peers is too superficial; he is caught in a cultural transition and is disowning the old and reaching for the new. The same sort of thing happens with the mobile individual moving, for example, from the lower to the middle class. Here is the boy "from the wrong side of the tracks" who by reason of athletic success in high school finds himself in college. Assuming that he has not only an athletic record but also the intellectual ability to succeed in a preprofessional program of studies, he may find himself moving farther and farther from the lower-class culture into which he was born. Probably without being aware of what is happening to him, he finds a gulf widening between the values by which his parents live and the values of the middle class to which he comes to aspire. Or, sans the athletic element, counselors during the time of the "GI Bill" saw this happening time and again. On the adult level, there is the young Mexican American teacher in a dominantly Anglo school who has successfully made the transition. He is liked by students, and his colleagues respect and accept him. In the Mexican quarter, however, his very success makes him just a bit suspect. He has somehow deserted his own. The mobile person must be able and willing emotionally to break with the old without yet having the new firmly in hand. This is the price of mobility, and the price is high.

Perhaps the tension of acculturation of lower-class youth to mid-

de-class schools might be lessened if the process could be less conspicuous, but this is a great deal to expect. In spite of American ideals of democracy, the basic social structure of the school is authoritarian and its flavor middle-class by reason of the middle-class values of the great majority of teachers. In a study of the complaints of administrators and teachers of schools in lower-class areas of California, Davis (9, p. 275) found a common core of complaints, whether the students involved were white, Anglo, Negro, or Mexican. Most frequent among the offenses were dirtiness, uncouth and aggressive language, cursing, fighting, ganging, sexual precocity (by middle-class age norms), and various kinds of dress and make-up regarded as objectionable. Interestingly enough, essentially the same items were given by principals and teachers attending a summer workshop in human development at the University of Chicago. It is not our intention to suggest that any or all of these behaviors should be accepted or encouraged by the schools. Certainly problems arise around them. We are simply pointing to the fact that the problems which result from the interacting of lower-class culture and the middle-class culture of the schools are often problems of acculturation.

A good bit of insight into the process of acculturation can be gained from a study of Navaho veterans made by Vogt (42). The definition of values used was the same as noted earlier in this chapter. Case histories of the men were developed covering the time before, during, and after military service. One question raised in the study was: Under what conditions do significant changes in individual Navaho value systems occur? The findings indicated three crucial conditions: (1) a background *within* Navaho society in which the individual is not effectively socialized to conservative Navaho values; (2) face-to-face relations with whites *outside* of Navaho society, such as schooling; (3) personal adjustment lacking in satisfying affective ties with others, and characterized by conflict and insecurity. A second question concerned the part played by contacts during service in bringing about shifts in Navaho values. Service experience seemed important in that the men were away from home for longer periods than previously experienced, they traveled widely, and they were brought into contact with whites who accorded them more respect than had people of the Southwest. Experiences which appeared to be associated crucially with value changes were of three types: (1) the development of a sense of relationship to the larger society and a realization that the Navaho people are, after all, only part of the social universe; (2) an experience of friendlier

contacts with whites than had previously come their way, and (3) in the case of the more acculturated, changes toward American orientations as to nature and time. The third question posed, as to what service experiences were most significant, was answered differently for the two extreme groups. Changes associated with the service were particularly significant for those veterans who before entering service had had many years of contact with whites in schools, and who had a good command of English. On the other hand, however, service experience also brought significant changes for those for whom the service was almost the first contact with whites.

This study was not of course intended to yield results for application to the specific problem of acculturation in schools, and it would be unpardonable to detract from the neatness of its design and execution by attempting to apply its findings out of context. But even with such risks in mind, the temptation to offer several comments is irresistible. There is first the suggestion that marked acculturation comes after a period of disruption: the individuals were not fully socialized to the traditional values of the parent culture; experiences were conflicted; and the men lacked satisfying affective ties with others. Then came a broadening of contacts in the new culture; but, more important, a substantial part of the new contacts was satisfying in a way not previously experienced. Here again we see the dual aspects of acculturation noted before, a negative side in which old values are broken down, and a positive phase in which new values are developed. Both apparently are essential. In the schools there is so often little opportunity for the second aspect. The lower-class boy, be he white or Negro, finds himself effectively rejected by the middle-class school because of the physical aggression, tavern language, and sex and property attitudes which his own culture has taught him; but little help is available in learning the needed new behaviors and few satisfying experiences to sustain whatever efforts he makes.

GUIDANCE AND ACCULTURATION

Transition from one culture to another is at best a poignant experience for the individual, and at the worst a tearing emotional disruption. Conflicts of a deeply disturbing nature are illustrated in the collection of case reports edited by Seward (37). Here can be found examples of individuals from all of the ethnic groups which we used as examples. But our emphasis is not on cases of such intensity, or exclusively upon

the acculturation of individuals in ethnic groups to the way of life of the majority. Probably counselors in secondary schools will more frequently encounter problems of acculturation from one social class to another than problems of persons in transition from ethnic groups. There are several suggestions implicit in our preceding discussion which may well apply to either kind of acculturation problems.

First of all, a genuine understanding of cultures can help counselors and other guidance personnel to achieve a more complete acceptance of the individual. Once we come to realize that for the other person his way of life is as normal and right to him as ours is to us, we have done much to avoid the temptation to blame him for being different from us. The tavern language of the lower-class boy, for example, becomes simply a normal learning in his culture. This does not mean, of course, that the counselor needs to adopt this language as his own; acceptance is not adoption. But acceptance does mean that different cultural learnings cease to be moral issues. And here we are confronted with a question: Can such acceptance of cultural differences be largely if not wholly on an intellectual plane, or must there be also a kind of cultural empathy? Probably this is, after all, an academic question. The individual whose relations to others within his own culture lacks warmth can hardly be expected to acquire suddenly a warmth in cross-cultural relations. He will continue to be pretty much himself, but in his own way he can strive toward accepting the individual as a product of his cultural learnings rather than blaming him for being different.

A second implication of our discussion is that guidance has a very definite contribution to make in offering support to the individual during the ordeal of acculturation. While the individual is suspended between the old and new worlds, with the old crumbling and the new not yet established, he may be fortunate enough to have the resources of a supporting home; the prestige of some special achievement in school, be it music, speech, athletics, academic success, or others; the accident of accepting friendships continuing from childhood; or the understanding and genuine acceptance by at least some teachers or other adults in the school situation. But unless he is so fortunate, he has but two courses open to him: continue in school while taking out his tensions in overt aggression or in silent, internalized revolt, or dropping out of school. It should be a function of guidance to identify those in the process of acculturation and to set about consciously providing support for those lacking the needed resources. The public school does much to promote social mobility, and probably contributes to the breaking down of val-

ues of ethnic groups. But little is done to assist with problems of acculturation. Blame and rejection must be replaced by understanding and acceptance if the individual is to make a successful transition from the old to the new.

SUMMARY

Culture, as we have used the term, means the total way of life of a group. American culture has developed from a variety of historical roots and is actually a complex of cultural systems. Among these systems may be distinguished a general American cultural system, ethnic group subcultures, social class subcultures, and rural and urban subcultures. The individual may participate in the general American culture and in one or more subcultures as well. If he does, he experiences the various cultures as a functioning unity. Stress and conflict may result from such participation in plural cultures.

The concept of values affords a unifying principle for the understanding of cultures. Value was defined as a conception of the desirable. There are two principal constellations of American values: (1) those centering about democracy, such as equality, liberty, and individualism, and (2) those centering about technology and progress. Each of the subcultures also has its distinctive pattern of values. Probably the dominant social class values are those of the middle class, which emphasizes such values as industry, thrift, success, and orderliness. On the one hand, middle-class values contrast with the more traditional and family-oriented upper-class values and on the other hand with the greater emphasis on the present found in lower-class values. Rural and urban values also differ, though perhaps not so clearly as do the social class values. The values of ethnic groups may be complicated by social class values as in the case of Negroes; may differ from American middle-class values and yet be compatible, as in the case of Japanese Americans; may be rather similar to middle-class values, as are apparently the values of Jews; may be basically different from the values of general American culture, as seems true of American Indian values; or may have the effect of isolating from contemporary general American culture as do the values of Mexican immigrants and Hispanos, even though some common basis in rural values seems to exist.

Acculturation, the process of acquiring values different from those of the culture into which one is born, is a difficult and often conflicted process. Two aspects are involved, the breaking down of old values and

the learning of new. The second phase of the process is one in which the individual is in need of support and reward for new learnings. It is at this point that guidance can render genuine service to the individual during the process of acculturation.

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CHAPTER 4

Stratification, Mobility, and Prestige

For many years social scientists have been impressed with the importance of social stratification. One kind of stratification which has received a great deal of attention in recent years is the social class structure. A bibliography of the investigations into the structure of social class easily reaches several hundred titles without being at all exhaustive. There can be little doubt that the configurations of behaviors represented by the construct "social class" define for the members of the classes differing ways of life and that these various configurations are, in effect, subcultures. The implications for guidance are apparent. To understand the social class structure in which the individual lives is to understand a very important part of his world, and yet the matter of social class has been rather neglected in guidance literature until quite recently.

SOME BASIC CONCEPTS

Before undertaking even a brief discussion of stratification in the United States we must clarify the meaning of certain basic terms as we shall use them. There will be no attempt to trace developments of the concepts represented by these terms or to enter into polemics as to what a given term "really" should mean. If the purpose of clarity seems to be served by pointing out incidental comparisons and contrasts with other uses of the terms, we shall do so; but our purpose is the modest one of simply explaining what we intend to convey by these terms.

The first of these words is *status*, by which we shall mean a position in a social group. It is a structural concept—that is, it refers to position rather than function. Many statuses are positions in a hierarchy of some kind and so are ranked statuses, but not all statuses are ranked.

Either individuals or groups may have status, for groups may have some standing defined in a larger social structure. Status is a more general term than stratum, because stratum implies ranking, a superior-inferior ordering of some kind, and statuses may be either ranked or unranked—simply positions. Most individuals occupy positions in a number of group structures and so have a number of statuses. If these statuses are ranked, the individual may be high in some hierarchies, and low in others. For example, a given boy, Bob, in high school may enjoy high status in the football hierarchy, although his social class may be upper-lower, his scholastic rank about average, and his moral reputation also about average. Another boy, Jim, may be ranked in the upper-middle social class, above average scholastically, be considered above average as to moral reputation, but be so low in the football hierarchy that only with difficulty does he retain a place on the "B" squad.

Thus far we have used the term *social class* without pausing for formal definition. There has been much disagreement and confusion centered about the term *class*. In Marxian ideology a class was an aggregate of persons who perform the same function in production. The organization of production was regarded as the basic determinant because, it was argued, work is man's basic form of self-realization; by work, man provides for subsistence; by the use of tools he makes work productive, and in doing so he controls nature and makes history. Accordingly, the fundamental determinant of class was thought to be man's relation to production. Other indexes of class, such as income, consumption patterns, educational attainment, and occupation were regarded as only clues to the distribution of material goods and prestige symbols.

The concept of class held by Weber was somewhat different. For Weber, a class was a number of people who had in common a specific causal component of their "life chances." This component, although economic, was not specifically limited to position in production, but was broadened to include economic interests, the possession of goods, and opportunities for income, as these three things were conditioned by commodity and labor markets. Class situation was, therefore, ultimately market situation, and yet it was recognized that the market situation was not completely operative because of "status groups" (prestige groups). In contrast to Marx, then, Weber recognized prestige factors in class, normally expressed by a specific "style of life." Basically, however, classes were thought of as stratified in relation to production and acquisition of goods, while "status groups" were more apt to be stratified according to

consumption of goods as represented by styles of life. It was this aspect of consumption which was emphasized by Veblen in his discussion of "conspicuous consumption" as characterizing the *nouveau riche*.

It has seemed important to look briefly back at these "classic" notions of class, because some of the more recent concepts of class can be more readily understood in contrast to the ideas of Marx and Weber. In recent years two major groups of studies concerned with the problem of class have been carried out in the United States. Both have sought to study class in an operational way, divorced from any particular economic ideology or philosophy of history. One of these, of which the Warner studies are typical, has developed criteria of social classes from intensive community studies. A social class is regarded as an interacting group of individuals having some defined status in a social hierarchy. Although the focus is on the social, economic factors are recognized as important but not necessarily determinative. Acceptance into intimate association is emphasized as the basis for class membership. The second recent type of class investigations has endeavored to define class on a subjective basis. Classes are regarded as consisting of those individuals who regard themselves as members of a given class, or who identify with the class. Classes are distinguished from one another by characteristic attitudes. The group interest theory of class proposed by Centers is a development of this conceptualization of class. Because of these divergent concepts of class it is difficult if not impossible to formulate an inclusive definition of class, and later we shall examine in more detail examples of these two treatments of the problem. When the term *social class* is used without qualification as to the criteria for membership, we shall mean simply one of the identifiable socioeconomic strata comprising a stratified society.

In any concept of social classes, some kind of boundaries are implied, whether defined by some set of objective criteria or regarded as existing only in the mind of the person who identifies himself with a particular class. These boundaries should not be conceived as definite division lines; they are rather marginal zones in which one class merges into another. But if a status is a position, it must be located somewhere, or at least be regarded as being so located. This raises the question of movement from one status to another in a hierarchy; such movement is termed *mobility*. Although the kind of movement most discussed is upward, downward mobility is possible and does in fact occur. Ordinarily we think of social mobility as a family or individual matter, but

larger groups may also be mobile in the sense of changing to a higher or lower position in the larger social structure.

Thus far we have introduced a structural concept (status), a classifying concept (social class), and a movement concept (mobility). The fourth term, *prestige*, represents a concept of a different order. Prestige is an attitude concept. Prestige is the attitude of esteem or honor directed toward an object in a ranked status. Thus, we speak of a social class, or a person, or an occupation, as having prestige. What is meant is that the social class, or person, or occupation, or some other object is regarded with esteem or honor. The prestige may be attributed by those outside the social class or occupation, or by other individuals toward the esteemed individual, or prestige may be attributed by the group of individuals to themselves or by the individual to himself. Perhaps in the last analysis self-prestige attitudes come from others, but that is another question.

STUDIES OF SOCIAL CLASS

We shall be concerned with two approaches to the problem. One of these, typified by the investigations of W. Lloyd Warner and his associates, employed the methods of social anthropology and yielded what may be called a system of ascribed statuses. The second, of which the studies of Richard Centers are examples, might be termed psychological in the sense that the central problem consisted of the attitudes of individuals and their identifications with classes as they perceived them. No sharp line can be drawn, but the orientations of the two types of studies are different and consequently emphasize somewhat variant aspects of the general problem. Differing methods were employed, and since the findings of any investigation are colored by the methods used, we must examine briefly the methods of these two approaches if we are to understand even the general outline of the findings.

The methods employed by the Warner group are in many ways similar to those used in the *Middletown* studies, and are in general somewhat as follows. The research team went in as participant observers to study the community. They observed the behavior of individuals in as many as possible of the various facets of community living. Interviews were conducted in which questions were asked designed to elicit from the interviewees what they thought the local hierarchy to be, how they would place their fellow townsmen in the status structure,

and what they felt to be the characteristics of the various levels. These procedures constitute the "Evaluated Participation" method, for which six specific techniques were developed (53). On the basis of the complex of data thus secured the team sought to develop inductively a structure scheme which seemed to fit the facts. Sometimes original hypotheses were modified during the process. For example, Warner and Lunt report that at the outset of the study of *Yankee City* it was thought that the basic controls of thinking and action would be found to be economic. Such a hypothesis proved inadequate, and because of this inadequacy a new class hypothesis was developed. The concept of class was then formulated as: ". . . two or more orders of people who are believed to be, and are accordingly ranked by members of the community, in socially superior or inferior positions" (52, p. 82). In such a hierarchy, rights, privileges, and duties were unequally distributed among the several groups. Of course, social classes so conceived were not regarded as discrete groups. The behaviors and characteristics which were considered modal or typical of a particular class were often evident in the class above or below the class in which they were found to be modal, in much the same way that a given level of achievement may be thought of as the "norm" for the sixth grade even though in a given sixth-grade class we may find individuals whose achievement levels range from the fourth to the eighth grade, or even more.

Thus far, such studies might be regarded as community level studies made on the basis of reputation and consensus. But once such a classification system was developed, another step was taken in some studies. An effort was made to find objective criteria which might be used for assigning individuals to class membership. The Index of Status Characteristics was developed. This was a four-factor status scale in which each of the factors was judged on a seven-point scale. The factors used were occupation, source of income, house type, and dwelling area. Social class groups have frequently been classified on the basis of some set of objective criteria, but usually the criteria have not been developed by an intensive study of a particular community in the manner of the studies of the Warner group.

As might be expected with a method so thoroughly oriented to specific communities, somewhat divergent pictures of class structures were obtained. In the original study of *Yankee City* a sixfold classification was used, a slightly different six in *Old City* (24), five in *Elm-town* (28), while three were differentiated in *Brasstown* (43), and two in *Plainville* (55). Such a situation makes very difficult cross com-

parisons of the structure in various communities. Moreover, we have no assurance that this method of studying stratification can be applied meaningfully to large urban areas, though studies now under way should test this possibility. Certainly nothing like a nation-wide picture of social stratification can be derived from studies now available. Moreover, as Mills (35) has pointed out, the composition of the middle class seems to be changing. But in spite of all these difficulties, there is con-

TABLE 2. Social Class Memberships by Percentages of Certain Community and Education Groups

	Yankee City	Georgia Town		Elmtown Adolescents	Cornbelt Christian College Students
		White	Negro		
Upper	3.0*	4.1	.3	.5	5.1
Upper-middle	10.2	20.7	1.6	4.2	18.4
Lower-middle	28.1	35.7	9.2	21.5	50.6
Upper-lower	32.6	29.1	25.9	42.5	22.6
Lower-lower	25.2	10.4	63.0	31.3	3.3
Unknown	.9				
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Upper-upper and lower-upper classes combined.

SOURCES: *Yankee City*: W. L. Warner & P. Lunt. *The social life of a modern community*. New Haven: Yale Univer. Press, 1941. p. 88. *Georgia Town*: M. C. Hill & B. C. McCall. Social stratification in "Georgia Town." *Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 1950, 15, 721-729. *Elmtown* adolescents: A. B. Hollingshead. Class and kinship in a middle western community. *Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 1949, 15, 472, computed from table 1. *Cornbelt Christian College* students: J. R. Mook. Social class and social mobility in a midwestern college. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Univer. of Chicago, 1949. P. 46.

siderable interest in comparing the class structures found in various communities. Several examples are given in Table 2 which make possible comparisons of some results obtained in different kinds of communities and groups. *Yankee City* is an older, rather highly industrialized community in New England. *Georgia Town* is a market center and county seat in the "Cracker" culture area of southeast Georgia. All individuals 12 years of age and over were assigned statuses on the basis of the Index of Status Characteristics. The separate classifications of whites and Negroes illustrate the existence of social class hierarchies within a separate color caste. *Elmtown* was selected for study because it seemed to be a typical Middle-Western community of some 10,000 pop-

ulation very largely of native-born whites, with an economy combining agriculture, diversified manufacturing, and some mining. The 735 adolescents were classified on the basis of social class of parents. The social status of students in *Cornbelt Christian College* was based on home status ratings determined by a modified Index of Status Characteristics. The picture was complicated by the fact that at the time of the study (1947-1948), 70 percent of the men and 40 percent of the total enrollment were veterans, and the social status of veteran men was somewhat lower than that of the younger nonveterans who would presumably be more representative of students in this college in more normal times.

Characteristics of Social Classes

Are there then no conclusions which can be drawn and applied? In the sense of a whole-cloth application to a particular and different community, no. But it ought to be possible to construct on the basis of such studies a kind of generalized picture which will catch something of the meaning of class structure, even at the sacrifice of some factual accuracy. In full realization of the hazards of overgeneralization, and at the risk of being unfair to interpretations carefully wrought for specific communities studied, we shall attempt such a picture. Our purpose is to give a general impression of some of the characteristics and differences in ways of life in the various social classes, as social class was conceptualized in these studies. We shall draw at will from reports of various investigations without citing evidence for specific points. We shall use material from such studies as *Children of Brastown* (43), *Democracy in Jonesville* (48), *Deep South* (17), and *Plainville, U.S.A.* (55), in addition to those of the groups noted in Table 2. No attempt will be made to keep descriptive statements separate from interpretative comments. Although various numbers of classes were used in the different studies, we shall as a matter of convenience adopt the sixfold classification as developed in the *Yankee City* descriptions.

THE UPPER-UPPER CLASS

This class is composed of the old, established families, the local aristocracy if there is one. They have "background." Members are deferred to in almost all important relationships. Their names are sought for patron lists. Most own their homes, which are typically the large houses in restricted areas; in the South they may be the old mansions. The homes need not be the newest; in fact, it is better if they are sur-

rounded by tradition. Servants are a normal part of the pattern of living. Men who engage in occupations will be in those of a proprietary or managerial sort, but within this class we find also the largest number of employable individuals who do not work—men of leisure. Upper-upper individuals marry later than those in other classes, and consequently here we find the highest percentage of single persons. There is a high degree of participation in social clubs, but relatively little in fraternal and civic organizations. Gracious living and good taste are basic parts of the code. Typically, personal publicity is avoided. Individuals affiliate with exclusive churches, and often contribute heavily to their financial support, but are not particularly regular in attendance or active in participation. Children may attend elementary public schools, but are then sent to private preparatory schools, and from there to carefully selected colleges. However, there is not the same pressure for college graduation that one finds in the upper-middle class. Arrests are rare, constituting considerably less than 1 percent of the total for the community, partly because such indiscretions as do occur seldom reach the police blotter. Upper-upper individuals see themselves as the old aristocracy by reason of inheritance ("Our families have always been the best people"). They are apt to see the upper-middle class as "nice, respectable people," the lower-middle class as "good people" but "just nobody," and the two lower classes without differentiation as the "working class" or the "poorer class."

THE LOWER-UPPER CLASS

The second ranking class is distinguished from the upper-upper group as being the "new" rather than the "old" aristocracy. Here we find the *nouveaux riches*, the parvenus. They may have accumulated wealth equal to or superior to some of those in the upper-upper class, but their wealth is too new, or they lack family background. They are still in the process of converting economic gain into "badges of prestige," and "conspicuous consumption" is rather frequent. Most are in proprietary or professional occupations, although some are active in other areas of business. Many live in large homes, located in the areas favored by the upper-upper group, though some considerable percentage will be found in medium-sized homes in good repair. Marriage among the young is less strictly within class than in the case of the upper-upper persons. Some adolescents attend the public school where they take college preparatory programs, though frequently an effort is made to send youth to the "right" preparatory schools, and then on to

college. As contrasted with the upper-upper class in which one rarely if ever finds members of ethnic minority groups, a few ethnic individuals are found among the lower-uppers. Interest in selected fraternal organizations and community associations generally is considerable, and there is participation in the accessible social clubs. Very few arrests are recorded, and as in the case of the upper-upper class, offenses which among the lower classes might result in arrest are handled informally. Among some of the more mobile individuals there is an avid interest in things "cultural," sometimes in the Dodsworth manner. Their attitude toward the upper-middle class seems colored by the fact of only recently having left this class, and there are relatives who would be so classified. They may deny that persons in the upper-middle class are really below them socially, but they seem to feel that lower-middle class individuals are somehow really different. Differences between themselves and the upper-upper group are minimized, but the two lower classes are considered without distinction as "just the working class," or "the poorer class."

THE UPPER-MIDDLE CLASS

This is the group in which we find many of the local civic leaders. They are apt to furnish the officers of the chamber of commerce, the Rotary Club, some of the lodges, the board of education, and country club, as well as many trustees and members of official boards of churches. Aggressive leadership and "getting things done" is a part of the code for both men and women. The women are active in the woman's club, if possible in the Daughters of the American Revolution, and perhaps the garden club, but do not have access to the exclusive social clubs of the upper-upper group. They frequently are active in the higher prestige churches, and attend more regularly than do the two upper classes. Arrest rates are only slightly if any higher than for the two classes above them. Occupationally the men tend to be concentrated in business as owners of small businesses, or managers of larger businesses controlled by the two upper classes. Still, there are also a number of professional persons, some skilled workers, and very occasionally a semiskilled worker. White-collar occupations definitely predominate. Most upper-middle families own their own homes, which are typically of medium size, comfortable and in good repair, but only very infrequently the older mansions or the new "show places." The great majority are native-born Americans, though a considerable number were born and reared in other communities. The age of marriage is a year or

two below that of the two upper classes. Children attend public high schools and usually go on to state universities or colleges. Here we find the highest percentage of college graduates. More than any other class, this group subscribes to magazines and uses the public library. Although extensive travel is not common, a yearly vacation trip is almost a standard part of the cultural pattern. The lower classes are apt to regard them as the "higher-ups," or "those who think they are somebody," or "almost society." To the upper classes they are solid, substantial, citizens. Stable upper-middles participate rather freely and informally with the lower-middles without maintaining any great social distance, but the more mobile upper-middle class individuals are apt to exaggerate the difference. The two lower classes, though, are thought of, often without much distinction, as "just the working class."

THE LOWER-MIDDLE CLASS

The three lower classes consist of the "common man," and the lower-middle class is at the upper edge of this largest portion of the population. Here we find clerks, semiskilled workers, small businessmen such as shopkeepers, more skilled workers than in any other class, and a minority of professional persons. Incomes are characteristically wages, though the white-collar workers are on salaries and the business group depend upon profits. A substantial minority of mothers are employed outside the home to supplement family income. The majority of families have small savings accounts and insurance policies. Probably most have limited bank credit, and those who do not, resort to the small-loan broker in time of crisis. Most homes are small but comfortable, and the percentage owning them seems to vary considerably with the region of the country. A goodly portion of the houses are located in the more desirable parts of the town, but not in the exclusive sections. The percentage of church attendance is apt to be higher for this group than for any other class. Both men and women are ardent "joiners" of lodges with auxiliaries, social clubs of lesser prestige, church groups, political party organizations, and a few are found in Rotary and (in some localities) the country club. In contrast to the avoidance of personal publicity by the upper-upper group, even the smaller social affairs of the lower-middle are detailed in the papers. As might be expected, the educational level is lower than in the higher classes. College graduation is relatively infrequent, but graduation from high school is an increasingly common achievement, with more interest displayed in "shop" or "trade" courses than in any of the higher groups. There is considerable

class consciousness evidenced by such phrases as "we poor folks," and those in the higher classes are apt to be thought of as there "mainly because they have money." Such resentment as there is, however, seems directed more sharply against the upper-middle class than toward the two upper classes.

THE UPPER-LOWER CLASS

Here we find the concentration of wage earners who work in the factories, mines, mills, and on the farms as laborers. There are some skilled workers, many semiskilled and unskilled, clerks, and a few owners of small businesses. Dwellings are apt to be small and in moderate to poor state of repair. Substantially fewer than half own their homes, and ownership seems to concentrate in occupational groups; the business owners, craftsmen, and clerks. A minority have small savings accounts and limited bank credit. Small loan brokers, however, regard the upper-lower class as excellent risks. Marriage occurs at an earlier age than in higher classes; families are larger; and family stability is definitely less than in the two middle classes. Among the older generation the education level is characteristically the upper years of elementary school; but most children remain in school through one or two years of high school, and some graduate. This group is considerably less active in the churches than are the members of the middle classes, although the women participate more than the men. Some service clubs and lodges are virtually closed to members of this group, but a minority are quite active in accessible fraternal organizations. In areas where labor is unionized, this group is apt to be active in union leadership. Much of the leisure time is spent about the home, at the movies, and in visiting. Social participation tends to be within-class. In descending the social structure, we find the first definite increase in arrests in this group. The upper-middle class is apt to regard the upper-lower class rather vaguely as poor but honest, hard workers, who try to raise their children properly but never seem to get ahead. The upper-lowers, for their part, think of the three upper classes as "society" based on wealth, but they sharply separate themselves from the lower-lower group whom they regard as "loafers" and "the criminal class."

THE LOWER-LOWER CLASS

Characteristically persons in this group are employed in semi-skilled or unskilled labor, often of a seasonal sort, so that unemployment is rather common. Employers complain that they are unreliable.

During periods of economic depression, relief loads are concentrated in this class. The percentage of home ownership is very small, and the dwelling area is commonly segregated and given various names, according to local usage, such as "shanty town," "string town," "squatters' paradise," "canal town," "box town," "Pole town," and the like. Homes are poorly furnished, practically innocent of books or magazines, and little provision for privacy is possible. Family life is unstable, and the incidence of broken homes is high. Formal education usually ceases when the minimum age is reached, and enforcement of the minimum is difficult. A few may attend high school for a while. The majority of families have no actual church membership or participations, and high-prestige churches are closed to them. In fact, lower-lower individuals are typically isolated from organized social and civic activities except for those who may be employed in unionized labor situations. Incidence of arrests is high, typically the highest of any of the classes. This group is apt to be rather passive and fatalistic about their lot; living becomes a kind of resigned, day-to-day affair. They resent those mobile individuals in the upper-lower class just above them as ambitious and snobbish, and the higher classes are simply "society." The upper classes regard lower-lowers as lazy, lacking in morals, foreigners, given to sexual looseness, and crime. Actually, the facts do not support many of these charges, and as Warner has remarked, "Their reputation for immorality often is no more than the projected fantasy of those above them; as such they become a collective symbol of the community's unconscious" (49, p. 58).

Subjective Class Memberships

We turn now to an approach to the problem of social classes which emphasizes much more of the subjective element. Studies by Centers, Cantril, and others have been concerned with such questions as the classes to which people feel they belong, and why they feel they belong in particular classes, rather than class memberships ascribed to them by others. This difference in approach from that of the Warner studies is quite understandable when we remember that Warner was applying the methods of social anthropology to modern societies, whereas the studies of Centers and Cantril developed out of an interest in social psychology and a background of surveys of public opinion. Various strata develop in a society from the economic system prevailing in a culture, and from the functions, roles, and statuses imposed; but these strata, Centers believes, are not necessarily classes. In his words:

Class, as distinguished from stratum, can well be regarded as a *psychological* phenomenon in the fullest sense of the term. That is, a man's class is part of his ego, a *feeling on his part of belongingness to something*; an *identification* with something larger than himself. . . . To be sure, others may think of a man, because of his economic and social attributes, as belonging to a class different from that to which he feels he really belongs, and though knowledge of such ascription must form an important part of his frame of reference and have an enormous, perhaps determinative, influence upon the identification he does make, he is ultimately bound, it would seem, only by his own feeling of loyalty and by his own interests and values (12, p. 27).

As might be expected, the picture gained from questioning people about their feelings of class membership is quite different from that resulting from ascribing membership on the basis of more objective criteria. One of the most consistently found differences is the percentage of people who regard themselves as members of the middle class as compared to the percentage to whom middle-class membership is ascribed. In 1939 in a survey conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion (the "Gallup poll") the question was asked: "To what social class in this country do you feel you belong? Middle class, upper class, or lower class?" The responses were: upper, 6 percent; middle, 88 percent; and lower, 6 percent (23, p. 309). A year later, an open-end form of question was used in a survey conducted by *Fortune* (22, p. 14): "What word would you use to name the class in America you belong to?" The results were much less clear-cut. Forty-seven percent gave responses which either used the word "middle" or words which could be interpreted to mean that, but 27.5 percent said they did not know. Cantril (8) reported on interviews conducted in June, 1941, which made it possible to relate social class and economic group identifications. Two questions were used:

Which income group in our country do you feel you are a member of—the middle-income group, the upper-income group, or the lower-income group?
 _____Upper _____Upper-middle _____Middle _____Lower-middle
 _____Lower

To what social class in this country do you feel you belong—middle class, or upper, or lower?
 _____Upper _____Upper-middle _____Middle _____Lower-middle
 _____Lower

Among the conclusions reached by Cantril in his interpretation of the findings were that the "overwhelming majority of the American People" identify themselves with the middle class. There was definitely not a one-to-one correspondence between income group and social class

identifications. Rather, the tendency toward identification with the middle class is greater among lower-income people, and disparity of social and income class identifications increases as one goes up in social class and down in income groups. There is a "distinct tendency" for people to regard their social class as higher than their economic group. Moreover, the majority in each of eight occupational groups identified themselves with the middle class, but the tendency to identify in this way was stronger among business executives, professional persons, white-collar workers, skilled workers, and farmers than among semiskilled and unskilled workers, and servants (8, 47). Centers noted that in the

TABLE 3. Class Identifications of a National Cross Section of White Males

	July, 1945 (N = 1,099) Percent	February, 1946 (N = 1,337) Percent
Upper class	3	4
Middle class	43	36
Working class	51	52
Lower class	1	5
Don't know	1	3
Don't believe in classes	1	0

SOURCE: R. Centers. *The psychology of social classes*. Princeton: Princeton Univer. Press, 1949. P. 77, tables 18 & 19.

responses to the *Fortune* survey there seemed to be an avoidance of the word "lower" and that a number had used the words "working" or "laboring." He therefore framed the following question: "If you were asked to use one of these four names for your social class, which would you say you belonged in: the middle class, lower class, working class, or upper class?" (12, p. 76). The results of interviews showed that about half of those responding placed themselves in the working class, and about two-fifths in the middle class (Table 3). Evidently the term "working class" was much more acceptable—possibly less threatening.

Social Classes as Reference Groups

Another group of studies has carried forward investigation of a special aspect of status and has developed the concept of reference groups. This line of inquiry seems to offer particularly important implications for guidance. The term *reference groups* was introduced in

in 1942 in a study of status by Hyman (30). In the exploratory part of the study he conducted rather intensive interviews with a number of persons. On the basis of outcomes of these interviews he developed scales for the measurement of six dimensions of status: general, economic, intellectual, cultural, social, and physical attractiveness. Subjects were then asked to rate themselves on each of these statuses against three different reference groups: the total population in the United States, friends and acquaintances, and their own occupational groups. Hyman was able to show that systematic change of reference groups altered judgments in four ways. Changes in status were produced. Within each status dimension an individual's judgment of his status shifted when reference groups were changed. Interrelations between statuses could also be changed. The reliability of status measurement was found to be a function of the reference group; economic status was judged reliably only in reference to the occupational group, and social status with some reliability only in reference to a group of friends. Conclusions regarding general status were tentative, but general status appeared to be a composite of specific statuses. However, the nature of this composite general status depended upon the reference groups employed; and since the values of the reference groups were thus involved, probably specific statuses contributed to the general status in accordance with their degree of value to the individual.

Hyman used the term *reference group* to mean rather generally any group with which an individual compares himself. As further investigations were carried out, difficulties of terminology emerged. Sometimes reference group was used as it was by Hyman; sometimes it was used to mean only those groups with which an individual identified himself. Sometimes reference groups were limited to nonmembership groups, and sometimes the situation was stressed in which reference groups embody cultural norms and values. A dozen years after the original study, Bott (5) reviewed these difficulties in terminology and suggested a distinction between (1) direct reference groups—those in which the referent is an actual group with interlocking roles and distinctive norms which can be directly internalized by the individual, and (2) constructed reference groups—those in which the referent is a concept or social category rather than an actual group, with relatively high projection of norms into the constructed group. This is an interesting distinction. Both the occupational groups and the friends and acquaintances used by Hyman seem to be examples of direct reference groups, and the "population of the United States" appears to be a constructed

group. If these are fair examples of the distinction intended by Bott, then the earlier findings of Hyman would seem to support the distinction drawn by Bott.

But perhaps direct and constructed groups are just the end points of a continuum of varying degrees of personal reality and immediacy of experience, ranging from the direct end of actual groups with "interlocking roles and distinctive norms" known from day-to-day experience, to the constructed end which is a "concept or social category," into which by reason of its very ambiguity much projection may occur. Such a hypothesis seems to offer some assistance in relating findings from the various studies of ascribed and subjective statuses which we have been discussing, as typified by the Warner and Centers studies. The lower-lower class person who thinks of the upper-upper classes vaguely as "society," and the upper-upper persons who lump together the lower classes as "the poor people" are both doing really the same thing—using a constructed group which for them has no real meaning in personal experience. For each, the distant classes represent an unstructured stimulus situation, and so stereotypes and various other subjective elements are easily projected. For the lower-middle person, however, the upper-middle class which is only one step away takes on more reality from personal experience and can function as a direct reference group because the lower-middle individual knows of the roles and norms of the upper-middle class. Those who are judged to be nonmobile on the basis of ascribed status rankings are in one of two situations. Either they have judged themselves by their own class as a reference group and found satisfaction, or they have judged themselves by the norms of a higher group and found the distance to be too great to be worth attempting. Constructed groups seem to be less commonly used in judgments; Hyman found during interviews that the "general population of the United States" was rarely used as a reference group. On the other hand, the intimate groups—friends and those with whom the individual works—were the most frequently used.

Thus far we have been concerned principally with characteristics of groups which function as reference groups. But the really crucial element in the concept of reference groups is the kind of relationship existing between individual and group; the individual must be ego-involved with the group if the group is to function as a true reference group. Sherif and Sherif have given a definition which stresses this distinctive element: "Reference groups are those groups to which the individual relates himself as a part or to which he aspires to relate him-

self psychologically" (41, p. 175). Mere association of an individual with members of a group does not make that group a reference group for the individual, and on the other hand, a group with which the individual has no personal experience may be a powerful reference group for the individual. Thus the distinction between reference and non-reference groups is not the same as the sociological one between primary and secondary groups. For example, if a boy is forced to continue in school by parental pressure or legal age requirements, and finds himself in an algebra class made up largely of students expecting to attend college, he may associate with his classmates in face-to-face relations; but the class may have no meaning for him as a reference group. Not unless and until he accepts some substantial share of the values of his classmates as standards by which he judges himself will the class become a reference group. Suppose that his own goal is to become a professional baseball player. In that case, the members of some major league ball club whom he has never seen in his life may constitute a genuine reference group to which he relates himself strongly. Or to cite an example of adults: the American tourist in a foreign country often does not understand and seldom relates himself in any ego-involved manner to the people in the land he is visiting. To him the manners and customs which he observes are merely strange and foreign because they differ from his own. Rarely does he judge himself by values indigenous to the people of the land. The groups with whom he may associate (other than Americans) do not become reference groups.

We found earlier that when social class membership is judged on the basis of objective criteria some considerable proportion of the population are ascribed membership in the lower classes. In *Yankee City*, for example, well over half the population were adjudged members of the lower classes (Table 2). But when a national sample of people were asked about the social class to which they felt they belonged, and the words "lower class" were used, 5 percent or fewer so classified themselves (Table 3). Very few were willing to relate themselves to a group called "lower," but when the term "working class" was used, about half the interviewees made this identification. Work as a value is thoroughly interwoven in the American tradition, especially the frontier tradition. Earlier we noted the high value placed on work in the Horatio Alger myth. But the connotation of "lower class" is so antagonistic to the general American value of equality that probably few

are able to relate themselves to a group the very name of which seems to deny this cherished equality.

This reluctance or inability of persons to relate themselves to groups lacking in status raises the whole question of the relation of reference groups to status and mobility. Sherif and Sherif (41, p. 629) have pointed out that one of the conditions which make reference groups important in modern society is the existence of diverse, multiple groups in a society permitting vertical mobility. In a simple folk society having little division of labor, roles differentiated largely on the basis of sex and age, and lacking any very definite social class stratification, the individual lives out his life according to traditional patterns practically without opportunity for vertical mobility. Reference groups and membership groups coincide; the individual's values are the values of the group to which he belongs. But in a modern society in which both stratification and the possibility of vertical mobility exist, as in the United States, mobility becomes a value in itself. On some objective basis the individual may be ascribed membership in one social class, but he may feel that "really" he belongs to a higher group. In other words, the group of higher prestige becomes his reference group, to which he aspires and by which he judges himself. Typically the public school holds before youth the model of middle-class values as being the desirable standard, and consequently the mobile portion of lower-class youth come to accept the middle class as their reference group.

The results of such middle-class identifications by students can be seen clearly in the problems of guidance in areas of vocational education. Here, for instance, is Joe, an intelligent ninth-grade boy who enjoys his shop courses and does well in them. He plans tentatively to become an auto mechanic. But more and more he comes to realize (though probably without being able to verbalize his feelings) that boys in vocational courses are somehow not regarded by most of the teachers as the high prestige group in the school. This status seems to be accorded those who are preparing for college. His father, a semiskilled worker in a local factory, has encouraged him to finish high school but has not held up college as a goal. Joe becomes more and more aware that his parents live in a way somewhat different from the parents of most of the students who seem to belong to the prestige group. If Joe comes to feel that the really desirable way to live is that represented by those students and their parents who would be classified by a sociologist as "middle class," then for Joe the middle class will

have become a reference group, for he will judge himself by this group. In a year or two he may be vaguely but deeply dissatisfied with his program in vocational education. It will do little if any good to talk about the dignity of work. Joe can see for himself that in the community highest standing is not typically accorded those who work with their hands, and he probably will be able to sense that many of his teachers feel that the white-collar way of life is the only really acceptable mode. Vocational education, along with American education in general, has seldom really faced up to this problem of negative prestige. The problem gets smothered in platitudes about education for democracy which, however admirable the sentiments they express, serve as a smoke screen between the middle-class teacher and the flesh-and-blood individual of the lower classes.

There is no ready-made and generally acceptable set of concepts of the social classes which the individual can learn as he learns mathematics or science. Necessarily, each person develops his own concepts out of his own immediate experiences in his home and community, supplemented by his vicarious experiences furnished by the printed page, the radio, television, and the movies. It is to be expected, then, that objective and subjective approaches to stratification will yield differing numbers of persons allocated to the various classes. This is just what we noted earlier. Centers (13), on the basis of a study carried out in Los Angeles County, has expressed the belief that his method of identifying classes would result in selecting upper, middle, and working classes essentially comparable to upper, middle, and lower classes as ascribed by the Warner methods; but such a view seems to need further justification. It seems more probable that in a complex, mobile society the relationship between social class membership as determined by objective and subjective methods is only a modest one, simply because the experiences of individuals with social class differ so widely.

As suggested before, each person develops his own individualized concept of social classes, and it is these individualized concepts which function as reference groups. Concepts resulting from face-to-face relations seem to function better as reference groups than groups of a "constructed" nature. Hyman found that judgments of social status would be made reliably only in reference to friends and acquaintances, and judgments of economic status only against occupational reference groups. Bott (5) further elucidates the varied nature of social class models in her study of 20 families, in which she identified four types of models which she described as two-valued power models, three-

valued prestige models, many-valued prestige models, and mixed power-and-prestige models. While there is considerable interest in identifying such types of models, the guidance-oriented inquirer is more concerned with the processes by which a given individual acquires his own particular set of concepts of social class.

OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY

As the concept of stratification has been developed in the Warner-type studies, social classes are conceived as relatively open and fluid. In a word, social stratification is a class hierarchy, rather than a caste system. The importance of this situation in American society is very great, for mobility of individuals is possible. It has been frequently noted, and by many not within the Warner group, that historically there have been three important means to mobility. The frontier was one of these. As the virgin prairie was broken into fields and small communities emerged, the American dream of equality was almost realized for a time. The development of the large cattle ranges and the exploitation of forest and mineral resources, however, demanded large capital, division of labor, and increased technology which carried with them increasing stratification. But even so, the unfortunate or disenfranchised could move west to the new country where they, and especially their children, could move upward in the scheme of things. With the closing of free land and increasing industrialization the frontier faded, and with its passing went one important means to mobility. But a second avenue was open, that of business success. Whether or not there has been a significant lessening of opportunity for the individual in business of the small, self-owned variety, so that an increasing number of young men must not only begin but continue their economic lives as employees of large organizations is something of a moot question. An increasing urbanization seems to place some limits on small individual enterprise. But success in business whether large or small has been and still is a means to mobility. The third major means to mobility has been education. Individuals of the lower-middle class, or upper-lower class, who could somehow obtain the formal education to become physicians, dentists, lawyers, architects, engineers, teachers, or other professional persons, and who in the course of time achieved some financial success which made possible the adopting of behaviors and manner of living of higher classes, found themselves capable of mobility. Probably they did not think of their success in such sociological terms; to themselves and

to their communities, they had simply gotten ahead. This last means to social mobility—education—demands a somewhat closer consideration.

We do not propose to offer any dogmatic answer to the question of the degree to which education is still functioning as a social elevator. Our purpose is only to call attention to some of the more easily recognizable threads in this tangled web. There is first of all the question of what education means to the students and their families. The Lynds said of *Middletown*:

Education is a faith, a religion, to Middletown. And yet when one looks more closely at this dominant belief in the magic of formal schooling, it appears that it is not what actually goes on in the schoolroom that these many voices laud. . . . This thing, education, appears to be desired frequently not for its specific content but as a symbol—by the working class as an open sesame that will mysteriously admit their children to a world closed to them, by the business class as a heavily sanctioned aid in getting on economically or socially in the world (33, pp. 219–220).

Anyone who as a teacher or counselor has had interviews or contacts with a considerable number of youth will be able to support these observations from his own experience. Education is a symbol of mobility, but what are some of the factors pertinent to the realization of mobility?

A greater percentage of high school graduates than ever before are entering college, but does this mean that all these, even if intellectually capable, will be able to actualize mobility through education? Standards for admission to the professions are rising. This favorable "hiring ratio"—large numbers of applicants for a relatively small number of admissions—is in fact a condition that makes selection possible. A generation ago, it was not too difficult for a young man at least partially to "work his way through" medical school; today it is exceedingly difficult. Standards are such, not only in medical schools but in many professional schools, that there is a tendency to select those who can devote full time to school simply because they appear to be better scholastic risks. And, of course, periods of training have lengthened for the professions. In the business area the number of college graduates seeking employment has increased enormously. It seems improbable that even all of the capable among these can realistically look forward to positions comparable to those which the graduates of, say, a generation ago, might have attained. The evidence on this, however, is not at all clear, as we shall note later.

Whether or not occupational avenues to mobility are realizable, many in the colleges are being trained for social mobility of a general sort. In a small liberal arts college studied by Mook (36), *Cornbelt Christian College*, about three fourths of the students were found to come from homes ranked lower-middle class or lower. Judging from the expressed vocational and educational objectives, there was "anticipated social mobility" on the part of 90 percent of junior and senior men, and 70 percent of senior women. One cannot, of course, generalize on the basis of a single college, however dramatic the situation. And the point at issue here is not the desirability of such situations to democratic ideals. The question is simply how much of this mobility can be actualized.

The conflict of education as a symbol and as an actualization of mobility is felt no less keenly at the secondary school level. Many beginning jobs are open only to high school graduates even though the specific duties and responsibilities of the jobs seem only vaguely related to training actually obtained in high school. The requirement of high school graduation is often regarded as one convenient means of a preliminary elimination of applicants. Currently we are hearing much discussion of the possibility that in industry the spread of automation will create the need for a larger percentage of the working force to be trained on a higher level. More realistically, however, it should be noted that thus far automation has affected only a limited number of areas of production. What will happen in the future can only be guessed. Will the total educational level move up so that, although education will still offer mobility advantages, the starting point of competition will be at a higher level? There also seems to be an increasing need, not necessarily related to automation, for technicians trained at a level somewhere between that of high school graduation and four-year college graduation. In 1949, Warner, Havighurst, and Loeb pointed to ways in which the schools simultaneously serve two contradictory functions, by providing techniques of upward mobility for some, while restraining others by such devices as the misuse of specialized curricula. "Nevertheless," they concluded, "the American school and college system is the greatest agency we have for equalizing opportunity and for promotion of the rise of the able young" (51, p. 157).

Thus far we have been considering particular means to mobility, and more specifically education as one of these. We must now turn briefly to the question of increase or decrease of occupational mobility. This is one aspect of the broader matter of whether or not the social

class structure is becoming more rigid, a possibility which has been frequently suggested. For the eventual answer to this we must look to the sociologists, social anthropologists, and economists, and we can make no attempt to review here presently available evidence. We shall, however, note briefly scattered sources of evidence and opinion bearing on the possible reduction or expansion of occupational mobility, which is an important part of social mobility.

One of the first comprehensive studies of occupational mobility was made by Sorokin (42) as a part of his study of the broader question of social mobility. For Sorokin, one of the three principal concrete forms of social stratification was the occupational, the other two being economic and political. Occupational stratification he saw as resting chiefly on the degree to which occupations involved the performance of functions of social organization and control, and the degree of intelligence necessary for successful performance. Speaking in the broad context of Western society he raised several questions regarding occupational mobility. One of these was whether or not sons followed the same occupations as their fathers, for an affirmative answer to this would mean lack of mobility. He found such "transmission of occupational status" to occur in all groups, but that "contemporary occupational groups are far from being rigid, and the membranes between them far from impenetrable." However, even though "inheritance" of occupation seemed to be decreasing, within the same society it increased in some groups and decreased in others; consequently no general conclusion could be drawn. Another question posed was concerned with the extent to which the sons of fathers in the same occupation dispersed into other occupations. Sorokin found that "within present Western societies, children of fathers of the same occupation, and often children of the same family, are dispersed among the most diverse occupational groups." Both upward and downward mobility occurred, and occupational "inheritance" persisted in varying degrees; but in general, under normal conditions, "a permanent ascending—inter-occupational and intra-occupational—current has been active."

There was not universal acceptance of this picture of occupational fluidity as presented by Sorokin. More specifically, it was questioned whether or not occupational mobility in the United States was increasing or decreasing. Data are simply not available from which can be drawn conclusions on a national scale for the whole occupational range, but it will be instructive to examine several examples of special studies, even though limited either to a particular locality or to a limited

segment of occupations. A study of the San Jose, California, community reported in 1937 by Davidson and Anderson (16), affords a cross-section picture of 1242 adult males in 314 occupations distributed over six levels of employment. The levels were those described by Edwards (20): professional persons; proprietors, managers, and officials; clerks and kindred workers; skilled workers and foremen; semiskilled workers; and unskilled workers. The sample included 7 percent of males gainfully employed in the community. We shall note here chiefly that part of the study concerned with vertical mobility, but it should be kept in mind that vertical mobility accounted for only slightly over half (56 percent) of the total movement, an almost equally large portion being horizontal movement on the same level. The proportions of horizontal to vertical movement varied considerably from level to level, vertical movement being most pronounced among proprietors, clerks, and skilled workers, and least among the unskilled. For all levels, the average movement per individual amounted to a change of one level, (for example, semiskilled to skilled, or vice versa) while the net total movement was upward by about one-fifth of a step. Three-fourths of all movements were confined to horizontal moves on the same level or vertical moves of one step up or down. Complete upward movements of individuals did occur but were rare, while complete downward movement never occurred.

There was a definite core of "inheritance" of occupational level shown by the employment of father and son on the same level, but two clusters of levels could be distinguished in this respect. The cluster showing most persistence was composed of proprietors, skilled workers, and unskilled workers, where the percentages of fathers and sons having occupations on the same level were 73.1, 38.8, and 39.9 respectively. More divergency of father and son employment levels occurred among the professional persons, clerks, and semiskilled workers. Only about 10 percent of professional sons had professional fathers, about three-fifths of the newcomers to this level being drawn from proprietor fathers. It was pointed out, however, that this very high percentage of newly arrived professionals was probably due to an overweighting of teachers in the sample. Another very open group was that of clerks, where only about 7 percent had fathers on the clerical level. The other 93 percent were recruited chiefly from proprietary, managerial, and official, or skilled fathers, although one-fourth of the newcomers were from unskilled fathers. Almost 90 percent of the sons employed in semiskilled occupations were drawn from fathers at other

levels, principally the proprietary. Davidson and Anderson also obtained the occupations of grandfathers, so that it is possible to trace the relationship of occupational level over three generations (Table 4). It was evident that there was a definite lessening of "inheritance," particularly among proprietors, managers, and officials, and among the unskilled, these two levels being dispersed into the open groups noted above: the professional, the clerical, and the semiskilled.

A final consideration of very real importance to guidance is vertical movement of individual workers during their work experiences. The workers averaged 3.7 different occupations each. All levels of

TABLE 4. Consistency of Level of Employment of Fathers and Sons

	Percentages Showing Occupational Inheritance Grandfather to Father	Father to Sons	Difference
Professional	29	25	-4
Proprietors, managers, and officials	66	32	-34
Clerks and kindred	20	23	3
Skilled	49	42	-7
Semiskilled	31	29	-2
Unskilled	60	42	-18

SOURCE: P. E. Davidson & H. D. Anderson. *Occupational mobility in an American community*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univer. Press, 1937. P. 167.

workers included some who had worked at other levels, except that no unskilled persons had ever been professionals. The previous experiences of workers suggested some interesting patterns. Only about one-fifth of the previous experiences of professional workers had been in manual labor, and on the other hand, workers at levels other than the professional rarely had had professional experience. Earlier experience of proprietors had been largely of a clerical nature, while more than a fourth of the clerks had previously been in semiskilled and unskilled work. By contrast to the clerks, about two-fifths of the experience of skilled workers had been semiskilled and unskilled. The semiskilled came most frequently from previous experience of unskilled labor, but frequently with experience at higher levels. Unskilled labor "is not a catch-all for those degraded from higher levels," since three-fourths of the work experience of the unskilled had been on the same level. Such evidence as the above along with other not cited here led the authors to suggest the existence of discernible career pat-

terns. The most likely way of entering a profession, for example, seemed to be birth into a family of relatively good circumstances, securing schooling through the needed professional level, and then entrance directly into a professional occupation. Clerical workers came from a variety of homes, although principally homes at the proprietor, clerical, or skilled-work levels; they made use of the public school, and then (typically) entered clerical work with little or no experience of the non-white collar variety. In contrast to these two white-collar paths, the most frequent pattern of the skilled worker on emerging from the home of a father who himself was a skilled worker was to secure minimum formal schooling, and then enter semiskilled employment in training for skilled work. Of these three patterns, the one leading to the professions apparently permits fewer deviations.

Centers (10) has reported a study concerned with occupational mobility which he regards as a follow-up on a national level of the Davidson and Anderson study. Adult males constituting a national cross section were interviewed as to their own and their fathers occupations. It appeared that slightly more than one-third of the fathers had sons in occupations of higher level than their own, slightly more than one-third about the same, and somewhat less than one-third of the sons were in occupations at a lower level. Overall, there was an upward mobility of 6 percent of sons. This rather small upward mobility, and also the finding that most mobility either up or down was from the adjacent stratum, is in harmony with the findings of Davidson and Anderson. However, the findings of Centers can hardly be taken as an extension to the national level of the picture drawn by Davidson and Anderson, since the data used by Centers were gathered in 1945, a time when some millions of younger men who might otherwise have been in the labor market were in the armed forces and drastic readjustments in civilian employment were occasioned by the war.

Several studies have been made which, although limited to the definitely upper-managerial echelons, are nevertheless important in any consideration of occupational mobility. In 1932 Taussig and Joslyn (45) reported a study of American business leaders in which the fathers of these leaders were identified by occupational level. In 1955, Warner and Abegglen (50) reported another study of the same problem, made in such a way that the newer findings could be compared with those of Taussig and Joslyn. The data, given in Table 5, lead to several interesting observations. In proportion to their numbers in the adult population, the business owner or executive and the professional groups furnished the largest numbers of business leaders, both in 1928

and 1952. If we represent by a ratio of 1.00 a proportional representation among the business elite of any one occupational group of fathers, we find that in 1928 professional fathers furnished 4.33 times their share of business leaders, but that in 1952 their representation had dropped to 3.50. In like fashion, in 1928 businessmen fathers furnished 9.67 times their proportional representation, but in 1952 this representation had dropped to 4.73. Farmers, white-collar workers (clerks

TABLE 5. Occupational Mobility Rates: 1929 and 1952 Business Leaders' Fathers Compared with Adult Males of 1900 and 1920, in Percentages

	Comparison for 1928 Group		Comparison for 1952 Group	
	Fathers of Business Leaders	U.S. Adult Males of 1900	Fathers of Business Leaders	U.S. Adult Males of 1920
Laborer	11	45	15	47
Clerk or salesman	5	7	8	10
Business owner or executive	58	6	52	11
Professional man	13	3	14	4
Farmer	12	38	9	27
Other	1	1	2	1

SOURCE: W. L. Warner & J. C. Abegglen. *Occupational mobility in American business and industry, 1928-1952*. Minneapolis: Univer. of Minnesota Press, copyright 1955 by the University of Minnesota. P. 46.

and salesmen), and laborers each furnished considerably less than their proportional representations, although there was a slight increase for the last two (50, pp. 48, 66-67). The investigators concluded: "In the broadest sense, this research indicates that at the levels studied here American society is not becoming more caste-like: the recruitment of business leaders from the bottom is taking place now and seems to be increasing. Mobility to the top is not decreasing; in fact, for the last quarter-century it has been slowly increasing" (50, p. 35). It is important to remember that "the levels studied here" were the very top—major executives in very large businesses.

MOBILITY OF TEACHERS

Guidance functions in the public schools are for the most part carried on by teachers or by counselors recruited almost entirely from

the ranks of teachers. The mobility of teachers then becomes a topic of very considerable interest, not only for the sake of securing a better understanding of teachers themselves, but because of the possibility of mobility-related attitudes being injected into the guidance situation. Unfortunately, relevant data are very fragmentary and scattered. Most of the available sources are studies made for other purposes. Whitney (56) in 1927 compared the backgrounds of students in teachers colleges and in universities. Considerably more of the fathers of the university students were professional persons or were in business, while definitely more of the fathers of students in teachers colleges were skilled or unskilled laborers; and the colleges and universities drew about equally from the farm. In 1939 Elsbree (21, pp. 549 ff.) summarized published studies by Coffman, Hill, and Moffett, and an unpublished investigation by Strayer. From these studies a composite picture was drawn of the typical woman teacher—for the typical teacher was a woman. She was 24 years of age, native born of native-born parents both of whom spoke English. She was most apt to be the daughter of a farmer, skilled workman, or owner of a small business. The median family income (1925-1929) was between \$2000 and \$2500. Reared in a rural community or small town, she probably entered teaching at 19 after four years of school beyond the elementary years, had little contact with music beyond the radio and local talent, less with art; and acquaintance with literature consisted of reading an occasional novel, the *American Magazine*, the *Ladies Home Journal*, and the *Saturday Evening Post*. On the basis of such information Elsbree characterized teachers as coming mostly from the lower-middle class. It would be impossible, he felt, because of the meager data for earlier years, to show any marked decline or improvement in the social and cultural heritage of teachers since 1865. A year later the same general picture given by Elsbree was reported by the Research Division of NEA (37), but the term "middle-economic level" was used rather than "lower-middle class."

Shortly before World War II a survey of 9122 public school teachers was conducted by Greenhoe (25). Although all parts of the country were represented in the sample, about half the teachers included were in Ohio, and about two-thirds were elementary teachers. The sample was loaded, too, with younger teachers of rural background, about two-thirds being under 35 years of age, and about half born in communities of less than 2500 population. Nevertheless, the findings are interesting and in general in harmony with the results of

the earlier studies noted above. Some 38 percent of the fathers of these teachers were farmers; 26 percent were in business, 18 percent were day laborers, and 3 percent were teachers or clergymen. Some regional differences were found; somewhat more of the teachers in the Middle and Northeast States came from business and farm homes. An inquiry into the educational backgrounds of the fathers revealed that almost half had not attended high school and that about one-sixth had attended college. Educational achievement of mothers was substantially the same, although somewhat fewer had attended college. One of the most interesting findings of Greenhoe was that the great majority of these teachers were teaching in communities of about the same size as those in which they were born, and this means largely rural and smaller communities. Almost 90 percent of those teachers who came from communities of less than 2500 were also teaching in communities of less than 2500.

The group studied by Greenhoe was rather similar in some respects to a group of seniors at the University of Wisconsin in 1947-1948 who were preparing to teach in Wisconsin, as reported by Best (4). Whereas half the national sample of Greenhoe were born on farms, 38 percent of the men and 49 percent of the women of the Wisconsin seniors came either from farm homes or communities of less than 3000. In both studies approximately one-fourth of the fathers were in business. But among the fathers of the Wisconsin seniors were fewer unskilled laborers, and more in professional occupations.

Thus far we have noted studies which have dealt with the social, educational, and occupational backgrounds of teachers. There seems to be considerable agreement that teachers come typically from lower-middle class and upper-lower class homes. Perhaps also as many as one-third to one-half come from rural and small-community backgrounds. Occupations of fathers are most typically farming, business (small-business proprietors and clerks), and skilled labor, with both unskilled labor and the professional occupations having lesser representations. But even if such findings can be substantiated as presently valid, they furnish only indirect evidence as to whether or not teachers as a group can be characterized as mobile. Some degree of mobility occurs as between generations when the son of a clerk, or semiskilled worker, or tenant farmer becomes a teacher, but the question of within-generation mobility is another matter concerning which we have little real evidence. Moreover, we shall see that the occupational status of teaching is rather ambiguous, differing with the levels of elementary,

secondary, and university within the occupation of teaching. Our present knowledge simply does not permit of any generalizations as to whether or not the individual teacher is characteristically a mobile person. But if so, such mobility might be expected to be most evident in urban settings. For this reason two Chicago studies are of interest.

Becker (3) found that teachers typically sought to move to schools whose patrons had higher social status. Valentine (46) investigated prospective teachers' expectations and attitudes in relation to social class and concluded that middle-class environment fostered the attitudes displayed by the students, that these middle-class attitudes existed *before* entering college, and that although the attitudes were middle class a majority were members of lower-middle class and upper-lower class by objective criteria. In his discussion of the problem of teachers and stratification, Brookover (6) draws an interesting distinction between the established middle-class teacher and the striving middle-class teacher. The former, he suggests, clearly displays the middle-class values and tends to emphasize traditional educational goals, while the latter may over-emphasize middle-class behavior from feelings of insecurity. Brookover suggests two propositions, that children should have contact with teachers of varied social class backgrounds, and that teachers should be selected for "nonshock" reaction to social class behavior. These are significant suggestions for guidance.

OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE

Another aspect of stratification which is of especial importance in guidance is occupational prestige. This is intimately related to both economic and social status. Whether or not the relationship be an inevitable one, the highly developed division of labor and mass production so characteristic of our capitalistic economy is associated with a rather sharply defined hierarchy of occupations. Proprietary, managerial, and professional occupations are ranked at or near the top of the hierarchy, and unskilled labor at the bottom. Occupational rank cannot be accounted for by any single factor, such as amount of income, any more than the social class structure can be explained by a single factor. Rather, the rank accorded various occupations seems to reflect the ideology coloring the total economic and social structure. However, empirical studies have found occupation to be a particularly useful indicator of social class. Warner uses occupation as one of the four factors in the Index of Status Characteristics, and Centers has remarked that "It is

obvious that the person's occupational stratum is an even better index to his attitude than is his subjective class identification" (9, p. 490).

In a recent study reported by Centers (14) a nationally representative cross section of 1270 persons were interviewed by the staff of the National Opinion Research Center and asked to place each of 24 occupations in its appropriate social class. The social classes were named as the middle class, the lower class, the working class, and the upper class; then the question was asked: "I'd like to know in which of those four social classes you'd put most of the people doing different lines of work. For example, banking—do you think of bankers as belonging to the middle class, the lower class, the working class, or the upper class?"

The "mean social rank" in Table 6 was computed by assigning a weight of one for a lower-class placement, two for working class, three for middle class, and four for upper class. On the basis of mean ranks thus obtained, it is clear that professional and managerial occupations rate high, some white-collar occupations and skilled trades in the middle, and personal-service and unskilled labor occupations at or near the bottom. Moreover, there is considerable consensus as to the social classes in which people in these various occupations are assigned. Big-business owners and executives are most clearly accorded upper-class status, while there is less agreement that doctors, lawyers, and bankers so rank. The modal placement of department store and factory managers, insurance and real estate salesmen, small-business owners and managers, and (less definitely) farm owners is middle class; apparently middle class means "business class" to most. Among the assignments to working-class status are both some white-collar workers such as barbers, salesclerks, and waiters, and more clearly such blue-collar workers as carpenters, truck drivers, coal miners, and semiskilled factory workers. There are no occupations allocated to the lower class by majority opinion, but unskilled laborers are given lowest status. Persons in some occupations seem to be "marginal men" not clearly in any one group, such as the college professor who appears to be modally regarded as middle class, but who has considerable support for the upper class; or schoolteachers also modally middle class, but considered by almost a third of the interviewees to be working class. Both these educational groups are quite heterogeneous, of course, and each contains a considerable range of rank within itself.

A number of earlier studies, though not concerned with the relation of occupational prestige to social class, give much the same

TABLE 6. Social Class Assignations of Various Occupational Groups

Occupational Category	Percent of Interviewees Making Assignment					Mean Social Rank
	Upper Class	Middle Class	Working Class	Lower Class	Not Stated	
Big-business owners and executives	82	11	3	—*	4	3.81
Doctors and lawyers	57	33	7	—*	3	3.58
Bankers	49	38	9	—*	4	3.40
College professors	38	48	9	1	4	3.28
Department store and factory managers	17	59	20	1	3	2.97
Schoolteachers	13	53	31	1	2	2.79
Insurance and real estate salesmen	6	59	29	2	4	2.74
Farm owners	9	53	34	1	3	2.71
Small-business owners and managers	4	65	26	3	2	2.71
Foremen	3	41	51	2	3	2.46
Office workers	2	40	54	2	2	2.43
Barbers	2	27	64	4	3	2.37
Salesclerks	1	29	63	5	2	2.26
Carpenters	2	30	74	2	2	2.23
Tenant farmers	1	19	62	14	4	2.07
Semiskilled factory workers	1	15	69	12	3	2.04
Truck drivers	1	9	79	9	2	2.01
Waiters	1	6	76	15	2	1.92
Coal miners	1	8	73	16	2	1.92
Farm hands	1	6	68	23	2	1.85
Sharecroppers	—*	11	47	37	5	1.74
Janitors	—*	5	59	34	2	1.71
Servants	—*	5	55	38	2	1.66
Unskilled laborers	1	3	49	45	2	1.59

* Less than ½ of 1 percent.

SOURCE: Adapted from R. Centers. Social class, occupation, and imputed belief. *Amer. J. Sociol.*, published by the University of Chicago Press, 1953, 58, 546.

picture of an occupational hierarchy. The earliest is that by Counts (15) in 1925. High school seniors in several schools, and a group of high school teachers were asked to rank 45 occupations. Responses placed the banker at the top, while near the top were college professor,

physician, clergyman, and lawyer; toward the middle of the list were bookkeeper, electrician, locomotive engineer, insurance agent, and policeman; and at or near the bottom were waiter, teamster, hod carrier, street cleaner, and ditch digger. A very similar pattern of rank was obtained from adults in a study by Hartmann (26) almost a decade later. Subjects were asked to rank occupations by sorting cards, arranging the occupations "in order of your admiration" for the vocation. The physician this time was found at the top of the list. Banker, which headed the Counts list, was not named on the Hartmann cards. A little more clearly in the Hartmann findings than in the Counts study, the skilled trades (electrician, machinist, carpenter) occupied middle positions.

Again and again the same general pattern of rank was found in other studies. Lehman and Witty (32) reported on a study of a very large number of subjects (13,346 boys, and 13,532 girls), but because of the method used comparisons with other studies are limited. Subjects were given an extensive list of 200 occupations and asked to select the three which they believed to be most respected. The results, of course, give an indication of degree of agreement on high-prestige occupations, but no judgments of the rank of occupations deemed lower on the scale. The five most frequently given high rank by 18-year-old boys were: doctor, minister, banker, judge (or justice of the peace), and lawyer. Girls of like age made only one change, by dropping judge and including musician in the top five. For the highest-ranking occupations, then, there is a high degree of agreement with the findings of other studies.

The occupational prestige hierarchy seems to be highly persistent and quite rigid in our culture. We have noted the similarity of findings in the Counts, Hartmann, Lehman and Witty, and Centers studies, ranging from 1925 to 1953. To these may be added testimony from the data of Welch (54) and Richey and others (40). Two studies were more specifically directed to an investigation of persistence. Nietz (38) surveyed groups in 1928, 1932, and 1934 and found no important differences. The rankings at all three times resembled closely those obtained by Counts, and Nietz concluded that the depression had had little or no effect on the hierarchy. In 1947, one major depression and one world war after the study by Counts, a corresponding study was reported by Deeg and Paterson (19). This time the subjects were both high school seniors and undergraduates in college. The list of occupations employed was very similar to that of Counts, so that com-

parisons could be made. The hierarchies resulting from the two studies were strikingly similar; in fact, the rank-order coefficient of correlation between the two sets of ranks was 0.97. Two years later Welch (54) found a coefficient of 0.98 between rankings she obtained and those reported by Deeg and Paterson. Taken together, these studies from 1925 to 1953 demonstrate the existence of a definite occupational prestige hierarchy which has persisted for more than a quarter of a century in a period marked by major economic and political dislocations.

An almost equally clear although more limited conclusion is possible regarding the relation of sex, age, and formal schooling factors. Most of the studies already noted have analyzed data for sex differences and found none. Welch (54) used a balanced sample of 250 men and 250 women; the rankings assigned by the two sexes were found to correlate 0.98. Baudler (2) and Menger (34) studied the occupational prestige of women's occupations; each used groups of subjects composed of both sexes, and neither found any significant sex differences. Interestingly enough, the rank-order coefficient found by Baudler was 0.98, the same as that obtained by Welch. Stevens (44) studied prestige ranks of women's occupations as judged by women. It is difficult to relate his findings to those of others because all but one of the occupations judged were either professional or semiprofessional in nature, but there is at least no clear indication of disagreement.

Reports are available of studies made with subjects ranging from late childhood to a rather indefinite upper limit of "graduate students" or "adults," which indirectly furnish data on age differences. Conclusions must therefore be limited accordingly, but in general the findings of such studies furnish no basis for a belief that age is an important factor, at least from adolescence on. There is one study concerned directly with age—the Lehman and Witty study noted above. From the report of this investigation some illuminating suggestions emerge. Increasing age seems to be associated with an increase in conformity to the norms of the adult culture regarding occupational prestige. For example, minister was ranked fourteenth, or fifteenth by 8-, 9-, and 10-year-old boys, but rose to second place for 18-year-olds. In similar fashion, college professor was ranked twenty-sixth by the boys at age 12, but seventh at age 18. Conversely, cowboy dropped from fourth place for 8-year-olds, to twenty-second at age 12, and even lower at later ages. Doctor, banker, and lawyer varied little in rank with the age of the boys, from 8 to 18. One gets a twofold impression: (1) that

adult judgments of a few occupations are adopted early, and (2) culturally approved attitudes toward other occupations are achieved more gradually. It must be remembered that the Lehman and Witty findings were concerned with only high-prestige occupations. Most of the studies from which data for age differences can be extracted are actually more pertinent to formal schooling or grade level conclusions. The studies by Counts, and by Deeg and Parerson, used subjects ranging from high school seniors through graduate students and found no differences. Welch (54) and Baudler (2) gave specific attention to the matter; the former reported a rank-order coefficient of 0.98 between rankings by college freshmen and graduate students, and the coefficients found by Baudler among high school, undergraduate, and graduate groups ranged from .90 to .97. The lowest correlation between college-class rankings was the .76 reported by Stevens (44), but this coefficient was probably attenuated by the homogeneity of the occupations rated; with one exception all were either professional or semi-professional. The relationship seemed to be complicated also by an urban-rural factor.

It seems plausible that the dominant ideology of a particular society is reflected in the occupational hierarchy. A study by Davis (18) provides some support for this hypothesis. Two years after the study by Counts, Davis had two groups of Russian children rate occupations. The subjects ranged from 12 to 19 years of age; most were in a summer school near Moscow and were members of a Communist youth society. The Russian youth accorded high rank to peasant, aviator, Member of the Central Executive Committee, doctor, party worker, civil engineer, professor, commissar of the Red Army, and coal miner, while storekeeper, banker, prosperous businessman were near the bottom of the list, and minister at the very end. These rankings seem to reflect a curious mixture of indoctrination, and a kind of residual of the old order. The high rankings given peasant, party worker, and commissar, and the placing of minister at the bottom, seem to indicate recent indoctrination. The high prestige of civil engineer, doctor, and possibly professor may be residuals, as suggested, or it may be that these professions were highly functional in the then-current Five-Year Plan.

Thus far we have seen that the existence of a rather rigid prestige hierarchy of occupations in American culture has been demonstrated, and we have concluded tentatively that the ordering of ranks does not seem to be related to sex, formal education, or age except that conformity tends to increase with age. We have suggested that the hier-

archy is very probably related to the dominant ideology of a particular culture. But we know little about the specific elements out of which are built up the prestige of occupations, or about the acquisition by the individual of prestige attitudes toward occupations. Some beginnings have been made in these areas. A study by Anderson (1) indicates that differing frames of reference will result in differing ranks of occupations. A number of college men were asked to rank occupations, first on the basis of social contribution, second on social prestige, and then on estimated economic return. Three rather different occupational hierarchies resulted. For example, banker was in first position for both social prestige and economic return, but dropped to fourth in social contribution. Clergyman ranked first in social contribution, third in social prestige, and descended to sixteenth in economic return. School-teacher was given fifth place in social contribution, eleventh in social prestige, and nineteenth in economic return. By contrast, baseball player ranked seventh on estimated economic return, but dropped to thirteenth in social prestige, and twenty-first in social contribution. The feminine counterpart of the Anderson study was made by Stevens (44), who found only moderate correspondence of rankings on these same three criteria as judged by college women. Contribution to society correlated $-.35$ with financial returns, when social prestige was partialled out. The partial coefficient for contribution to society and social prestige was $.54$, and for social prestige and economic return, $.45$.

Another facet of the functioning of occupational hierarchies is the possibility that the same occupation may symbolize different kinds of prestige for different individuals. For one, becoming a physician may mean the prestige of high intellectual achievement; for another, a respected status for participation in community leadership; for still another, the prestige of being an independent professional practitioner, and so on. Actually, we are largely lacking in an understanding of how various prestige elements function in the perception of occupations. Osgood and Stagner (39) studied 10 elements of stereotypes thought to be associated with occupational prestige, such as financial return, being noticed, and "brains" as opposed to brawn. Occupations were rated according to these elements, and then later the occupations themselves were ranked. An extremely high rank-order coefficient (0.99) was obtained. The authors concluded that their data suggested "the presence of an extremely rigid frame of reference."

A somewhat different aspect of the problem was attacked by Kay (31), who sought to differentiate the cultural and individual factors.

Prestige ratings of occupations were obtained, and then interviews were conducted in which an effort was made to determine the source of the attitudes expressed in the ratings. He concluded that for politics, journalism, farming, social work, and law, cultural sources were most frequent, while personal sources predominated in attitudes toward medicine, teaching, engineering, pharmacy, music, business, and carpentry. And finally, there is a bit of rather inconclusive evidence suggesting that occupational prestige attitudes which conform to the cultural norms persist in times of stress. Byers (7) found that 50 men of the 309th Infantry, while awaiting return home, ranked occupations in much the same way as a "civilian" group.

It may be convenient to summarize the present state of our knowledge about occupational prestige in a few brief statements, although of course such brevity involves oversimplification. The general pattern of our occupational hierarchy places managerial and professional occupations highest, skilled occupations and some white-collar occupations near the middle, some other white-collar occupations, personal service, semi-skilled, and unskilled labor near the lower end. Presumably this arrangement reflects the dominant socioeconomic patterns of our culture. Both sexes make about the same judgments of occupations. By late adolescence conformity to the general pattern has been established, so that beyond this point age is not an important factor. Extent of formal education appears to be unimportant. We know little about the patterning of specific components into the composite prestige attitudes which we recognize, and we have little understanding of how the individual develops his prestige attitudes.

SUMMARY

Four basic concepts were introduced and defined: (1) status, a position in a social group; (2) social class, an identifiable socioeconomic stratum which may be regarded as ascribed on the basis of objective criteria, or as the social group in a hierarchy to which individuals psychologically relate themselves; (3) mobility, a change of status; and (4) prestige, an attitude of esteem directed toward individuals or a group. Studies of social class can be divided into two general groups on the basis of methods employed, those which ascribe social class membership on the basis of empirically derived objective criteria and those which seek to identify the social groups with which individuals identify themselves.

The characteristics of social classes as derived from studies of ascribed status studies were described. Subjective class identifications were shown to be related to the manner in which the inquiry is phrased. Social classes may also function as reference groups, and this fact complicates relationships. Historically there have been three means of social mobility open to the individual: (1) migration to the frontier, (2) success in business, and (3) education. Although the evidence does not permit a firm generalization, there is some reason to believe that the occupational aspect of mobility may be increasing somewhat, both as to mobility between generations, and within generations. Education seems to continue to be a means to mobility, although the degree of mobility appears to be related to social class membership. There is no clear evidence as to the degree to which teachers and counselors may be characterized as mobile.

There is a definite hierarchy of occupational prestige which has persisted over at least a quarter of a century in which highest prestige is attached to proprietary, managerial, and professional occupations, and lowest to unskilled and semiskilled jobs, while skilled occupations and some white-collar jobs fall in the middle of the hierarchy. Presumably this hierarchy reflects the general social and economic structure. Attitudes of prestige do not seem to be related to sex, to level of occupation, or to age from late adolescence on into maturity. Apparently the culturally approved prestige attitudes toward occupations are established by late adolescence. We know little about the manner in which the individual acquires his occupational prestige attitudes.

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CHAPTER 5

Foreshadowings of Guidance

Certain elements of guidance thought can doubtless be traced back to the Greek philosophers, to parts of the Old Testament, or to other early sources. Plato, for example, expressed some ideas about the placement of individuals in vocations. But the social world of Plato rested on a concept of democracy so different from that found in a modern industrialized society that such searchings for the historical roots of guidance ideas can easily become more erudite than truly pertinent. There is no desire to controvert the importance to educational thought of such influences as scholasticism, the humanist tradition, and others; but brevity demands selection, and we have chosen to emphasize examples of later emergents.

We shall, as it were, sink test shafts to strata of varying depths to secure samples of the educational thought out of which guidance came. Yet our sampling will not be of a random nature. Our basis for sampling rests on the thesis that within modern times there have been two facts of major relevance and importance to that part of education which we call guidance, one intellectual and one social. The intellectual fact is the development of the method of empirical science. The social fact is the rise of the middle class in a commercial-industrial world. Out of the scientific method came our modern understandings of nature, our dominant attitudes toward man and the universe, and a technology which made possible the industrial revolution. As one part of the development of science—and a rather belated one—came psychology which has contributed many of the techniques for the assessment of the individual in guidance. The rise of the middle class, although intertwined with the development of technology, is also basically associated with our pattern of fundamental values—individualism, equality, and liberty—especially in our concepts of political de-

mocracy and an emerging economic democracy; and the middle class is particularly associated with the compromises between our fundamental values and those perhaps lesser yet real values which do in fact operate in a society, such as utilitarianism in education. It is assumed, of course, that by guidance we mean guidance as typically and in fact conceived, not guidance as it perhaps ought to be by some as-yet-undefined standards.

On the thesis that these two are basically relevant—the growth of science and the rise of the middle class—we shall select our examples. Comenius, standing as he does near the beginning of the modern period, is a convenient symbol of both the impact of science on the surviving medieval order in education, and of rising democratic elements in educational thought. The Commonwealth educators in England illustrate the budding utilitarianism in a political democracy of a just emerging middle class, then more commercial than industrial. In America, Jefferson will serve as a focus for mixed aristocratic and democratic notions about education, while Franklin is a straightforward representative of the middle class in a society just turning to technology.

JOHN AMOS COMENIUS

In a little village in southeastern Moravia, not far from the Hungarian border, a child was born who was destined to become the father of modern educational reform. His birth occurred in 1592—one hundred years after Columbus succeeded in reaching the new world. His name was John Komenský; but following the fashion of the time, John later Latinized the name to Comenius, and it is by this latter form of the name that he is usually known. His middle name Amos (meaning loving), was conferred upon him by Rector Lanecky when he was a student in Latin school (13). The peculiar contribution which the mature Comenius was to make was in the nature of a synthesis of many of the new currents of thought of his time, and their interpretation for education, for he lived in a time when the modern world was being born. In his most famous writing, *The Great Didactic* (5), his discussions range over most of the major areas of educational problems: curriculum, method, organization, administration, philosophy, and others. Of psychology in the modern sense he had little or none, for the simple reason that psychology in the modern sense did not then exist. He was a systematizer. Adamson (1, p. 79) has said that he stands alone in bringing together various considerations into "one

connected, self-contained, and consistent system." Butler (4) regarded his relation to elementary and secondary education as similar to that of Copernicus and Newton to modern science, and to that of Bacon and Descartes to modern philosophy.

Yet in spite of his great importance to educational thought in the larger sense, our interest in Comenius is a twofold one, both broader and narrower than that of the story of his impact on educational thought in general. In the broader sense, Comenius serves as a convenient central figure about which to suggest some of the major features of the modern world in the making. In the narrower sense, we find in the thought of Comenius some foreshadowings of guidance thinking. But before proceeding to either of these ideas, it will be helpful to seek a closer acquaintance with the man himself.

John was the youngest of five children, and the only son. His parents were fairly well-to-do members of the peasant class, who owned some property. His father, Martin, was probably a miller by trade. The home was broken by the death of both parents and two of his sisters when John was only 12 years of age. During the next four years John lived with an aunt, and at the age of 16 entered the Prěrov Latin School conducted by the Unity of Brethren, the sect of which his father had been a member. While in the Latin school John decided to become a priest of the Brethren, and in due time he moved on to complete his education at the Herborn Gymnasium and at Heidelberg. After a two-year interlude of teaching in the Prěrov Latin School, he was ordained a priest of the Unity of Brethren. He married a young woman of considerable wealth, Magdeline Vízovska, and shortly thereafter accepted his first charge as pastor at Fulnek. He seemed well launched on a career in the ministry; indeed, Spinka (13, p. 32) has suggested that he became an educational reformer "more by accident than by primary design." For these were the troubled times of the Thirty Years' War. Probably in the year 1620, Fulnek was attacked and largely burned. Comenius lost his house. His library was saved temporarily by being moved to the city hall, only to be burned later by the Capuchin friars who came to convert the heretics. About two years later his wife and two children died of a plague. Comenius finally found refuge along with other priests of the Unity on the estates of Count Charles of Zerotín, who had been his benefactor while John was a young student preparing for the priesthood. Still a young man in his early thirties, Comenius was to spend the remainder of his life as an exile in Poland, Prussia, Austria, Holland, England, or wherever opportunity might be

afforded. But it was during these years of exile that his great works of educational reform were written. There is even some reason to believe that at one time he was asked to consider the presidency of Harvard (13, pp. 84 ff).

The century of Comenius was a time when the implications of some of the thunderous events of the preceding centuries were felt on the intellectual level in a concentrated fashion. The Crusades had long since opened the floodgates to the waters of the outside world which undermined the medieval order. The Italian Renaissance had reached its peak in the time of Lorenzo the Magnificent, only a century or so before the birth of Comenius. The age of exploration had seen Columbus reach the West Indies, as well as other far-ranging voyages such as those of Bartholomeu Dias, Vasco da Gama, and Ferdinand Magellan. No longer could the world be thought of as European, with a few suburbs in northern Africa. The Gutenberg printing press had opened the way to a wide dissemination of printed materials, and had produced the first Bible more than a century before Comenius. Luther had announced his 95 theses in 1517. The Italian philosopher and prophet of the modern world, Giordano Bruno, had been burned at the stake while Comenius was still a child. In the New World, Jamestown was first settled shortly after Comenius entered Latin school, and the Pilgrims landed at about the time of the death of his wife and children. Shakespeare was still living when the young Comenius was ordained a priest. Among his other contemporaries were such intellectuals as the theologian and humanist Erasmus of Rotterdam; the philosophers John Locke, Francis Bacon, and René Descartes; the physicist Galileo; and such educational reformers as John Dury and Sir William Petty. Comenius was greatly attracted by the new empirical science as taught by Francis Bacon, but was prepared to go only part of the way with empiricism. As Ulich (15, p. 193) has pointed out, Comenius' concept of nature was a combination of the Baconian-empirical, and the Stoic-Christian. Such combinations seemed characteristic of Comenius. It was his peculiar genius that he responded sensitively to so many of the forces then coming together in the making of the modern world. In fact, it was his lifelong ideal, never fully realized, to create a "pansophy," a kind of evaluated summary and unification of all knowledge.

When we raise the question as to what specific contributions Comenius made to guidance thinking in the modern sense, we must be prepared for a modest answer. As suggested before, there was no

modern psychology on which to draw. His recommendations regarding discipline, for example, as given in *The Great Didactic* (5) would be thoroughly disturbing to one imbued with a modern concept of mental health and adjustment. Although he conceived of discipline as the exercising of paternal authority in which personal feelings of anger had no place, he recommended the use of personal ridicule and open comparisons of unsuccessful students with the more successful. Even such measures, however, were reforms in the sense of minimizing physical punishment, which was the current mode, whether for "moral delinquencies" or failure to learn. On the more positive side, there is in *The Great Didactic* an earnest and sustained effort to organize instruction from the point of view of the child with due regard to his developing abilities.

But perhaps the aspect of Comenius' thought most relevant to the guidance point of view lies in his proposed organization of education. He thought of education as consisting of four phases: (1) the informal learning in the home, or the Mother School; (2) the Vernacular School, corresponding roughly to the elementary period; (3) the Latin-School or Gymnasium; and (4) the University or travel. The Vernacular School was for children of both sexes and all stations in life, ages 6 through 12. In contrast to the views of some of his contemporaries, Comenius held that the age of 6 was too early to decide whether a boy was "destined" for manual labor or higher education. Moreover, "We wish all men to be trained in all the virtues, especially in modesty, sociability, and politeness, and it is therefore undesirable to create class distinctions at such an early age, or to give some children the opportunity of considering their own lot with satisfaction and that of others with scorn" (5, p. 212). As the name implies, the Vernacular Schools were to be conducted completely in the mother tongue; this practice offered advantages for those who would not proceed to the Latin-Schools, and (he was convinced), no difficulties for those who would. The six-year curriculum of the Latin-Schools was to be based on the seven liberal arts (grammar, dialectic, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy), supplemented by some introduction to physics, geography, chronology, history, morals, and theology. Such a program of studies would not seem intended for everyone, but Comenius was not clear as to what if any policy of selective admission was intended. We are told, however, that "The Latin-School gives a more thorough education to those who aspire higher than the workshop" (5, p. 201), and that youths who complete the Latin-School should have ". . . laid a solid foundation for any more advanced in-

struction that they may receive in the future," so that the spirit is that of preparation for college rather than terminal training for any occupational pursuit. On the question of admission to the university, though, the recommendations are quite clear and specific. A public examination was to be held for students leaving Latin-School, ". . . and from its results the masters may decide which of them should be sent to the University, and which should enter on the other occupations of life. Those who are selected will pursue their studies, some choosing theology, some politics, some medicine, in accordance with their natural inclination and the needs of the Church and of the state" (5, p. 233).

It would be completely unfair and unhistorical to expect to find in Comenius any statement of principles of guidance in a modern sense. The remarkable thing about his thought is that, in a time when the modern world was only newly born and not yet fully accepted as legitimate, and when education was pretty much within the scholastic tradition, his ideas of public education were so democratic—and that in the absence of anything like modern psychology, his notions of education were so nearly child-centered. He envisaged an educational system which would be progressively selective from the Vernacular School to the University. But problems of adjustment simply were not so conceived by anyone at that time. Problems of occupational planning were also outside the range of vision, except for those entering the University. There seemed to be a complete innocence of any concern about those whom we might now call the noncollege bound, once they had completed the Vernacular School. Although Comenius recognized that it was the "destiny" of many to enter manual work, there was apparently no concern about trying to identify and assist such students, and vocational education as we know it was far in the future.

THE COMMONWEALTH EDUCATORS

With the English revolution of 1648 and the coming of the Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell a period of reform began in which proposals of educational reform were able to gain a hearing long denied. As Adamson (1, p. 97) has noted, important educational measures were introduced and passed in the very year of the King's death.

Samuel Hartlib

One of the individuals very busy in the cause of education during this time was one Samuel Hartlib who, although he never achieved the status of a front-office position, did in fact exert considerable influence

and served as a kind of promoter of the reform ideas of others. In the particularly apt words of Ballou (3), ". . . he was their switchboard operator, establishing connections for them and facilitating the exchange of their ideas, and experiments." Born at Elbing, Prussia, he went to England, probably as a student; at least, we know that he was at the University of Cambridge in the years 1621-1626. Various letters (14) indicate that young men coming to Oxford from the Continent were sent to him for counsel regarding their choice of studies at the University, so that he seems to have been recognized by his friends as a kind of advisor and counselor. His friends sought to secure for him some position to help him with his financial burdens, such as a position with a church, or as Library-Keeper at Oxford, or the Provostship at Oriel College (14, p. 30). The project dearest to his own heart, however, was the establishment of an office in the government sometimes referred to as the Office of Address and sometimes as the Office of Intelligence, which was to have certain fact-gathering and advisory functions for education in England, and of which, presumably, Hartlib was to be chief. But the plan never materialized. His financial difficulties continued, in spite of gifts from friends and at least one small grant of 50 pounds by Parliament (14, p. 25). Perhaps the most lasting contribution made by Hartlib was his sponsorship of the publication of the writings of others. Among these were some of the writings of Comenius, and papers by John Milton, Sir William Petty, and John Dury.

The Old and New: Milton and Petty

The eight-page tractate by Milton, *Of Education*, presented a concept of education which was apparently both cultural and utilitarian: "I call therefore a complete and generous education that which fits a man to perform justly, skilfully, and magnanimously all the offices, both private and public, of peace and war" (2, p. 55). As Milton develops his idea of a curriculum, however, the proposed education is rather thoroughly humanistic, notwithstanding the inclusion of military training and some elements of science and politics. Heavy reliance was placed upon the classics, especially Latin and Greek; Hebrew was to be learned in order to read the Scriptures, and Italian was to be acquired at "some odd hour." A modern teacher of agriculture would be horrified at Milton's suggestion that through a study of Cato, Varro, and Columella one might learn about agriculture. There was simply no recognition of anything like Bacon's idea of the direct study of nature; and Comenius' considerations of teaching method, as in the

Janua and *The Great Didactic*, were rather disdainfully waved aside. It is of course manifestly unfair to judge Milton's ideas of education on the basis of this single tractate. Ainsworth (2) has examined various expressions of Milton's ideas regarding education throughout his writings; but even in this more complete context we find little to suggest that Milton was sensitive to the developing democratic concept of education, and we find no evidence of a shift toward a greater acceptance of empirical science in education in the Baconian sense. Certainly there was nothing which anticipated in any direct way a concept of guidance in the modern sense.

The paper by Sir William Petty, *The Advice of W. P. to Mr. Samuel Hartlib for the Advancement of Some Particular Parts of Learning*, was much closer to contemporary thinking about educational reform. Then a young man of 25, Petty was to become well known in the field of political economy for his early studies of vital statistics. One finds prominent in the *Advice* the very things not found in the tractate by Milton, an enthusiasm for the new method of empirical science, and a strong strain of utilitarianism. Petty advocated "Literary Workshops" for children of all social classes above the age of 7. ". . . none being to be excluded by reason of the poverty and inability of their Parents, for hereby it hath come to passe, that many are now holding the Plough, which might have been made fit to steere the State . . ." (1, p. 132). There should be established also a "Gymnasium Mechanicum or Colledge of Tradesmen for the Advance of all Mechanical Arts and Manufacturers." For the advancement of science at the higher levels there should be a *Nosocomium Academicum* devoted primatily to pute science, but including also a hospital to advance the study of medicine and surgery. The idea of providing training for the performance of occupational duties was in harmony with the tenets of Calvinism, which taught that each man has a calling which he is to follow on earth, and that the faithful pursuit of this calling is part of his duty to God (3). Petty had also a strong faith in the possibility of "the relief of man's estate," as Bacon had expressed it.

Since Petty was not a schoolmaster, he did not offer opinions regarding method, but he had some ideas about curriculum. The workshops (or "workhouses," in Petty's own phrase) began with training in observing and remembering, and later came reading and writing. In the *Advice*, all were to learn drawing, and only such as displayed talent were to study music. Some later notes by Hartlib on the views of Petty (14, p. 46) suggest that he thought all should study both music

and art, since the training of nimble fingers was thought to have later value for mechanical employment. Older children, as provided in the *Advice*, should be taught the elements of arithmetic and geometry, and "such as shall have need to learne" them might study foreign languages. All, however, of whatever social rank, were to learn some handicraft. Lest this sound like a modern suggestion for industrial arts, it should be noted that in his list of suitable pursuits in this area Petty included such items as painting, erching, gardening, confectionery, and the preparation of skeletons of animals. In any event, "I would have him *learn a trade, a manual trade*; nay two or three, but one more particularly" (1, p. 134). The democratic spirit and utilitarian emphasis of the workshops is evident. Perhaps something of the spirit of Petty's ideas about the range of desirable experiences for adolescents can be gained from some later notes as to his recommendations for his own two boys, ages 14 and 18. "Cooke upon Littleton, The termes of the Law, Justinian's Institutions, Aristotle's Rhetorick, Hobs Logick & De Cive, Tullie's Offices, Erasmus Colliquies, Caesar, Sallust, Tacitus, Florus (?), Suetonius, Virgill's Georgick, 6 first chapters of Genesis, St. Luke's Gospel and the Acts of the Apostles, Peter, James, John, & Jude's general Epistles, Josephus, Molière, Geometry & Arithmetic, Baker's Chronicles, Reynard & Aesop, Gazettes, Maps & Globes, Anatomy & Ars Parva, Dispensatory" (11, p. 5). In addition, various activities were suggested, such as fencing, dancing, playing the flute, and singing. To his daughter were commended economics, gardening, cookery, and "clothes."

John Dury

Actually the major efforts of John Dury were devoted to ecclesiastical matters rather than to education as such. He came from a background of rather sturdy individualists in matters churchly. His grandfather was a monk who left his cloister to become a follower of John Knox, and was imprisoned for attacks against the Scottish Court. His father was banished from Scotland for refusing to submit to the Scottish Council. John himself devoted much of his life to attempts to bring about a reconciliation of the Lutherans and Calvinists. He lived in England and in several countries of the Continent, including Sweden, France, and Prussia. It was in 1627, while living at Elbing in Prussia, that his friendship with Hartlib began, and for years he and Hartlib maintained a voluminous correspondence (14). He was well acquainted, too, with Comenius. Like many other men of

the cloth at the time, Dury experienced persistent financial difficulties, complicated in his case by his need to support his sister. He accepted such positions as chaplain to the Earl of Leicester and, later, chaplain to Princess Mary, neither of which alone paid enough for independent maintenance. In 1645 he married a widow, a Mrs. Moore, sister of Sir Robert King and aunt of Lady Ranelagh. Apparently certain friends of his wife felt that she had married below her station, a possibility which the loyal wife stoutly denied in a letter to Lady Ranelagh (14, p. 248). But when later Mrs. Dury proposed to supplement the family income by the manufacture and sale of perfumes, friends again were disturbed at this descent to the level of trade.

Dury is best known in education for his publication, *The Reformed School*, possibly in 1649, but more probably in 1650 (14, p. 268) and in any event shortly after the Revolution of 1648. The publication resulted from an interest of Dury's which had been developing for some years and which reflected many of the ideas of Comenius. The educational aims of the school were to be four, similar to "the four things" later proposed by Locke (1, p. 143): (1) Godliness, (2) bodily health, (3) manners, and (4) learning. Instruction was to be dependent not so much on the will of the instructor as on "Children's Naturall Capacities." Ideas as to both method and curriculum rather closely resembled those of Comenius. The curriculum was so extensive that some critics suggested that such an academy infringed on the proper sphere of the university. Dury replied in a *Supplement* to the original proposal in which he further expounded his ideas of the relations of schools and universities (1, pp. 152 ff.). The proper end of schools was to prepare pupils, with due regard to their capacities and needs in useful matters, so that "they may be able to exercise themselves in everie good employment afterwards by themselves. . . ." The purpose of universities, on the other hand, was to bring together those capable of profiting by advanced study, so that, "by their Mutual Association, Communication, and Assistance in Reading, Meditating, and conferring about profitable matters, they may not only perfit their own Abilities, but advance the super-structure of all Learning. . . ." Dury then proceeds to a remarkable statement of the philosophy of schools in the Commonwealth.

Thus then I conceiv, that in a well-Reformed Commonwealth, which is to bee subordinate unto the Kingdom of Jesus Christ, wherein the happiness of the nature of man: and the Glorious libertie of the Sons of God is to bee revealed; all the subjects thereof should in their Youth bee trained up in some

Schools fit for their capacities, and that over these Schools, som Overseers should be appointed to look to the cours of their Education, to see that none should be destitute of some benefit of virtuous breeding, according to the several kinds of employments, whereunto they may be found most fit and inclinable, whether it bee to bear som civil office in the Common-wealth, or to be Mechanically employed, to bee bred to teach others humane Sciences, or to bee employed in the Prophetical Exercises (1, p. 154).

Here, then, we have an expression of the democratic ideal of education, for all according to their abilities. And here, too, in a statement made 300 years ago, is an idea closely approximating the guidance ideal of individual assistance to each in planning and pursuing education in accordance with his own abilities and desires. But unfortunately such ideals were not then to be realized in England. With the collapse of the Commonwealth went much of the educational reform movement, crushed by the reactionary forces of the Restoration.

John Locke

It may seem strange that we have passed over so illustrious a spokesman of the new science and contemporary of both Comenius and the Commonwealth educators as John Locke. Certainly his treatise *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* did become a classic and became more influential in England than were the ideas of Comenius, Petty, or Dury. This was because, as Ulich (15, p. 200) has observed, Locke provided the educated Englishman of the time with "the right mixture of progress and conservatism, whereas Petty was too revolutionary and Comenius too mystical," although Locke's book was less comprehensive and original than *The Great Didactic*, and less representative of the interests of the developing middle class than Petty's *Advice*. In America, too, the ideas of Locke were more a direct influence than were the notions of Comenius or those of the Commonwealth educators. But in our exceedingly brief sampling of concepts of the kinds of education in which guidance might find a congenial setting we can give attention only to the beginnings, and we find these beginnings in the thought of the Moravian Bishop and the Commonwealth educators rather than in Locke. Such seed grew at first in the soil of religious republicanism, and so found a better chance for continued growth in America than in eighteenth-century Europe. And so it is to the struggling colonies and later the new nation emerging in North America that we now turn.

ENGLISHMEN AWAY FROM HOME

We must not fall into the error of supposing that an atmosphere of religious republicanism led to any smooth and automatic evolution of the kind of education in which guidance could grow. There were many falterings and setbacks. In the early colonies there was simply an attempt to recreate in the New World something of the kind of culture which had been known back home. It could scarcely have been otherwise. In England of the early seventeenth century there had been a two-class educational system: for the elite who were to become leaders, Latin grammar schools and the university; for the masses, terminal schools teaching reading, writing, and perhaps a little arithmetic. It is not surprising to find this pattern in the early colonies. The colonies also felt strongly the influences of the religious tradition and the classical heritage. In New England particularly, we find a stalwart Puritanism in which the political and ecclesiastical power structures were often combined in the same persons. Such essentially undemocratic social conditions could hardly produce a thoroughly democratic concept of education. There were, of course, some gains, such as *The Massachusetts Act* of 1647 which provided for the establishment of common schools and grammar schools and, in effect, made education but not school attendance compulsory. But as Edwards and Richey say: "A democratic school system in America was neither an inheritance nor, as often supposed, a gift of Puritan New England. It has been an achievement, perhaps the most significant cultural achievement, of the American people" (6, p. 14).

The successful outcome of the Revolution cleared the way for a whole complex of changes in the life of the people. Reforms such as the abolition of primogeniture and entail did much to forestall the development of a landed aristocracy. The developing middle class was able to press for the kind of utilitarian education which was felt to serve its interests. The West opened with amazing rapidity; by 1800 a million persons had crossed the Appalachian Mountains, and in another 20 years the population of the West amounted to 2½ millions. The voices of those who would have made education a kind of Christian benevolence to the poor, under the sponsorship of a state church, were simply lost in the noise of building a lusty young nation. A Jacksonian democracy with its faith in equalitarianism was in the making.

A new kind of social mobility became possible. The freedom of the individual became a realizable ideal, especially in the West, and his plans for himself could mean something. Thus a basic condition for guidance came into being, even though guidance in a modern sense was nonexistent. The respect for the individual which Comenius had carried into education on religious grounds, and which had been nurtured by the Commonwealth educators as a practical gain to the Commonwealth as well as to the individual, had now become a thing based on natural right.

THOMAS JEFFERSON

Just as in Comenius many contemporary strands of thought met, so in Jefferson we find the interweaving of varied threads of the world of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Few if any of the leaders of the new nation were so keenly interpretative of the intellectual tapestry of the time. The intellectual roots of Jefferson lie more in the Renaissance and in the Reformation than in the Industrial Revolution. He was a humanist who loved dearly the classics. But his highly developed aesthetic appreciations were in the classic mood, free of the excess of sensuality sometimes associated with the Renaissance. Though he was born on the frontier, in his personal tastes there was much of the aristocrat about him. He placed high value on friendships and gracious living; he enjoyed beautiful surroundings, good food, fine wines, and thoroughbred horses. Money was a secondary thing, and if the maintenance of cultural values in living meant going into debt, then let debt come, as in fact it did.

Jefferson proposed a plan for the progressive selection of promising poor boys to be educated at public expense, so that "twenty of the best geniuses will be reared from the rubbish annually" (16, p. 464). However democratic the intent of the proposal, such phrasing certainly has an aristocratic ring. Yet, in a letter to John Adams (16, pp. 473-478) he carefully distinguished between a natural aristocracy based on "virtue and talents" and a "*pseudo-aristoi*" of wealth and birth without virtue and talent, whose ascendancy must be prevented. For Jefferson was sincerely democratic in his social philosophy. His democratic beliefs were not of the leveling sort, however; rather, his basic humanism gave him a belief in the fundamental dignity of the individual, from which it followed that men should be lifted to higher stations according to ability rather than leveled to some common plateau. His belief

in the dignity of man was deeply embedded in a fundamentally Christian attitude; yet he firmly believed that one of the first things necessary to raise the level of education was to free the people from any coercion in religious matters. It is because of such balancing attitudes that Jefferson affords a better expression of the spirit of his time than would a person more provincially devoted to some one insight.

Through much of his life Jefferson sought educational reforms in his own state of Virginia. Late in October of 1776 the Virginia legislature passed a bill providing for general revision of the laws. Jefferson and two fellow lawyers, Pendleton and Whyte, accepted appointment as a committee to consider the matter and make recommendations. In June, 1779, they made their report in the form of 126 recommended bills. Among these were bills to establish religious freedom, to abolish primogeniture, to humanize the criminal code, and to establish elementary and intermediate schools. Jefferson regarded the school bill as an essential part of these reforms; but the legislature thought otherwise, and the school bill failed.

We cannot pause to follow the proposals of Jefferson through the vicissitudes of the years, but shall note only certain features of the bill of 1817, *A Bill for Establishing a System of Public Education*, which gives the essentials of his thinking. This bill provided for establishing elementary schools, "colleges" or intermediate schools, and the University of Virginia. Counties were to be divided into wards, each to include a number of persons about equal to a company of militia, and in each ward an elementary school was to be established. These schools were to be supervised by visitors, who were to seek and employ as teacher "a person of good moral character, qualified to teach reading, writing, numerical arithmetic, and the elements of geography . . ." (10, p. 234). At these schools every mentally competent child was to receive free instruction. In each of nine districts colleges were to be established. "In the said colleges shall be taught Greek, Latin, French, Spanish, Italian and German Languages, English grammar, geography, ancient and modern, the higher branches of numerical arithmetic, the mensuration of land, the use of globes, and the ordinary elements of navigation" (10, pp. 237-238). The subjects to be offered at the proposed University afford an interesting reflection of the breadth of Jefferson's thinking. There was provision for both liberal education, and more specific preparation for law, medicine, agriculture, and military service. "In the said University shall be taught history and geography, ancient and modern; natural philosophy, agriculture, chemistry, and

the theories of medicine; anatomy, zoology, botany, mineralogy, and geology; mathematics, pure and mixed; military and naval science; ideology, ethics, the law of nature and of nations; law, municipal and foreign; the science of civil government and political economy; languages, rhetoric, belles lettres, and the fine arts generally . . ." (10, p. 241). Jefferson's plan for the selection of promising students to be given continued education at public expense was spelled out in some detail. The visitors of the ward schools were to select from each school "some one of the most promising and sound understanding" who had completed the three elementary years and whose parents were too poor to provide further schooling for him. This boy was to be sent to the first meeting of the visitors in his own collegiate district. From among these candidates the collegiate visitors were to select two who were to be maintained and educated in the college for five years. At the end of this time, one of the five was to be selected and sent to the University, there to continue at public expense "in such branches of the sciences taught there as are most proper to qualify him for the calling to which his patents or guardians destine him . . ." (10, pp. 242-243).

Jefferson's proposal of free elementary education reminds us of the suggestions of the Commonwealth educators, but Jefferson saw more clearly the importance of a literate citizenry to the maintenance of basic political freedom. The intermediate level of the colleges, as suggested by Jefferson, was pretty thoroughly humanistic, with only minor concessions to geography, history, and arithmetic—more in the spirit of Milton. But in his proposals for the University he went far beyond his time in the emphasis he would give to technological and professional training. Chiefly because of such recommendations he has sometimes been considered an exponent of utilitarianism in education, but this is unfair. Jefferson's interests were simply so broad that he included the utilitarian as one part of what he felt necessary and desirable for the growth and well-being of the country. There was no stress on choosing *either* the humanist *or* the practical; he saw places for both.

In his total concept of an educational plan he was perhaps influenced by Destutt (10, p. 164), who felt the need in France of two kinds of school systems for two groups, the *ouvrière* and the *savante*. Jefferson thought of the mass of citizens as divided into the laboring and the learned groups, but proposed the more democratic course of keeping all together in the elementary schools, after which those destined for the learned group might proceed through the college and university, while the laboring group could go into agriculture, become

apprenticed, or seek further training in trade schools. Jefferson's plan for progressive selection and education at public expense of promising youth was based on his conviction that talent existed among the poor as well as among the wealthy—certainly a democratic point of view. But the provision of such educational opportunities as a kind of social elevator for the individuals concerned was not his chief purpose. Rather, these youth were the natural aristocracy, whose talents should be salvaged for their potential leadership value in the Republic. To put it another way, the kind of social mobility into the middle class represented by Franklin was not in his thinking.

Jefferson was aware, too, of the possible overcrowding in the learned professions. He discussed the matter in a letter to David Williams (10, p. 155), pointing out the distress of those who had prepared for such occupations and were unable to enter them, and that because their education had been oriented toward the professions "their habits of life have disqualified them for reentering into the laborious class." But everything considered, he concluded that individual choice was better than any plan which could be devised for dealing with the problem. All in all, perhaps the most basic question raised by Jefferson is that of providing different kinds of education for differing individual and group needs. This of course is a broad question of educational policy. But inherent in this broad question is the problem of educational and vocational guidance for maximum utilization of such differentiated opportunities, and the more specific Jeffersonian question of the identification and selection of the able—the "natural aristocracy" of "talents and virtue."

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN

In sharp contrast to the almost austere, cultured Jefferson stands Franklin, the amiable, practical, upward-mobile tradesman. Although Franklin was 37 years the senior of Jefferson, we have chosen to place Franklin after Jefferson in our discussion because Franklin seems to symbolize better the things to come in educational developments than does Jefferson. Perhaps fortunately for him, many of his exploits and adventures of late adolescence occurred while he was in England, and so were not particularly visible to his Calvinistic family back in Boston. It was while he was debating whether he should remain in England that he was offered the opportunity to become the clerk for a Quaker merchant Denham back in Philadelphia. Franklin accepted,

won the approval of his employer by his industry and reliability, and so began a career in merchandising. But an epidemic struck Philadelphia in 1727, and both he and his employer were stricken. Denham succumbed but Franklin recovered, though he suffered some time thereafter with pleurisy. He returned to his old trade as printer with his former employer Keimer. It was about this time that Franklin seems to have experienced a kind of conversion to settled, conventional way of life (7, p. 114).

Franklin went about his self-improvement in a most systematic way, selecting 13 virtues in which he undertook to discipline himself in an orderly way, keeping records of his day-to-day success or failure. The virtues are an interesting mixture of Aristotelian-Christian ethics, and practical middle-class pragmatic morality. In the former class would fall temperance, silence, sincerity, justice, moderation, tranquillity, chastity, and humility, but the others—order, resolution, frugality, industry, and cleanliness—are surely middle-class values. There is in these virtues none of the more daring tempest of eighteenth-century radicalism in which Franklin had dabbled while in England. So marked was the middle-class tone of his later life that one of his biographers, Fay (7), has made his mobility strivings a major key in interpreting his life, and has called him "the first American bourgeois." Certainly in this regard he was clearly distinguished from Jefferson. The contrast of the two men is concisely put by Ulich: ". . . there are two types of personality without which no society of free and self-reliant people can thrive. One is represented by Benjamin Franklin, the proud, industrious, and thrifty man with a trained and experienced common sense; and the other type is represented by Thomas Jefferson, the highly cultured, yet democratically minded natural aristocrat . . ." (15, p. 257).

By the age of 24 he was established in his own printing shop and, although still in debt, was well on the road to becoming a respectable businessman in Philadelphia. A year earlier he had married Deborah Read, to whom he had become engaged before leaving for England. Looking back in his old age, Franklin regarded his early neglect of Deborah as one of his great mistakes. The romance had seemed genuine, and probably they would have been married had not her parents thought them too young and perhaps Franklin's prospects not too solidly founded. Benjamin failed to keep up correspondence, stayed in England much longer than he had planned, and Deborah, despairing of seeing him again, married another, who soon deserted her. Their re-

newed relations seem almost more of a business arrangement than a revival of courtship. After their marriage, Franklin assumed the care of her widowed mother, and Deborah accepted into the home Franklin's illegitimate son William. Nevertheless, they achieved a home and apparent happiness, although Deborah may have been more at ease as the dutiful wife of a tradesman than in the role she was later called upon to play as hostess to some of the famous men of the time. Reminiscing in his *Autobiography*, Franklin wrote: ". . . she proved to me a good and faithful companion, and contributed essentially to the success of my shop. We prospered together, and it was our mutual study to render each other happy. Thus, I corrected as well as I could, this great error of my youth" (8, pp. 89-90).

Franklin achieved increasing stature in community affairs. He was the efficient organizer. He gave Philadelphia paving, street cleaning, and lighting. He promoted the Pennsylvania Hospital. He organized the first chartered fire insurance company. He organized the American Philosophical Society and became its president. He achieved independent wealth. His activities broadened to national scope, and finally he was Ambassador to France. Truly, he had come a long way, this self-made man with less than two years of formal schooling. After confessing to a certain indulgence in vanity, he was able to write with satisfaction: "From the bosom of poverty and obscurity, in which I drew my first breath and spent my first years, I have raised myself to a state of opulence and some degree of celebrity in the world" (8, p. 9).

Even by the most generous sort of estimate Franklin cannot be regarded as a major philosopher of education. His contributions to the schools were those of action and influence, more in the manner in which a civic-minded and progressive member of a school board contributed to the welfare of the schools. As early as 1743 Franklin formulated proposals for an English school, which was to teach neither the ancient nor the modern foreign languages. But his interest was diverted, apparently by the current troubles with Spain and France. When later the idea was revived, he yielded to the advice of friends and sponsored instead an Academy, which was to contain both Latin and English schools. In his *Proposals Relating to the Education of Youth in Pennsylvania* (9) he outlined his ideas as to the proper nature and functions of the proposed Academy. His own statements were fortified by quotations from numerous eminent men, so numerous in fact that the quotations bulked considerably larger than Franklin's own comments. Realizing that time limitations of students necessitated some selection

of subject matter, he proposed the teaching of "those Things that are likely to be *most useful* and *most ornamental*." All were to be taught writing, English grammar and composition, selected readings in literature, arithmetic, accounts, and the first principles of geometry and astronomy. History would provide the means of introducing geography, chronology, ancient custom, and morality. The specific virtues mentioned for inculcation were temperance, order, frugality, industry, and perseverance. Provisions were to be made for the physical well-being of the students through exercise. He praised rather effusively the classics and thought that students should be encouraged to study Latin and Greek. Those intending to enter the ministry should study both Latin and Greek; those looking toward medicine, Latin, Greek, and French; prospective lawyers, Latin and French; while those expecting to enter commerce should study the modern languages, French, German, and Spanish. "And though all should not be compell'd to learn Latin, Greek, or the modern languages; yet none that have an ardent Desire to learn them should be refused. . . ." Science was given a practical bent, for along with the study of natural history should be included "a little gardening, planting, grafting, and innöculating," with "excursions to plantations of the best farmers to observe methods." Franklin recommended also a group of topics which, in more modern terminology, seem to be a kind of blend of economics and general science, all to be approached through history. "The History of Commerce, of the Invention of Arts, Rise of Manufactures, Progress of Trade, Change of its Seats, with the Reasons, causes, &c. may also be made entertaining to Youth, and will be useful to all. And this, with the Accounts in other History of the prodigious Force and Effect of Engines and Machines used in War, will naturally introduce a Desire to be instructed in Mechanicks, and to be inform'd of the Principles of that Art by which weak men perform such Wonders, Labor is sav'd, Manufactures expedited . . ." (9, pp. 28-29). And through the whole educational process should be cultivated a "*Benignity of Mind*, which shows itself in *searching for* and *seizing* every Opportunity to *serve* and *to oblige*; and is the Foundation of what is called GOOD BREEDING; highly useful to the Possessor, and most agreeable to all." The aim and end of all learning should be the development of inclination and ability to serve mankind, one's country, friends, and family.

In spite of the accolade awarded the teaching of ancient languages, it is difficult to escape the impression that Franklin's basic interest was in those parts of education which he regarded as useful, and

that his *Proposals* represented a sort of compromise which he thought might have a chance of acceptance. As the Academy developed, the emphasis was more and more given to the ancient languages, and Franklin was disturbed. Shortly before his death, when he was no longer able to attend the meeting of the trustees of the Academy (1789), he prepared for that group his *Observations Relative to the Intentions of the Original Founders of the Academy in Philadelphia* (12, vol. 2, pp. 133-159), in which he expressed the opinion that the current trustees were not keeping faith with the founders. He pointed out that the Latin master was being paid twice the salary of the English master, while teaching only half as many students. Moreover, the Latin master was accorded greater prestige by reason of his title of Rector, whereas the English master had no title. In other matters, too, this partiality was evident, said Franklin; in the meeting of the preceding March the trustees had voted 100 pounds sterling for the purchase of Latin and Greek books, maps, drafts, and instruments, and nothing at all for English books. The result of "our injudiciously starving of the English part of our scheme of education" was the loss of 50 scholars, some of whom were attending private schools "professing to teach what had been promised to be taught in the Academy." He noted that ". . . there is in mankind an unaccountable prejudice in favor of ancient customs and habitudes, which inclines to a continuance of them after the circumstances, which formerly made them useful, cease to exist." He recalled that after gentlemen began to wear wigs, hats no longer served a useful purpose, and yet for a long time the well-dressed man continued to carry a hat under his arm. "The still prevailing custom of having schools for teaching generally our children, in these days, the Latin and Greek languages" he regarded as very much like the custom of the *chapeau bras*. Such an expression is probably close to the real sentiments of Franklin, not only in his old age, but in his first proposal of the English school. The essence of Franklin's thinking seemed to be not that the classics should be excluded from the schools, but simply that they should not be imposed upon all regardless of life needs, and that ample provision should be made for the more practical preparation of those whose life expectancies seemed to indicate commerce, or agriculture, or other such practical pursuits. In a word, Franklin stood for an emphasis on practical, present-day oriented education, and the virtues to be inculcated—temperance, order, frugality, industry, and perseverance—suggest a strong flavoring of middle-class values.

SOME BASIC CONCEPTS AND QUESTIONS

In our review of examples of educational thought from Comenius through Jefferson it has been obvious that nothing like a complete and modern concept of guidance emerged. But two basic concepts were developed which, when slowly implemented through the years, created conditions favorable to the growth of guidance. One of these concepts was that of free education for all as a function of the state. We find this in Comenius as a sort of religious-social ideal, and Petty was more specific in providing that no social distinctions be allowed. Jefferson added the notion of local responsibility and support of schools, completely separated from churchly influence. All these pioneers seemed to regard elementary education as the upper limit of such free education, and all seemed to feel that such elementary education would be the same for all. The idea of personal adjustment to the school situation simply did not occur to them, or if it did, adjustment was purely a matter of discipline. The second major concept was that of providing different kinds of education for the differing needs of individuals and groups. Usually it was the needs of different groups which were recognized, as in Comenius' urging of Vernacular Schools for those who would not go to Latin-Schools, or Franklin's stressing of the need for a practical education for those who would enter commerce or the trades. The problem of individual differences, to the extent it was recognized at all, was subsumed under the problem of teaching method. By the time of Franklin and Jefferson the concept of free public education with varied offerings for meeting different needs was established, even though converting this ideal into general practice was yet a long way off.

But there is a deeper lying question implicit in the ideas of these pioneers which was not given explicit formulation. Comenius had spoken of a boy's being "destined" for manual labor or for higher education. Petty thought of "such as shall have need to learne" foreign languages. Dury would have instruction dependent on "Children's Naturall Capacities," and would prepare them "to exercise themselves in everie good employment afterwards"—a concept much broader than the vocational. Jefferson thought of the laboring and learned classes and, staunch individualist that he was, would leave the choice of kind of schooling to individuals or, actually, to the parents of the boys. Jefferson left no doubt, however, as to his belief that there existed a natural aristocracy of talent, having no real relation to social position

maintained by an artificial aristocracy. Franklin was not explicit on the point, but the spirit of his own life suggests that he believed a man's future to depend upon his own ability, industry, and, perhaps, good fortune. What then is the basis on which it may be decided that one boy or girl shall receive this kind of education, and another that kind? Is it ability? The needs of society? His prospects, based on his socioeconomic position? His own choice? The choice of his parents? Or a kind of mystical "destiny"? If hard pressed the Commonwealth educators would probably have answered in harmony with the "destiny" of Comenius, but with the Calvinistic coloring of predestination. This sort of answer could hardly find general acceptance today. An answer based on socioeconomic position violates our democratic values. The imagined answer of Franklin—ability and industry—is essentially the Protestant ethic, and too easily becomes a justification of inequality. If we take ability as the major basis of decision, the realization of ability potential would require for many, as Jefferson recognized, some kind of outside assistance. Granted the democratic right of the individual to his own choice, does this mean that the state is obligated to furnish any kind of education desired by the individual, regardless of his ability and the needs of society? This fundamental question of a basis for guidance has not yet been answered. Being nondirective as a technique in counseling is one thing; but offering nondirection as an answer to this question is quite another matter and amounts to an assertion of complete individualism. It is perhaps not too much to suggest that even now guidance as such has not achieved a philosophy. Rather, *guidance practice simply reflects the particular educational setting in which it operates.* This may be desirable, but it just passes the question back to the philosophy of the particular school or school system.

SUMMARY

The kind of educational system in which guidance finds a congenial setting results from developments which can be traced back to at least the time of Comenius. In this period can be identified two major movements, the rise of empirical science, and the increasing influence of a commercial-industrial social class. The genius of Comenius is his ability to synthesize so many of the divergent intellectual influences of his time; his sympathies encompassed in varying degrees humanism, the new science, and the contemporary gropings for a more democratic education. He proposed elementary education for all, Latin-Schools

which would include both the liberal arts and some science, and selective admission to the University. The Commonwealth educators stressed a utilitarian kind of education and a broadened curriculum, and schools which at the lower level should be available to all in democratic fashion. Dury, especially, conceived of education adapted to the abilities of students and oriented toward the differing occupational outlooks of individuals.

In the North American colonies education was at first patterned on European models, but as the United States came into being significant developments occurred. In Jefferson can be seen a mingling of classic tastes and democratic thought. His educational proposals included a plan for the progressive selection and education at public expense of the natural aristocracy to provide leadership for the nation. His plan provided for education at three levels, the elementary, an intermediate stage of "colleges," and the university. Franklin stands as a symbol of the developing and mobile middle class. Although not a major educational philosopher, he exerted considerable influence toward a utilitarian type of education.

Implicit in the educational thought of the individuals whose ideas were discussed is an unanswered guidance question: on what basis should it be decided that a youth, having completed elementary school, should receive one kind or another of further education? Should the basis for decision be abilities? Social need? "Destiny"? The choice of the youth? The choice of parents? Or some other?

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CHAPTER 6

The Guidance Movement in the United States

In his presidential address to the 1950 convention of the National Vocational Guidance Association, Hoppock (27) noted how the vocational guidance movement had been dominated by first one and (1) then another group. In the early days the leaders were typically social workers interested in child labor and in the problems of transition from school to work. Among the early leaders were Frank Parsons in Boston, Anna Reed in Seattle, Ann Davis in Chicago, Emma Prichard Cooley in New Orleans, and Edith Campbell in Cincinnati. In the late 1920's and early 1930's domination of the movement shifted to educators, and by 1930 Richard Allen, then president of the NVGA, was able to speak of "the conquest of our association by educators." Leadership had shifted to school administrators and professors of education, such as Richard Allen, John M. Brewer, Harry Kitson, George Myers, William Proctor, and Grayson Kefauver. The depression years of the middle and late 1930's brought another shift so that occupational trends, mobility, placement, and problems of unemployment came into focus, with the emergence into prominence of such names as Carroll Shartle and William Stead of the United States Employment Service, Mary Hayes and Roswell Ward of the National Youth Administration, and Howard Bell of the American Youth Commission. Following World War II came the staggering undertaking by the Veterans Administration of advising returning service personnel, with a strong emphasis on psychometric methods. Finally, Hoppock noted that there had appeared a different approach to counseling—the non-directive or client-centered—and that the foundations of the older vocational guidance movement "are beginning to crumble."

No complex movement such as that of vocational guidance can

be traced to any simple set of circumstances. Brewer (15) points out four conditions which, taken together, led to the rise of the movement: (1) the fact of the division of labor, (2) the growth of technology, (3) the extension of vocational education, and (4) the spread of modern forms of democracy. That there were many background influences and tangential forces seems self evident. As Kitson remarked in his autobiographical sketch published on the occasion of the Silver Anniversary issue of *Occupations*: "I attained adulthood at a propitious time: was graduated from college the year that Parsons' book was published; a year before the Binet tests were brought to America; two years before the publication of Frederick W. Taylor's book, *Principles of Scientific Management*, Thorndike's *Individuality*, and Gilbreth's *Motion Study*" (35).

Kitson was speaking in a context of vocational guidance. If one surveys the guidance movement in the broader sense it is necessary to recognize such influences as participation of governmental agencies, the interest in progressive education, the rise of clinical psychology, the increasing interest in mental health, and doubtless many others. Wrenn (68), looking back from the vantage point of 1951, said "Two broad trends in personal assistance have characterized the first half of this century, those of vocational guidance and psychotherapy." In the pages following we shall give a share of attention to the beginnings of vocational guidance which may seem to be disproportionate, but our effort is to sketch beginnings. And the beginnings of guidance in this country were in vocational guidance.

FRANK PARSONS AND THE BOSTON VOCATION BUREAU

Late in the fall of 1907 Frank Parsons had formulated plans for the organization of a vocational bureau, and he sought financial support for the undertaking from Mrs. Quincy Adams Shaw, daughter of Professor Jean Louis Randolphe Agassiz of Harvard. By January of the following year plans were completed, and the Vocation Bureau came into being on January 13, 1908, under the leadership of Frank Parsons as Director and Vocational Counselor. The Bureau was established with a main office at the Civic Service House and branch offices in the Young Men's Christian Association, the Economic Club, and the Women's Educational and Industrial Union. Parsons maintained office hours at each of these places.

The principles on which Parsons carried on counseling afford

an illuminating insight into his work and forecast some currently accepted practices, particularly assessment of the individual, and the use of occupational information. As summarized by Albertson in his introduction to Patsons' book, *Choosing a Vocation*, these principles were:

1. It is better to choose a vocation than merely to hunt a job.
2. No one should choose a vocation without careful self-analysis, thorough, honest, and under guidance.
3. The youth should have a large survey of the field of vocations, and not simply drop into the convenient or accidental position.
4. Expert advice, or the advice of men who have made a careful study of men and vocations and of the conditions of success, must be better and safer for a young man than the absence of it.
5. The putting down on paper of a self-analysis is of supreme importance (44).

Parsons himself was a remarkable individual who has become something of a symbol of vocational guidance. A closer acquaintance with him may help us catch something of the spirit of the early years. Born November 14, 1854, in Mount Holly, New Jersey, he received his early education at home and at a local private school. In 1869, at age 15, he entered Cornell University; he graduated in three years with a high record in mathematics and engineering (38). Upon completion of college he was employed by a railroad as engineer; but the company failed in the panic of 1873, and he never began work. Parsons then obtained employment in a rolling mill, lifting and shearing iron and loading bundles. He continued this work for the greater part of a year at \$39.00 per month before becoming a teacher in a district school at Southbridge, Massachusetts. After being promoted to the high school he taught mathematics, history, and French. He also participated in a local debating society, and it was during such participation that a local lawyer heard him and urged him to study law. He began to read law at Southbridge, then moved to Worcester to continue his study, and a year later passed the bar examination with evidence of outstanding achievement (38).

But Parsons had paid a high price for this achievement in eye-strain and general physical exhaustion, and on medical advice he went to New Mexico where he lived in the open for much of three years. In 1885 he returned to Boston as a chief law clerk, and after only six years of law practice was invited to join the faculty of the Law School of Boston University. Four years later he made his first and only bid for

entrance into politics as candidate for mayor of Boston. Fortunately for the future of vocational guidance, perhaps, he was defeated, though by less than 1 percent of the votes. An interesting detour in his career began in 1897 when he joined the faculty of Kansas State College of Agriculture and Applied Science in Manhattan. But certain railroad interests were not particularly enthusiastic about his liberal views and writings, and these interests were apparently powerful enough to force the resignation of Parsons, President Will, and several other faculty members. This displaced group then joined the faculty at Glen Ellyn, Illinois, where Parsons became Dean of the College of Liberal Arts.

By the time Parsons came to the Civic Service House of Boston he had had a rich and varied experience. Assisted by Ralph Albertson, he organized in 1905 the Breadwinners' College (later called the Breadwinners' Institute) as a part of Civic Service House. Thus, finally, did Parsons come to a commitment to educational work in a social settlement and, later, specifically to vocational guidance. Brewer (15) suggests that "this interesting educational experiment is a direct outgrowth of some of his earlier experiences," and comments briefly on several speculations as to Parsons' motivations. Perhaps he had become convinced that "only by education could his far-reaching plans find ultimate realization." Perhaps, also, as a bachelor given to solitary study and writing, "he went to Civic Service House for friendship and relief from sedentary work."

Whatever his motivations may have been, he had less than a year of life before him after the organization of the Vocation Bureau, and yet he is probably best remembered for that short year of endeavor in vocational guidance. On September 26, 1908, he died, reportedly of cancer. His pioneer book *Choosing a Vocation* (44) was published posthumously the following year.

The social thinking of Parsons is probably most characteristically summed up in his own statement as *The Philosophy of Mutualism* (43). Essentially, he sought cooperation among the various segments of the business world and the achievement of economic equality. The reforms through which this equality was to be achieved were woman suffrage, proportional representation, a system of "multiple voting," voting by mail, compulsory voting, civil service reform, and the initiative and referendum. He hoped to abolish saloons, renovate slums, prevent marriage of criminals, and improve public education. He saw government ownership of public utilities as the only solution to the encroachment of the huge "public" utilities of his day. Of course, these

ideas of social reform were not original with Parsons; as Davis (21) has pointed out, they were accepted by him from a group of thinkers in Boston of the 1850's. There were other elements in his thinking. The "socialistic" strain, such as it was, was perhaps that of Richard T. Ely, especially the latter's attempt to unite ethics and economics, although Parsons shows also the influence of Edward Bellamy. Parsons himself did not specifically acknowledge an intellectual debt to Herbert Spencer, but his writings suggest Spencerian influence, especially the notions of the organic conception of society, the conflict theory of progress, and evolutionary stages of human development (21:89-90). As Davis has summarized the spirit of his thought: "The driving spirit behind his philosophy was his belief in the infinite goodness of man, coupled with his capacity to win the war of good over evil, of law over anarchy, of cooperation over competition, of reason over blind domination, and of the individual over forces which compelled him to become beastlike and a brother to the ox" (21, p. 118).

After an interruption of some months, the work of the Bureau was continued under the leadership of David Stone Wheeler who became Director on June 19, 1909. Later in the same year the directorship passed to Meyer Bloomfield who continued in that capacity until 1917. Brewer (13), writing in 1918, listed 10 "past activities" of the Bureau, including the establishment of vocational guidance in the Boston schools and training courses for Boston teachers; the introduction of summer school courses in a number of colleges; holding of the First National Conference on Vocational Guidance in 1910, in cooperation with the Boston Chamber of Commerce; investigation of vocational guidance in Europe and in Puerto Rico; organization of the Boston Employment Managers' Association in 1911; correspondence, conferences, interviews, and lectures; and the publication of some books and a number of pamphlets. Brewer continues with a summary of "the present work of the Bureau" which suggests a continuation of much the same kind of service. Apparently one of the problems even then was dealing with requests for counseling by mail; it is interesting to note that the Bureau took a firm stand against such practice.

During the years of World War I the Bureau was headed by Roy W. Kelley, and then John M. Brewer became Director. In a very brief reference to his assumption of the Directorship, Brewer (15) mentions that the Bureau emphasized work with the schools and that a series of courses for the preparation of counselors was organized.

GUIDANCE IN THE SCHOOLS

The origin of the vocational education and vocational guidance movements in this country seem to have had "little direct connection" (15, p. 67). The German influence on vocational education, so strong in the first years, resulted in the establishment of specialized secondary schools. This situation created problems of choice of school and curriculum for pupils, a guidance problem in which one might have expected Frank Parsons to be interested, but there seems to be no evidence that he was concerned. But the two movements did find a point of contact in the Boston schools. On May 3, 1909, Superintendent Stratton D. Brooks initiated a request which resulted a month later in a proposal by the trustees of the Boston Vocation Bureau of a plan for working with school children in the choice of school and curriculum. The Bureau proposed the appointment of a committee of masters and submasters as a "vocational direction committee" as well as the appointment and training of a number of counselors in the schools. For its part, the Bureau indicated willingness to appoint a full-time director to assist with the work. The School Committee accepted the plan, and the Bureau appointed Frederick J. Allen as assistant director.

It should not be supposed that the early activities in the Boston schools constituted the single beginning of guidance. A number of first efforts were made in widely scattered schools. In New York City activities originated within the school system, but without official endorsement, sponsored and largely financed by the High School Teachers' Association, under the leadership of Eli W. Weaver. As early as 1904 Weaver, then a teacher in the Boys' High School in Brooklyn, undertook the placing of boys in farm work during summer vacations, and in part-time work during school. By 1908, 2500 boys registered for summer placement. In 1909 teachers were reported to be serving in a number of high schools as counselors; bulletins of vocational opportunities were available; studies of career plans were included as part of an English course; and various other activities were undertaken. After receiving a detailed report of guidance activities in 1909, Superintendent Maxwell recommended the establishment of a central bureau with Weaver as head. Although the Board did not endorse the establishment of such a bureau, there were, as Reed (47, p. 9) has pointed out, three concrete results of the work of the Teachers' Association: (1) the New York City Vocational Guidance Survey,

February-July, 1911; (2) the organization of a number of local agencies to deal with guidance and placement; and (3) the Second National Conference on Vocational Guidance, held in New York City, in October, 1912.

In cities other than New York beginnings were also being made. In Westport, Connecticut, a course in vocations was introduced and taught by the principal, George H. Boyden. In Detroit, Jesse B. Davis, while serving as eleventh-grade counselor in the Central High School from 1898 to 1907, devoted most of his time to counseling some 500 students. And when he became principal of the Grand Rapids High School in 1907 he not only provided for counseling but introduced weekly periods in the English classes devoted to "vocational and moral guidance." We cannot pause to give other examples, but an excellent review has been given by Reed (47) of early activities in a number of other cities: Cincinnati, Philadelphia, Chicago, St. Louis, Minneapolis, Hartford, De Kalb, Omaha, New Orleans, Birmingham, Los Angeles, Oakland, San Francisco, Salt Lake City, Seattle, and others. It is not possible to force the beginnings in these places into a single pattern, but one is impressed by the interest and support of philanthropic groups outside the schools.

Although the beginnings of guidance are indistinguishable from the beginnings of vocational guidance, it is important to note that many of the early leaders held quite broad concepts of guidance. For example, Davis (22), in his book *Vocational and Moral Guidance*, was true to his title and devoted considerable attention to moral and religious instruction. His chapter "A Word to Parents" contains much of what today we might call mental health. A "contribution" by Cornelia S. Hulst in Davis' book deals with the teaching of social and civic ethics "from the standpoint of the chosen vocation." And that Davis was aware of the broad and eclectic nature of his approach to guidance is indicated by his comment in his preface, "Each worker is attacking the problem from his own point of view. In fact, not all have yet agreed upon a definition of the term, 'vocational guidance.'" A somewhat more strictly vocational approach was made by Bloomfield (12), in *Youth, School, and Vocation*. Quite understandably, his approach seems more colored by the philosophy of the Vocation Bureau, since he was the Bureau's Director, and Davis had had little if any direct contact with this organization. Bloomfield saw clearly the need for vocational guidance and vocational training to be closely related, and he used the phrase "vocational service" to cover both. Like Davis, he stressed the

importance of placement. But he did not feel that the school should undertake the total task; certainly, he said, the schools were not ready for such an undertaking. He foresaw the further development of public employment services—only a few states then had employment offices—and proposed the organization of a juvenile employment department in public employment services. In short, vocational service was a broad social responsibility, to be undertaken jointly if not co-operatively by various social institutions.

This broad approach to the task of vocational guidance remained vigorous well into the 1930's. Although the various activities which comprised the guidance effort came to be centered more and more in the schools, there was room for many professional groups to make contributions: educators, psychologists, social workers, personnel managers—practically anyone who was able and willing. In 1930, Kitson (33) expressed the conviction that vocational guidance was "really a social problem," and "not exclusively or even largely a public school problem." Two years later, Brewer (14), in his book *Education as Guidance*, came near to equating education and guidance. The social welfare tradition of Frank Parsons was strong in these years, and it should not occasion surprise to note that when in 1926 the American Association of Social Workers appointed a Job Analysis Committee to undertake the study of jobs in social work, one of the areas included was the duties and activities of vocational counselors. The study was reported by Fitch (24) in 1935.

We have noted that the earliest vocational guidance efforts were characteristically undertaken by individuals and were not particularly related to total school programs, or even to the vocational education movement, although certain leaders expressed broad outlooks on the problem. After about a decade of such efforts a new pattern began to emerge. City-wide organizations of guidance services made their appearance. Brewer (15) gives the following summary of the beginnings of city-wide organizations: in 1914, Cincinnati, Lincoln, Minneapolis, and Oakland; in 1915, Boston and Philadelphia; in 1917, Pittsburgh and Atlanta; and in 1918, Seattle and Providence. During the years 1919 through 1928 a total of 17 more cities organized. In reviewing these organizational beginnings one gets the impression of considerable concentration in the New England and East Central States, with a scattering along the West Coast. Of the 27 cities having vocational guidance programs on a city basis by 1928, a total of 21 were located east, and 6 west, of the Mississippi River. The distribution

suggests a relationship between the location of guidance programs and industrial centers.

THE IMPACT OF TESTING ON GUIDANCE

Thorndike and Hagen (61) suggest that the development of psychological and educational measurement in the twentieth century may be divided into three more-or-less distinct stages. The pioneering phase, from 1900 to 1915, saw the development of the first Binet scales and the American revisions, the appearance of group intelligence tests, and the first standardized achievement tests. In the second phase from 1915 to 1930, the "boom" period, came the use of the Army Alpha and Beta tests with large numbers of men in World War I, and the widespread use of group intelligence tests in the schools. During this same period also appeared standardized tests for all school skills and content areas, and then followed the development of achievement batteries. Finally, another wartime product, the *Woodworth Personal Data Sheet*, emerged as the patriarch of numerous personality inventories and questionnaires which were to follow. By about 1930 the emphasis shifted away from the construction of more instruments toward a more critical evaluation of the instruments and problems involved.

It is not our purpose to review the testing movement as such, but we shall look a little more closely at some of the developments most directly in the line of guidance developments. The framework of periods suggested by Thorndike and Hagen, although set in a larger context, will be useful for our more specific purpose. We turn first, then, to the pioneering period.

In a sense, Binet was performing a guidance function when he undertook the construction of a scale of intelligence. In 1904 the French Minister of Public Instruction had appointed a committee to investigate the causes of retardation among public school children, and Binet was a member of that committee. Binet soon published several papers on various aspects of the problem, and in 1905 he and Simon (9) reported in some detail their proposals for classifying both normal and abnormal children as to intelligence.

There was no immediate surge of interest, but five or six years later the *Psychological Index* was listing each year 12 to 15 articles concerning the new tests. Revisions of the Scale for American use were made by Henry H. Goddard and by Fred Kuhlman, both in 1911. Then in 1914 Whipple's translation of Stern's book was published as

The Psychological Methods of Testing Intelligence (52). Thus, before 1915, intelligence testing had been introduced in America and was attracting considerable attention. Interpretations were in terms of mental age; the IQ had not yet been introduced. It should not be assumed that the new developments received unanimous approval. Some of the earliest articles, such as those of Ayres (7), Terman (57), and Lawrence (36), although appreciating the implications of the undertaking, were critical of various aspects of the scales themselves. And Whitmer (65) argued that the grading of intelligence by a single scale was impossible. But in 1915 Terman (59) announced a new revision which he and his associates had developed and which was to become known as the Stanford Revision. The following year, *The Measurement of Intelligence* (58) was published. For the first time the IQ method of interpreting scores was used, although such a ratio had been discussed earlier by Stern and others.

No further consideration can be given here to the early developments of intelligence scales. Nor will any space be devoted to early group tests of intelligence, or to early achievement tests. Since our primary focus is upon the effect of testing on the guidance movement, it is more to the point to try to gain some notion of the opinions of guidance leaders as to the value of testing in guidance. Bloomfield (12), writing in 1915, thought that "At present it is doubtful whether psychological tests of the ordinary sort can be used to much advantage by the counselor." He felt, however, that with further progress in research, tests might become more and more useful. A similarly cautious attitude was expressed by Hollingsworth (26) in the same year. Kitson (32) called attention to the popular conception that guidance was a matter of "pigeonholing" an individual into a vocation for which he was "cut out," and the hope that tests might be the chief instrument in doing this. A more fruitful conception, he proposed, was that the guidance process be "monitory" in nature—warning the individual of his strengths and weaknesses. To this monitory function tests might contribute. In 1915 Bloomfield (11) published his *Readings in Vocational Guidance*, a compilation of 36 articles (not counting the examples of occupational information briefs) by almost as many authors. A perusal of these materials yields only two or three references to testing in guidance, only one of which is clear-cut: the testing done by Helen Thompson Wolley at Cincinnati in connection with a follow-up study. By 1918 a committee on vocational guidance, appointed by the Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education of the Na-

tional Education Association, made its report. One of the eight recommendations of the Committee, noted in an earlier chapter, was the "studying and testing of pupils' possibilities," but a careful, open-minded statement was made regarding the use of tests in guidance: "Their value as contributions in the field of experimental psychology should not be confused with their value as effective means of selecting an occupation for the individual or an individual for an occupation. As the work is in the early stage of experimentation, judgment on this point must be suspended until results are more conclusive" (41).

The "boom" character of the second period became manifest with the coming of World War I. The results of a number of researches were pooled in the development of the Army Alpha group test for literates and the Army Beta for illiterates. By Armistice Day, 1918, intelligence tests had been administered to 1,726,966 men (69, p. 12). According to the *Examiner's Guide*, seven purposes of psychological examination were recognized. Several of these stated purposes were concerned with classification and ultimate assignment of men, with the supplying of further information regarding men not responding satisfactorily to training, and with identifying and placing men of marked special skill. And so testing was contributing to guidance functions, whether or not such functions were labeled as guidance. Further guidance implications developed as the data from this mass testing were reviewed. For example, striking differences in the mean scores of occupational groups were noted. And the data from the Student Army Training Corps strongly suggested that there were differences in the mean scores of men in different colleges. There was evidence that many outside the Army were interested in this testing program. By 1920, Yoakum and Yerkes noted in the preface to *Army Mental Tests* that "During the past few months the Office of the Surgeon General of the Army and the National Research Council have been besieged with requests for information concerning the methods of psychological examining and for the printed materials used in the United States Army" (69).

Especially during the postwar years of World War I, intelligence testing in the schools became a band wagon affair. Many if not most of the leaders in the field kept their balance, but unfortunately practice at the school level often bore little relation to informed opinion. The cautious attitudes of the earlier years were forgotten, and many abuses were compounded by enthusiastic but naïve testers. Pupils were promoted on the basis of test scores alone, without regard to other indicators of development. "IQ" became a part of educational jargon to be

bandied about, often with no more attached meaning than would be carried by a word from a strange language. Attempts were made to determine a minimum IQ necessary for success in college, as if all colleges were alike and changeless in their demands. Truly, these were the years of raw adolescence for intelligence testing in the schools.

But there were other testing developments during these years which must be noted briefly. Standardized achievement testing became widespread. Although the beginnings of such testing were not in these years, the growth period was. Much of the achievement testing was only indirectly related to guidance since it was focused upon surveys of achievement for administrative purposes. Interest inventories emerged and gave promise of eventually achieving maturity. Perhaps the most important single event in the interest field was the appearance of the *Strong Vocational Interest Blank*. The testing of special aptitudes was also making gains. *The Seashore Measures of Musical Talents* appeared in 1919, and the *Meier-Seashore Art Judgment Test* in 1929. In the late 1920's O'Connor (37) was experimenting with dexterity tests at the West Lynn Works of the General Electric Company. *The O'Rourke Mechanical Aptitude Test*, developed during World War I, was published in 1926. *The MacQuarrie Test for Mechanical Ability* had appeared a year earlier. *Aptitude Testing*, by Hull (28), was published in 1928 and was a solid contribution in tune with the psychological temper of the time—although the book may now seem to have a certain mechanical air about it.

"Testing" was a popular topic for speeches and symposia at meetings of various professional groups, and from time to time various groups undertook reviews of available instruments and their applications. An example of the latter was reported by Brewer. The group, consisting of 11 persons, sought to interpret current developments and status for nonspecialists. A statement in the *Preface* gives a clue to the feeling of time: "The importance of measurement for educational and vocational guidance can hardly be overestimated, though at the same time the dangers of its use are great. On the one hand no careful work is possible without well-established standards of attainment which may be used with reasonable accuracy for large numbers of children. On the other hand, measurement is a sharp tool, and in the hands of those who work too fast or carelessly, much harm is likely to result" (16).

The period from 1930 on, as we have noted, was characterized by a more critical approach to testing in guidance. There was, of course, no sharp beginning of this change of temper. Those who had lost equilib-

rium did not suddenly recover it in 1930, and of course a substantial number had not lost balance, as evidenced by such reports as that by Brewer noted above. But in general there was a rising critical attitude. One of the expressions of this was an increased interest in "testing the tests"—an emphasis suggested by such persons as Kitson (34). In 1934 Thorndike (60) reported on his 10-year follow-up study of 2500 boys and girls with the finding that educational careers could be predicted quite well on the basis of tests given at age 14, but that there was little or no indication as to what vocational futures would be. Such a finding naturally became the center of considerable controversy. Not only were the tests themselves being subjected to critical study, but long looks were taken at the use of tests. In graphic words Crawford spoke of testing: "Individual guidance is a sort of mental physic, and as in the case of any other medicine, its contents should be known to the doctor and its power suited to the patient. . . . By no means should we forego their use—but we ought to have a kind of psychological pharmacopoeia, to say nothing of a Pure Norms and Tests Act" (20, p. 18).

Especially in the fields of interest and aptitude testing advances of real significance to guidance were made. A great number of validation studies were made of the *Strong Vocational Interest Blank*, which were summarized by Strong (54) in *The Vocational Interests of Men and Women*. More recently the results of an 18-year follow-up study with the same instrument have been published (55). Several new instruments for the measurement of interests appeared, most noteworthy of which was the *Kuder Preference Record* in 1939. In the field of aptitude testing, emphasis shifted toward the development of test batteries, a shift made feasible by the application of factor analysis methods. Thurstone led the way with the *Primary Mental Ability Tests*, and then came the *General Aptitude Test Battery* of the United States Employment Service, the *Differential Aptitude Tests*, and more recently a number of others. Such batteries, with all parts standardized against the same norm group or groups, made possible meaningful differential appraisal of various abilities of an individual.

The usefulness for guidance of developments in the field of personality tests was considerably more dubious. Since the term "personality tests" is quite ambiguous we must pause to delimit our intended meaning. Interest inventories are personality instruments in a broad sense, but we wish to exclude them arbitrarily from present consideration. We wish to exclude also instruments intended to give a survey picture of expressed student problems, such as the *Mooney Problem*

Check List. We do mean to include instruments intended to assess personality structure or dynamics or both. Within this rather arbitrarily limited meaning of the term, one particular group of instruments might be described as the self-inventories or questionnaires. Devastating critical reviews, such as that of Ellis (23), did much to shatter naïve faith in such "tests." But there were some promising instruments which appeared, such as the *Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory*, appropriate to clinical situations, but hardly useful for the average secondary school counselor. From the early 1930's right down to the present a vast amount of attention has been devoted to projective devices, particularly *The Rorschach Inkblot Test* and *The Murray Thematic Apperception Test*, but the resulting evidence for validity seems disappointingly small. Super (56, p. 527) noted a major trend toward the use of projectives and away from personality inventories, and a minor trend toward the refinement of inventories by the application of factor analysis methods. Both trends, he felt, could be traced to low validities characteristic of personality inventories. Two committees of the American Council on Education reflected the growing critical attitude in this area. The Committee on Review of the Testing Movement (1), reporting in 1937, struck a hopeful note and suggested that a Commission on Examination and Guidance be established which should concern itself with considering and promoting research in relatively new parts of the field, particularly aptitudes, attitudes, habits, traits, and emotions. Seven years later, in 1944, The Committee on Measurement and Guidance reported: ["The field of personality measurement is replete with recent tests. . . . However, there is so much doubt concerning the validity of nearly all of these personality measures that most persons engaged in individual evaluation still place greater reliance upon informal practices" (3, p. 20).

No discussion of the impact of testing on guidance would be complete without a recognition of the widespread use of tests in Veterans Administration advising centers in the years following World War II. In these centers contacts with clients were at best limited to a few occasions, and often only single contacts were involved. Under such circumstances it was inevitable that much use would be made of tests. The impetus thus given to testing did not cease with the closing of the advising centers, for a considerable number of them continued under community or college sponsorship, often with a continuation of much the same personnel and pattern of functioning.

One of the most significant recent events related to the use of tests

in guidance is the development and publication of a code of ethics for psychologists by the American Psychological Association. One of the problems considered was "Publishing and Using Psychological Tests and Diagnostic Aids" (4, pp. 143-156). In addition to the general discussion of ethical standards, a statement of "Technical Recommendations" (5) was published for the guidance of those who make and publish tests. The statement of standards was developed by a joint committee of the American Psychological Association, the American Educational Research Association, and the National Council on Measurements. The importance of developing such ethical standards can hardly be overestimated, for no one using tests in counseling relationships can escape the moral responsibility inherent in such practice, whether or not he be a member of the American Psychological Association. And surely a group without a code of ethics can hardly be a profession.

THE DEPRESSION YEARS

No attempt can be made here to tell the story of the many and varied strands of development and retrenchment during the early 1930's. The overwhelming numbers of unemployed naturally focused attention upon the immediate need—placement in jobs. But discussions of techniques of counseling and placement seemed pretty academic when jobs simply did not exist. Nevertheless, valiant efforts were made, and significant studies accomplished. We shall note very briefly only one example of each of two types: a service project, and a research study. Projects initiated by governmental agencies will be discussed later, as a part of the more general topic of government agencies and guidance.

The Adjustment Service was established in New York City in 1933 under the direction of Jerome H. Bently (8). It was made possible by the cooperation of many persons, agencies, and private business: the Carnegie Corporation, the American Association for Adult Education, the State Department of Education of New York, the National City Bank, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, the Young Men's Christian Association, and others. During the Service's 17 months of existence, some 16,000 clients were served. One of the significant aspects of this Service was that general counseling was provided—the individual was approached as a human entity. The counseling service welded into a functional whole all of the various services—psychologi-

cal, medical (including psychiatric), social, occupational, educational, and avocational information. Although the Service was in existence too short a time to permit any evaluation on the basis of ultimate effects on clients, several evaluative studies made by different approaches indicated a high level of achievement. The possibilities of adult guidance had been demonstrated.

The second example to be noted is one of several major projects sponsored by the Employment Stabilization Research Institute of the University of Minnesota. The Institute brought together the skills of the economist, the industrial engineer, the social worker, the medical practitioner, and the psychologist in the study of problems of unemployment. Almost 100 persons participated in the project for something over three years. The results of the study have been reported in a bulletin series, and in a number of journal articles, but a summary report of the second project was given in *Men, Women, and Jobs*, by Paterson, Darley, and Elliott (45). The study was important not only because of the actual findings but also because it became a very considerable stimulus to the development of adult vocational guidance. It is, of course, impossible to give a fair impression of the findings of such a study in a few sentences. Nevertheless, at the risk of giving a distorted picture, a few of the findings will be noted in an attempt to give some notion of the bearings of this study on guidance. Definite differences in abilities, physical condition, age, and reasons for unemployment were found as between those who became unemployed early and those who entered the ranks of the unemployed later. But employed workers were less easily distinguished from the late-unemployed. When attention was turned from a study of the workers themselves to reasons for unemployment, it appeared that such factors as seniority and family responsibility were taken into consideration by a large number of employers, although relative efficiency of the workers seemed to be a factor in about half the cases. And over and above all differences found, a study of case histories emphasized again and again the importance of remembering that each individual worker was, after all, an individual.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND GUIDANCE

As the depression deepened, vast numbers of young people became unemployed—just how many it is difficult to say. Estimates of unemployed persons under the age of 25 for the years 1933–1935 range from 3 million to 6 million. In an attempt to deal with this problem

the Civilian Conservation Corps was established in 1933, and the National Youth Administration in 1936. The original purpose of both was to provide employment for needy youth, but both agencies came to assume educational functions, particularly vocational training of an on-the-job type. It was the expansion of these educational functions, interpreted by some as carrying a threat of movement toward a dual system of education, together with certain indications that the agencies might become permanent, which led to the recommendation of the Educational Policies Commission in 1941 that these agencies be discontinued and their educational functions be transferred to the Office of Education (42).

But some gains in guidance were made during the life of the agencies. There could be little doubt that the youth involved were in need of guidance. A report (2) indicated that, while it would be impossible to select any one of the 260,000 enrollees in the Civilian Conservation Corps as typical, a "sort of synthetic individual" displaying the most frequently-found characteristics could be described. This synthetic enrollee was apt to be between 17 and 18 years of age, in fairly good health, the son of a native-born farmer or industrial worker. His family, consisting of parents and four brothers or sisters, lived in a six-room house without running water, indoor plumbing, telephone, or electric refrigerator. The boy had completed the eighth grade and perhaps part of the ninth, but reading and arithmetic skills were at about the sixth-grade level. Work experience was limited to odd jobs around the home and perhaps a few months of employment at very low wages.

Especially during the period of the National Youth Administration, the end of 1935 through part of 1943, some organized efforts at guidance were made (64). An estimated 2,677,000 youth were employed in projects under the out-of-school program in these years. Five steps in guidance were set up: (1) to help the youth evaluate himself, (2) to help the youth make a vocational choice, (3) to help the youth plan his training program to achieve the vocational choice he made, (4) to place the youth in the work he could best do, and (5) to follow up on the work assignment to insure results for the youth. Since the NYA "was not prepared to take care of all these steps within the framework of its own organization," an attempt was made to utilize community resources and cooperate with other government agencies. Guidance record forms were developed. Counseling was undertaken by NYA and cosponsor supervisors, and later by guidance officers. Although some testing was done, it was not used as a basis for selection and assignment

to projects on a national basis. A number of occupational information pamphlets were developed and made available. In the later years the NYA worked closely with the United States Employment Service in placement, and the Junior Division of the USES was organized—the sort of thing Bloomfield had suggested in 1915. And in the last years of the agency's life, as the country moved toward impending war, the emphasis shifted away from guidance as such toward preparing workers for jobs in defense and war production and the recruiting of youth workers. Finally, an indirect result of the program, as Mathewson has noted, was the opportunity for a number of guidance workers to receive "seasoning on the job" (39, p. 35).

A major contribution of government to guidance was the development of the *Dictionary of Occupational Titles* by the Department of Labor, first published in 1939. With its condensed job descriptions and system of coding job titles, the *Dictionary* became a standard reference for counselors. The coding system, in particular, afforded a basis for the classification and filing of occupational information. Part IV of the *Dictionary* was devoted to entry level jobs and proved particularly helpful. Other contributions to occupational information were made, but it is here possible only to note several examples. In 1936 the Report of the President's Advisory Committee on Education (19) recommended the establishment of the Occupational Outlook Service in the Bureau of Labor Statistics to bring together information of interest in choosing an occupation. Out of the work of the Outlook Service came the series of occupational information pamphlets known to many during the period of veteran advisement as "M-7." These were later revised and made available to school counselors and others as the *Occupational Outlook Handbook*, first published in 1948 (63). Several bibliographies of occupational information, such as that by Greenleaf (25), were published.

The United States Employment Service began to undertake counseling along with the Service's usual function of placement, and Stocking (53) reported that during 1946 the Employment Service had handled almost a million counseling cases, about three-fourths of them ex-service men. As part of the counseling effort the Service began a program of research in testing, which resulted in the *General Aptitude Test Battery*. During the early 1950's the Battery was made available for use in schools under certain conditions.

The advising of World War II veterans under the program of the Veterans Administration was probably the most extensive single pro-

gram of guidance ever undertaken, at least in the United States. Aside from the direct service to the veterans themselves, there were important indirect results. As summarized by Ira Scott (50), then Director of the Advisement and Guidance Service for Vocational Rehabilitation and Education, these were:

1. Funds were made available for the counseling program on a nation-wide basis in such a way that public and private institutions could participate on a remunerative basis.
2. Many communities were aided in developing facilities and personnel.
3. The cost to the taxpayer was no greater than if federal agencies had undertaken the task.
4. The program lifted guidance above the level of a gratuity.

Prior to 1938 there was no special unit in the U.S. Office of Education for guidance, although the Bureau of Education cooperated with various professional groups in conferences and in the publication of reports and studies. As early as 1914 the Commissioner of Education requested Meyer Bloomfield to make a special study of the guidance problem in the schools. The report was published as *School and the Start in Life* (10). The Bureau also published the proceedings of the organizational meeting of the National Vocational Guidance Association held at Grand Rapids, Michigan in 1913. A definite proposal for the establishment of a guidance service in the Office of Education was discussed during the New Orleans meeting of the National Vocational Guidance Association in 1937. The following year, the National Occupational Conference, with the approval of the Carnegie Foundation, made available to the Commissioner \$40,000 to help in the organization and promoting of a guidance service (17). Richard Allen was named consultant on guidance, and by the end of the year the Occupational Information and Guidance Service was established in the Division of Vocational Education, operating under funds made possible by the George-Dean Act. Although no specific appropriations were included in this Act, ". . . the language finally used is unquestionable as to its recognition of vocational guidance as a reimbursable activity" (30). Funds appropriated under the George-Barden Act could be used to provide any or all of three kinds of services: (1) the maintenance of a state program of supervision in vocational guidance, (2) the maintenance of a state program of training vocational counselors, and (3) the salaries and necessary travel of vocational counselors, and the purchase of instructional equipment and supplies for use in counseling.

Under the impetus given by federal aid, the number of states hav-

ing programs of guidance services increased rapidly. In 1938, only two states had the position of state guidance supervisor. New York had established a program under a part-time supervisor in 1925, and in 1929 the position of supervisor was made full time. Vermont had established a state program of guidance in 1936. In 1938 Maryland became the first state to establish a program under the new provisions. The next year four more states established programs: Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, and North Carolina. In rapid succession came five more in 1940, four in 1941, twelve in 1942, and so on.

But a major change was in the making. Under the provisions of the George-Barden and George-Dean Acts the focus of efforts was necessarily on vocational guidance, and this constricted view was not in harmony with the broader concept of guidance actually developing in the schools. Apparently in recognition of this feeling, some states changed the titles of supervisors to Supervisor of Guidance Services or something similar to suggest a broader outlook. In some cases, the office of the supervisor was transferred from the state board for vocational education to the department of education. At the national level a broader outlook was emerging under the vigorous leadership of Harry Jager (31). An organizational change was precipitated on May 16, 1952, when the Guidance and Personnel Branch of the U.S. Office of Education was discontinued as it had existed under the Division of Vocational Education. Something over a year later, on October 27, 1953, a Pupil Personnel Services organization in the Division of State and Local School Systems was effected, but reduced to the status of a section, and with very limited personnel. Harry Jager was again made Chief of the reconstituted Service, but his untimely death the following year halted effective service for guidance within the Office of Education. Various professional groups, especially the American Personnel and Guidance Association, continued to express concern over the situation, and the next year, 1955, a Guidance and Personnel Services Section was announced. On July 1 Frank L. Sievers assumed duties as the first Chief of the new Section. Thus, after a period of three years of tense, halting, and confused transition, guidance on the federal level moved from a vocational education setting to a more inclusive organizational home in the Division of State and Local School Systems.

The transition was not complete, however. Although guidance had been separated organizationally from vocational education, not all of guidance services had been gathered within a single organizational unit. There was thus lacking at the federal level a symbol of the unity

of guidance at the same time that the theme of unity of effort and the "team approach" was beginning to receive considerable attention in the schools. And before any solution to this fractionation was developed, a major innovation appeared on the federal horizon as the National Defense Education Act of 1958. Part A of Title V authorized annual appropriations of \$15,000,000 for each of four years beginning with the fiscal year 1959. In order to participate in the program a state must submit a plan for the testing of secondary school students to identify those with outstanding ability, and for a program of guidance and counseling of secondary school students. Part B authorized an appropriation of \$6,250,000 for the fiscal year 1959, and \$7,250,000 for each of the three following years to establish training institutes through contracts with institutions of higher learning.

At the present writing there is no adequate basis for discerning the long-range effects of this legislation, but there is a temptation to speculate about a number of possibilities. Does this Act represent a first phase of major and continuing federal support of guidance? What will be the effects of the explicit emphasis on testing? Are we again entering a "boom" period of testing such as followed World War I? Certainly there are more adequate tests available now than then, but are there enough school personnel really qualified to deal competently with this sudden expansion of testing? The intent of the Act is clearly one of manpower identification and utilization. Will this Act set a precedent for the future in defining the role of the federal government in guidance around manpower needs? The answers to these and many other questions will have to wait upon the pattern of developing events.

PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION AND GUIDANCE

In 1930 the Progressive Education Association sponsored a conference out of which came the establishment of the Commission on the Relation of School and College and the Eight-Year Study. Arrangements were worked out by which 300 colleges and universities agreed to accept the graduates of the 30 participating high schools whether or not these graduates met the traditional entrance requirements. Thus freed of the threat that their graduates might not be accepted into college, the participating high schools were able to undertake more immediate and radical revisions than might otherwise have been possible. The story of this undertaking is so well known and the materials so easily available that little purpose would be served in reviewing here even

the general outline of developments. Rather, let us note the relation of the Eight-Year Study to the development of the guidance movement.

The major accomplishments of the Study were in the area of curriculum revitalization and revision. As newly formulated objectives emerged, it became evident that the then-available tests were inadequate for evaluation of progress toward these objectives; consequently in 1934 the evaluation service was established. One of the purposes of evaluation recognized was "to provide information basic to effective guidance of individual students" (51). Many instruments for evaluation were developed in the broad areas of aspects of thinking, social sensitivity, appreciation, and personal and social development. Several committees were concerned with the development of instruments of evaluation for guidance purposes, and for transfer from high school to college. Notable among these were the Behavior Description Card and the Confidential Report to the Committee on Admissions. The Behavior Description Card was designed to be a means of recording both the most common behavior and the range of behavior of the student in an objectively descriptive way, thus avoiding the pitfalls of rating scales. Such a description, it was hoped, would be helpful for counseling and would provide useful information for recommendation to college. The Confidential Report was intended to replace the traditional transcript of high school credits and to supply college admissions officers with additional information relevant to activities participated in, special interests and abilities, limitations, and emotional stability.

An extensive study was made of the graduates of the 30 high schools involved in the Eight-Year Study as these graduates progressed through college. A sample of 1475 graduates, matched individually with graduates from conventional schools, was selected and various comparisons made. The findings were summarized by Chamberlin, and others (18). In general, the graduates of the experimental schools were found to achieve rather better academically in all fields except foreign language, were more often judged to have certain desirable personal and social characteristics, had about the same adjustment problems but were more effective in efforts toward solution, and had a somewhat better orientation toward vocational choice. The follow-up study was, of course, concerned with a testing of the outcome of the total project. It is mentioned here because of the obvious bearings it has on the matter of guidance for the college-bound group.

What, then, is the meaning of the Eight-Year Study for the guidance movement? Basically, the Study points up the existence of

two parallel streams of development. On the one hand, there was vocational guidance in the Frank Parsons tradition, which began in an atmosphere of social work, entered the schools as a somewhat independent effort not even very strongly related to vocational education, only occasionally becoming an integrated part of the total school program, and finally through government participation achieved a closer relation to vocational education on state and federal levels until the reorganization of guidance in the Office of Education in 1955. On the other hand, we have a stream of development as seen in the Eight-Year Study which attempted thoroughly to integrate guidance with the teaching process, accepted the idea that guidance is an individual matter but leaned heavily on group methods in attempting to meet individual needs, and displayed great faith in curriculum revision and construction as a basic approach to the problems of youth. Much was accomplished in clearing away traditionalism in the secondary schools and adapting school experiences to the changing nature of the secondary school population, but contributions to guidance as specific services to individuals were rather oblique.

THE CLINICAL APPROACH

In undertaking to sketch this phase of the development of the guidance movement, probably a logical procedure would be to attempt a definition of what is meant by "the clinical approach" and then report on various events falling within such a definition. But there are obvious and perhaps stifling difficulties in the way of such an attack. Even if there were available some currently accepted definition, it would hardly seem fair to apply such a concept backwards to, say, the year 1910. Perhaps our present purpose can best be served by frankly regarding the term, "the clinical approach," as a loose sort of generic term and letting the various events speak for themselves.

In a loose sense, then, Frank Parsons believed in and practiced the clinical approach. He believed, as we have seen, in a scientific study of the individual; the trouble came in lack of developed techniques for such study. As Paterson (46, p. 14) remarked, ". . . when he went to the psychological laboratories for techniques he found that the cupboard was bare." Consequently he turned to emphases on self-analysis and the use of occupational information. Actually, as Paterson continued, the early development of the clinical approach came not through the schools, or even from those who were closely identified with the

guidance movement as such. Rather, it grew with the introduction of personnel selection practices in the armed services, in industry, and in civil service; research oriented toward immediately compelling situations, such as the Minnesota Employment Stabilization Research Institute; and the long slow progress made by psychologists in the field of individual differences. In the 1930's came increased application of tests in student selection and emphasis on testing in counseling.

From what has been said thus far it may appear that the clinical approach of the 1920's and 1930's relied chiefly on testing. There may have been some who felt so, and sometimes the emphasis on testing in diagnosis has been dubbed the "actuarial method." But such books as Williamson's *How to Counsel Students* (66) or his later *Counseling Adolescents* (67) ought to be sufficient evidence that the use of testing in diagnosis certainly need not result in a narrow approach to student personnel in general or to counseling in particular. But there is another line of influence which should be noted before we move on to more recent developments.

In the year of Frank Parsons' death, 1908, Sigmund Freud came to Clark University at the invitation of G. Stanley Hall, to deliver a series of lectures on psychoanalysis. And so was launched in America a surge of interest which ranged through popular periodicals and lectures, literature, the theatre, the child study movement, psychiatry, and later clinical psychology and counseling. It seems fair to say, however, that Freudian ideas exerted relatively little influence on guidance practices in the secondary schools for the two or three decades following Parsons' death. For one thing, teachers typically received very little training in psychology. During the thirties and forties, particularly, vocational counseling in the secondary schools became more closely identified with vocational education, and so the personnel involved were frequently those with backgrounds of vocational education. Such persons rarely had included in their training any considerable emphasis on clinical aspects of psychology.

The work of Carl Rogers (48, 49) and his associates brought to counseling a new and vigorous emphasis on a special aspect of the clinical approach. Nondirective techniques in counseling laid relatively little stress on diagnosis, and so testing as a means of diagnosis was assigned a minor rôle. The work of Rogers stimulated a great amount of research on the counseling process, and another important result of the contributions of the Rogers group was to establish a clinical emphasis in guidance and in counseling in particular which was quite in contrast

to the "actuarial" emphasis. Although the emphases of Williamson and Rogers differed, both were more clinical in the modern sense than the self-analysis and occupational information methods of Frank Parsons.

The rising strength of the clinical approach can perhaps be seen most clearly in some of the more recent developments in counselor preparation. The Division of Professional Training and Certification of the National Vocational Guidance Association appointed a committee in 1947 to prepare a manual on the preparation of counselors. After a preliminary report the following year, a joint committee was formed including representatives of eight organizations, under the general chairmanship of Leonard M. Miller. The final report outlined seven areas designed to constitute a common core of training for all counselors. In the discussion of one of these core areas, the study of the individual, the report not only mentioned the traditional techniques such as tests, inventories, and the interview, but also recommended that the counselor be prepared for proper utilization of the results of projective techniques (40, p. 8). In the discussion of qualifications and training of the counselor we find the statement: "Because the counselor deals primarily with human beings his preparation must include extensive study in psychology. For example, it must include study of the individual, the dynamic pattern of characteristics that makes up a human personality, and the growth and development of the individual. The counselor should also study methods of dealing with the individual, and personnel procedures of appraisal and therapy, both group and individual" (40, p. 19).

Such a statement could hardly have been made by a committee representing diverse groups in the early 1920's or even the early 1930's. In 1949 and in 1950 meetings were held at the University of Michigan under the sponsorship of Division 17 of the American Psychological Association (29). This group sought to identify more specifically the needed elements in the psychological preparation of counselors, and to clarify the relationships between counseling psychology and clinical psychology. Programs for the training of counseling psychologists on the doctoral level began to be announced by various institutions, and by 1959 the Committee on Doctoral Education of the Education and Training Board of the American Psychological Association announced approved programs in 27 institutions (6, p. 245). There are still many unresolved issues; but the clinical approach in counseling is a firm influence, and real progress is being made in standards of training. Such an

emphasis in one part of guidance—counseling—will almost certainly exert a strong influence on the total field of guidance.

SUMMARY

Guidance in this country began as vocational guidance. It is not possible to identify the beginning of the guidance movement with a single time and place, because the earliest efforts were being made in the schools and in privately supported agencies such as the Vocation Bureau of Boston at about the same time. The work of Frank Parsons illustrates the way in which vocational guidance began as one aspect of a broad social welfare concern. As the movement developed, leadership was taken over very largely by professional educators, and city-wide guidance organizations began to appear in the schools. By the time of World War I the vocational guidance movement was well under way, and the National Vocational Guidance Association had been organized.

The introduction of intelligence testing led to some interest in testing in relation to guidance prior to World War I, but the first major impact of testing on guidance was felt in the years after the War. Although many of the leaders in guidance maintained critical and balanced attitudes, practice in the schools often outran caution and the "boom" period of testing made its appearance. In the early 1930's a more critical attitude toward testing developed, and the emphasis turned away from the proliferation of new tests to "testing the tests." Testing continued to be a conspicuous part of guidance and received added emphasis during the period of advisement of veterans following World War II. In recent years, a more mature and critical attitude can be seen in publications of the American Psychological Association dealing with questions of standards and ethics.

The depression years of the 1930's brought about a shift in the emphasis in guidance toward more concern with job placement, and important research undertakings and service projects were accomplished. Some efforts toward guidance services were made during the Civilian Conservation Corps and the National Youth Administration. It was during these years also that a Junior Division of the United States Employment Service was organized.

In addition to activities during the depression, the federal government has participated in guidance in a number of ways. In 1938, an Occupational Information and Guidance service was organized in the Di-

vision of Vocational Education and was later replaced by a Guidance and Pupil Personnel Services section in the Division of State and Local Schools. Most recently, the National Defense Education Act of 1958 has had marked impact on guidance activities. Occupational information materials were published, two major examples being the *Dictionary of Occupational Titles* and the *Occupational Outlook Handbook*. The General Aptitude Test Battery was developed as a counseling and placement tool.

The Eight-Year Study, which grew out of the Progressive Education movement, made significant contributions in the area of curriculum revision, but contributed only indirectly to the development of counseling as a direct service to the individual. The Study, however, does serve to point up the contrast of guidance conceived as a process inseparable from teaching, relying on group methods and especially curriculum revision, as against guidance conceived as special services to the individual.

A major trend during the last few decades is one which may loosely be called the clinical approach. A special aspect of this trend has been the development of the nondirective approach in counseling. Several important reports of committees have emphasized the importance of more psychological content and clinical techniques in the preparation of counselors.

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CHAPTER 7

Context and Limits

It has become traditional in discussions of guidance to distinguish three major aspects of the problem: the individual, the environment, and the interrelations of individual and environment. To this tripartite framework Mathewson (35) has added a fourth, that of values—both the personal values of the individual and values as they exist in the culture. In previous chapters we have been concerned with the environment, and especially the social milieu. We have sought to illustrate the impact of various subcultures of the adult world on the individual. Our viewpoint has been largely that of an external observer. In the present chapter we shall continue briefly from the vantage point of an outsider to consider youth groups and youth culture and their relations to adult society and culture. As an example of the limits imposed by the social milieu on individuals we shall review the selective nature of American secondary education.

The term *context* as we shall use it includes two orders of facts: (1) the societal-cultural environment as viewed by external observers, as we have been doing thus far, and (2) the facts of the experience of the individual in his life space. Both orders of events contribute to the total context in which the individual lives out his life, and both impose some probable limits on the life expectancy of the individual. The experiential facts we shall consider later in the chapter. Facts of context and limitations gleaned from the external view may be seen in such examples as the failure of the social milieu to provide adequate educational opportunities and the imposition of discriminatory practices in social participation in various group memberships, the school situation, and so on. Guidance personnel will, of course, be interested in such problems, simply because guidance is one part of the total educational process. And certainly any adequate understanding of guidance problems

and functions will include an exploration of whatever factors may contribute to the context in which the individual lives and of any limitations impinging on his life expectancies.

YOUTH GROUPS AND YOUTH CULTURE

In preliterate societies a rather definite age grading usually exists, often marked by ceremonial rites of passage. Linton (30) has noted a minimum of seven age-sex categories: infant, boy, girl, adult man, adult woman, old man, and old woman. In our own society there is little formal categorization of these periods, as Parsons (38) has pointed out, except in the educational system. There has been a decline, too, in ceremonies. Confirmation rites in some Christian churches and the Bar Mitzvah among Jews might be interpreted as survivals of puberty rites, as might the debut among upper classes, the latter often being accompanied by "conspicuous consumption" and prestige competition (5). Traditionally, adolescence has been interpreted in our society as a period of stress and strain due largely to the physiological changes of puberty, but anthropological studies such as those of Mead (36) have taught us that adolescence so conceived is not at all a universal phenomenon, and that much of the stress and strain, when it exists, is probably cultural in origin. In fact, not all societies have a name for adolescence; the passage is simply from childhood to adulthood.

In our own society, among the upper groups, adolescence tends to become a continuation of childhood in the sense that the child is still preparing for the adult role. From another point of view, however, it is at the beginning of adolescence that a complex set of patterns and behavior phenomena develops, involving both age-grading and sex role elements. It is these two groups of phenomena which Parsons (38) refers to as "youth culture," and which he regards as "unique and highly distinctive for American society." As contrasted with the adult male role, youth culture is "more or less specifically irresponsible"; the dominant note is having a good time, especially in social activity with the opposite sex. For males, high value is placed on athletics as an avenue of achievement and competition, in sharp contrast to adult standards. For females, an emphasis on sexual attractiveness develops. For both sexes, the "rounded humanistic pattern" is valued, rather than special competence. To a considerable extent, youth culture has crystallized about the system of formal education. Colleges become the principal centers of prestige, although some of the most distinctive characteristics are found

in the high school. In considering this brief summary of Parsons' statement of the characteristics of youth culture, it is important to remember that he was speaking primarily of the upper-middle class. In the lower classes, it would obviously not be accurate to characterize youth culture as essentially irresponsible and an extension of childhood, to the same degree. Linton (30) has pointed out that "The blurring of divisions between the child and adolescent groups depends on different developments at different social levels." Prior to the passage of child labor laws, for example, many preadolescent children of the lower classes became wage earners and continued on into adulthood as workers.

The literature of education is replete with a great variety of terms related to this matter of youth cultures: peer groups, peer culture, age-mates, adolescent society, adolescent culture, and so on. Considerable confusion often results from lack of definition and spelling out of the intended implications. There seems to be rather general consensus on one point, however, not only among educators but also among sociologists, that such groups do develop a culture which exists in its own right and is to some degree independent of the matrix of adult culture. The play groups of children possess a culture in the sense that certain codes, games, and folklore are passed along by children to other children. Preadolescent gangs certainly develop and enforce codes of conduct. A particular school society has its own traditions and ceremonies which constitute a culture in a limited sense. In our present brief considerations we shall limit ourselves to the period of adolescence, and, to avoid confusion with younger age groups, we shall use the terms *youth groups* and *youth culture* rather than the more inclusive *peer groups* and *peer culture*, even though in current usage the latter terms have come to refer chiefly to the adolescent age.

Youth groups are certainly nothing new; they probably exist and have existed in any society which affords enough opportunity for interaction of youth apart from adults for groups to form (30). But there is one rather distinctive and new aspect of youth culture in American society. As we noted above, Parsons has pointed out that youth culture has tended to crystallize about the system of formal education. Let us follow the implications of this idea. In simpler rural society there was opportunity for youth to be gradually inducted into adult roles. Boys early participated in the work of adults about the farm, and girls in the work of the house. With increasing urbanization there has been less opportunity for such gradual induction. Moreover, the developing middle class came to stress longer and longer education as preparation for adult

life, with a prolonged childhood or delayed adulthood. It is not surprising that the schools, as a dominantly middle-class institution, came to fill more and more of this nonfunctional segment of the adolescent's life, for the adolescent is a kind of marginal man, neither child nor adult. And so there developed an institutionalized detour of youth cultures through which the individual passes, rather than going by gradual induction from childhood into adult roles. It is the extent to which this detour through youth culture has developed in affiliation with a secondary institution—the school—which is new and distinctive in American life.

The whole question of how youth groups and youth culture are related to adult society and culture is a matter of definite significance for guidance. Presumably the schools afford a bridge between the two, but we have seen that in current American society the bridge is at least not the most direct route. Several decades ago Waller stressed the separateness of the culture of the school from that of the adult world (59, p. 104 ff.). Two sorts of conflict were almost certain to arise, he felt: (1) between teachers and students because teachers represent the wider culture, and students the local, and (2) between teachers as adults and the peer culture of students. "The barriers which separate the adult, especially the adult who happens to be a teacher, are nearly impenetrable" (59, p. 186). To make things worse, the teacher in the community is apt to be there in the role of a stranger (59, p. 62). Waller's impressions seem to have been gained from small- to moderate-size schools, often in rural areas, and his views were formulated some 30 years ago. Nevertheless, we must not make the mistake of too hastily dismissing his insights. On the other hand, it is easy to overemphasize the separateness of youth and adult society and culture. A recent study by Elkin and Westley (17), made in an upper-middle class suburb of Montreal, found that a dominant pattern was that of adult direction and approval of adolescent activities, and that in many respects youth internalized "responsible" and "adult" perspectives. The youth from whom Elkin and Westley secured their data were 14 and 15 years of age, Protestant, and Anglo-Saxon. Most of the fathers were employed at the executive, managerial, or professional levels.

A kind of intermediate position as to the relation of adult and youth cultures and societies comes from a study by Thrasher, made shortly after the appearance of the book by Waller. From his study of Chicago gangs Thrasher concluded that "gangland represents a geographically and socially interstitial area in the city" (53, p. 22). It is

the social rather than the ecological part of this concept with which we are concerned. Gangs, Thrasher believed, represented "The spontaneous effort of boys to create a society for themselves where none adequate to their needs exists" (53, p. 37). This interpretation by Thrasher can well be broadened to apply to youth groups generally. Adolescents, as we noted earlier, are suspended between childhood and adulthood, and modern adult society really has little place for them. This is especially true among the middle class in urban areas where the irresponsibility of childhood is prolonged and induction into full adult status is delayed. Youth must create their own society in the crevices of adult society—in the "interspaces." In such a situation, youth groups create a culture which is also interstitial in character and is neither the culture of childhood nor completely the culture of their adult contemporaries.

McGuire has suggested that "peer culture" refers to a "noninstitutionalized pattern of behavior norms" which includes "a set of approved social skills appropriate to boys and girls as they progress through adolescence" (32, p. 6). But since youth culture seems to be gaining an ever closer affiliation with the school, it is an open question as to whether or not youth culture is not becoming more institutionalized. Waller indicated how some of the ceremonies of youth culture, such as pep meetings and various other ceremonies of competitive activities, have been adopted into the school. Under the influence of "progressive education" there has been much stress on the contemporary needs of youth in curriculum building, and frequently in guidance literature one finds discussions of the "problems of youth." Adolescents have surely become more conscious of themselves as adolescents by reason of the flurry of magazines for teen-agers, youth panel discussions on radio and television, a host of youth organizations, and the like. It seems possible that the cumulative effect of repeatedly reminding the adolescent that he is an adolescent, and of accepting more and more youth culture into the institutional setting of the school, may be more firmly to orient him toward youth culture rather than to assist him in a transition to adult society and culture.

The studies which we have noted thus far reflect in one way or another a special segment of society, or a special emphasis. The findings of Thrasher, for example, came from a study of Chicago gangs; Parsons and Elkin had particular reference to upper-middle class groups. Waller's observations are based on conditions now somewhat removed from us in time; much has happened since the early 1930's. McGuire was emphasizing the noninstitutionalized nature of adolescent culture.

In an investigation by Gordon we have more recent data—and data drawn from a rather representative high school population. The school studied was located in a suburb of a large Midwestern city, but the parents of the 576 high school students included in the study were somewhat less concentrated in professional and proprietary groups than is often found in suburbs. Of these heads of families, 5.7 percent were professionals, 12.8 percent were proprietors, 35.8 percent were craftsmen, and 20.6 percent were employed clerically (20, p. 29). The hypothesis, as revised during early stages of the study, was that "the social behavior of the adolescent is a function of his social status in the social system of the school" (20, p. 129). The concept of *general social status* was used and regarded as a composite of separate positions held in the three subsystems of the school organization. These were identified as (1) the formal organization of the school which prescribes achievement, (2) the system of student organizations (extracurricular activities), and (3) the network of interpersonal relationships. Various indexes were developed for these three systems. In the case of the last, interpersonal relations, sociometric methods of the friendship-choices variety were used. Gordon concluded that "The social behavior of the adolescent in this school situation appears to be functionally related to the generalized position which he achieved within the combined spheres of action. . . . The dominant orientation to action was toward the performance of those roles which gained prestige" (20, p. 130). "The prestige values of the informal sphere were friendships, dress, grade level, clique incorporation, dating, and approved behavior. Money, leisure, car, and kindred possessions also were highly prized" (20, p. 133). General status, then, was a composite of statuses based on multiple values, and various combinations of these might become the basis of prestige, with the result that "Social position finally rested in a state of delicate balance" (20, p. 134).

The findings of Gordon serve to raise cautions lest we too hastily reach the conclusion that youth culture and society are merely mirror images of the associated adult society. There can be no doubt that social class of parents is a significant factor affecting the status which the adolescent is apt to achieve in youth society. But it is not the only factor, and sometimes not the controlling factor. In the words of Gordon, "There has been some tendency to impose the imagery of social class too rigidly upon the social system of the adolescent within the high school" (20, p. 100). In commenting on much the same point, Dahlke notes that a great variety of social principles ramify into the informal order

in the school, and that no primacy is assigned to the social class principle. "Sex status, color, nationality, religious group, personality adjustment, and town-country distinctions bring about the cohesion and cleavages, the negative and positive social relations among children. The task for the teacher is to have a total view, not only to see the general order of this informal configuration but simultaneously to understand it in terms of these intersecting principles" (10, p. 349). A somewhat similar point of view is expressed by Phelps and Horrocks (39) on the basis of their study of the recreational activities of youth in central Ohio. They found that socioeconomic status is not the dominant factor in informal group attitudes, but they add that the public school is a strong influence in promoting upper-socioeconomic values. In commenting on the source of peer cultural patterns, Tryon (55) has suggested that they are only partly learned from adults and that they seem also to emerge out of the group. In general, then, it appears that although youth culture exists within some not-very-clearly-defined limits established by the parent adult culture, youth culture at least to some extent has its own bases for ascribing status. Probably any experienced teacher or counselor can recall some individuals who were able to achieve status and prestige in their youth groups which were well beyond that which would have been predicted on the basis of the parents' standing in the community.

Youth cultures have sometimes been interpreted as if they were somehow automatic results of developmental phases. There is a danger, as Anastasi and Miller have indicated, of creating an impression of a "typical" adolescent "who manifests certain preferences, attitudes, or ideals by virtue of having reached a certain developmental stage" (3, p. 43). Such an interpretation would take us backward to the psychology of the twenties and earlier at which time adolescence was frequently seen as an unfolding of inherent instincts almost if not completely independent of the social context in which the individual lives; we can almost sense the spirit of G. Stanley Hall hovering in the background. It may therefore be helpful to note briefly some examples of developmental studies which have avoided this temptation and which give full recognition to factors of social context. The first pair of investigations afford a comparison of the attitudes of adolescents in different regional settings, and the third reports preferences for personality traits in groups equated for age and sex but differing in social backgrounds.

The Adolescent Growth Study of the University of California was

concerned in part with some qualities and aspects of personality of adolescents which adolescents themselves considered desirable. Tryon (54) found that 12-year-old girls favored quiet, nonaggressive behavior, associated with friendliness, likeableness, and good humor—the sort of behavior often regarded by adults as desirable for 12-year-old girls. By the age of 15, however, the emphasis changed toward qualities which are usually idealized for boys: extroversion, activity, and good sportsmanship. Attractiveness to the other sex also emerged as important, but seemed unrelated to the other traits. Boys at age 12 tended to idealize the skillful, daring, fearless leader, and some defiance of adults appeared. At age 15, physical skill, aggressiveness, and fearlessness were still important, but defiance of adults had lessened, and personal acceptability had become more important. The group studied was probably relatively free of ethnic influences, since no Negroes, Mexicans, or Orientals were included in the sample. With this exception, however, the group was thought to be representative of the Oakland public school population of those two ages, and it seems probable that the sample included individuals of differing socioeconomic backgrounds. Kuhlen and Lee studied by sociometric methods the judgments of some 700 students in Grades 6, 9, and 12 in regard to personality characteristics deemed desirable by them. All 700 students were in schools in central New York State. Both the New York and California studies demonstrated that "at different ages through adolescence different values are held as to the desirability of various personal characteristics" (27, p. 336). But certain differences were found, and Kuhlen and Lee suggested that since the New York subjects were rural or village children who were probably of a lower socioeconomic status than the urban California subjects, the differences in the findings might be due to "differences in the adolescent mores of the two populations studied."

Anastasi and Miller (3) studied adolescents in Grades 10–12, divided into precollege and noncollege groups and equated for age and sex. The occupational level of parents of the precollege group was relatively high, all occupations falling within the professional, semiprofessional, managerial, and clerical occupations, retail business, or skilled trades. In contrast, most of the parents of the noncollege were foreign-born, and most were employed at the level of semiskilled occupations, minor clerical or business positions, or lower. Both precollege and noncollege groups, and both boys and girls, showed common preferences for such traits as "friendly," "well-mannered," "cooperative with a group," and "loyal to friends." However, significant differences in

preferences of the precollege and noncollege groups were found. Qualities such as "serious-minded," "talkative," "talented in arts and crafts," "enjoys working on own hobbies," and "enthusiastic" were preferred by the precollege group, but the noncollege group named such traits as "good listener," "athletic," "enjoys practical jokes," "peppy," "neat in appearance," "grown-up," and "hail-fellow-well-met."

None of the three studies noted above was intended to answer the broad question of the relation of youth and adult cultures, but the findings suggest that the differing preferences for various personal qualities are not to be explained by maturation alone, and indicate the importance of socioeconomic factors. Developmental data must be related to the adult cultural context and also to the immediate culture of the youth group. And as we saw earlier, the relation of adult and youth cultures is by no means clear, even without the complicating fact of developmental factors. The guidance task with adolescents may be viewed as twofold: (1) to assist the individual with the process of development while temporarily living in his world of youth society and culture, and (2) to help him to understand, accept, and plan for a realistic role in the adult world. Basic to an understanding of a desirable balance of these two guidance tasks is the problem of the relation of youth society and culture to the adult world. A too-exclusive emphasis on immediate adjustment of the adolescent to his youth society and culture tends to make of guidance an immediate "trouble shooting" enterprise operating on the assumption that if the adolescent becomes "well adjusted" to his present interstitial world he will somehow become a well-adjusted adult. Something like this seems to have happened in more extreme cases of enthusiasm for the "child-centered" approach. Even more basic is the difficulty with the concept of "well adjusted." Do we mean that he learns how to "get along" with his peer group by learning to conform, by accepting the values of the youth culture without question? Youth groups are typically rather rigid in their demands for conformity, and the pressure in this direction is strong. On the other hand, if the guidance emphasis is on the adult world, then guidance functions rather easily take on the character of crystal gazing (such as forecasting the supply and demand in a particular occupation which will confront the high school sophomore by the time he graduates from college). Or guidance becomes static in outlook, assuming that what is good for today's adults will inevitably be good for today's adolescents when they become adults.

To repeat, a very real question in guidance practice is one of strik-

ing a desirable balance in the youth-culture and adult-world oriented aspects of guidance. And since guidance is concerned with individuals, there is no general answer, but only the difficult task of trying to understand which emphasis is more needed by the particular individual in his particular context at a given time, and in view of his individual life expectancy. A few "type cases" can be anticipated. The middle-class student can probably be expected to remain longer in the interstitial world of youth culture than will the lower-class youth whose transition into the adult world will be more accelerated. The overprotected youth may first of all need help in living with his immediate youth society and culture. The youth of superior ability may experience problems if overly restrained from entering the adult intellectual world. But in the last analysis there are few generalized "problems of youth"; there are instead individual adolescents who have problems in the process of growing up.

SELECTIVE ASPECTS OF SECONDARY EDUCATION

Educators have long been concerned with the fact that American schools become increasingly selective from the middle grades through the senior high school. The study of this problem by educators antedates both *Middletown* and the social class studies of the Warner group. The selective nature of secondary school attendance persisted in spite of the rapid growth of high schools in the several decades before and after the turn of the century. In 1880, there were 2.8 percent of persons in the age group 14-17 enrolled in public secondary schools. In a 50-year period, enrollments increased so that by 1930 the percentage was 46.6. High school enrollment approximately doubled each decade from 1890 to 1930. High school populations approached closer and closer to being representative of the general population. This story of the rapid growth of high schools is too well known to require retelling here. We shall see, however, that the popularization of the high school did not result in the elimination of selectivity.

One of the earlier studies of the problem was that by Counts in 1922. Data were secured from 6782 freshmen and 2522 seniors in four cities: Bridgeport, Mt. Vernon, St. Louis, and Seattle. Counts found a close relation between parental occupation and attendance of children at high school. The parental occupational groups most represented in the high schools were the five nonlabor groups: professional persons, proprietors, commercial-service groups, managerial, and clerical—in a

word, the white-collar groups. Least frequently attending were children of common laborers, and only slightly more frequently found in attendance were children of personal-service workers, miners, lumber workers, fishermen, and various tradesmen and machine operatives. Differences at the two extremes were marked; for example, 17.7 percent of the freshmen and 22.9 percent of the seniors were children of proprietors, while only 1.8 percent of the freshmen and 0.6 percent of the seniors were children of common laborers (9, p. 37). In between these two extremes were moderate representations of printing trades, public-service work, machine trades, transportation work, and building trades. Discrepancies of representation of the various occupational groups were greater in the senior than in the freshman year. Children of native-born parents were in general more apt to attend high school than were children of immigrants, although Russian Jews, Irish, Germans, and people of the British Empire were about as apt to send their children to high school as were native-born parents. In interpreting the findings, Counts commented: "Secondary education is not education for adolescence, as elementary education is education for childhood, but rather education for a selected group of adolescents . . ." (9, p. 141).

About a decade after the Counts study, an investigation of the secondary school population was included in the National Survey of Secondary Education. The Counts survey of Bridgeport and Seattle was duplicated insofar as possible in order to produce comparable data for these two cities. In Seattle every occupational group was found better represented in the secondary schools in 1930 than in 1920; but the upper groups had increased their representation during the period to a greater extent than the lower groups, and the schools had consequently become more socioeconomically selective—if parental occupation be taken as the criterion of socioeconomic status. In Bridgeport, however, the difference in representation between upper and lower groups had decreased. The total study included 34 full-time schools of various types in 13 cities in different parts of the country, and also continuation and evening schools. A revision of the Counts scheme of classifying occupations was used.

The findings can scarcely be reduced to a few simple statements without distortion, and yet some salient features of selectivity do stand out. For one thing, the different curriculums seemed to attract students of differing socioeconomic status: "the academic and scientific curriculums have larger proportions than the other curriculums from the upper levels, and the household and industrial arts have larger propor-

tions from the lower-economic levels than the other curriculums" (26, p. 49). The relation of parental occupation to curriculum enrollment was far from clear-cut, however. For example, in the comprehensive schools, 11.3 percent of the fathers of those enrolled in the academic (college preparatory) curriculum were professionally employed, but 26.6 percent of the fathers were semiprofessionals, 32.6 percent were skilled workmen, 22.2 percent were semiskilled, and 2.0 percent were unskilled. The distribution of fathers of students in the academic curriculums in general and technical schools was roughly comparable to that in the comprehensive schools. A second finding was that urban children attended high school in higher proportions than do rural children; 58 percent of the urban children 14-17 years of age were in school, as against 39 percent of rural children. A third finding of the survey was that the secondary school population was overwhelmingly native-born. In the full-time schools, the percentages ranged from 92.1 to 97.6, with a somewhat larger percentage of foreign-born students in the evening schools, and still larger percentage in the continuation schools. As might be expected, a much larger percentage of fathers than of students themselves were foreign-born. The three findings of the Survey briefly noted above do not, of course, give an adequate picture of the results of this study, but may be sufficient to indicate that the selectivity of the high schools found by Counts in 1920 was still basically true in 1930.

One more example of studies of selectivity antedating World War II should be noted, and that is the Regents Inquiry reported in 1938 by Eckert and Marshall. Since this study was limited to the pupils in the State of New York, there is of course no intention of generalizing to the country as a whole, and we shall be concerned only with those aspects which bear on socioeconomic selectivity. Included in the sample studied were those who graduated, those who dropped out before graduation, and those who continued in postgraduate work in high school. More than three out of five students were found to leave school before graduation, and those who withdrew usually did so before completing the tenth grade (16, p. 8). Financial status of families, as judged by teachers and principals, was found to be definitely related to continuing in school. Of the withdrawing students, 39.3 percent came from homes rated as "poor" or "indigent," while 60.1 percent of the graduates came from homes in "moderate," "comfortable," or "wealthy" financial status (16, p. 71). Parental occupations were rated by the Rulon revision of the Minnesota Occupational Scale, an instrument which includes social prestige values as well as financial returns. So rated, occupation of par-

ents was found to be related to graduation. The mean rating of occupations of parents of girls who withdrew before graduation was about one-half a standard deviation lower than the mean parental occupational level of girls who graduated, but the difference was somewhat less in the case of boys (16, p. 77). Again, parental occupations were found to be related to the curriculums in which students enrolled. A hierarchy of curriculum groups existed, with the college entrance group being drawn largely from the upper groups, and those in the general, business, and other vocational curriculums, from successively lower groups. The authors reporting the study felt that "While encouraging variations occur occasionally, the great mass of adolescent boys and girls seem destined to maintain in their generation the economic hierarchy established for the preceding one" (16, p. 78), and concluded that "Within the schools of our democracy, an aristocracy, not alone of aptitude but also of economic privilege, still exists to perpetuate class barriers" (16, p. 85).

Studies made in more recent years, roughly since World War II, seem to reflect two somewhat divergent approaches. One group of investigations centered upon drop-out students, attempting to find factors associated with withdrawals and to discover symptoms of potential drop-outs. A second group of studies seemed to be concerned chiefly with the relation of social class to selectivity in the schools. Comparisons among such differently oriented studies are difficult and sometimes impossible. Moreover, most of the studies were concerned with one or a few communities; only occasionally were they state-wide in scope. The result of these varying orientations and delimitations of scope is that few if any generalizations for the nation as a whole can be drawn. But for our purpose this inability to arrive at a broad national picture is not especially crucial. After all, guidance services are carried on in a given community, and the first need is for knowledge of the context and limits existing in the particular community. Of course, students do migrate to other communities, and consequently there is a secondary need for knowledge of the communities and areas to which they move or from which they come. We cannot furnish a given guidance worker information regarding his own community; but a review of some of the available studies may afford some understanding of the nature of the factors which function as limitations on the individual as he continues through the secondary school, and of how these factors limit his participation while he remains in school.

Studies of drop-outs have first claim on our attention. One of the

answers frequently sought in surveys was an estimate of the holding power of the secondary schools. A summary prepared on the basis of census data for a conference on life adjustment in 1950 (57) showed that 86.49 percent of the population 5-17 years of age were enrolled in schools in October, 1946. Of the pupils enrolled in the fifth grade in 1938-1939 school year, 41.9 percent graduated in 1946. A number of studies in various localities during the years shortly before and after 1950 led to the conclusion that typically about half the students who entered the ninth grade eventually graduated from the twelfth. But a recent study which surveyed 14 cities affords reason to question this percentage. In cities of 200,000 to 1,000,000 population, the voluntary withdrawal rate from September, 1951, through June, 1955, was 28.5 percent, and in cities over 1,000,000 population the rate was 38.0 percent. Even after taking into account both voluntary and involuntary withdrawals, the retention in both groups of cities was well over 50 percent: 69.9 percent and 54.7 percent respectively. Retention rates of individual cities ranged from 89 to 45 percent (45, pp. 8-9). Quite generally studies have found that withdrawing is concentrated in the ninth and tenth grades, and at about the age of 16. Probably the high frequency at age 16 is related to the fact that this is rather commonly the upper limit of compulsory attendance. More boys than girls drop out, especially in the Grades 9 through 12.

No simple combination of two or three factors can adequately explain the facts of early school leaving. Rather, one of the most consistent findings of studies is that a whole complex of factors is involved. Of course, some factors are more important than others. Gragg (21), for example, after a study of two communities (Ithaca, New York, and New Haven, Connecticut), concluded that the most significant factor distinguishing the drop-out from the graduate was retardation, but that a number of other factors were also significant: sex, verbal intelligence and school achievement as measured by standardized group tests; participation in activities; membership in homes broken by divorce or death; and occupation of parent. It is worth noting that the factors found in studies by Gragg and others reflect both youth groups and adult society; participation in school activities, for example, is most immediately a youth culture factor, while occupation of parent and the broken home factor clearly link drop-outs with the adult society in which the adolescent lives.

It would manifestly be of great practical importance in guidance and in the total educational enterprise if some syndrome of symptoms

could be discovered by which the potential drop-out could be identified in advance of his actual school leaving, and consequently much attention has been given to this problem. One of the clearest statements of "symptoms of vulnerability to early school leaving" is that developed by Dillon on the basis of his study of selected communities in Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana:

1. Fairly consistent regression in scholarship from elementary to junior to senior high school
2. Frequent grade failures in the elementary school
3. High frequency of grade or subject failure in the junior and senior high school
4. Marked regression in attendance from elementary to junior to senior high school
5. Frequent transfers from one school to another
6. Evidence of a feeling of insecurity or "lack of belonging" in school
7. Marked lack of interest in school work (13, p. 82)

Early school leavers might be characterized as a marginal group. There are, of course, wide individual differences in all of the characteristics displayed, but the average drop-out is at a disadvantage in his group. Many are marginal socially. They frequently live in the less favored sections of the town or city (28). Often their parents have less than high school education (41). Typically their fathers are employed in semiskilled or unskilled work (13, p. 25), and quite frequently their mothers are employed outside the home (13, p. 14). A goodly number come from broken homes (41), though Dillon (13) found that the average early school leaver did not come from a broken home. Transfers from one school to another are not uncommon (45), and such shifting suggests that families may not be very firmly established in their residential areas. In a study of rural children, Drier (15) noted that a higher percentage of sons of farm renters than farm owners intended to quit school at the end of the eighth grade. School leavers are marginal in ability for the kind of tasks demanded of them in the typical school. The mean intelligence test scores of drop-out groups are below average (8, 13, 28), and more particularly they tend to be low on "verbal" test scores (21, 28). Their reading achievement scores are below average (28). They are retarded one or more grades, and often this retardation began in the elementary years. They fail subjects more frequently than those who continue in school (13, 57). In view of the marginal nature of their school existence, it is not at all surprising that they dislike or are uninterested in school, and many admit to being discouraged (8, 13,

25). A considerable number confess to feelings of not belonging (28). They participate very little in school activities (12, 41, 57). Their attendance is irregular (13). Some rebel and become truants; Rimel (41) found 91 percent of all truanancies among girls occurred among those who dropped out before graduation. In a word, the world of school as they experience it is simply not for them.

We have been able to cite only a few examples of the many studies which have been made of students who leave school before graduation from high school, but this brief review may serve to give something of the picture of these drop-out students. In general, it is probably fair to say that both the earlier and the more recent studies confirm the contention of many that secondary education in the United States is a definitely selective affair, in spite of democratic ideals of equality of educational opportunity. The theme of selectivity has also been developed in another group of studies which more consistently sought to explore the relation of socioeconomic stratification to secondary schools, and we now turn to examples of these studies.

For a number of years students of secondary education have observed that persistence in school seems to be related to socioeconomic status. The early study by Counts (9) noted in our previous discussion furnished evidence that, in the freshman year, the higher-ranking occupations were overrepresented and the lower occupations underrepresented, and that these differences became sharper in the senior year. If occupation is taken as a criterion of social class, then the findings of this and similar studies can be interpreted as evidence of social class differences. The National Survey (26) a few years later supported this relation of occupational level of fathers and secondary school attendance. Writing in 1937, a few years after the National Survey was reported, Strang (51, pp. 291-292) noted that the overrepresentation of the professional, proprietary, and managerial groups increased from elementary school through college, but that also there seemed to be an increasing representation in public high schools of labor and clerical-service groups. Strang found further that studies then available indicated that students attending private high schools, or public high schools in suburban areas, were clearly differentiated as to socioeconomic status of fathers from the general high school population of representative cities. Persistence in school was related not only to general factors of occupational level and ecology, such as Strang noted, but to the more specific industrial composition of an area. For example, in a study of 8 of the 14 cities in Michigan having populations from

10,000 to 20,000, Dear (12) found that the machine trades and building trades were relatively heavily represented. At the seventh-grade level, 9.8 percent of the fathers of students were employed in building trades, and 13.9 percent of fathers were in machine trades. In the twelfth grades, however, representations had decreased to 9.5 percent and 9.8 percent respectively.

Studies made from about 1920 to 1940 such as we have mentioned above seldom made direct social class interpretations of their findings regarding socioeconomic status, but later studies frequently were designed and pursued in a framework of social class concepts. In the well-known report of *Elmtown* (Jonesville), Hollingshead dramati-

TABLE 7. Social Class and School Attendance

Social Class	In School		Out of School	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Upper	4	100.0		
Upper-middle	31	100.0		
Lower-middle	146	92.4	12	7.6
Upper-lower	183	58.7	129	41.3
Lower-lower	26	11.3	204	88.7

SOURCE: Status in the high school. A. B. Hollingshead. In W. L. Warner. (Ed.) *Democracy in Jonesville*. New York: Harper, 1949. P. 206.

cally marshalled the data on social class and school attendance (Table 7). The figures speak for themselves. Social class memberships were ascribed by a modification of the Warner scheme. In a study of another community (New Haven, Connecticut), Davie (11) made social class assignments on the basis of area of residence. The sample was unusually complete, the 3736 cases representing 38.3 percent of the 16- and 17-year-old adolescents of the community. Attendance was found to decrease progressively but not proportionally from class I through class VI. High school attendance was roughly proportional to the numbers of classes II through V in the community population. But both classes I and VI were underrepresented; each of these classes enrolled about four-fifths of its share. Class I, however, was overrepresented in private schools, and class VI was overrepresented in trade schools. No recent comprehensive national study relating social class to school enrollment is available, but the evidence from various community studies such as those noted above is so consistent that it is possible to assert

with considerable confidence that social class, as ascribed on the basis of objective criteria such as those of the Warner Index of Status Classification, is a factor in selectivity in secondary education. Although speaking of only one community, the comment of Hollingshead on the nature of the relationship is well worth considering.

We believe this is a two-way relationship. On the one hand, the class culture of the child provides him with certain beliefs and values about the high school. On the other, the institutional values of the school, represented by the Board of Education, the professional administrators and teachers, as well as the students, develop differential attitudes toward the persons in different positions in the social structure which act as attractive or repelling agents to keep the adolescent in, or force him out of school (60, p. 206).

There is also a very real relationship between school marks or grades and the complex of factors variously termed socioeconomic status or social class. A detailed recital of studies offering support for this assertion would be something less than inspiring, but we should at least illustrate several of the different treatments of the problem. Again we find the pattern of earlier studies employing differing criteria of socioeconomic status, and the later emergence of studies structured in a social class frame of reference. Engle (19) in 1934 compared underprivileged and privileged groups, and a randomly selected group of high school students in Michigan City, Indiana. He found that both in school marks and intelligence quotients the students from privileged homes ranked highest, those from the random sample next, and those from underprivileged homes lowest. The "privileged" were those subjectively judged to be so, and the "underprivileged" were those whose families were receiving public assistance. In 1942 Stroud reviewed previous studies of achievement and intelligence in relation to socioeconomic status, and reported a group of his own studies. An interesting feature of Stroud's studies was the instrument which he constructed and used for rating socioeconomic status. This instrument contained a number of elements which were commonly used in later studies as criteria of social class. There were four sections: (1) miscellaneous items such as the presence or absence of a telephone, furnace heat, refrigerator, and servants in the home which, taken together, might be regarded as indicators of standard of living; (2) the educational level of parents; (3) occupation of father; and (4) monthly rental value of the home. On the basis of previous studies as well as his own, Stroud reached the conclusion that "... the relation between socioeconomic status of pupils and their academic achievement is of about the same

degree as that between socioeconomic status of pupils and their test intelligence" (52, p. 101). The studies on which this conclusion was based were for the most part conducted in the elementary grades; however, later studies indicate a significant relationship between grades and social class in the secondary school years. Again *Elmtown* is a case in point (23, p. 172); most of the high grades given were awarded to students in the three higher classes, and most of the low grades to students in the two lower classes. Particularly indicative was the distribution of students who failed one or more courses (23, p. 173). Almost one-fourth (23.1 percent) of these failing students were in class V, 10.0 percent in class IV, 2.7 percent in class III, and 2.9 percent in

TABLE 8. Distribution of Academic Grades by Social Class

Social Class	Grades	
	A and B	D and F
Upper-middle	343 (216)	19 (75)
Lower-lower	48 (147)	136 (51)

SOURCE: S. Abrahamson. Our status system and scholastic rewards. *J. educ. Sociol.*, 1952, 25, 445.

classes I and II together. Much the same pattern of relationship between social class and grades as found in *Elmtown* was reported by Abrahamson (1) in his study of six communities. In Table 8 the figures in parentheses indicate the number of high or low grades social class groups would have received had their grades been in proportion to their numbers in the populations of the communities. A comparison of these proportions with the numbers of high and low grades actually received clearly indicates the class bias.

We have reviewed briefly some evidence indicating that socioeconomic status is related to persistence in school attendance. We have found that social class as ascribed by objective criteria of the Warner type is related to school attendance. We have found also that school marks are related to social class membership. The assigning of school marks is, after all, a one-way process—from middle-class teacher to students in varied social classes—and therefore it should not be surprising that a relationship exists between grades given and social class membership of students. But what about the area of secondary school

activities in which the interaction is much more from student to student than from teacher to student? Do these activities not constitute a part of youth society relatively free of intrusions from a stratified adult society? Let us note some examples of studies which have been concerned with aspects of this problem.

Smith (48) studied the relation of socioeconomic status as measured by the Sims Score Card to participation in 31 extracurricular activities. The subjects were some 1500 high school students in Portland, Oregon. He concluded that, "extracurricular activities with but few exceptions tend to be selective in terms of socioeconomic status." In 28 of the 31 activity groups the mean socioeconomic scores were higher than the mean score for the school population as a whole. Even groups like the Hi-Y were selective; 74 percent of the membership of this organization was drawn from the upper 53 percent of the school population. Shannon and Kittle used as the single criterion of economic status the rental cost of homes and related this factor to participation in 21 activity groups in the Laboratory School of Indiana State Teachers College. In 9 of these 21 groups the students were found to come from homes having rental values significantly higher than the mean rental cost of homes of the entire student body. These 9 groups were the staff of the annual, participants in the junior prom, the junior high basketball squad, the senior Girl Scouts, the Invent and Test Council, the tennis team, the Book Club, the Thespian Society, and the drum majorettes. Among those groups which could not be differentiated from the general student group by rental cost of homes were intramural athletic teams, the basketball and football squads, the student council, the class officers, and the Hi-Y (46). A considerably more clear-cut picture of the influence of social class on participation in activities was found in *Elm-town*, where class bias was found in all activities except one. The one exception was boys' athletics, which seemed to draw about proportionally from all classes (23, p. 202).

The sheer cost of activities may in itself be a deterrent to participation for some. Surveys of costs of participating in activities have frequently been reported, but one of the most extensive of these is the study by Hand (22), based on a sample of 65 senior and four-year high schools in Illinois in 1947-1948. Some examples of the findings will serve to suggest the general picture. Two-fifths of the schools had class dues ranging from \$1.00 to \$5.00. The median cost of class pins and rings was \$13.00. Fees for participation in athletics ranged from \$1.00 for wrestling in one school to \$50.00 for golf in another. The

mean cost of tickets for home athletic contests was \$5.05. Costs of participation in various school clubs ranged from nothing to a median of \$19.50 in one school. Numerous other items were reported by Hand, but these will suffice to show that the costs may well place limits on participation for a number of students.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL HABITAT

If the paramount concern of guidance is the individual, as surely it must be, then the guidance worker must take into account not only the context as seen from the outside, but the total dynamic pattern of individual and environment, including the person's own perceptions and experiences. The behavior of the individual results not from a mechanical bouncing about of the person in a physical environment, but from the dynamic interaction of the person in his psychological environment. For example, as you read these pages, there are probably a number of facts of the physical environment which are not at all important in your behavior. The physical arrangements of furniture in your room or in the library are probably not at the moment psychologically relevant. Neither are the lighting arrangements, unless the light is so dim or so intense as to be disturbing. If we are to understand your present behavior, we need a concept which can encompass both you and the psychologically relevant parts of your environment. There are a number of functional relationships in the total situation such as the following: you are a teacher and know that next year you will have specific guidance responsibilities, or perhaps this chapter has been assigned and you expect that it may be covered in the next test, and so on. Many things enter into your perception of the situation, and it is *your* perception which is of prime importance, not the perception of your roommate or of someone sitting at the next library table. And so your behavior is, in the words of Lewin, a function of your "life space" (29). Your life space consists of you as an individual, the psychologically relevant parts of your environment, and the interrelations in the total situation.

This general point of view has developed over a number of years in psychology from Gestalt backgrounds. We cannot attempt to trace even in general outline the development of these concepts; nor shall we enter into any of the various controversies which have ensued. Various names have been given to somewhat divergent interpretations, such as "personalistic psychology," "phenomenology," "private worlds,"

the "personal frame of reference," and so on. One element which all of these special varieties of theory have in common, however, is an emphasis on the dynamic interaction of the individual with his own special world, and it is this characteristic of this general point of view which seems to hold great potential for guidance theory. Guidance is confronted with the problem of understanding the individual as an individual in his own world, and not as a statistical abstraction of characteristics of a group. There is certainly a large place in science for the search for general principles of lawfulness—the "nomothetic"—but to insist that the nomothetic is all of science is quite another matter. Surely there is a place also for the "idiographic"—the study of the individual case. Perhaps the theory needs of guidance can best be served by a blending of the general and the particular in something of the manner of the personalistic psychology of Allport (2).

Before we proceed further, two points must be made regarding the meaning which we intend by the term life space. First, the life space of the person is not limited to the conscious experience of the individual. In one of the most stimulating recent applications of phenomenological theory to counseling, Snygg and Combs (50), in their discussion of the "personal frame of reference," seem to locate psychological causation entirely within the phenomenal field of conscious experience. Such was not the meaning of life space as developed by Lewin, as Smith (49) has pointed out, and such is not our intended meaning. For Lewin the life space was not *merely* the phenomenal field, but rather a hypothetical construct inferred by the psychologist-observer. The life space concept includes subjective elements, but is not only subjectivism. We shall speak frequently of subjective elements such as the person's self concept, and it must be borne in mind that such pieces of subjective experience are part of but not all of the life space concept. The second point to be made is that the life space is unique to the individual. An external observer can never have a life space identical with that of the person he observes, but he may with considerable success reconstruct the life space of the observed person by reason of common meanings attached to words and gestures, and because within a given culture there are bound to be some experiences shared by many if not by all. When the counselor seeks to understand the client from the client's point of view, he is, in fact, seeking to reconstruct the client's life space. But in the last analysis, the subjective content of the life space is not directly accessible to anyone other than the individual—not to counselor, or to teacher, or to parent, or to any

As we saw earlier in the chapter, the societal-cultural context may be viewed from the outside; and when this is done, certain limits on the life expectancy of the individual come to light, as illustrated in the selective nature of American secondary education. But when we shift our orientation to that of the individual in his life space, when we use a "personal frame of reference," we find another order of facts which also carry implications of limits on the individual. Each individual's life space includes, among other elements, his self concept which he has developed out of the totality of his experiences. An eleventh-grade boy, for example, may come to regard himself as "not very good at books" because he has always received low grades, as not acceptable in certain social groups because he has been consistently excluded, but as a really good mechanic because he has successfully held a part-time job in a garage. Such evaluations of himself by others as their judgments are perceived by him, if accepted, become part of his self concept and function as experientially derived limits. This is true whether or not his self concept is in harmony or at variance with the "objective" facts. For him they are true, and on his perceptions he acts. If he really accepts the evaluation of his schoolwork by his teachers as expressed by low grades, school becomes something from which to escape rather than something to be continued. He may, of course, revolt against rather than accept the judgment of his teachers and seek to enter college in the face of "evidence" against his probable success.

Perhaps we can illustrate the sociological and the life space approaches by a reconsideration of the problem of early school leavers. When considering this problem from the standpoint of an external observer we suggested that these students might be thought of as a marginal group, in the sense that they were at a disadvantage with others of their groups in a number of ways. But what does this mean in terms of a life space interpretation? How do they perceive and experience their marginality, if such it be? For one thing, we might expect a person marginal in his social milieu to experience considerable frustration. Segel (44, p. 39) has noted that one type of study of school leavers showed that the reasons most often given by youth for leaving school centered about dissatisfaction with school, while a second group of studies related school leaving to such factors as socioeconomic status and scores on aptitude and achievement tests. The expressions of dissatisfaction speak for themselves. Segel suggests that the findings of the second group of studies might be interpreted as a syndrome of symptoms of frustration, of which elimination from school is one element.

Moreover, those who remained in school were often more frustrated than those who dropped out. Three kinds of reaction to frustration were described. The first of these was withdrawal—an avoidance of "all contacts which might threaten his own self-enhancement, thus exhibiting the regressive type of frustrated behavior" (44, p. 42). The second type of reaction was termed aggressive, an attempt to dominate others by sheer physical force or verbalism, or both. The third kind of reaction, named fixation, was the behavior shown by those who continue their inadequate behavior in the same way day after day, and who continue in school even though they are not part of it in any vital way. Whether or not one accepts these particular interpretations of frustration given by Segel his suggestions illustrate the personal frame of reference interpretation as contrasted with the view of the external observer who notes simply that early school leavers exhibit the characteristics of marginal persons.

We have emphasized that the life space concept is anchored in the individual. The term *personal frame of reference* helps to carry this stress, albeit with a phenomenological flavor. An implication of this general approach to the problem of understanding the individual is that each individual exists in his own psychological habitat which, in the phrase of Barker and Wright, is the "psychological context of behavior," which lies "at the intersection of the behaving person and the milieu. The habitat is a dynamic system within which the person and the environment are interconnected" (4, p. 11). We shall find it convenient to speak of the person and the milieu as if they were separate parts of the life space, but we do not intend to make the sort of theoretical distinction drawn by Lewin (29). Rather, we shall follow the lead of Barker and Wright in regarding the psychological habitat as coextensive with the life space, all aspects of which are dynamically interrelated. The concept of the psychological habitat thus affords a means of conceptualizing the behavioral context of the individual and of reconstructing his experience in his habitat without slipping into the solipsism of complete subjectivity. Thus, if more complete information were available as to the experiences of some one of the school leavers described by Segel, we might expect to find that the school part of his psychological habitat was perceived, not as a region of achievement and satisfying rewards as returning successful alumni might view it, but as a region of defeat and frustration. And the particular content and quality of his experience would be unique to him.

At least three aspects of psychological habitats are identifiable—

the person, the milieu, and certain standing behaviors. The person, of course, is central, and his perceptions of the milieu are selective. As we pointed out earlier, not all of the physical environment is important; only those parts which are psychologically relevant enter into the life space. The notion of standing behaviors is somewhat more subtle and requires further consideration. First of all, the behaviors with which we are concerned are extra-individual, in the way in which culture is extra-individual—they exist prior to and independently of the individual. Moreover, standing behaviors are perceived as appropriate to a particular behavior setting. In their study of *Midwest*, Barker and Wright define a behavior setting as "a standing pattern of behavior and a part of the milieu which are synomorphic and in which the milieu is circumjacent to the behavior" (4, p. 45). Standing behavior patterns, then, are those extra-individual behaviors which occur and seem appropriate in particular settings, such as cheering for one's team at a football game, or drinking coffee from a cup rather than from a bowl, or wearing street clothes rather than pajamas to class. Presumably the continuing occurrence of these behaviors (their "standing" quality) results from cultural learnings which lead to their perpetuation. Also, they are learned as being congruent; that is, the behavior and some part of the surrounding milieu appear to fit, to belong together. Thus, it is fitting to cheer for the football team in the stadium, but not in the church part of the milieu even though the team should attend the same church in a body. Again, certain behaviors are recognized as belonging in the locker room of the gym, but are not appropriate in the history classroom.

There are many kinds of habitats within the school situation, and still more in home and community. We shall illustrate only two within the region of school. First, we shall turn to the classroom situation and give chief attention to teachers as a part of the social milieu. Second, we shall center upon other youth in the school situation. To do this we shall follow an imaginary boy Tom.

Teachers in the Habitat

Tom probably has little direct personal contact with the principal of the school, and still less with the superintendent; consequently these persons stand primarily as symbols of authority in the social context of the school. Various other persons play different roles in the school scene—the coach, the school nurse, the counselor, the dean of boys, the custodian—and may acquire for Tom differing degrees of importance ac-

ording to his involvement with them. On some occasions persons from the larger community context may become a part of the school milieu in a more or less transitory fashion; among these are certain alumni, assembly speakers, and others.

All of Tom's teachers are important in the school milieu, but we shall describe only one. Miss Warren is in her first year of teaching at Central High School, but she had previously taught three years in a smaller school. Her field is English, and she expects to complete her master's degree the coming summer at State University. Her father is a dentist in a small city of 50,000 in an adjoining state. In contrast with the small manufacturing community of 10,000 in which Central High School is located, her home town was more urban, but her earlier teaching experience was in a definitely more rural area. This is Miss Warren's first experience with a student body in which any considerable portion of the students are sons and daughters of factory employees. She is a bit disturbed about what appears to her to be laxity of scholarship standards in the teaching of English, but has made an effort to avoid any open display of her feelings before students. Miss Warren regards herself as something of a scholar at heart, and secretly she hopes eventually to become a novelist. She feels that among her duties as a teacher of English she should, first, maintain a standard of achievement so that those entering college will be well prepared and, second, contribute to raising the intellectual tone of both students and community. She places high value on orderliness, industry, conventional morality, and artistic appreciation, and feels that some of the students "who do not come from the better homes" are rather lacking in these virtues.

Tom is 16 years of age, in the eleventh grade, a letter man in basketball; he ranks in the upper 20 percent of his class in scholastic aptitude as indicated by a test given in the ninth grade and in about the middle of his class in scholastic achievement. His father is a machinist in the local factory. Tom works after school in the local J. C. Penney store. He regards himself as a regular guy, and as a better-than-average athlete but probably not good enough to become a professional. He recognizes that his grades are about average, but feels that they would be better if he really wanted to be an egghead. He feels himself attractive to and successful with girls, but admits to himself that there are several girls in the "upper set" whom he would like very much to date but has never asked for fear of rebuff. In a rather ill-defined way he thinks of himself as leader in his own small clique, but has never been much concerned about being elected to offices in the school. His level of

aspiration occupationally is to become a merchant and eventually an owner of a store, preferably in his home town. If he can achieve this he would consider himself successful. He has no particular plans for college, and in fact he places little value upon formal education beyond high school, although his father wants him to attend State University. All these and many other elements enter into his self concept and into the structuring of the goal region of his life space.

In what sort of psychological habitat does Tom find himself? Miss Warren's English class is a particular part of the total school milieu, and Tom-in-Miss-Warren's-class-with-related-behaviors is a quite specific psychological habitat. To this situation Tom brings his concept of himself as an average achiever, an athlete, a regular guy, and future merchant. Miss Warren enters the field seeing herself as something of a scholar, as one who should prepare students for college, and (probably unconsciously) as a conservator of middle-class values. Tom does not aspire to college; for Miss Warren, college graduation is doubtless a *sine qua non* of satisfying living. Tom is only moderately mobile; for Miss Warren work, achievement, and success with resulting mobility are high values. The standing behavior patterns in the situation are the customs of Central High as selectively rejected, tolerated, or encouraged in Miss Warren's class. In such a situation (and they do occur), there appear to be seeds of conflict, frustration, or both. If we conceive of guidance as helping the individual to develop according to his own emerging life pattern and expectancy, then this particular habitat involving Miss Warren and Tom seems to contain certain roadblocks to the guidance process. It will probably be difficult for Miss Warren to understand Tom's lack of interest in college and to accept as normal his pattern of values. She may interpret his lack of mobility orientation as mere laziness. Tom, for his part, could easily feel that she is a high-brow and so withdraw from participation in English class in all but those minimum essentials required for a passing grade.

Other Youth in the Habitat

Probably few if any would question the general proposition that one of the most important psychological habitats for the youth is that consisting of himself, other youth, and various standing behaviors and values of the particular youth culture in which he finds himself. Implicit in any such psychological habitat are certain factors which operate as limits on the choices, plans, and adjustments which the individual can make, and hence such limits become important in the guidance

process. It is relatively easy to recognize limits as they exist in the physical life space of the individual. The young child, for example, is usually not permitted to play more than a short distance from his home, and so his interaction with his age-mates is limited by his neighborhood. As he moves on through elementary school, junior high school, and senior high school, he is brought into contact with wider and wider circles of his age-peers. But the mere existence of an increased number of other youth in his physical life space does not mean that he enters into dynamic interrelations with all of these other individuals. They may or may not become important in his psychological habitat. The position of his family in the community, the traditions and attitudes of his family, the value patterns he has learned, the current codes of his adolescent clique—all these and many other factors serve as limits in including or excluding from his psychological habitat certain of these other youth. It is easy to assume that a thoroughgoing democratic interaction and participation will ensue because the individual is brought into physical proximity in the high school situation with other youth from varied contexts and classes, but such is obviously not the case. Limits on participation and acceptance develop, and some of these limits of the psychological habitat are imposed by the individual himself.

A number of studies have sought to discover general characteristics or traits of adolescents which are perceived by other adolescents as earmarks of acceptability. This type of study has been greatly stimulated by the development of sociometric methods. We noted earlier the Tryon (54) study which was concerned especially with traits or qualities of personality considered desirable by 12-year olds and 15-year olds. A more recent example is the study by Marks (34), who found that in general, the acceptable adolescent is seen by his peers as sociable, involved with people, and relatively impulsive. Acceptable boys showed significantly fewer mechanical-constructive interests than did the unacceptable, but whether such interests contributed to isolation, or served as compensations for isolation, was not clear. Acceptable girls seemed to have fewer intellectual-cultural interests than the unacceptable. Such attempts to isolate and describe general characteristics of adolescents regarded as desirable by other adolescents are helpful, but are only marginally related to the problem of the psychological habitat, which stresses the uniqueness of the individual's particular habitat.

Earlier in the chapter, while considering the matter of youth groups and culture from the standpoint of an outside observer, we

noted that various kinds of participation—as in activities in high school and in recognitions and rewards—are related to social class membership. Is acceptance by peers also related to social class? There is considerable evidence for an affirmative answer. One of the clearest illustrations of such findings comes from a study by Abrahamson (1). In Table 9 the numbers in parentheses are the numbers of high and low acceptance scores which would have been received by members of the upper-middle and lower-lower classes had the social acceptance scores been distributed in proportion to the numbers of students in the

TABLE 9. Distribution of Social Acceptance Scores
by Social Class

Social Class	Scores	
	High	Low
Upper-middle	45 (22)	27 (48)
Lower-lower	3 (19)	62 (40)

SOURCE: S. Abrahamson. Our status system and scholastic rewards. *J. educ. Sociol.*, 1952, 25, 445.

social classes. A comparison of these with the actual distribution given by the numbers not enclosed in parentheses shows the strong tendency for upper-middle class students to be accorded more than their share of social acceptance, while lower-lower class students receive much less than their portion of acceptance. Social acceptance was judged from scores made on the Ohio Social Acceptance Scale. Wade (58) found a rather similar bias of social acceptance on the basis of social class among college students.

Perhaps a word of caution is in order, for we would not leave the impression that social class as ascribed on the basis of objective criteria can afford any complete explanation of acceptance among adolescents, or that acceptance is a unitary thing. Surely the individual's acceptance of himself must be related to his degree of acceptance by others. We cannot, of course, apply directly to adolescents the findings from studies of children, but it is interesting to note that Zelen (62), in a study of sixth grade children, found significant relations between self-acceptance and peer-acceptance, between peer-

acceptance and acceptance of others, but *not* between self-acceptance and acceptance of others. One special aspect of acceptability among adolescents is the area of dating practices. Breed (6) compared two groups classified as to social class on the basis of fathers' occupations. One group was thought to correspond to the white-collar or business class, and the other to the blue-collar class. Similarities of the two groups were more impressive than the differences; only two of the 10 sets of responses showed differences significant at the 5 percent level, and none at the 1 percent level. As Breed pointed out, however, the class range of the group was not very great. The "blue-collar" group would probably have fallen chiefly in Warner's upper-lower class, with some in the lower-middle. There were no unskilled laborers among the fathers, and no unemployed, and all students expected to complete high school. Breed made the interesting comment that "The working-class youth were apparently socialized by contact in school with the more numerous middle-class boys and girls. Why should they not observe and eventually follow, to some extent, the middle-class norms practiced by the other seniors?" (6, p. 143)

The comment by Breed raises a question noted earlier which takes us to the heart of the concept of the psychological habitat. Is mere contact with other youth enough to bring them within the individual's psychological habitat? It does not seem so. The psychological habitat is constituted of dynamic interrelationships. Each psychological habitat includes a multiplicity of factors among which dynamic interrelationships obtain, but at the moment we are concerned only with other youth. Let us return for illustrative purposes to the imaginary Tom whom we described earlier; but now we shall be interested in his relations with other youth rather than in his relations with his teachers.

Among Tom's friends are Jim, Ronald, and Lucille. Jim is one of Tom's closest friends; they grew up together in the same neighborhood. Jim's father is employed as draftsman in the same factory in which Tom's father works. Jim has participated in both football and basketball, though with somewhat less success in basketball than Tom has enjoyed. Jim is also something of a radio ham. He hopes to be able to secure some training in electronics while in military service, which he expects to enter shortly after graduation, and has rather vague plans for further schooling in electronics after discharge from the service. Ronald is a fellow member of the basketball squad, and the son of a cashier in a local bank. Tom did not know Ronald until they both became members of the squad, since they live in different parts of the city

and had not been previously thrown together. The boys get along well together, but Tom does not feel Ronald to be his close friend in the same sense that Jim is. After high school, Ronald expects to enter the School of Business at the University. Lucille is Tom's more-or-less steady girl friend, the daughter of the owner of a small neighborhood grocery store. Lucille's parents have always made Tom feel welcome in their home when he called for Lucille for dates. Their home somehow reminded him of his own, though he probably would not have consciously described it as rather small but comfortable and unpretentious. Lucille is taking the commercial course in high school and plans to secure some further training in business college after graduation from high school. All these persons as well as some others are significant persons in Tom's psychological habitat, in that mutually dynamic relations exist between them.

There are of course many other youth in high school with whom Tom is acquainted, but who are only on the fringe of his psychological habitat. There is, for example, Harvey Nielson, currently editor of the school annual, and last year president of the class. Then there is Sheila Livingston, the homecoming queen, and Jerry Lundstrom who won some kind of an award for an essay on science. Tom knows also Sid Nelson, Oscar Schwartz, Rita Carmichael, and Ken Brown who are "good kids," but just don't stand out in any particular way. He used to know John Hehn pretty well, but since Johnny began to get into so much trouble with his gang he and Tom haven't seen much of each other. Currently Johnny is on probation for theft of tires from parked cars.

Limits and the Psychological Habitat

Throughout our discussion of contexts we have been insisting that certain limits are imposed on the life expectancy of the individual. These limits are relatively easy to see and appreciate when we view the context from a sociological or anthropological point of view. It is not difficult to realize, for example, that certain societal and cultural factors in the milieu in which the school exists have brought about a selective action in secondary schools. Those who for one reason or another withdrew from school before graduation experience certain limits on their life outlooks. But what about those more intangible limits established in the psychological habitat? Such limits emerge from the dynamic relations of the individual to his habitat. What, then, are some of the limit-generating factors found in the habitat of the individual? Obviously no exhaustive list can be attempted, and we are just be-

ginning to understand a few of the relationships involved. Our purpose is to illustrate the manner in which limits on life expectancy exist within the psychological habitat, and we shall limit ourselves to brief explorations of two heuristic propositions: (1) that reference groups function in defining the direction and level of aspirations, and (2) that achievement motivations are channeled by the values of the habitat.

Reference groups, it will be recalled, were defined as groups to which the individual psychologically relates himself and by which the individual judges himself. A great deal of shifting of reference groups occurs in the normal process of growing up. The adolescent in the process of seeking emancipation from parents often makes the adolescent clique his reference group in a rather devastatingly complete fashion. As he achieves maturity, a number of groups may come to function as reference groups: his own family, his club or fraternal order, his labor union, his church group, the chamber of commerce, and so on. Apparently a somewhat similar shifting of reference groups may occur as rural youth move into a psychological habitat dominated by urban youth. Orzack studied the in-group and out-group choices of high school students in various activities and relationships. He concluded that "The most general finding is that certain agencies of participation are associated with the alienation of the students from their residence groups" (37, p. 31). Rural students who participated in certain school-centered activities tended to select associates from among urban students. Many school activities seemed to function as means for progressively dissociating rural students from other rural students, and probably from rural values, with the result that they came to be socialized along lines of urban values. Perhaps it is the kind of activity which is important—not just the extent of participation—but the picture is far from clear. In a study of students in four rural high schools Rose (42) found no evidence of a relationship between the number of activities participated in and the kind of reference group—chums, immediate family, or organized groups. Nor did the choice of reference group seem to be related to happiness of parents as judged by the students. There was, however, a relationship between kind of reference group and number of siblings; in families of few children, chums seemed to function more often as reference groups, while children from large families seemed to choose organized groups as reference groups.

In an earlier chapter we noted that social classes may function as

reference groups. Thus, the upper-lower class boy in high school may come to accept the values of the middle-class boys with whom he associates, and to judge himself by the norms of the middle class. In other words, the middle-class youth become truly a part of his psychological habitat. But the relationships involved in such functioning of social classes as reference groups are far from simple. Certainly middle-class youth do not become reference groups for lower-class youth simply by their presence in the school, as noted earlier, although sometimes it seems so. Smith (47) found an association (significant at the .01 level) between the wishes of 265 Negro high school seniors and their social class membership. The greatest differences among social classes occurred in wishes for material possessions and education. For example, 96 lower-lower class students wished for material possessions, while only 7 upper-middle class individuals expressed this wish. It is an obvious interpretation to say that the wishes of the 96 lower-lower students represented need, but it also seems relevant to suggest that these 96 perceived the middle class as having material possessions and education, and that the middle class was for them a reference group by which they judged themselves.

To illustrate further the complicated nature of the relations involved when social classes function as reference groups, let us note several other studies. In the absence of studies employing adolescents as subjects, however, we shall have to use studies of adults. On a simple need hypothesis, we might expect that members of the lower classes would have high levels of aspiration, while members of the higher classes would have no particular needs leading to aspirations for still higher status. The relationship of aspiration and social class is certainly more complex than this.

Reissman (40) found that reference groups affect the relationship. His subjects were three groups of white, male, native-born adults, including a group of policemen from all parts of the country. Now policemen are usually ranked relatively low in social class and prestige hierarchies, and this particular group seemed to hold rather low levels of aspiration. However, as compared with their own brothers, many of the policemen had made considerable occupational advancement, and consequently, as Reissman suggests, their apparently low levels of aspiration might actually be expressions of satisfaction with their achievement if their brothers constituted their reference groups. The picture was further complicated by the age factor. Reissman found that among men over 50 years of age with high past achievements there seemed to

be created a kind of momentum which carried them to higher levels of aspiration for the future. Apparently a different kind of relationship existed for young men of low achievement, who also expressed high levels of aspiration. Still another complication in the social class and reference group relationship exists in the possibility of religious or, perhaps better, denominational factors. The association of the Protestant ethic with values placed on hard work and success suggests possible differences between Catholics and Protestants as to patterns of mobility and levels of aspiration. With such a hypothesis in mind, Mack, Murphy, and Yellin (33) studied groups of salesmen, engineers, and bankers, but found no differences associated with religion. In interpreting their results these authors noted the study of Hyman (24) and his findings that factors within social class were related to mobility; recognizing that all the occupations they had studied were middle class, they suggested also that possibly the Catholics had internalized the mobility ethic of their own occupational roles and were already participating in the Protestant ethic. One more study will be noted briefly; it was concerned with future and success orientations, commonly regarded as middle-class value orientations. Turner (56), using college students as subjects, investigated the effect of four reference groups: childhood and neighborhood groups, the chosen occupational group, other college students as peers, and persons most desired as lifetime friends. The college student subjects were assumed to be a future-time and success oriented group. Among the findings of Turner were: a tendency to seek to exceed rather than merely equal the average of the reference group; differences in the relevance of various reference groups as standards for occupational success and for ethical and moral behavior; and less future-orientation and more present orientation with respect to ethical and moral values.

What then shall we conclude regarding our original proposition, that reference groups function in defining the direction and level of aspirations? Certainly we cannot regard the proposition as proved. As indicated at the outset, our intentions in introducing the propositions were heuristic; we are not offering hypotheses for crucial testing. But there is enough supporting evidence to suggest that the relations between level of aspiration and reference groups may constitute a fruitful area of exploration in seeking to understand some facets of the psychological habitat. The difficulties are that many of the studies thus far available, such as those cited, are not made within the conceptual framework of the psychological habitat, and that in reinterpretation

such as we have attempted, it is easy to do violence to the investigations on which we must typically rely. We are just beginning to understand the relationships involved.

Let us now turn to our second proposition that achievement motivations are channeled by the values of the habitat. Our concept of values is that introduced earlier, that values are concepts of the desirable. In any habitat in which the social milieu is an important part there will be these concepts of the desirable, concepts held by the individual himself, and by other persons. In the habitat of Tom-in-the-English-class, we may recall, the values held by Tom and by Miss Warren regarding academic achievement were somewhat at variance. And in the habitat involving Tom and other youth, Tom found his own values differing from those of Johnny Hein and his gang. In our present discussion we are limiting ourselves to those values of a special sort—those relevant to the satisfaction of achievement motivations. We are suggesting only that, given certain motivations toward achievement, these motivations are channeled in part by the interaction of the concepts of the desirable held by the individual and those existing in the social milieu of the habitat. As with our first proposition, we seek only to point toward a possibly fruitful area of investigation, not to prove a specific hypothesis.

Any individual in the course of his life experiences develops a pattern of values which, to some extent at least, is unique to him. No other person has had quite the same concatenation of relations with parents, siblings, relatives, peers, teachers, neighbors, townsfolk, and others, or has had quite the same vicarious experiences through newspapers, magazines, books, sports, radio programs, television programs, religious services, and the like. The pattern of values which the individual learns is therefore idiosyncratic to some considerable extent. On the other hand, any individual shares many experiences with others by reason of participation in a common culture and common groups, and he will accordingly share many values with others. Probably the proportion of total values which are shared values will be relatively high for the person who has spent his entire life in a single context, as in the case of Tom who was born and grew up in the same community, and relatively low for a person who has experienced other contexts, such as a member of a minority group who has spent his early years in his own subculture, and has then moved to a new context dominated by another and differing cultural group. But whether the idiosyncratic content of his value pattern be high or low, it is always present to some

viduals, since they learn to fear failure less and are urged less to succeed, would react more directly to specific conditions of particular failures. Her subjects were high school seniors, classified as to social status on both an objective criterion (occupation of parents) and by the students' own class identifications. The hypothesis was supported, and age, sex, and school attended were shown not to be factors in the results. Since Douvan used as one criterion for selection of subjects their social class identifications, social classes as reference groups may have been involved. Such studies as the above are important in raising a warning flag against any easy assumptions regarding social class, achievement, level of aspiration, and values. Explanations in terms of characteristics of groups are far from adequate. Perhaps our earlier point will bear repeating, that the individual not only shares in the values of the social milieu, but brings to the habitat a pattern of values which is to at least some extent uniquely his.

Thus far we have given no attention to the genesis of achievement motivations, and have simply assumed that such motivations exist in different individuals in varying degrees. We cannot attempt even the briefest of reviews of studies concerned with genesis, but we must at least recognize that the individual does have a history, and that presumably the individual's motivations existing at any one time have roots in his earlier experiences as well as in the dynamics of the present situation. Students of a psychoanalytic persuasion have stressed the historical aspects; those with field theory leanings have emphasized the dynamics of a field in a kind of cross-section-in-time manner. A good starting point for the reader who is interested in empirical studies of the problem is *The Achievement Motive* by McClelland and three other investigators (31). We might expect to find some of the most clear-cut examples or "ideal types" of achievement motivations among those who have started low and climbed to the greatest heights up the mobility ladder. For this reason the recently published study by Warner and Abegglen (61) of the business elite is of interest. These authors stress that the mobile man is often escaping from something as well as striving toward a goal. Early home experiences frequently seem to be related to their achievement motivations. There seems to be a certain hollow quality and lack of warmth of relations to parents. Many of the fathers were failures in one way or another: they were drunkards, or deserted their families, or were simply flat and inadequate persons—scarcely models of the male role. The mothers, on the other hand, were

often strong persons, and whether by intention or not, the boys learned from their mothers that they must be better than their fathers. But if the mothers were strong, they were not overly possessive, and the boys were encouraged to strike out on their own. The guide to success held before them was hard work in school and on the job. This is not to suggest that the social graces of getting along with others were frowned upon. To the contrary, "winning friends and influencing people" was regarded as important. The boys consequently grew to adulthood able to relate themselves easily but superficially to others, lacking deep involvements with others, and so able to break such ties as did exist and to move on to new positions which promised further success and achievement in an apparently endless succession of moves. Something of the same pattern was reported by Ellis (18) in a study of unmarried career women.

But let us return to our original proposition that achievement motivations, however they develop, are channeled by the values of the habitat. What does this mean for guidance? It means that the concepts of the desirable which the individual has learned exclude from consideration certain pursuits through which achievement motivations might be realized. The boy from a background of high social and economic status attending certain private schools cannot satisfy achievement motivations by entering the occupation of taxi driver, or machinist, or becoming a professional athlete. Or if he attends a public school, he cannot enroll in a vocational curriculum. From these areas his values exclude him just as effectively as if there were institutionalized bars to his admittance. The boy from a lower-class home who has learned that competitive physical aggression is valued, and that too much book learning is not quite respectable, finds it difficult to realize achievement motivations through scholastic pursuits. To do so he must break with the values of his home and neighborhood, and take the path of mobility. If, perhaps, becoming "better than his father" has become a powerful motivation he may restructure his pattern of values at the price of breaking with his past and undertake a flight into success.

SUMMARY

The context in which the individual lives may be viewed from two points of view, that of the external observer, and that of the experient-

ing individual. These two aspects represent two inseparable orders of events, both of which impose certain limits on the life expectancy of the individual.

An important part of the objective order of events is composed of youth groups and youth culture. A distinctive feature of American life is the extent to which youth, in the transition from childhood to adulthood, detour through a rather separate youth society and culture. Youth culture may be thought of as arising in the crevices of adult culture, not completely independent of the culture of adults, and yet possessing certain distinctive traits probably reflecting special needs of youth. Guidance is confronted with the problem of maintaining a desirable balance in stress upon adult and youth cultures. The limits imposed upon the individual by the social context are reflected in the selective character of secondary education. Individuals who leave school before graduation do not uniformly display any single set of characteristics; many different factors are operating, and the factors have differing importance for various individuals. In a very general way, however, it might be possible to describe drop-outs as marginal, at serious disadvantage in one way or another as compared with those who continue in school. These disadvantages may be related to home situation, to abilities, to social class membership, to economic handicaps, or to many other factors.

The concept of the life space is a useful concept in seeking to understand the context of the individual, including the standpoint of his own experience. The life space is not conceived as subjective only, but stresses the dynamic interrelations of the person and his psychological environment. The psychological habitat is a special interpretation of the life space, three aspects of which are the person, the milieu, and standing behaviors. Teachers and other youth were discussed as components in the psychological habitat of a high school student to illustrate experience with the psychological milieu. The psychological habitat as well as the external context may operate to place limits on the life expectancy of the individual. Reference groups, as a part of the psychological habitat, may serve to establish limits. Social classes may function as reference groups, and if so, the values of the social class which becomes the reference group are limiting factors. Mere physical proximity to a group does not make that group a reference group; there must be psychological involvement. Two hypotheses were suggested: (1) that reference groups function in defining the

direction and level of aspirations, and (2) that achievement motivations are channeled by the values of the habitat.

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CHAPTER 8

Occupational Preference and Choice

In our discussion of context and limits we noted that there are two orders of events which need to be considered: the external facts of context, particularly the social milieu, which are external in the sense of being evident to an outside observer, and the subjective experiential facts which are unique to the individual. This dichotomy is partly one of convenience for discussion and must not tempt us into regarding the individual and his environment as really separable. The important thing we must seek to understand is the dynamic interaction of the person with his psychological environment. In our discussion of environmental factors we used the "psychological habitat"—the dynamic system "within which the person and the environment are interconnected." Although we wish to continue a recognition of the total life space, our attention in this chapter will center largely on the individual. We have long since reached a stage in our thinking about occupational choice in which it is no longer convincing to regard occupational decision as exclusively an intellectual process in which various possibilities are sorted out in a logical manner until the one most reasonable occupation is selected. Occupational choices are no more or less logical than are other major decisions made by the individual.

At the outset we are confronted with the necessity of a choice of terminology. There seems to be ample precedent in the literature for employing either the term *choice* or *preference*. Our selection of terms is arbitrary. *Preference* seems the better term when we are speaking of the period of childhood because of the shifting nature of expressions of choice. Such choices are more nearly temporary preferences. *Choice* to many seems to connote some confirming action of commitment. On this basis we might well speak of occupational choice as made by a high school student if he evidences by selection of his courses or some

other activity that he is actually guiding his actions by his choice. Preferences should not be understood as single, isolated events, for the normal expectancy is that a given individual will express a number of preferences in the course of growing up, and often these preferences seem to fall into a pattern. In like manner, we shall not regard a choice as a single event, but as a stage in the total process of occupational development.

Although we recognize that development toward and entry into an occupation is continuous and all of a piece, in this chapter we shall be dealing with only a limited portion of the total picture. Our emphasis will be on the succession of occupational preferences which normally occurs during the process of reaching the choice stage and before the individual completes his formal schooling. This period would include the *growth stage* and the *early exploratory stage* as the terms are used in the Career Pattern Study (87, p. 39). This time also includes that portion of the career pattern which Form and Miller (22) call the initial work period. But our emphasis is dynamic rather than chronological. Occupational choice in the sense of a commitment to an occupation may or may not occur within the time of formal schooling or preparation. It would be rather meaningless to define the period in terms of grade levels, or to relate it to an average chronological age or period. The decisive thing is the degree of development reached by the individual. For some the period will close at the minimum legal age or grade for leaving school; for others, the period will continue on into graduate school years or even beyond. In spite of the fact that the time encompassed by formal schooling may vary greatly with individuals, the limits on the length of a given chapter cannot be so flexible. We shall not follow the individual on into early work experience and adjustment to the job, or into the period of stable employment.

Our purpose is to seek to understand some of the factors in occupational preferences and choices during this period and something of the pattern of development of the individual. This means that we shall ignore some considerations which, from the standpoint of social planning and educational strategy, are very meaningful. Occupational choices of individuals have importance both to individuals and to society. Menger (63), for example, suggested three criteria of the rationality of vocational choices: (1) the intellectual abilities of individuals will be utilized at an optimum level, (2) vocations chosen must provide social standing that will afford satisfaction in daily associations, and (3) the number of choices of given occupations should approach

the number of persons actually needed in the occupations. The social implications of suggestions such as these must be passed by. We shall seek only to understand something of the process involved in reaching preferences or choices. One or all of the considerations noted by Menger may enter into the occupational choices of the individual, to the extent that he is able to perceive them as related to him. He may well avoid certain occupations which he feels to be either too demanding intellectually, or not sufficiently challenging for him. He may seek or avoid occupations because of "social standing" or prestige factors, as he perceives them. Or he may avoid certain occupations which seem overcrowded, or seek others which seem to offer room and opportunity. But such considerations are in relation to him; it is doubtful that many individuals make occupational choices primarily on the basis of social planning or statesmanship. How many, for example, chose their present occupations primarily because they were convinced, after an extrapolation of employment trends, that they should help to fill out the needed number of workers in some particular occupation, say plumbing, or barbering, or elementary school teaching? Occupational choice by the individual is not social planning.

Although our interest is primarily in exploring backgrounds of importance to guidance at the secondary level, we cannot begin with these years if we are to understand the process of occupational choice. Many important factors are operating long before the child reaches these years, and probably some bases are being laid before he enters school at all. We must, then, begin by asking what foundations for occupational choice are established before the person reaches adolescent years. We need to know something of the child's development upon which are built the later succession of occupational preferences, and finally a choice. After gaining some understanding of preadolescent developments, we shall then turn to a consideration of some of the factors operating in vocational preferences in later years (especially adolescence), and seek to suggest something of the developmental pattern.

PREADOLESCENT FOUNDATIONS FOR OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE

• Development is continuous. There are variations in the pacing of development; not all phases proceed uniformly on a united front, but there are no sharp breaks which allow us to say, "Here this stopped,

and that began." We cannot expect therefore to be able to put a finger on any one point in the development of the individual and say, "This is the beginning of occupational preference." We can, however, identify some of the forces at work in development which have importance for the succession of occupational preferences which normally occur. For convenience, we shall deal with these under two topics: (1) the narrowing of the field, and (2) the development of the self and self concept.

The Narrowing of the Field

Relatively little attention has been given to the occupational preferences of preadolescents, but fortunately several studies have employed large samples which included younger children. Before we consider evidence bearing on whether or not the range of preferences does in fact decrease with age, we must note the important complicating factor of sex differences. In general, boys express preferences for a wider range of occupations than do girls. Menger (63) found that in her total sample of some 19,000, boys chose 199 different occupations, and girls only 113. The findings of Boynton (6) for 1,640 children and adolescents revealed the same sort of sex difference. Four occupations (teaching, getting married, nursing, and working in a beauty parlor) accounted for 75 percent of the choices of girls, but 11 occupations were needed to account for the same percentage of boys' choices. We must therefore take into consideration sex differences in discussion of the narrowing of the field of choice.

Rosenberg has suggested that "It is possible to visualize the occupational decision process as a series of progressive delimitations of alternatives. A number of factors in the individual and in society operate to cut down the broad range of occupational possibilities available" (76, p. 4). He noted further that the bases for elimination vary; some occupations are not socially appropriate, some are not possible, and some are not desirable. There is persuasive evidence of a progressive narrowing of range of occupational preferences of boys at least up through Grade 6 and perhaps beyond, but any similar conclusion regarding the preferences of girls is questionable. The investigation by Menger (63) included almost 2,000 boys and girls in Grades 3 through 6. Boys in Grade 3 expressed preferences for 89 different occupations, but by Grade 6 the number had declined to 58. During Grades 7 through 9 there was an increase, so that by Grade 9 the high point of 95 was reached. The progressive restriction of preferences

which Menger found to be true through Grade 6 covers a period which would carry a good many boys well toward or into adolescence. For girls the picture was quite different—in fact, the trend was reversed. At Grade 3 the number of different preferences was 36; fluctuations were small from this grade through college years, and the high point of 47 was reached in the senior year of college. When the data were classified by age rather than by grade level the same trends were evident. Lehman and Witty (50) found that the average range of occupations chosen by various groups of boys at age $8\frac{1}{2}$ was 23.3, and at age $18\frac{1}{2}$ the number dropped to 15.6. The Lehman and Witty findings at least add the support of numbers, since their study included a total of over 27,000 subjects.

There are difficulties, too, in comparing the results of studies employing different methods of collecting data. But in the absence of extensive longitudinal studies of occupational preferences of individuals through the preadolescent years we rely tentatively on such evidence as we have to test the hypothesis of a progressive narrowing of range of preference, and in the case of boys the evidence does seem to be in general supporting though not confirming. Moreover, the preferences of boys seem to provide a clearer case of occupational preferences than do the preferences of girls, especially when marriage and homemaking are counted among the occupational choices of girls.

Thus far we have endeavored to show that during the preadolescent years boys as a group progressively narrow the range of their occupational preferences, while girls seem to have a more limited range of choices through all age and grade levels. But what is the process involved in the gradual narrowing of range of choices by individual boys, if this is indeed true? On a strictly logical basis it would appear that the final selection of an occupation from among the 30,000 to 40,000 possible choices involves an impressive task of comparing, evaluating, and choosing. But the development of choice is not logical in this sense. The development of preferences among occupations is first of all limited by the range of occupations about which the child has some knowledge, either first-hand or vicarious. This fact is relevant to individual differences in the range of occupations available for choice, but does not explain the apparent tendency of the individual boy to narrow his range of choice, unless indeed we assume that the boy forgets about a number of occupations as he grows older. The opposite assumption seems more reasonable, that as the boy grows older he learns of more occupations. Yet the range which actually enters

into his preferences seems to narrow. We must then seek a more dynamic explanation.

Probably one of the earliest operating dynamic factors which serves to narrow the field of possible occupational choice is the definition of roles by the culture and subcultures in which the boy lives, and of these roles, one of the earliest to be learned is the sex role. Tyler (90), in a study of interests of first-grade children, found sex differences in enough single items to make it possible to construct an index of masculinity. There were also sex differences in the organization of interests. Tyler suggested that her findings might indicate a role theory of interest patterning. By the time these same children were 10 years of age, sex differences in interests were still evident; but it was clear that more complex differences were involved (91). Items differentiating the sexes were almost entirely different for the sexes. Both extremely masculine and extremely feminine items were too unanimously disliked by the other sex to be useful for differentiation. "It is as if at this stage boys and girls were certain about repudiating things characteristic of the opposite sex but differed as to what should be included in this category." Four interest factors were isolated for boys: (1) a rejection of inappropriate activities, (2) an antisissy factor, (3) an antiwork (or antiadult) factor, and (4) a pseudovocational factor. For girls only three factors were identified: (1) an antiactivity factor, (2) an antiaggression factor, and (3) a general factor having to do with the rejection of inappropriate activities. From Tyler's findings it seems clear that the development of interests is related to the sex roles being learned, and it is also clear that these roles do not exist in isolation from the beginnings of other roles and attitudes.

The factors which Tyler found for boys hint of the beginnings of delineation of a work role. Somehow play and work activities become differentiated in experience. Ginzberg and others found by interviews a recognition among children that they would need to work when they grew up. One 8-year-old said: "I am different from my father because I don't work; children usually play, and adults work." A 10-year-old commented, "Most everyone works," although some worked harder than others, and "Even rich people have to work to get rich" (27, p. 62). Doubtless the child's conceptions of work roles is complicated by the sex differences in work roles which he sees about him. Some things men do, and women do not do; other kinds of work are women's work, and men do not do these things. Work roles, as such, and sex differences in work roles will be further complicated for the child by

subcultural factors. Thus, the upper-lower class child may learn from his experience that both mothers and fathers work in factories, but that fathers are more apt to do the heavier work, while mothers work with smaller things and do lighter work. By contrast, the upper-middle class child may come to feel that the proper work role for men is the white-collar sort and that mothers do not work at all outside the home. The net result of these early learnings of work roles is that the child comes to regard many kinds of work as inappropriate for him, and thus the field of possible choice is effectively narrowed by his learning of roles.

There can be little doubt that many general attitudes and values are learned before adolescence which have important bearings on later occupational preferences. Some of these attitudes and values have their roots well back in early childhood. Roe (75) has developed a series of hypotheses concerned with the relation of early experience to vocational choice, and with the patterns and intensities of basic needs in the early experiences of the child. Without pausing to consider the general theoretical framework provided by these hypotheses, let us note the implications drawn from them in the relating of early experience to the development of vocational interests. Roe discusses three patterns which may be dominant in the home, whether shown by one or both parents. The first of these is emotional concentration on the child, ranging from overdemandingness to overprotection. Persons from such homes who do not develop primary self-concentration may be constantly aware of the opinions and attitudes of others toward themselves, and thus need to maintain their self-positions. A major orientation toward persons thus develops. The second relational pattern is that of avoidance of the child, either by emotional or actual neglect of the child. Here we have the basis for developing a defensive awareness of persons, which may take the form of aggressiveness toward others, or a defensive rejection of persons and a turning to nonpersons. The third home pattern, that of acceptance of the child, may result in primary orientation toward either persons or nonpersons, but in either case the orientation will not be a defensive one. On the basis of an orientation toward persons, Roe points out, we might expect the development of predilections for service, business contact, general culture, and arts and entertainment interest groups. Those with nonpersons orientations might be expected to display interests in technology, outdoor, or science groups. (The interest categories are those of Roe's classification.)

These suggestions as to the possible relationships between early

childhood experiences in the home and basic attitudes seem to hold a great deal of promise for a more meaningful understanding of vocational interests. As we shall see later, one of the findings from analyses of interest inventories is that interests in people and interests in things can be differentiated. Roe's term "nonpersons," however, is intended to include both inanimate and animate objects other than persons, and also to avoid the difficulty of suggesting defensiveness by the term "away from persons." Thus "nonpersons" is a broader orientation than that toward "things" which are only inanimate objects. In these suggestions of Roe regarding early attitude formation there is again the implication that the field of occupational choice is being narrowed. If, for example, a "nonpersons" orientation is formed, it will be very difficult later for interests involving strong "persons" orientation to be developed. Thus far the hypotheses of Roe have not been fully tested. Grigg (31) made a study for this purpose, employing graduate women students in nursing and in physical science and mathematics. The students responded to a questionnaire concerning early relations with parents. No significant differences in total scores were found. Roe has commented that the selection of these two groups might be open to criticism, since nurses tend to show high interests in both social service and science, and that the use of women as subjects may not give us a clear-cut situation of vocational interests (31). To these comments we would add the observation that the procedure of asking graduate students to recall early childhood experience with parents would seem to open the door to much distortion of recall.

The importance of social class differences in child rearing practices, and hence in the early formation of attitudes and values, has been stressed by a number of students of the matter, especially those who might be considered to be in the Warner group. In a Chicago study Davis and Havighurst (16) found substantial differences as between the middle and lower classes. The same type of differences was found between middle- and lower-class whites as between middle- and lower-class Negroes. In general, "middle-class children are subjected earlier and more consistently to the influences which make a child an orderly, conscientious, responsible, and tame person. In the course of this training, middle-class children probably suffer more frustration of their impulses." There were also differences between whites and Negroes which did not appear to be explicable as social class differences. Negro parents were found to be more permissive than whites in the feeding and weaning of children, but stricter than whites in toilet training. A

study made in the Greater Boston area furnished data for rather different and often opposed conclusions (55). Here the comparisons were between child rearing practices of the upper-middle and upper-lower classes. Among the findings were that upper-lower class mothers were more severe in toilet training, although beginning when children were at similar ages; more severe in sex training; and more frequently using physical punishment, deprivation of privileges, and ridicule. On the other hand, upper-middle class parents allowed children more freedom to show aggression toward parents, and mothers were somewhat warmer and more demonstrative. "Taken together, the findings imply that the upper-middle class are more 'permissive' than the lower class in child-rearing." It would appear, then, that until there is more agreement as to what social class differences—if any—do exist in child rearing practices, there is little to be gained in speculating as to their possible effects upon shaping occupational choice. The more direct sort of influence resulting from parent-child relationships as hypothesized by Roe seems a more promising lead.

Thus far we have been pointing out how the learning of sex and work roles, and formation of general attitudes, may operate to limit the range of occupational preferences and eventual choice. We have been assuming that the process is one of moving from general, undifferentiated beginnings to more specific structurings. There is some empirical evidence for this. In the case of the development of interests, for example, Tyler (91) found that among 10-year-olds "like" responses were more numerous than "indifferent" or "dislike," and that consequently the factors identified by factor analysis were really clusters of dislikes. Moreover, there was no polarity about likes or dislikes. To use Tyler's illustration, disliking of unskilled occupations does *not* go with liking for professional ones. And the clusters of dislikes seemed to represent general attitudes rather than merely similar activities. Tyler comments, "The suggestion that general attitudes may take precedence over experience with specific activities may be the most important outcome of this research." There is some further support for the idea that general attitudes serve, as it were, to establish rather early the boundaries within which interests develop. Tyler (92), in a comparison of the interests of English and American children, found a high degree of similarity between the interests of children in these two national groups, but a greater tendency for English children to register dislikes. Three possible explanations were suggested for this difference: (1) that American children may be more enthusiastic about things in general, (2) that

there may have been an American bias in the items, and (3) that the patterned interests may to some extent be an indicator of maturity. Tyler comments that possibly the English child's world may be a little clearer, that he is brought up to "know his place," and thus sees more things as inappropriate to him. These findings and interpretations of Tyler seem to reinforce the results of her earlier study that there occurs a process of general attitude formation preceding specific learnings of interests, and further, that cultural differences are important in the establishment of dislikes and perceptions of appropriateness.

Development of the Self Concept

Perhaps the development during preadolescence most basic for occupational choice is the coming into being of the self. The infant and his environment may be regarded as a total field of forces having almost no differentiation of organism and surroundings. The infant must learn what is him and not-him. Gradually he learns that the crib against which he bumps is not-him, and that those about him who minister to his needs are somehow others. Probably the first major facilitation of the process comes with the beginnings of language. In time, the child learns to use the pronouns "I" and "me." The "I," according to Mead (61, p. 175), is the response of the organism to the attitudes of others; the "me" is the organized set of attitudes of others—the "generalized other"—which one assumes for himself. With the acquisition of language, then, the self may become an object to itself; "I" will do this thing for myself—for "me." The child is able to perceive some aspects of himself, and builds up out of his experience a concept of himself, of what "he" is like. Of course, Mead was not the first to relate language to the growth of the self concept. Some interesting speculations as to the possible effect of names applied to persons were made by Hall (33) as early as 1897 when he collected 780 different names used for children. They ranged from terms of endearment, through names derived from physical characteristics, such as "bowlegs," "fatty," "runt"; names suggesting characteristic acts, as "snoozer," "chatterbox"; to names involving alliteration ("kit-cat"); and names from fiction (Miss Muffet). One girl at the age of 3 knew no name but "Papa's Devil," and a girl of 13 responded only to "Stick-in-the-mud." Cooley (13) observed the learning and use of personal pronouns by his daughter through the first 33 months of life. Almost 30 years later, Bain (2) repeated the process and in general confirmed the observations of Cooley that the child learns to verbalize about oth-

ers before he does about himself; that his consciousness of self arises out of responses to others; and that "I" is a product of social interaction, and is different from the concept of self as an object, which comes later.

Another line of speculation raised the question of whether or not the child thinks of "I" as referring first of all to his physical body. Cooley (13, p. 163) commented that such notions of the early sense of self constituted "juvenile metaphysics." In studies several decades later, Piaget (71) might also be accused of a kind of metaphysical approach, though for him the beginning of the consciousness of self was quite the opposite of having primary locus in the physical body. Probably influenced by anthropological studies of primitives, he traces the evolution of the consciousness of self from an early stage of "absolute realism" in which the child supposes names to be inseparable from the things named, with the child's consciousness projected into reality, to a subjective state in which thought seems to be regarded as situated in ourselves.

The notions of the self and self concept have received increasing attention in recent years, after a lapse of interest in the 1920's and 1930's. In the 1949 presidential address to the American Psychological Association, Hilgard (37) developed the thesis that all mechanisms imply a self-reference and that the mechanisms are not understandable unless we adopt a concept of the self. The whole development of non-directive counseling led by Rogers and his students certainly is anchored in a belief in the self. Just 15 or 20 years ago, no one in the area of child psychology ever got around to an extensive study such as that reported by Jersild (44) in his recent *In Search of Self*. And the publication of a series of papers on the self such as that recently edited by Moustakas (68) would have probably seemed a bit on the exotic side 25 years ago. Recently, too, the thread of interest in the use of "self" words which had been pursued earlier by Hall, Cooley, and Bain was again picked up and followed in by a more sophisticated method by Helper (36), as we shall note later. A review of topics of current doctoral dissertation titles attests to the continued interest in the self as a topic for research. Introductory textbooks in guidance do not always reveal any very acute awareness of these developments, but the importance of the self concept has been often recognized in special aspects of counseling. By 1949 Hobbs was willing to define guidance as "the function of providing an individual with the optimum oppor-

tunity to examine his self and his potentialities in relation to his world" (39).

Thus far we have been using the term *self* as though it carried some uniform meaning. Unfortunately this is not the case. Seven more or less distinct usages have been identified by English and English (19). The sense in which we have been using the term thus far has been loosely as a synonym for consciousness of self—the self of immediate experience. Such a restricted usage does not provide us with a sufficiently broad base of reference for understanding some of the current trends toward interpreting vocational preferences and choice in a frame of reference involving the constructs of self and self concept. Let us therefore turn briefly to some examples of the thinking reflected in various uses of the term *self*. Since the *self* and *ego* have often been used in an overlapping manner it will be necessary to introduce incidentally some consideration of the *ego*.

For James, writing before Freudian ideas had made any appreciable impact on American psychology, the self was the experiencing or phenomenal self, and broadly considered as all that a man felt to be his—his own body and clothes, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, and the like, for "All these things give him the same emotion" (43, p. 291). The essence of self was the feeling of "me" or "mine." This immediately experienced self James regarded as the "Empirical Self." More systematically, though, the constituents of self could be divided into two classes: (1) the empirical self which included the material self, the social self, and the spiritual self, and (2) the pure ego. The ego James regarded as a philosophical concept, divorced from immediate experience—a kind of metaphysical principle viewed "out of time."

To the sociologist Cooley (12) the self meant much the same as to James, and ego, when he used the term, was simply a synonym. Cooley approached the matter of self in the general framework of his thesis that society and the individual are inseparable, that both the individual and society are terms which refer to abstractions from a total reality of which society and individuals are the collective and distributive aspects. "It is well to say at the outset that by the word 'self' in this discussion is meant simply that which is designated in common speech by the pronouns of the first person singular, 'I,' 'me,' 'mine,' and 'myself.' 'Self' and 'ego' are used by metaphysicians and moralists in many other senses, more or less remote from the 'I' of daily speech

and thought, and with these I wish to have as little to do as possible. What is here discussed is what psychologists call the empirical self, the self that can be apprehended or verified by ordinary observation" (12, p. 136).

Freud, of course, introduced a whole new vocabulary, in which there was no real equivalent for the term *self*; the closest approximation might be said to be the term *ego*. The psyche was conceived as at first dominated by the *id*; but as a result of reality perceiving, the *ego* becomes differentiated; and in turn, the *superego* differentiates out of the *ego*. Of the three (*id*, *ego*, and *superego*), the *ego* is most conscious and in touch with reality, and in this sense perhaps most comparable to the phenomenal self, but the self in the sense of James found no place in Freudian thinking. Since the *id* was the source of instinctive motivations, the *ego* itself was not dynamic in nature, and the conflicts occurring in the *ego* between the *id* and the *superego* were regarded as relatively unaffected by cultural and situational factors. The influence of such later psychoanalytic writers as Horney (40), Fromm (23), Sullivan (83), and Erikson (20) restored an emphasis on cultural and situational factors, and something of a dynamic character to the *ego*. From even such an extremely inadequate sketch as this it must be evident that Freud spoke a language quite different from that of James and Cooley. Moreover, the dialect of the later psychoanalysts is much more a variant of the Freudian language than of that of James and Cooley.

The rise of classical behaviorism was roughly concurrent with that of psychoanalysis, but two more differently oriented systems are difficult to imagine. Early behaviorism found no place for either the self of James or the *ego* of Freud. But for our purpose the important point is that neither psychoanalysis nor classical behaviorism afforded a very positive and fruitful approach to the kind of problem of complex motivation of normal people which seems to be involved in occupational preferences and choice. For Freud, motives were given in an unchanging *id*; for behaviorists, motives were genetically given as drives. In either case the best that could be hoped was that the individual might reduce his tensions by achieving insights or by reconditioning. There was little hope for the development of really new motivations. Difficulties created by the deficiencies of these systems were evaded, in the words of MacKinnon and Maslow, "by studying mainly crippled people and desperate rats" (56, p. 646).

But more positive approaches were in the making. From the organismic treatment of certain problems in pathology, Goldstein (28)

developed the principle of a trend toward self-actualization—the fullest realization of the potential and nature of the organism. This was more briefly stated and applied as a theory of motivation in a later statement (29). Tension reduction—as seen, for example, in the pleasure principle of Freud—was seen by Goldstein not as normal but as pathological. The normal organism seeks not the preservation of an existent state; instead, “The tendency of normal life is directed toward activity and progress.” Maslow further developed the idea of self-actualization. He reconsidered the whole matter of need gratification (59), and stressed the distinction between coping behavior and expressive behavior (60). Coping behavior is instrumental, adaptive, purposive; it has among its determinants drives, needs, goals, and aims. “It comes into existence to get something done.” Expressive behavior, on the other hand, although “determined,” has many determinants, and need gratification need not be among them. It simply reflects a state of the organism. Thus, people who are at this level of motivation—the self-actualizing people—behave with a high degree of spontaneity. Their behavior is not due to need in the sense of a lack or deficiency. “Self-actualization is intrinsic growth of what is already in the organism, or more accurately what *is* the organism itself” (60). Intriguing as is this concept, its application to occupational choice suggests difficulties. Self-actualizing people seem to be of such a special kind that one wonders whether the concept will be useful in understanding the garden variety of occupational choice, or only those special cases in which the person seems to live for and through his occupation.

Another newer and positive approach to the problem of motivation is represented by the point of view of Snygg and Combs (81), which, though not restricted to special kinds of people, appears to make the phenomenal self both an experience and an explanatory principle. The phenomenal self is defined as those parts of the phenomenal field perceived by the individual to be part or characteristic of himself. The phenomenal field, in turn, is “the universe as it appears to the individual at any moment.” The phenomenal self “includes many aspects of the phenomenal field, such as the individual’s physical self and many relationships of self to physical objects and to the culture, which are only infrequently or weakly in figure at any moment,” while “The self concept includes those parts of the phenomenal field which the individual has differentiated as definite and fairly stable characteristics of himself” (81, pp. 111–112). In their emphasis on the contemporary nature of motivation Snygg and Combs are clearly in-

fluenced by Lewin (52), but in their insistence that behavior is completely determined by the phenomenal field (81, p. 15) they seem to be going well beyond Lewin. Such an emphasis on contemporary motivation, however, does help us to understand the shifting nature of occupational preferences during childhood; each preference becomes an expression of choice as the child sees and feels his world at the moment. What is lacking is some basis for explaining why a series of such occupational preferences over a period of time often seem to express a pattern of development.

Another positive approach to the problem of the self is found in the self-consistency theory of Lecky.

We conceive of the mind or personality as an organization of ideas which are felt to be consistent with one another. Behavior expresses the effort to maintain the integrity and unity of the organization. The point is that all of an individual's ideas are organized into a single system, whose preservation is essential. In order to be immediately assimilated, the idea must be felt to be consistent with the ideas already present in the system. On the other hand, ideas whose inconsistency is recognized as the personality develops must be expelled from the system. There is thus a constant assimilation of new ideas and expulsion of old ideas throughout life.

The nucleus of the system, around which the rest of the system revolves, is the individual's idea or conception of himself. Any idea entering the system which is inconsistent with the individual's conception of himself cannot be assimilated but instead gives rise to an inconsistency which must be removed as promptly as possible (48, pp. 135-136).

This theory of Lecky's is particularly appealing in that it enables us to conceptualize the self as having a relatively stable but not inflexible core of organization, and yet we have in the self-consistency principle a basis for understanding how at one stage of development a particular occupational preference may be assimilated and later rejected as the child's conception of himself or of the occupation changes. The touchstone of preference at any time in development is whether or not the child perceives the occupation as consistent with his concept of himself.

We have reviewed these examples of various ways of conceptualizing the self partly for the purpose of illustrating the difficulties underlying the choice of terms. What we would like to have is some one term which could serve as an adequate symbol for a number of ideas. We would like a term which could convey that our concept of self includes the self of immediate experience of James, but is not limited to this meaning. We would conceive of the self as having dynamic quali-

ties, and not simply as a kind of geographical location of conflict as in the Freudian notion of the ego. We wish to give full recognition to the importance of contemporary motivation, yet not go the whole way with the phenomenologicalism of Snygg and Combs, and thus leave a little room for developmental patterning of a relatively stable self. The self-consistency concept of Lecky we would include with its emphasis on the self concept, but the rather intellectualistic terms in which Lecky's theory is cast should not lead us to minimize the dynamic importance of nonverbalized needs and forces. This is one of the really important contributions of Freud. To symbolize all this in one word is virtually impossible. Perhaps the Greeks had a word for it, but we know of no such term. Probably the semantically practical thing to do is to use two terms, the *self* and the *ego*. Murphy (69), for example, defines the self as "the individual as known to the individual"—what we mean we say "I"—and the ego as "The group of activities concerned with enhancement and defense of the self." In somewhat similar fashion Symonds (88) treats the self as body and mind and their processes as reacted to by the individual, and regards his concept of self as identical with the phenomenal self of Snygg and Combs. Symonds conceives the ego as that phase of personality which determines adjustments to the outer world in the interest of satisfying inner needs in those situations where choice and decisions are involved. The ego is the observer, thinker, and actor. Since our efforts are directed chiefly toward helping the student understand some of the background of the problem and to clarify our own usage of terms in subsequent discussion, and not toward a systematic, theoretical statement, we shall be quite arbitrary. We shall use *self* as our principal term, trusting to context to identify whether we intend to refer to the phenomenal self, or self as a dynamic, integrating principle of personality.

While the child is achieving selfhood and a concept of himself, he is also developing a concept of an ideal self, as he wishes he may become. In Freudian terminology, this is the ego ideal, arising from identification, at first with a parental figure. In non-Freudian terms, the ideal self is more apt to be regarded as an integrated set of values and aspirations. A time-honored method of studying the concept of the ideal self is to ask children to write a theme on some variant of the topic "What I Would Like to Be When I Grow Up." In 1898 Darragh studied such essays by 1440 children. The specific form of her question was "What person of whom you have heard or read would you like most to resemble? Why?" Evidently, even for young children, oc-

cupation was a part of the self ideal for some, as the following quotations will show.

- Boy of 9: "H. W. Longfellow. Because he knows how to write poems and he is called a poet and I would like to be called a poet."
- Boy of 10: "I would like to be like Doctor About. Because it is a nice occupation, and is a smart business."
- Boy of 10: "I want to be a preacher. He is a very good man and they have a very good position."
- Boy of 10: "I would like to be William Shakespere because he is the most famous poet in the United States."
- Girl of 12: "My teacher. Because she is a teacher and receives a large salary a month, and teaching is a good occupation" (15).

Passing over some of the more colorful elements, such as making a United States citizen out of "Shakespere," let us note an interesting age trend. At age 7 a total of 47 percent found their ideals in father, mother, neighbor, or friend; 39 percent in characters in literature; and 14 percent in persons in history. By age 16, a total of 8 percent found ideals in parents or acquaintances; 12 percent in literary characters; and 80 percent in historical persons. Apparently, with increasing maturity, more and more pupils look farther afield from parents and immediate circles for sources of their ideals.

Essentially the same method was used in a later study by Havighurst, Robinson, and Dorr (35). The essay topic used by them was "The Person I Would Like to Be Like." In the instructions the pupils were told the person might be either real or imaginary, or a combination of several people, and they were asked to tell something about the person's age, character, appearance, occupation, and recreations. The persons described were grouped into eight categories: parents, parent-surrogates, glamorous adults, heroes, attractive and successful young adults, composite or imaginary characters, age-mates, and a miscellaneous group. A developmental trend was noted which delineated in more detail that noted in the Darrah study; the ideal self begins in childhood as identification with a parental figure, moves during middle childhood and early adolescence through a stage of romanticism and glamour, and culminates in late adolescence as a composite of desirable characteristics symbolized by an attractive visible young adult or simply an imaginary figure. Environment was found to have a great effect on the ideal self. Children from families of lower socioeconomic status were found to lag behind those of middle-class status in progressing through the stage of identification with the glamorous adult. It was noted that individuals influence the development of the ideal self, especially if the individuals are visible and successful young

adults. Teaching about the lives of great people was also found to be an influence on the ideal self. For younger children, even an immediate event such as the celebration of Washington's birthday might be reflected in choices. However, the ideal self did not seem unduly influenced by such ephemeral events; the core values and attitudes were not thought to change rapidly. One group was asked to write essays a second time after 10 weeks, and the consistency was found to be from 85 to 90 percent, depending on the method of measurement used.

Our understanding of the nature of the ideal self is being expanded by current studies. Helper (36) studied the development of both self concepts and the ideal self as a problem in learning. Defining the self concept as consisting of "whatever symbolic responses are associated with the individual's identity symbols (his name, nickname, I, etc.)," he regards the self concept as "a product of highly complex verbal learning." Several of his findings are particularly pertinent to the ideal self. Children's ideal-self concepts were found to be as similar to ideal-child concepts held by randomly selected parents, as to ideal-child concepts held by their own parents. Although not so interpreted by Helper, this finding seems to emphasize the values common to the culture and subculture in which the parents participated. Another finding of the Helper study was that for boys the self-concept modeling was positively correlated with parental reward for similarity to the father. Perkins (70), working with children in the fourth and sixth grades, found that the self concepts and ideal selves became increasingly and significantly congruent with greater age. For girls, this increased congruence is greater than for boys. Most interesting of all the Perkins findings relating to the ideal self is that there is little or no relationship between changes in children's self-ideal congruency and changes in their school achievement, or changes in their acceptance by peers. Such investigations as these hold promise of real help for us in seeking to understand the development of the ideal self.

If we are to relate the ideal self to the development of occupational preferences we must leave the level of actual research findings and indulge in some speculative interpretation. First of all, it seems probable that the occupational preferences of early childhood are more closely related to the concept of the ideal self than to the somewhat more realistic self concept. When adults ask the child "What do you want to be when you grow up?" his answer is to exactly that question—what he *wants* to be. He is not yet much concerned about reality. Consequently, we are apt to term such expressions of preference as phantasy. But such phantasy is the normal life of a child; he need

not be immediately bothered by questions of how to prepare for the occupation, or whether he has the abilities, or other mundane matters. On the basis of his developing ideal self, he wants to be—and so he will. The boy who wanted to be like "Shakespeare" could immediately accept this goal which somehow, out of his perceptions, he had come to feel was desirable. Later, as congruence of self concept and ideal self increases, troublesome questions of reality may intervene. Or he may learn that being a poet is regarded by others as "sissy," and he can consequently no longer hold this goal—for certainly being a sissy is not a part of his ideal self. Are early expressions of occupational preference then to be dismissed as phantasy? Not at all. They give us two important kinds of clues: (1) as to the child's concept of his ideal self, and (2) as to his perception of an occupation.

PREFERENCES AND CHOICES WITHIN THE PREPARATION PERIOD

In our discussion of occupational preferences during preadolescence we developed the general proposition that various factors operate to delimit the number of occupations which logically might be possible choices for the individual. Because the preadolescent is in general unemployable on a permanent basis in our culture, it was convenient to draw a line at the close of preadolescence as a limit to these considerations. But we cannot so conveniently draw a line to establish limits for the next period. For some, the period of preparation will end before the completion of high school; for others, after graduation from high school; and for still others, after completion of some post-high school training in technical schools, apprenticeships, college, or graduate school. Obviously the close of the period of adolescence may or may not coincide with the close of the preparation period. Doubtless the use of such an indeterminate period will be disturbing to some who might wish for a more neatly categorized segment of development, but we shall use the open-ended period in the belief that for the individual the meaningful terminus is the close of his period of preparation whenever that may come. Then and not until then does he make a genuine transition into the adult world of work.

Trends in Choices

Literally thousands of pages have been used in reporting surveys of expressed occupational choices at the high school level, since tradi-

tionally this is the time when occupational choice has been regarded as meaningful. Most of these studies were made between World Wars I and II, and allowance must therefore be made for the possibility that these older surveys may not reflect the current situation. But even if this doubt as to current applicability could be laid aside, it would be rather unrewarding to plod through an exhaustive review of them. The majority of these surveys were made by questionnaire without supporting evidence from interviews, and usually only one administration of the instrument was involved so that no longitudinal data were gathered. There is seldom any basis for judging whether or not the expressed preferences or choices were related to later actual behavior. Reports of findings were typically made in terms of averages. Such statistical reporting serves to identify gross trends and to suggest characteristics of groups, but there is always the temptation to forget that the one who makes the occupational choice is not a statistical mean or median, but the flesh-and-blood individual in his own life space, having his own perceptions of himself and his world. For these reasons, our treatment of these surveys will be limited.

As examples of the earlier studies we choose studies by Bedford (3), Beeson and Tope (4), Douglass (18), Fulmer (25), Mahoney (58), Menger (63), Witty, Garfield, and Brink (93), Sears (79), and Woodruff (94). Taken together, these studies included about 13,000 students in Grades 7 through 12 in 12 states. There is no way of determining the ethnic group or social class composition of the samples, except that in the Witty, Garfield and Brink study choices of whites and Negroes were identified, and only the choices of whites are included in the above tabulation. The choices of Negro students will be considered later. Among boys, the most frequently reported choices were engineer, farmer, physician, lawyer, and (less frequently) mechanic. A few such occupations usually accounted for from about 45 to 75 percent of all choices. Among girls, the choices of teaching, various kinds of clerical work, and nursing accounted for from 50 to 65 percent of all choices. Quite typically, about 20 to 25 percent of boys chose engineering; usually the kind of engineering was not specified. Sears (79) reported on the choices of about 1,000 seventh- and eighth-grade boys; his findings show about 25 percent chose engineering, while the next closest were lawyer, mechanic, and farmer with only about 5 or 6 percent each. The Menger report broke down choices by grades, making it possible to identify choices of seventh- and eighth-graders. For boys, the most popular choices were engineer (17 percent) and aviator (12 per-

cent); among girls, the choices given were stenographer and secretary taken together (40 percent), teaching (20 percent), and nurse (11 percent). In contrast to this typical concentration of choices in a few occupations, there was usually a scattering of occupations chosen by only two, three, or four individuals. Menger found 45 occupations each of which was named by only one person.

The popularity of various occupations varies with grade level. There are differences within the secondary school years, but the differences are more marked if comparisons include both secondary and elementary grades. The most complete data on this point are furnished by Menger. Some occupations increase in frequency of choice as one goes from lower to higher grades; among boys in Grade 3, for example, engineering was chosen by about 9 percent, and frequency of choice increased to a high point of 22 percent in the twelfth grade. By contrast, about 23 percent of boys in grade 3 named aviator, but only 4 percent gave this choice by Grade 12. A small group of occupations (physician, lawyer, mechanic) remained as the choices of a small group in all grades from 3 through 12. In no case was any one of these occupations chosen by more than 9 percent, and variations from grade to grade did not exceed about 5 percent. Some choices appeared in early grades (fireman, policeman, carpenter, sailor) and then dropped out completely, while others were not mentioned at all until the senior high school years (businessman, pharmacist, educator, accountant). Something of the same pattern in popularity can be seen in the choices of girls, but the occupations are different. Teaching and nursing decrease in popularity with grade level, but remain the choices of substantial numbers at the twelfth grade—28 percent and 10 percent respectively. Stenographic and clerical work increase in frequency of choice from Grades 3 through 12. Some choices appear in early grades and then disappear (acting, dancing, telephone operator), and choices of journalist and business women do not appear until senior high school grades. Small percentages of girls—never more than 5 percent—aspire to be artists or bookkeepers at all grade levels.

One of the interesting findings contained in these survey studies is the number of pupils who report no vocational choice. Menger found an increase in percentages from Grade 3 to a high point in Grade 11. For boys the percentages ranged from 6 to 18, and for girls from about 8 to 21. The decrease in no choices from grades 11 to 12 was only 1.5 percent for boys, but 5.5 for girls. Bedford (3) found that in 1928 no choice was reported by 13.3 percent of the boys

and by 10.2 percent of the girls in the California schools he studied, while in 1934 no choice was given by 16.7 percent of boys and 19.7 percent of girls. Woodruff (94) found that 44 percent of the 1590 Oklahoma City girls in her sample had reached some decision; presumably, therefore, 56 percent had not. Generalizations from such scattered data are hazardous, but it does seem that girls more frequently than boys have reached no occupational choice by late high school years. More interesting, however, is the suggestion from the data of Menger that the number reaching no choice *increases* with successive grades until students are within sight of the end of high school—about the eleventh grade. It is tempting to speculate that the feeling of need for a decision intensified as the end of school approached. Such speculation, however, assumes that some considerable number of the students intended to seek employment upon graduation from high school, or felt that occupational choice was needed before entering college, and we have no such information.

Menger (63, pp. 38 ff.) analyzed her data for possible social status differences in the occupations chosen at various grade levels. The most clear-cut finding was that sex differences existed. The median social status score of occupations chosen by boys rose continuously (although somewhat irregularly) from Grade 3 through Grade 12, and especially after Grade 7. Menger commented that the social status of occupations chosen by boys seemed to be concomitant with continuing in school, and that the rise after Grade 7 probably reflected the increasing selection through school leaving. But the social status of occupations chosen by girls gave a contrasting picture; there was very little change in median scores from Grade 3 through Grade 9, a moderate drop during Grades 10 and 11, and then a rise to slightly below the starting point in Grade 3. Evidently the choices by girls did not reflect selection by school leaving in the same manner as did the choices by boys. Since Menger did not gather information in regard to the social class status of parents, it is not possible to say that the status differences in occupations chosen or that the factor of selection by school leaving is associated with social class as such; but, if so, the pattern is quite evidently different for boys and girls.

There is some indication of rural-urban factors operating in the choice of occupation, as reflected in a tendency for boys in rural areas to choose agricultural occupations somewhat more frequently than boys in urban areas. Beeson and Tope (4) found that in a rural area on the western slope of Colorado 16 percent of the occupations chosen

by high school boys were agricultural. On the other hand, Sears (79), in 1915 found that only 4.7 percent of seventh- and eighth-grade boys in the Oakland, California, area chose farming; and Witty, Garfield, and Brink (93) reported that 5.9 percent of the boys in the Chicago area chose agricultural occupations. The evidence is not clear-cut, though Douglass (18), whose survey included approximately half the high school seniors in the state of Washington, found that 13.3 percent of the boys chose occupations in agriculture, while Bedford (3), whose sample included students in a number of rural high schools, reported that only 6.6 percent of the high school students (both boys and girls) chose farming. Menger (63) reported from 2.1 percent to 6.7 percent of boys choosing farming from Grades 5 through 11, with no definite pattern according to grade level.

Thus far we have noted only some differences as to the percentages choosing agricultural occupations among groups which seem to be predominantly rural or urban. It would also be instructive if we knew something of the differences in choices of occupations other than agricultural between rural and urban groups. Fulmer (25) made a survey in 1924 of students largely in rural communities in Nebraska. The five most popular choices of boys were engineer, farmer, mechanic, lawyer, and businessman. In a second survey in 1928, Fulmer found that with one exception the top five were the same, though ranks had changed somewhat. The one exception was that aviator had replaced lawyer among the five most popular choices. It is perhaps worth recalling that Lindbergh first flew the Atlantic in 1927. In comparing her data with those of Fulmer, Menger (63, p. 49) found that of the five most popular choices by rural boys in her sample, three were the same as those in the 1928 Fulmer list (engineer, lawyer, and mechanic), while aviator and physician were also found among the top five in the Menger list. Such evidence is of doubtful value in attempting to assess the possible importance of rural-urban factors in occupational choice, but does help to give us a general picture of typical choices.

It has frequently been pointed out that the occupational choices of youth are unrealistic in the sense that many more choose high-status positions than can possibly find employment in the occupations of their first choice. This statement has been documented so many times that there is little point in repeating, but it will be helpful if we can gain some understanding of the factors associated with level of occupational choice. Evidence for such an understanding is available in a study by Hitchcock (38). The subjects of the study were 327 high

school seniors (142 boys and 185 girls) in a city of 35,427 within the metropolitan area of Boston. Mean age of the group was 17, and mean IQ 104. The greatest concentration of vocations of fathers was in the occupations of craftsmen and foremen (31.2 percent), although 13.5 percent were proprietors, managers, or officials, and 6.4 percent in professional or semiprofessional occupations. The educational levels of fathers ranged from no formal education (1.8 percent) to attended or graduated from college (3.1 percent), but 34.3 percent had graduated from high school, 27.5 percent from the eighth grade, and 21.1 percent had attended but not completed elementary school. The occupational choices of students showed the familiar pattern of concentration in higher-status occupations; 33.7 percent chose professional or semiprofessional occupations, although 35.5 percent looked toward clerical and sales work and 10.7 percent planned to be craftsmen.

The factors studied were treated in two groups, (1) those available from school records, and (2) those expressed by students in essays which they were asked to write. In Table 10 are shown the recorded

TABLE 10. Recorded Factors in the Level of Occupation Selected

Factor	Probability
Curriculum (college preparatory, commercial, general, industrial arts)	.00
IQ	.00
Sex	.00
Personality ratings by teachers	.01
Father's occupation	.01
Father's level of education	.02
Amount of work experience	.00
Participation in extracurricular activities	.00
Nonremunerative activities outside of school	.05
Kuder Preference Record results, Grade 9	.00
Scores on each of the following Cooperative Achievement Tests:	
Mechanics of Expression, Effectiveness of Expression, Total	
Reading Comprehension, Social Studies, Natural Sciences, and	
Mathematics	.00
Number of years present occupation was discernible as a consideration*	.02
Level of certainty of occupational selection*	.00

* Based on essays written by the students.

SOURCE: A. A. Hitchcock. *Factors in the selection of vocations*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale Univer., 1948. Pp. 164-206, Tables XV through XXXVIII.

factors and also two factors drawn from essays which were not expressed by the students as factors in choice. Only those factors are included in the table which were associated with level of choice at the .05 level or better. Evidently a wide range of factors enter into level of occupational choice. Factors such as father's occupation and educational level suggest socioeconomic influence in level of occupation chosen. Both higher-ability students, as indicated by IQ, and higher achievers tended to choose the higher-level occupations. Rank in graduating class, however, was not significantly associated with level of choice (.09 level). Sex differences were definitely significant, with more boys than girls choosing higher-level occupations. Differences in curriculum in which the students enrolled tended to follow the pattern to be expected—those in the college preparatory course more frequently chose the higher-level occupations. Interests as measured by the *Kuder Preference Record* were significantly associated with level at the ninth-grade level, but at the eleventh-grade level the association fell just short of significance—the .06 level. There is also a suggestion in the relationships that those choosing the higher-level occupations tended to choose them earlier and feel more certain of their selection. The considerations which students gave in their essays as factors which they believed related to their choice of occupation also covered a wide range. Twenty-one of these expressed factors were found to be significantly related to level of choice. The top 10 of these, in order of frequency of mention, were (1) success on a job, (2) success in school subjects, (3) enjoyment of work, (4) good pay, (5) liking for school subjects, (6) offer of a job or school opening, (7) security, (8) success in a hobby, (9) reading about an occupation, and (10) help to others. In addition to these most frequently mentioned factors, some others which were found to be significantly related to level of choice are of particular interest: success in extracurricular activities, independence of having one's own business, lack of success in school subjects, and information from tests. Among the expressed factors not significantly related to level of choice were advice or suggestions by parents, friends, and counselors; in contrast, however suggestions by teachers were significantly related to level (38, p. 211).

Earlier we suggested (Chapter 3) that choices of high-status occupations might be interpreted as an expression of the American dream of upward mobility. This general idea leads to a somewhat more specific hypothesis: in a minority group in which a larger proportion of

the group has farther to go to achieve occupations comparable in status to those of the majority group, we might expect to find a higher proportion of the minority than of the majority group aspiring toward high-status occupations. Negroes would seem to be such a minority group. Gray (30) studied the occupational choices of almost 800 Negro children in Grades 1 through 6 and compared her data with those of Boynton (6) whose sample included white children of comparable ages in Tennessee, Kentucky, South Carolina, Mississippi, and Oklahoma. Gray's general conclusion was that the occupational preferences of Negro children were essentially similar to those of white children, but with some emphasis on the part of Negro children on semiprofessional jobs. Negro boys differed from whites in showing more interest in a few professional occupations. For the entire group, the occupations chosen by Negro children ranked almost one point higher in status on a five-point status scale. At the high school level the evidence is mixed. Hyte (42) found that in eight Indiana high schools, 75 percent of the boys chose professional occupations; the two most frequently reported choices were teacher (23.8 percent) and physician (20.5 percent). Hyte notes also that only 11.6 percent of the boys' fathers were professionally employed. Witty, Garfield, and Brink (93) compared the occupational choices of Negro and white high school boys. Among both white and Negro boys the occupations of engineering, law, medicine, teaching, and architecture taken together accounted for about 45 percent of the choices. The largest difference in frequency in choice of any one of these occupations was engineering; 25.4 percent of the white boys made this choice as against 10.8 percent of Negro boys. However, two other differences were striking: musician was chosen by 2.0 percent of white boys but by 15.0 percent of Negroes, and postal work was the expressed choice of only 1.1 percent of white boys, but of 21.9 percent of Negro boys.

At the college level we might expect a greater proportion of professional status choices than at the high school level for both whites and Negroes (34); consequently, comparisons of choices held during college with those of early ages or grade levels would not be particularly meaningful. However, choices reported by college students are interesting in their own right. McMorries (57) reported on the occupational choices of freshmen at Lincoln University during depression years. The occupations chosen by 97 of the men and 107 of the women can readily be classified as professional. With a total freshman class of 319, this meant professional choices by about two-thirds

of the group; one-fourth of the total group had not yet made any choice. Cooper (14) reported a rather similar pattern of choices among Negro college students in North Carolina and noted also that 20.8 percent of men and 10.1 percent of women avoided certain choices because they felt that prejudices would limit their opportunities. The hypothesis with which we began, then, that we would find a greater preponderance of professional choices among Negroes is only incompletely supported, and factors other than status need seem to be involved. Support for the idea of aspiration growing out of need appears to be clearest among grade school children, and apparently reality factors—or, at least, factors perceived as reality—take on more importance with increasing age.

The Stability of Choices

A great deal of interest has centered about the question of the degree of stability of expressed occupational choice. In our discussion of the foundations of occupational preferences developed during pre-adolescence we noted that change of preference seems to be the normal thing and, further, that a number of factors are operative which result in a narrowing of the field from which a choice is ultimately made. Later, in Chapter 10, we shall consider some of the evidence which is often interpreted as indicating a rather high degree of stability of inventoried interests during later high school and college years. But is this apparent stability of inventoried interests paralleled by stable expressions of occupational choice? As in most matters relating to occupational choice, there is no single, simple answer.

A thorough review of the evidence available prior to 1930 was made by Fryer (24), in which he drew a useful distinction between interest in broad areas, such as agricultural or clerical work, and interest in specific occupations, as for example lathe operator, or teacher of English. There are, of course, serious difficulties in summarizing studies employing varying methods. Moreover, some of the data may well be regarded with caution. A number of the studies depended upon data gathered in retrospect, as when college students were asked to recall and report their occupational choices as they had been in high school. But in spite of such difficulties, the careful sifting of results by Fryer gives us a useful picture. We turn first to the matter of occupational choice in broad areas. Fryer used as a means of expressing degree of stability a percent of permanence, which is interpreted as "the chances in 100 of there being a certain development of vocational interests from period to period" (24, p. 150). For our present consideration of

broad choice areas, this means the chances in 100 that the expressed choice would fall within the same general area after a lapse of time. Fryer used the term *interests*, but since by interest in this context he clearly refers to expressed occupational preference or choice we shall substitute the term *choice*. Since there were a number of possible areas from which the choice might be made (at least in most of the studies), the "percent of permanence" should not be regarded as the guessing odds for being right or wrong, but as an index of predictability of choice from one time to another. As might be expected, the degree of permanence varied considerably with the length of time between choices. Table 11 gives the summary.

TABLE 11. Percent of Permanence of Interest Trends (Summary)

Periods	Percent of Permanence Between Periods
From elementary school, throughout high school, to college	42
From elementary school to high school	65
Over two-year period, high school (boys)	33
Over two-year period, high school (girls)	45
Over three-year period, junior high school (boys)	46
Over three-year period, junior high school (girls)	69
From high school to college	62
Two-year period from college to work	75

SOURCE: D. Fryer. *The measurement of interests*. New York: Holt, 1931. P. 150.

Studies concerned with the degree of permanence of specific occupational choices are summarized according to the three levels of elementary, secondary, and college. At the elementary level, the percentages of permanence varied from 24 percent to 75 percent, with a median of 46 percent. Fryer concluded that "Evidently the degree of permanence of the specific vocational interests to be expected under normal conditions in elementary school is about 45 percent over a year period. This means that there are 45 chances in 100 of predicting that the vocational interest by an elementary school pupil will be his vocational interest one year hence" (24, p. 153). For the secondary school period there are about 55 chances in 100 that specific vocational choice can be predicted over a period of a year. At the college level only three studies by two investigators were available. Two studies reported an 83 percent

permanence as between freshman and sophomore years, and one a 56 percent permanence for college girls over a three-year period. Fryer concluded that at neither elementary nor secondary levels would the expression of vocational choice be very valuable for prediction of choice one year hence, and as for college, no legitimate comparisons could be made with elementary or secondary school periods. Fryer commented, "These results indicate a considerable degree of permanence of specific occupational interests in the mental life of the individual. But from the point of view of vocational guidance and personnel selection the specific occupational interests cannot be used as criteria from which to predict future interests with chances of success that are better than 50 to 50 in the selection of the correct occupation from among one of the hundreds which might be selected. These are, of course, the results when the estimate of vocational interest by the subject himself is used" (24, p. 158).

The summary of permanence of interest by Fryer is presented in terms of the value of an expression of choice as a basis for predicting later choice. We may be aided in gaining an appreciation of the amount of change in choices by noting some examples of other kinds of interpretations. Also, we must note some examples of studies made after 1930, with which the Fryer review terminated. One means of estimating the stability of choice is to note how long the choices expressed at a given time have been regarded by the individuals as their choices. Douglass (18) found that, among the seniors in Washington high schools, 85 percent reported that they had made their choices within the previous three years, and 50 percent within the previous two years. He noted also that 54.6 percent reported that at some time in the past they had decided upon a different vocation. Pointer (72) gathered from pupils statements of occupational choice during the summer after their completion of the eighth grade in the spring. He found that at this stage of development 51 percent had changed their choices at least once; of these, 43 percent had made their changes before the end of the eighth grade, but 8 percent had changed their choices between the completion of school and their response to the questionnaire in midsummer.

A variant of the method of finding how long existing choices have been in effect is to ask students to recall the period within which their choices were made. This is best illustrated by several examples on the college level. Achilles (1) studied a large sample of approximately 4500 undergraduates in 50 colleges and universities scattered over the country. His findings as to the time of vocational choice are summarized in Table 12.

TABLE 12. Date of Vocational Decision as Reported by Undergraduates (October, 1934)

	Sophomores	Percent Juniors	Seniors
Before entering college	70.2	60.7	52.8
First year in college	18.9	12.1	7.9
Second year in college	11.8	20.8	17.3
Third year in college		6.0	16.7
Fourth year in college		.1	5.4

SOURCE: P. S. Achilles. Vocational motives in colleges. *Occupations*, 1935, 3, 626.

Achilles suggests the declining percentages from sophomore to senior years of those who reported decisions made before college may be due to changes of decision during college. A study by Katz and Allport (46) related the time of choice to college major. Again the sample was a large one, some 3500 students. Seven periods were indicated on the questionnaire, from before 6 years of age through various grade levels to graduate school. Students were asked to indicate in which of the periods their present vocational decision was reached. The most frequently named time was the first year of college, and the frequency of response varied considerably with the major in which the student was enrolled. From 45 to 48 percent of students majoring in business, forestry, or home economics reported choice at this time, but only 21 percent of students in graduate school reported decision during the first year of college. The second most frequently named time was the period after 6 years of age and before entrance into high school. Here the responses again varied with major, from 17 percent in graduate school, to 49 percent of those majoring in fine arts. Unfortunately, the period "during high school" was omitted from the questionnaire, although some students wrote this in. The authors suggest that this period would probably have had a heavy checking. At the extremes, only 1.6 percent reported choices before the age of 6, and less than 1 percent after graduation from college. Kaplan (45) reported the results of sending a questionnaire to former students who had attended the University of Idaho from 1936 to 1940. His question to the respondents was not quite a direct one asking for time of choice; rather, the former students were asked to give the age at which interest in their present occupations first became manifest. The modal age was found to be 18, and 55 former

students out of a total of 282 responding gave this age. However, there was considerable clustering from ages 15 through 20, with 11 persons saying before the age of 10, and one or two at each of the years 23 through 27.

In general, the literature is sadly lacking in actual longitudinal studies of changes in preference or choice. Sometimes incidental observations of groups are made. Mahoney (58), for example, noted that about half of 271 high school boys had changed their choices when questioned four months after the choices were first reported. The best evidence thus far available is probably that from the Wisconsin Counseling Study directed by Rothney (77). This study was an overall evaluation of the effects of counseling, and the tracing of shifts in vocational choice was only one part of the investigation. The data were gathered by interview, and two kinds of analyses were made, for consistency in broad areas and in specific occupations. The broad areas used were professional, semiprofessional, managerial, clerical, sales, service, agriculture, skilled, semiskilled, and (for girls only) married. Approximately two out of five made the same area choice in the twelfth grade as in the tenth. There were definite sex differences; girls in both experimental (counseled) and control groups showed greater consistency of choice than boys. There was even less consistency when specific occupational choices were considered, and again sex differences appeared. One month before high school graduation 26.3 percent of the total group of girls (both experimental and control groups) gave the same occupational choices as they gave in their tenth-grade interviews. For boys the corresponding percentage was 21.0. There was "no strong trend for greater consistency among the controls than among the experimentals" (77, p. 342). The general picture for both boys and girls in regard to specific occupational choice, without regard to the effect of counseling, is seen in the summary by Schmidt and Rothney (78) of data from a part of the group involved in the larger study (Table 13).

Change rather than stability of occupational choice seems to be the normal expectancy during the years of preparation in both high school and early college years. The skepticism of Fryer as to the predictability of occupational choice is supported by later studies, particularly the Wisconsin study noted above. Probably not more than about one-third of students entering the senior high school can be expected to have the same occupational choices by the time they graduate. The percentage for girls is probably higher, simply because the majority expect to marry. Even fewer than one-third of the boys may be expected to

graduate with the same occupational goal with which they entered the tenth grade. During college years we might expect to find a somewhat greater stability of choice; but to the extent that such stabilizing does in fact occur, it seems to come mostly in the junior and senior years, and this may be related to the necessity of commitment to a college major. Moreover, students in some college majors seem typically to make earlier choices than students in other majors. There is a wide range of ages at which choices reported in high school or college seem to have been made.

As a hypothesis we would suggest that the length of the period during which change of preference is the dominant characteristic (the "exploratory period") depends upon the length of time which the in-

TABLE 13. Consistency of Vocational Choices of 347 Senior High School Students

	Number	Percent
Consistent all three years	121	34.9
Consistent junior and senior years only	48	13.8
Consistent sophomore and junior years only	60	17.7
Inconsistent (no choices the same over the three-year period)	118	33.6

SOURCE: J. L. Schmidt & J. W. M. Rothney. Variability of vocational choices of high school students. *Personnel & Guidance J.*, 1955, 34, 143.

dividual feels he has before being confronted with the reality of earning a living, or the time which he feels he has before the norms of his group require that he be "settled down" occupationally, whether or not he must actually earn a living. Thus, the junior or senior in high school who knows that his period of preparation must end with high school, if not before, will begin to firm up an occupational choice; but the high school senior who is assured of attending college feels that he can continue longer to explore possible alternatives and so defer choice. If such a hypothesis can be supported, then attempts to find an average age of choice are relatively meaningless. Occupational choice does not become stable as an automatic accompaniment of age, or even at some stage of physical development. Rather, the achievement of consistency of occupational choice comes with a stabilizing of one's concept of a role in the world of work as a part of the self concept, and with a compromise with or acceptance of situational pressures from group norms or individual necessity.

But such considerations anticipate a point of view as to the total process of vocational choice. Before pursuing them further, we must turn to a consideration of factors in choice.

Factors Influencing Occupational Preference and Choice

One of the pressing needs in counseling is to understand the motivations involved in choice of occupation. Since we gave some attention earlier to the formation of foundations for occupational preference during preadolescence, we shall not go back but shall begin with adolescence and confine ourselves to the period of preparation, defined in an open-ended fashion as before. The most obvious method of studying choice factors is to ask individuals what they consider were important influences on their choices. As one reviews the published results of such investigations, which must represent thousands of hours of effort, the rewards seem rather meager for the time invested. It is a relatively simple process to survey and tabulate the reasons given, but really to understand the process by which a single individual reaches a choice is a task of real challenge, and how much survey studies contribute to the understanding of the individual is something of a question. Survey studies cannot be ignored, however, and we shall therefore begin with them and then move on to some more recent and intensive investigations.

SELF-REPORTS OF INFLUENCES

In the previous section we found that much of our evidence regarding trends was found in survey studies of large samples. Interest in such comprehensive dragnet studies seems to have sputtered out sometime in the years immediately preceding World War II, which means that most of the findings to be considered here will not be particularly current. Yet, just as we could learn something from them in regard to trends, so we can glean some understanding of factors involved in choice, for it is important to know what, in general, students perceive as leading them to their occupational choices. In Table 14 we have brought together some of the findings of four studies by way of illustration. In addition to the reasons summarized in Table 14 we should note that the findings in the Douglass (18) study were very similar. This study included 2844 high school seniors in the state of Washington. The reasons given by the seniors, in order of importance, were: (1) general impression that the occupation offers advantages and is attractive, (2) fitness for the occupation, (3) financial returns, (4) op-

TABLE 14. Reasons Given by High School and College Students for Choice of Occupation
(Percentages)

Reasons Given, Regrouped from Original Data	Bed- ford 1928	Hurlock and Jansing 1934 (Boys)	Peters 1941		Katz and Allport 1931
			As Most Import- tant	As Second Most Import- tant	
<i>I like it</i>					
Like it		40.9			
Liking for the particular kind of work					81.6
<i>Fitness for the work</i>					
Belief in personal qualifications	38.3				
Fitted for it		13.0			
Special capacities which I think I possess for that particular work					44.7
<i>Influence of parents</i>					
Choice of parent		2.0			
Parent			20.5	13.6	
Because it was a special wish or interest of my father					9.1
Because it was the special wish or interest of my mother					7.6
Because it was my father's vocation					5.5
Example afforded by the success of father or mother in that vocation					3.9
Because it was my mother's vocation					.8
<i>Influence of relative other than parents</i>					
Member of family in same work		1.3			
Relative other than parent			10.0	11.0	
Example afforded by success of brother or sister in that vocation					2.3
<i>Influence of persons other than relatives</i>					
Teacher			9.5	9.3	
Friend			11.0	8.1	
Professional acquaintances			5.3	3.4	
Persuasive influence of someone outside of college other than father or mother					9.9
Example afforded by some great or influ- ential person					8.2
Persuasive influence of teacher or profes- sor					7.2
Advice of parents, teachers, or friends	25.6				
<i>Financial returns</i>					
Money		20.6			
Opportunities to make money through that particular vocation					30.0

(Table continued on next page)

TABLE 14. *Continued*

Reasons Given, Regrouped from Original Data	Bed- ford 1928	Hurlock and Jansing 1934 (Boys)	Peters 1941		Katz and Allport 1931
			As Most Import- ant	As Second Most Import- ant	
<i>Security</i>					
Assured of position		7.0			
Opportunities for safety and security through that particular vocation (that is, I should be protected from fear of failure)					3.5
<i>Advancement</i>					
Offers advancement		5.4			
Opportunity for advancement			5.3	12.7	
<i>Social service</i>					
Do good		4.9			
Opportunities for social service through that particular vocation					19.2
<i>Miscellaneous</i>					
Success of others	19.5				
Experience in that line of work	16.6				
Travel and adventure		4.9			
Advertisements			1.6	5.2	
Social recognition of the vocation			5.3	3.4	
Opportunity for study			8.4	9.3	
Result of vocational guidance tests			5.8	2.9	
Result of hobbies			4.7	6.8	
Opportunity for quick employment			7.4	9.8	
Special opportunities which I have for preparation in that vocation or subse- quent pursuit of it					20.5
Opportunities for acquiring power through that particular vocation					6.7
A sense of duty					5.3
To prove that I could do that sort of work					3.7
Because of elimination of other voca- tions, that is, it seemed to be the only worthwhile work for which I was not in some way disqualified					16.4

SOURCES: Adapted from the following: J. H. Bedford. *Youth and the world's work*. Los Angeles: Society for Occupational Research, 1938. P. 46. E. B. Hurlock & C. Jansing. The vocational attitudes of boys and girls of high school age. *Pedag. Seminary & J. genet. Psychol.*, 1934, 44, 175-191. E. F. Peters. Factors which contribute to youth's vocational choice. *J. appl. Psychol.*, 1941, 25, 428-430. D. Katz & E. H. Allport. *Students' attitudes*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Craftsman Press, 1931. P. 110.

portunity for service, and (5) knowledge from experience of fitness for the work. On the basis of the findings reported in Table 14 and in the Douglass study, several observations can be made:

1. The most frequently given reason for choice is liking for or attraction to the occupation. This is true of both high school and college students.
2. The second most frequently given reason for choice is a belief in fitness or qualification for the occupation. Again, this is true in both high school and college years.
3. A considerable proportion of both high school and college students feel that they have been influenced in their occupational choices by parents. This is the third most frequently reported influence.
4. Other persons significant in the student's life space—teachers or professors, friends, and relatives other than parents—are regarded as being influential in choice, but their influence is reported somewhat less frequently than is the influence of parents.
5. Of the influences felt to be important by both high school and college students, the hope of financial reward is apt to be among the four or five most frequently mentioned reasons.
6. There is a relatively wide range of other influences reported by varying proportions of the groups. Doubtless some of this variation is due to sampling differences, and some may be due to the different forms of questionnaires used.

For the most part, studies based on smaller samples yield results rather comparable to those summarized in Table 14, if the smaller samples can be considered as approximately representative of the schools studied, and if the questionnaire used was such as to elicit or at least permit the expression of such influences on choice. Several examples are the surveys by Beeson and Tope (4), and by Pointer (72). Usually the most frequently reported influences fall into categories of liking for the occupation; belief in fitness for the occupation; the influence of parents and other significant persons such as friends, teachers or professors, and relatives other than parents; and financial return or factors related to return such as opportunity for advancement. Hitchcock, in a review of the literature up to 1948, identified 24 factors which had been reported by students as factors in vocational choice. He commented, "The factors that have been mentioned by subjects have been, in most studies, predominantly *interest in, liking for, and feeling adapted to the occupation*" (38, p. 41). In one large-sample survey by Lehman and Wirtz (49), which differs from the general picture in

its findings, the results were interpreted as indicating that monetary reward was the most important, the hope of social approval second, and the lure of an easy life least important. In this study, a check list of 200 occupations was used, and multiple directions were given. Students were to indicate the three occupations they would like best, the one they would most likely follow, and three they thought would require least work. The directions appear to have been loaded in the direction of the results obtained by specific suggestions of money and least work, as well as involving factors of aspiration, prestige, and realistic expectation.

The surveys noted thus far studied samples which, in varying degrees, might be regarded as unselected. It may be helpful to consider the results obtained from samples known to be special groups in one way or another. The group of 150 high school graduates studied by Berdie (5) was selected in the sense that they came to the Testing Bureau of the University of Minnesota for counseling. The students were asked to rank in order of importance 18 factors. The results were as follows:

1. Certainty of continuous employment
2. Opportunity for advancement
3. Opportunity to make money
4. Opportunity to use your own ideas
5. Pleasant people to work with
6. Good hours
7. Opportunity to learn the job
8. Opportunity "to do good for people"
9. Variety of work
10. Opportunity to be in a position of authority
11. Good boss
12. Clean work
13. Prestige of job
14. Opportunity for adventure
15. Opportunity for travel
16. Work outside (or inside)
17. Opportunity to become famous
18. Easy work (5)

It is impossible to make a satisfactory comparison between the results of this study and those of the studies noted above. The subjects in the Berdie study had no opportunity to indicate the influence of parents and other significant persons; nor are there any items in the Berdie list which are clearly comparable to the general idea of liking for the occupation or the individual's belief that he is fitted for the occupation. The Berdie factors might be regarded as occupational values—values

in the sense of desirable attributes of occupations. On the basis of this interpretation, it is particularly interesting that this special group who came for counseling regarded "Certainty of continuous employment" as of prime importance.

It is interesting to speculate that the high value placed upon certainty of employment may reflect a need for security. Such speculation suggests the further possibility that one of the blocks to reaching an occupational choice may be the placing of too high a value on security—so high that few occupations seem to offer the needed degree. Miller (66) tested the hypothesis that the frequency with which a particular value is regarded as most important is related to expressed vocational choice or lack of it, without regard to the occupation chosen. The subjects consisted of three groups of college men, with one group reporting a definite choice of occupation, one a tentative choice, and the other no choice. An instrument using the forced-choice technique was constructed, intended to measure the relative importance of four occupational values which were named security, career satisfaction, prestige, and social rewards. Age differences in responses to the instrument had previously been shown to be unimportant (65). In general, the hypothesis was supported. Among the more specific findings was that the number of persons in the no-choice group who chose security as their highest value was significantly greater than chance, while the number of persons in the tentative- and definite-choice groups for whom security was the highest value approximated chance. Moreover, the particular item "Certainty of continuous employment" was preferred to others a mean number of 7.85 times by the no-choice group, as against 5.08 times by the definite-choice group; the difference was significant at the .05 level. These findings may be related to those of a more recent study by Ziller (95), who devised a means of measuring the extent of risk which students were willing to take in a testing situation. The extent of risk taken was referred to as "utility for risk." The subjects were sophomore ROTC students. When the risk utility data were analyzed according to the various vocational objectives of the men, the sales group was found to have the greatest acceptance of risk, or risk utility, and the undecided group showed least willingness to take risks. Although the number of subjects in each of the occupational groups was small, the results are most interesting.

An incidental finding in the Miller (66) study, not included in the published report, was that items involving money either by the word or by implication—such as "High salary" or "Good income"—might be

its findings, the results were interpreted as indicating that monetary reward was the most important, the hope of social approval second, and the lure of an easy life least important. In this study, a check list of 200 occupations was used, and multiple directions were given. Students were to indicate the three occupations they would like best, the one they would most likely follow, and three they thought would require least work. The directions appear to have been loaded in the direction of the results obtained by specific suggestions of money and least work, as well as involving factors of aspiration, prestige, and realistic expectation.

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8. Opportunity "to do good for people"
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10. Opportunity to be in a position of authority
11. Good boss
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15. Opportunity for travel
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It is impossible to make a satisfactory comparison between the results of this study and those of the studies noted above. The subjects in the Berdie study had no opportunity to indicate the influence of parents and other significant persons; nor are there any items in the Berdie list which are clearly comparable to the general idea of liking for the occupation or the individual's belief that he is fitted for the occupation. The Berdie factors might be regarded as occupational values—values

definite choices were the same as the two most frequently given in the studies summarized in Table 14 for unselected groups: 49.7 percent of the boys said of the occupation chosen that they liked it, and 20.3 percent felt that they had special fitness for the occupation. The third reason in order of frequency, given by 12.5 percent, was that the occupation offers a good living; this is difficult to interpret; it may mean standard of living or perhaps may be an aspect of the broader monetary reward idea. The only reason given by any considerable proportion of the Negro boys which seems to be different from the frequently given reasons of white boys was that the field is uncrowded. This may reflect feelings as to limited opportunity for Negroes. In a study of the choices of Negro college students by Cooper (14), we find clearer evidence of differences in reasons as given by whites and Negroes. In the interpretation of the reasons given, financial returns and social status factors were stressed by the investigator. Other factors considered to be of major importance were the proximity of an educational institution, the influence of college offerings, and race prejudice. Among the factors regarded by the investigator as of minor importance were parental influence, belief in fitness for the occupation, and difficulty in getting into a union.

The mass of data resulting from self-report studies of factors influencing occupational choice may seem impressive by reason of sheer quantity, but one may well ask, "What do all these findings mean?" Any answer will, of course, reflect the bias of the commentator; but, recognizing this, two possible interpretations may be suggested. First, a major factor in occupational choice is perceived congruency of the occupation and of the self concept. This factor is reflected in the two influences most frequently reported by unselected groups, the liking for the occupation, and a belief in fitness for the work. How could one like an occupation if he felt it to be out of harmony with himself as he is able to perceive himself? And how could one choose an occupation for which he believed himself to be unfitted? Even the third most frequently given reason, that of the influence of parents and other significant figures, suggests the importance of the self concept. After all, one's self concept is derived from the responses of others to himself, as he is able to perceive them. One's parents, other relatives, teachers and friends are in a very real sense the source of one's self concept. The second interpretation suggested is that occupational choice involves an effort to satisfy personality needs. Here the data from special groups are particularly pertinent. Students come to a counseling center presumably because of felt needs, and their needs are reflected in values, things

associated almost at random with either security or prestige items. However, an income or money item might be so qualified that it would become an indicator of prestige, as, for example, "Salary or income above the average of the community." The implication seems to be that income or money items may mean different things to different persons, and an unqualified item serves as something of an unstructured stimulus to which the individual may attach his own meanings. Consequently, the third-place rank for "Opportunity to make money," in the Berdie report (5) may mean several things. There would seem to be a question raised, also, as to the interpretation of the Lehman and Witty findings as indicating that monetary reward was most important; what is symbolized by money? This line of interpretation seems to be strengthened by some findings by Rosenberg (76). Intercorrelations were computed among the various items which he used as indicators of values. One of the three highest was that between "Chance to earn a good deal of money" and "Give me social status and prestige"; the coefficient of association was .594. Rosenberg went further and developed a "psychological distance" scale for various values, as shown in the following arrangement of values:

1. Permit me to be creative and original
2. Use my special abilities and aptitudes
3. Permit me to be helpful to others
4. Work with people rather than things
5. Give me status and prestige
6. Chance to earn a good deal of money
7. Stable, secure future (76)

The interpretation of the arrangement is that the greater the separation of any two items, the less is an individual likely to want to satisfy both values. On this basis, then, the individual placing high value on money is apt to value also either status and prestige, or security, but a little less likely to value equally both status and prestige, and security; and the person placing high value on security is quite unlikely to value equally an opportunity to be creative and original.

It might prove illuminating if we could make comparisons in the self-reports of reasons for choice given by various ethnic groups, and by rural and urban groups. Unfortunately, large-sample studies which might make such comparisons worthwhile have not been reported, with one exception. This one exception is Negro students. Hyte (42) studied by questionnaire the occupational choices of 1500 Negro high school boys. The two reasons most frequently given by the 870 boys reporting

accepts middle-class values, therefore, this is important, not as a reflection of a need emerging from his own unique experience but because his group has defined getting ahead as desirable. Moreover, a given individual may accept as his the middle-class value of getting ahead even though on the basis of more-or-less objective criteria the status ascribed to him might be that of membership in the upper-lower class, or some other status.

An interesting comparison of two groups of Harvard freshmen was made by McArthur (53) which seems to involve differences in values held by subcultural groups. One group consisted of boys who were public school graduates and the other of boys from private schools. A number of hypotheses were constructed on the basis of a scheme for classification of values suggested by Kluckhohn (47). Very briefly, this scheme is based on the assumption that "there is a limited number of basic human problems for which all peoples at all times and in all places must find some solution." The five singled out by Kluckhohn as key problems are innate predisposition (basic human nature), man's relation to nature, the time dimension, the valued personality type, and modality of relationship. A second assumption is made that for each of these basic problems "the variability in solution is variability within a range of possible solutions." In a complex culture we can expect both dominant and variant solutions of these problems. Thus, in the case of our own culture, the dominant personality type might be regarded as the middle-class "Doing" orientation, while one of the variants is the upper-class "Being" outlook, the "spontaneous expression of what is conceived to be 'given' in the personality." McArthur found a number of significant differences in responses to the Thematic Apperception Test between the "Doing" middle-class public school boys, and the "Being" upper-class private school boys. In a discussion in more general terms of the differences in the two groups of freshmen, McArthur (54) noted that the "Doing" boys are more apt to enter Harvard with a clear choice of major, while the "Being" boys are apt to have a vague choice, often in the humanities. Moreover, the *Strong Vocational Interest Blank* was found to be predictive for the middle-class public school boys, but not for the upper-class private school graduates. McArthur was careful to reserve judgment as to how the obtained differences might best be interpreted—as social class differences, or as "career type" differences in the Miller and Form (67) manner, or in terms of Kluckhohn's value scheme.

The notion that there are social class related differences in values

which are desirable to them. The value placed on certainty of continuous employment, opportunity for advancement, and the like suggest feelings of need for security and self-realization. Students on the college level who have not yet arrived at an occupational choice may so badly need security that they are unable to find an occupation which seems to promise the needed security. Minority groups, as illustrated by Negroes, may have reasons for choice which are common to both whites and Negroes, and may also have reasons which reflect special needs. True, the reasons given by either unselected or special groups may be rationalizations, but they are nonetheless real to the person as he perceives them. Doubtless other factors are involved in occupational choice, but it does seem possible to interpret some of the more frequently given reasons as either a feeling of congruence with the self concept or a hoped-for means of satisfying needs, or both.

NEEDS, VALUES, AND OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE

We have been using the concepts of need and value in considering possible factors in occupational choice; let us pause, therefore, to raise the question of how needs and values may be related to each other. We are using *needs* in the usual sense of a lack of something, something which if present would yield satisfaction. Needs may be physiological in nature, such as the need of food or water, or may be of the derived, or secondary, or social kind, such as the need for security or for status. *Value*, as we have been using the term, means a concept of the desirable. The conceiving of any particular object as desirable may result from need, but need is not the only root of value. There are other sources, such as the kind of relationship which the individual experiences with other persons, particularly with significant persons such as parents, siblings, peers, and teachers. Values may result from the process of enculturation by which the individual learns to accept certain behaviors as desirable; such values have little relation to the special needs of a particular individual, in the sense that they did not grow out of his own needs. They existed prior to the individual as the right and proper modes of behavior—right because the culture has so defined them. For example, in the middle-class American culture it is right and proper for an individual to "get ahead," and opportunity for advancement consequently becomes a value. The individual learns that status seeking is right, and rather typically learns to accept this as a value for himself. An occupation which seems to hold promise for advancement thus becomes a means of realizing this particular value. For the individual who

which values are important to them in occupational choice does not, of course, tell us whether or not these same values actually entered into occupational choices of these persons when they entered work. Indeed, some may not have had much opportunity for choice. But the fact that such differences in values do exist among adults suggests that children and adolescents may be learning from their parents values which differ according to social class and rural or urban residence.

Thus far in our consideration of the possible functioning of needs and values in occupational choice we have noted evidence from studies of groups. Some of the earliest self-report studies of reasons for occupational choice were reinterpreted as reflecting special needs of selected groups, and the McArthur and Centers investigations were noted as illustrating the possible influence of differing values held in subcultures upon occupational choice. We now turn to the relation of needs of specific persons to occupational choice. We shall use the Dillon (17) study as an illustration. Intensive case studies were made of 25 subjects who had either been admitted to or applied for admission to student teaching. The methods used included the Rorschach test; the Thematic Apperception Test, both the usual test, and a special adaptation for use with teachers; a written instrument designed to secure some idea of the subjects' concepts of teaching; and interviews. The theory postulated was that an individual selects an occupation which, according to his concept of it and as he sees himself in it, seems to him to satisfy most adequately the needs that he feels the strongest pressure to fulfill. The findings are most interesting. Of the 17 subjects who had little or no doubt as to their choice, teaching seemed to provide for "essentially" all of the motivational pressures. Of the other 8 subjects, teaching seemed to provide relatively little opportunity for satisfaction; these subjects showed either active dislike or considerable uncertainty. The 3 remaining persons showed no aversion to teaching even though there were other goals which they preferred. Dillon regarded her findings as supporting but not proving the postulated theory, since it was not known how the subjects might picture themselves in other professions, or how persons preparing for other professions might picture themselves as teachers. Moreover, it was recognized that some other theory might be used to explain the findings; one such possible theory would be that when a person chooses a profession for whatever reason, he tends to build up a concept of it in accordance with his needs. The cautious attitude of Dillon toward her findings is well taken, and certainly too much weight must not be given to any one investigation. Nevertheless, the

associated with occupation seems to be supported by a part of the Centers (11) investigation, but a rural-urban factor appears to be present also. Adults were handed cards containing a number of items such as "A job where you could express your feelings, ideas, talent, or skill," and each interviewee was then asked, "If you had a choice of one of these kinds of jobs which would you choose?" Names assigned to the values thought to be represented by the various items were leadership, interesting experience, security, self-expression, and others as shown in Table 15. A review of the findings given in the table shows several signifi-

TABLE 15. Psychological Differences of Social Classes: Desires and Values:
First Choice

Percent Choosing	Urban		Rural	
	Middle Class (N = 385)	Working Class (N = 424)	Middle Class (N = 74)	Working Class (N = 126)
Power	2.6	4.2	8.1	7.1
Self-expression	30.6*	17.2*	21.6*	6.3*
Esteem	5.5	5.0	2.8	0.8
Security	8.8*	19.3*	8.1	17.5
Profit	6.0	5.9	4.2	5.6
Independence	17.9	20.3	32.4	31.7
Leadership	7.3	3.3	8.1	2.4
Social service	8.6	12.5	8.1	13.5
Fame	1.8	1.7	—	1.6
Interesting experience	10.9	10.6	6.6	13.5

* Differences between adjacent figures marked * in the same row are statistically reliable at the 95 percent confidence level or better.

SOURCE: R. Centers. *The psychology of social classes*. Princeton: Princeton Univer. Press, 1949. P. 152.

cant differences as between the middle and working classes, and also between urban and rural groups. Significantly more middle-class than working-class persons in both urban and rural groups appear to value opportunity for self-expression in the occupation. On the other hand, security was more frequently valued by working class than by middle-class members in the urban groups; but in the rural group the difference did not reach significance, although the trend was in the same direction as in the urban group. A study such as this in which adults are asked

Probably the most comprehensive study of the perception of occupations is that by Grunes (32). High school students were asked to group occupations in as many ways as they could, according to various characteristics. It was found that students shared a number of common perceptions according to which jobs might be grouped. Below are some of the groups of jobs and the common characteristics which students saw in them.

Group A

The jobs: college professor, minister, doctor, nurse, teacher; and less clearly, engineer, social worker, reporter, and business man.

Characteristics: require education, ability, brains, social skill, highly paid, and strength not required.

Group A-B

The jobs: business man and woman.

Characteristics: similar to A, but less stress on education.

Group B

The jobs: business woman, office worker, secretary, stenographer, bank clerk; and less clearly, salesperson, store clerk.

Characteristics: "business," verbally skilled.

Group C-1

The jobs: carpenter, mechanic, welder.

Characteristics: skilled, strong.

Group C-2

The jobs: farmer, rancher, hired man on farm, truck driver; and less clearly, ditch digger.

Characteristics: hard work, common labor, strong, not own boss.

Group C-D

The jobs: ditch digger, garbage collector, janitor.

Characteristics: hard work, common labor, strong, require little education or much of anything else except strength.

Group B-D

The jobs: salesperson, store clerk, waiter, waitress.

Characteristics: "business," require social skill.

Group D

The jobs: dishwasher, cook, maid, housewife, married woman who stays home and keeps house, cleaning woman; and less clearly, elevator operator, waitress, janitor.

Characteristics: common labor, hard work, requires little of anything, stupid, not own boss, uneducated.

In commenting on her findings Grunes made several interesting points. First, there did not seem to be much of a perceived break between skilled and unskilled manual workers, but there was a "deep cleft between what is usually called white-collar work and work done with the hands." Second, social class factors were evident in the perceptions. The subjects were divided into three groups on the basis of the Gough Home

study serves at least to emphasize that occupational choice does bear definite relationships to personal needs, and underlines the importance of the perception of self and occupation.

THE PERCEPTION OF OCCUPATIONS

If there be any truth in the interpretation of the process of occupational choice as a testing of one's perception of occupation against one's developing concept of self and ideal self, then one of the basic understandings needed would seem to be that of how the individual perceives an occupation. This perception is perhaps inseparable from how he sees himself in it and what promise it seems to hold for the realization of his values and meeting his needs. Although such perceptions may be expected to be rather highly individualized, there may be certain modalities in perception of occupation by reason of common experience of various age, sex, social class, and other groups. Seen from this point of view one of the glaring deficiencies in the literature on guidance appears to be the lack of studies concerned with this problem. It would be possible to stock the shelves of a small library with publications describing various occupations and how to teach this information, but one small part of one shelf would accommodate studies dealing even indirectly with how students see occupations.

As incidental parts of some studies, such as those of children's concept of the ideal self which we noted earlier, we gain some idea of what children see in an occupation. By interpreting the results of interest inventories as expressions of the self concept seen through occupational stereotypes we can learn something of another facet of the problem. Attitude survey studies sometimes include pertinent material, as in the report of prestige of occupations as seen by adolescents in *Youth and the World of Work* (64). Galler (26) studied the influence of social class upon occupational choice of boys and girls ages 10 through 14. Upper-middle class boys and girls gave "interest in the job itself" as a reason for choice more frequently than did lower-class pupils, and more altruistic reasons for choice were given by upper-middle class boys than by lower class boys. In general, Galler concluded that social class was at least as important an influence as age. At the college level, Raylesberg (73) found support for the hypothesis that, with vocational choice held constant, there is a significant relationship between personal values and the perception of occupation. His subjects were freshmen in engineering. Apparently various students saw in the same occupation opportunity to realize rather different values. Thus far studies such as these are rather isolated examples.

ing maturity, he achieves greater congruence of self concept and ideal self. This is not to say that self concept and ideal self ever become completely identical, but normally we should expect two related developments: (1) that the self concept becomes increasingly realistic with continuing "reality testing," and (2) that the individual becomes increasingly able to distinguish between occupational preferences as aspirations and as occupational expectations.

Reality testing does not begin suddenly with the coming of adolescence, or at any other one time for that matter, but—as Super (85, p. 285) has pointed out—begins when the individual first interacts with his environment and begins to differentiate "self" from "other." The theory of occupational choice developed by Ginzberg and associates (27, pp. 185 ff.) suggests that fantasy needs dominate preadolescent vocational preferences, and factors of external reality enter the picture rather late. Small (80) has furnished evidence against this assumption. It would seem more plausible, because of the very wide range of ages at which choices in the sense of commitment occur, to minimize age *per se* as a factor in reality testing; for some, reality factors dominate at very early ages, and others avoid the reality testing of their aspirations well into adulthood.

But can individuals actually distinguish between their aspirations and expectations based upon reality? The answer depends, of course, on whom we regard as arbiter of reality. If we are willing to place some faith and credence in the ability of the individual himself to make such judgments, then it appears that a good many adolescents are able to do so. Stephensen (82) found that of 1000 ninth-grade boys, 73 percent aspired to enter occupations at the two highest levels, but only 40 percent reported that they expected to do so. The high school age students who served as subjects in the Hurlock and Jansing (41) study were somewhat more confident; about two-thirds of the boys and three-fourths of the girls expected to be able to follow their first choice of occupation. Trow (89) asked students in grades 8, 10, and 12 to indicate the occupations which they considered probable choices, possible choices, and their favorite fantasy. Here the results are less clear-cut. Occupations were classified according to census categories. Fantasy choices were higher than probable or possible expectations for public service occupations and for the transportation and communication groups. In the manufacturing, trade, and clerical occupations the reverse was true, with probable and possible percentages running higher than fantasy percentages. Professional service gave the highest "possi-

Index. The lowest of the groups saw less distinction between business and professional people, while those in the highest class made less distinction between the various mechanical and manual jobs. Also, there was a definite class difference in the meaning of the word "engineer"; higher-status groups thought of the engineer as a professional, but lower groups saw the engineer as a skilled mechanic.

The cleft between white-collar and manual work reported by Grunes may well reflect a distinction deeply entrenched in our culture. It will be recalled that the most fundamental cleavage found by the Lynds in *Middletown* was that between the business and working classes. The social class differences in perception noted by Grunes are probably familiar to most experienced counselors—at least to those sensitive to social class factors. And to those who counsel with college freshmen the perception of engineering as skilled mechanical work is a matter of almost daily occurrence, or so it seems.

The implications for guidance practice of such studies of the perception of occupations are very real and apparently not much appreciated. We have wasted an enormous amount of time in seeking to teach didactic material about occupations which has little meaning because little related to the actual perceptions of jobs by adolescents. It may well be that a legitimate objective in the teaching about occupations is to help the student achieve a broad understanding of the world of work and perhaps to help him form desirable attitudes. But if we assume that by such teaching we are having any real effect upon the manner in which the student perceives occupations, we must be prepared with better evidence to justify our assumption than thus far seems available. The bases for perception of occupation seem to arise in part from the American heritage itself. It is difficult to escape the suspicion that, so far as having any real effect upon occupational choice is concerned, many of our occupational information activities in guidance have been sheer academic busywork. They speak a language foreign to that of the student's actual perceptions. Such a suspicion must, of course, be tested against careful appraisal of the outcomes of the activities involved.

Occupational Aspiration and Expectation

In our earlier discussion of the occupational preferences of children we suggested that expressed preferences might be regarded as reflections of the ideal self; the young child, relatively unhampered by reality considerations, is free to choose an occupation which, as he perceives it, is in harmony with his concept of his ideal self. With increas-

but that expectations were differentiated by their position in the social system. Whether or not social class may be said to differentiate mobility orientation depends, then, upon whether one is considering aspirations or expectations.

The Stephensen study throws light on one special aspect of discrepancy between aspirations and expectations, and serves to raise the general problem of compromise in occupational choice. As Super points out, the idea of choice as a compromise between interests, capacities, values and opportunities is an old one, which can be found as far back as Parsons. He notes that Ginzberg and associates made compromise one of the key elements in their theory, but failed to make clear the degree to which and the conditions under which one competing element yields to another and compromise is effected (84). The central concept used by Super is that occupational choice is an implementation of the self concept; in the process of implementation various compromises may often be inevitable. This idea, first presented by Super in a speech at Ft. Collins, Colorado, has remained an important ingredient in his theory. But in a later statement he suggested, "When wholesome development takes place the process is not so much one of *compromise* as one of *synthesis*. The term compromise seems more appropriate when the reality-testing process begins later than it should, when the self has not been adequately related to society" (85, p. 285). The synthesizing process is described as a learning process, often without verbalization, and often involving role playing and role taking.

Viewing the process as one of synthesis has the very real advantage of placing occupational choice in the frame of reference of a learning process, but may result in minimizing very real elements. For illustration let us return to the special case of discrepancy of aspirations and expectations noted in the Stephensen study. Suppose that we imagine that one of the individuals in class IV in this study had aspirations higher than his compromised expectations. His aspiration is to become a physician. Let us further imagine that so far as his abilities, interests, and values can be appraised his goal seems to be realistic. But he can see no means of obtaining financial support for the long period of schooling required, and in a "realistic" appraisal of the situation as he sees it, the odds against his completing medical school are very great. More or less consciously and over a period of time he weighs the goal of becoming a physician with the necessary long delay in marriage and establishing a family against the overall satisfactions to be gained by

ble" response of any category (50.9 percent), with "probable" at 32.7 percent, and "fantasy" choices at 42.4 percent. If now we introduce another basis for judging reality—census statistics of employment—we have an interesting contrast. The study was conducted in the Detroit area in which 48.5 percent were employed in manufacturing (although these figures were 10 years old at the time the data for the study were gathered). In spite of this rather strong indication of probable employment outlook, only 3.0 percent considered manufacturing jobs as possible, and 5.2 percent as probable. On the fantasy level, jobs in manufacturing were almost completely rejected; only 0.6 percent gave such occupations as their fantasy choices. Probably no firm conclusion can be drawn from these three studies, but students in the high school age group do seem to distinguish jobs which at least seem to them to be fantasy preferences or aspirations and others which they regard as more realistic expectations. How close their judgments of reality may be to reality as judged by others on the basis of some external criterion is another matter.

In our earlier discussion of characteristics of contemporary American culture we gave considerable attention to the matter of mobility. To what extent do mobility factors enter into occupational aspirations and expectations? Apparently mobility factors operate at least as early as the ninth grade, but differently in aspirations and expectations. In the study noted above, Stephensen (82) was concerned with two interpretations, that mobility orientation (1) follows class lines, so that the middle and upper classes are "strivers" while the lower classes set aspirations within the limits of their strata, and (2) that mobility orientation does not follow class lines, but rather that a similar mobility orientation exists throughout the stratification system. Occupations of fathers were used as a basis for dividing the pupils into six social class groups. The pupils were asked, in effect, what their occupational aspirations and expectations were. The number for whom aspirations and expectations were at about the same level exceeded those for whom plans or expectations were lower than aspirations in the four highest ranking classes, although proportions varied considerably with class. In class I (the highest), equality of plans and aspirations obtained for 91 percent, and plans were below aspirations for only 3 percent. In class IV, equality was found for 57 percent, but 38 percent indicated higher aspirations than expectations. In the two lowest classes, the situation was reversed. Stephensen interpreted the findings as indicating that the boys held a relatively common perception in the aspiration dimension,

heavy debt will be obvious, however, particularly to Carter (8, 9), Super (84, 85), to Super and associates in the Career Pattern Study (86, 87), and to Roe (74). The brief statement by Meadow (62) was a helpful summary, and the studies by Tyler (90, 91, 92), as we noted, were particularly helpful for considering influences during childhood. The theory of Ginzberg and associates (27), though accepted only in part, proved stimulating. Although this is not a statement of general theory, probably it is incumbent upon any writer who undertakes to discuss the matter of occupational development and choice to state as explicitly as possible the assumptions and biases which he has adopted, however tentatively. What follows then, is an attempt to state a point of view which in this chapter has been sometimes obvious, and sometimes lurking in the background.

First of all, vocational choice is a long-continuing process of development, not an isolated event. We do not, however, in spite of placing choice in the context of development, make the terms *choice* and *development* synonyms. There does come a time when many but not all individuals begin to shape their plans toward some more-or-less specifically conceived occupational goal, and this goal actually becomes functional in subsequent related decisions. This stage of development we would regard as the choice stage. The reaching of this stage is only modestly related to chronological age, and it does not mark any sharp cutoff between realism and fantasy. The Ginzberg hypothesis that choices before the age of about 11 are marked by fantasy, and after 11 tend to be realistic is not tenable; Small (80) found no linear relation of realism to age, but rather within the ages of 15 to 19 changes were sometimes toward greater realism and sometimes toward more fantasy. By conceiving of occupational choice as a stage in the developmental process we do not mean to accept any particular time schedule or system of life stages. Development toward occupational choice must in the last analysis be understood in terms of the individual's own developmental pattern and situation.

A complete theory of occupational development would take cognizance of both environmental factors and subjective factors. This we have not done. In Chapter 7, "Contexts and Limits," we looked at environmental factors in relation to the total life expectancy; from this it should be clear that the importance of such factors is recognized. In this chapter we have been concerned chiefly with subjective factors and only part of these, since we omitted discussions of abilities, temperamental characteristics, and similar matters in order to concentrate on

entering another occupation requiring less preparation and so affording opportunity of establishing himself earlier. The result is that he prepares to be a medical technician; yet even at the time of making this commitment his concept of the ideal self is still that of a physician. Now let us imagine another boy who might have been in the Stephensen study who also seems to possess the abilities, interests and values which would make becoming a physician a reasonable goal, but he is higher in the socioeconomic structure, a member of class II. For him becoming a physician is both an aspiration and an expectation, and he feels no need to alter his goal. Synthesis has been achieved.

But what shall we say of the first boy? Was his development unwholesome because he failed to achieve the same sort of synthesis? Or was synthesis achieved when he readjusted his goal and committed himself to reality even though his aspiration persisted? Was this compromise? If so, is the concept of compromise applicable only to those in less favored environmental circumstances? If both boys can be regarded as having achieved adjustment in the sense of minimizing tension, then perhaps the difficulty lies in the concept of adjustment itself. Adjustment conceived as minimizing tension, as we pointed out earlier, is scarcely consistent with the notion of self-actualization. And the thing which blocked self-actualization for the first boy was the hard facts of environmental limitations, at least as he saw it. The idea of compromise has at least the virtue of emphasizing such external realities. There are many who will find employment well below their legitimate aspirations—legitimate in the sense that their abilities, interests, and values would seem to qualify them for higher-status occupations—and for whom compromise or something like it by another name is just a part of the life expectancy. Adjustment may be achieved; self-actualization through occupation will not.

A SUMMARY AND POINT OF VIEW

One of our difficulties in seeking to understand the process of occupational choice is that empirical studies have outrun theoretical formulations. We simply do not have an adequate theory of occupational choice by which to orient our further investigations. A number of theories have been offered. We have no intention of propounding a new one. Since this statement is to be in the nature of a summary rather than a new proposal, and specific documentation has been made earlier in the chapter, we shall not pause for many detailed citations here. A

or profession is nothing but a sublimating process in the service of hunger and love we may assume that it also must be guided by the individual's unconscious motives" (7, p. 266). Developing further his point of view, it appears that men enter medicine because of sado-masochistic components which are at first accentuated and later sublimated. Prize fighters, wrestlers, bullfighters, warriors, and hunters are "direct descendants of pure sadism." Men become lawyers because of dishonest acts committed in childhood, and enter the clergy because of reaction to real or imaginary sins. Such ideas about occupational choice may afford material for an entertaining after-dinner speech, but hypotheses must be more than entertaining; they must be testable. Yet such bizarre ruminations, offensive as they are to anyone seeking to retain some vestige of an empirical orientation, must not blind us to their stimulating value. We cannot accept them as a basis for theory, but perhaps esoteric ideas are needed to throw light on esoteric cases. Cautela (10) has noted examples of the usefulness of the notion of symbolic need gratification in helping to understand several cases of occupational choice.

We have emphasized the long-continuing aspect of development toward choice. It probably begins in early childhood with the learning of general attitudes, sex and work roles, and the formation of value patterns. These beginnings gain coherence with the structuring of the self and the achievement of a self concept and concept of an ideal self. The process continues on into adolescence and for some into adulthood (chronologically speaking). Probably progress toward the choice stage is accelerated when the individual is able to perceive that he is nearing the close of the period of preparation and is in or about to enter the "transition stage." This may come at the age for legal school leaving, at the end of high school, at the end of college or graduate school, or at any time the individual ends his preparation. In exceptional cases it may never come. While the majority seem to pace their movement toward the choice stage more or less in step with the institutionalized time table of the schools, there is no way in which institutions can control the perception of the individual as to when he feels that he is through with preparation.

In the second report of the Career Pattern Study (86) may be found a useful classification of personality theories of vocational development. These are named as the psychoanalytically derived, the self-concept theory, the theory of interpersonal relations and need satisfaction, and the cultural-dynamic approach. It will be evident that we

development toward choice from the standpoint of the experience of the individual. In seeking to understand development within this experiential framework, the key concepts seem to us to be the self, self concept, ideal self, needs, and values. Interests are important insofar as they reflect value patterns which support them. Each of a succession of occupational preferences is accepted or rejected on the basis of whether or not each is perceived as consistent with the emerging self concept. Reality testing begins almost with the first halting formulations of the self concept. In the process of reality testing, concepts of both self and occupation may be modified. When discrepancies between aspiration and expectations develop (probably reflecting differences in self concept and concept of ideal self), tensions arise which can be relieved by something resembling compromise. But compromise implies a reasonably adequate perception of reality considerations (80), and consequently we seem to have entered a dead-end street—only those already having adequate perceptions of reality are able to relieve tensions by compromise. But perhaps many do not find themselves in situations in which compromise is needed. Their concepts of self and ideal self are sufficiently congruent so that no important conflicts develop. These may be the self-actualizing people for whom occupation is simply one means to the major goal of self-realization; indeed, occupation may be the major means of self-actualization. Obviously, not all persons find their major avenue to self-actualization in occupation; some exceptions are women who marry and find self-realization through homemaking, some members of upper-class cultures for whom the family orientation is stronger than the occupational, and some members of lower-class subcultures for whom occupation is at best a means to other and rather immediate satisfactions.

Needs are factors in occupational choice within the general sense suggested by Small (80), that people seek satisfaction of basic needs in every major aspect of their lives, including the vocational. (The extent to which specific needs are or can be satisfied through occupation is another matter.) Stated another way, in the words of Forer (21), occupational choice is purposive; it is not primarily rational or logical, and the primary reasons for choice of a particular occupation may be unconscious in the sense that a subject, even though pressed to do so, may be unable to state his reasons for choice. With this sort of recognition of unconscious needs in occupational choice we find no difficulty, but some of the interpretations of occupational choice in the classical Freudian mode we find quite meaningless. Brill has said, "Because work

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CHAPTER 9

Abilities and the Probable

Earlier we considered limits imposed upon the individual by the surrounding societal-cultural milieu, and by his own psychological habitat. As we undertake an examination of some of the questions centered about abilities we shall continue to be interested in a dual approach to context, for although abilities are in one sense qualities within the individual, no one can live in a vacuum. However great a potential may seem to exist for an individual as judged by abilities alone, any realistic viewing of the guidance problem *must* take into account also the degree of probability that he may be able to realize his potential. One kind of limit which may reduce the probability of achievement is obviously that of the societal-cultural milieu—the external. To these we must add the potential or aptitudes “within” the individual. Yet another set of “within” factors which may impede or facilitate his realization of potential are those more subtle subjective elements such as his perception of his abilities, his total self concept, his values in relation to his notion of his abilities, and the like. In a word, realization of potential by the individual depends partly upon his abilities, partly upon the fences erected by his society and culture, and partly upon the fences which he erects for himself out of his interaction with his world. Consideration of these subjective interactional factors we must delay to a later chapter. In this chapter we propose to sketch the development of certain basic concepts and problems and to explore the problem of prediction, first in a general way and then briefly as applied specifically to the identification of the talented.

SOME BASIC CONCEPTS AND QUESTIONS

Life would be simpler for the student of guidance if any given term—for example, *aptitude*—could be taken to mean the same thing

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Life would be simpler for the student of guidance if any given term—for example, *aptitude*—could be taken to mean the same thing

at different periods and in different discussions. Unfortunately, such is not the case. One finds in the literature varying usages of such terms as *ability*, *capacity*, *aptitude*, and *proficiency*. It may be helpful to state at the outset in a preliminary and rather arbitrary fashion some of the denotations and connotations intended by the terms as we shall use them. We shall then seek to describe briefly some of the background of the development of the concepts represented by these terms. We shall use the term *aptitude* when future reference is intended—when prediction from present performance is involved. *Proficiency* will be used to denote level or quality of present performance. The term *ability* will be used in a generic sense, in the manner adopted by Super (69, pp. 61-62), including both *aptitude* and *proficiency*. The term *capacity* will be avoided because of the connotation of native qualities which the term seems to carry for some.

The kind of performance implied by *aptitude* is always performance at some time in the future. Thus, in popular speech, we speak of a boy or girl as having aptitude for law, or medicine, or art, or acting. We do not mean that right now he is able to perform as a lawyer or doctor or artist on a professional level. Rather, we imply that he now gives some evidence that he will be able so to perform after the necessary training and experience. In a word, he seems to have the necessary ability to learn what will be required of him. And in such popular speech, aptitudes seem to be classified grossly according to areas of activity with which we are acquainted. We know of mechanics, plumbers, musicians, dentists, teachers, engineers, for example, and we speak of aptitude for one or another of these occupations. Such popular classifications of aptitude might be termed environmental classifications. What reason is there to suppose that abilities have anything to do with the particular environment with which we happen to be familiar? Were there not persons able to learn the trade of auto mechanic before there was such a job?

It is clear that we must seek a more precise meaning for the term *aptitude*, and one which refers to a quality of the individual rather than to an aspect of some particular environment. A number of suggestions have been made; a few representative examples will be noted briefly. In his pioneer book *Aptitude Testing*, Hull seemed content to regard aptitude testing simply as a sampling of the kind of behavior in which one might be interested, but he did distinguish between two kinds of tests: aptitude tests and proficiency tests (40, p. 50). An aptitude test "is a test designed to discover what potentiality a given person has for

learning some particular vocation or acquiring some particular skill," while a proficiency test "is a test designed to discover how perfect or skillful a person actually is in a given type of activity." Kitson (46), in 1934, suggested that aptitude "should be used to designate the readiness with which an untrained person acquires a given skill." Bingham (9, pp. 16-18) began his discussion of aptitude by quoting Warren's definition of aptitude as "a condition or set of characteristics regarded as symptomatic of an individual's ability to acquire with training some (usually specified) knowledge, skill, or set of responses such as the ability to speak a language, to produce music, etc." Bingham thought it commendable that Warren had not introduced the question of whether aptitude is acquired or inborn, but felt that the definition should be broadened to include readiness to develop interest in exercising the proficiency concerned, as well as readiness for acquisition. In short, Bingham so broadened the concept of aptitude as to make it mean a kind of general fitness for an occupation.

But the above definitions do not indicate the existence of another set of problems growing out of the application of factor analysis methods. Are there "pure" abilities which can be identified? If so, how are these related to each other? Super (69, pp. 60-61) suggests that a scientific as opposed to a popular definition of aptitude would provide for specificity, unitary composition, facilitation of learning, and probably constancy of some activity or type of activity.

Perhaps some of the difficulties encountered in attempting to formulate a clear-cut statement of the concept of aptitude can be illustrated by an example. Suppose that we are interested in trying to appraise the aptitude of persons for work as salespersons in a department store. First of all, what criterion or criteria of success shall we accept? The gross amount of sales? Judgment of supervisors? Tenure on the job? Promotion to better jobs? There must be some standard by which we can judge whether the "condition or set of characteristics" really is "symptomatic" or predictive. Suppose that we agree on the ratings by supervisors as the criterion. Now comes the search for "aptitudes." A job analysis should help identify important duties and responsibilities, but will not identify the abilities necessary in performing these. What is the combination of present abilities on the basis of which a prediction can be made? Intelligence? Ability to speak easily? Skill in meeting people? Skill in arithmetic computation? Ability to write legibly? Doubtless the reader can suggest others. Obviously many of these abilities contain large elements of learning. No matter; we are

concerned only with a basis for prediction from present performance to future performance. Now suppose that we could arrive at some combination of these or other abilities (as judged from performances) from which predictions might be made. Is it necessary that those who can perform successfully as salespersons also derive satisfaction from work as salespersons before they can be said to have aptitude? We think not; this inclusion of the interest or satisfaction element is a needless cluttering of the concept of ability. Let us recall some of the hypothetical characteristics suggested: intelligence, skill in meeting people, and others. Many if not all are complex functions. Must they therefore be rejected as characteristics from which aptitude predictions can be made because they are not specific, unitary in composition, constant, and such as to facilitate learning? Probably no such implication was intended by Super. Before attempting even the most general sort of answer we must turn to a consideration of the backgrounds out of which measurements of abilities evolved.

The early scales of intelligence, such as the Stanford revision of the Binet, were global measures—that is, they were composites of various kinds of test items so scored as to yield single scores. In the case of the Stanford revision, the scores were interpreted as intelligence quotients. There was thus provided not only a measure of the standing of a child relative to his age-mates, but also a measure of the rate of development. For instance, a child of 8 years with a mental age of 10, and so an IQ of 125, might be regarded as having developed at an average of 1.25 years of mental age growth per year of chronological age. This of course does not mean that he achieved 1.25 years of mental age *each* year, for obviously the rate of growth in the earlier years is more rapid than in later years. This second aspect of the IQ—rate of development—lost its meaning when the Binet scale was administered to an adult, and consequently it was necessary to interpret scores of adults as simply average, superior, or highly superior. Such gross statements of relative standing could, of course, be given more refined expressions in terms of percentiles, or some standard score. When the Wechsler scales were developed, these scores were also interpreted by the author in terms of IQ, and the practice has been continued by Wechsler, although granting that adult IQ's as ordinarily determined are not IQ's at all, but "some sort of efficiency quotients" (91, p. 33). We cannot here undertake to go into the many controversies regarding constancy of the IQ, the problem of absolute zero, and similar matters involved in the measurement of intelligence.

However valuable individual scales of intelligence may have proved to be for research or in clinical situations, the time and skill demanded in their administration and interpretation was such as to discourage their use with large groups in practical situations. Beginning in the twenties various forms of group intelligence scales or tests began to make their appearance. Until the middle to late thirties, at least, the great majority of these were of the global type, yielding single scores which practically always were interpreted as IQ's. Of course the IQ's obtained by these group tests were really not IQ's in the Binet sense, but various manipulations were devised for obtaining Binet IQ equivalents. Many group tests were in fact validated by studies purporting to show that scores obtained by them were comparable to IQ's resulting from the Stanford revision.

Another question raised was whether the kind of ability measured in global tests was really one ability or a kind of average of a number of more-or-less discrete abilities. The implications for guidance are obvious. If there is really one basic intelligence or ability, then it ought to be possible to rank various educational tasks and occupations according to the amount of this intelligence needed. If there is not one general ability, but a number of abilities, then the task becomes one of identifying the particular combination of abilities needed for success in an occupation or a defined educational undertaking. A somewhat similar statement of the guidance problem was made by Kelley (44) in 1914 in the early stages of the discussion of the nature of intelligence. The question is fundamental to a concept of ability or abilities and cannot be dismissed in cavalier fashion.

As early as 1904 Spearman (64) administered to several groups of school children discrimination tests in several sense modalities, and secured four judgments of intelligence of children. One set of judgments was based on school examinations. These judgments, modified in a way intended to exclude age as a factor, were considered to be estimates of "Native Capacity" and became the second judgment. The students were also judged by teachers as bright, average, or dull. A fourth set of judgments as to "sharpness and common sense out of school" was secured from fellow students. After a correlational analysis of the data, Spearman concluded that "all branches of intellectual activity have in common one function (or group of functions), whereas the remaining or specific elements of the activity seem in every case to be wholly different from that in all the others" (64, p. 284). This interpretation came to be called the two-factor theory; the name, according

to Spearman, being suggested by Sanctis de Sanctis. In 1914, the symbol g was introduced to represent the general factor, which Spearman interpreted as "the hypothetical general fund of energy" (65). Spearman spent much of the remainder of his life developing and testing the implications of this hypothesis. His book *The Abilities of Men* was essentially an elaboration of the basic idea, and the last statement by Spearman and Jones (67) in 1950 reaffirmed the existence of a general factor. By this time, however, the composite nature was hypothesized as G , the amount of energy; p , the inertia of this energy; and O , facility of recuperation after effortful expenditure.

Of course the two-factor theory did not long go unchallenged. Thorndike (75, p. 186) had suggested that mental traits were unrelated elements. By 1909 Binet (8, p. 346) felt that there were "Deux opinions absolument contradictoires." On the one hand there was the Thorndike view of a complex of elementary factors, and on the other hand, the two-factor theory of Spearman. In a study made by Simpson (63), a student of Thorndike, 15 tests were administered to a group of 37 adults. The tests were chosen to tap a wide range of abilities: two were tests of perception, three of memory, four of association, three of selective thinking, two of sense discrimination, and one of motor control. The subjects were divided into two groups in a way intended to yield two groups of contrasting general ability as shown by achievement. The "good" group consisted of college professors and graduate students; the "poor" group included 2 persons who were employed but judged "dull," 11 from the Salvation Army Industrial Home, and 7 found in the mission on the Bowery. After correlational analysis Simpson concluded that there was justification for something that might be called "general mental ability or general intelligence," but that on the other hand certain capacities were relatively specialized. He found no justification for the view that general intelligence could be explained on the basis of a hierarchy of mental functions with the amount of correlation due to the degree of connection with the central factor, as Spearman had contended. Spearman (65) replied by applying a partial correlation technique to the data of Simpson, holding g constant, and found the two-factor theory was confirmed. But later Thomson (74) demonstrated that hierarchies of correlation coefficients such as Spearman had taken as evidence for a general factor could be produced by dice throwing—a situation in which a common factor was known not to be physically present. Thomson's results, it appeared, could be explained by assuming a number of group factors of varying degrees of

generality. A mathematical paper by Garnett (26) further supported the view of Thomson.

And so a kind of middle ground emerged—a group factor theory which was accepted and applied to aptitude theory by Hull (40). According to this notion any particular performance required a specific set of ability elements. If a considerable overlap of elements existed, as in complex tasks, then considerable correlation would be found between abilities; if little overlap, the correlation coefficients found would be low. Tryon (88) pointed out that since an infinite number of factor patterns might be postulated for a given set of intercorrelations, the choice was an arbitrary one. Spearman, he noted, had chosen two, Kelley and Thurstone chose the most parsimonious set, Thomson a very large number, while he (Tryon) inclined toward a large number. After reviewing a number of studies, Tryon concluded that the dispersion of tetrads about zero demanded the postulation of multiple factors. And so the controversy went.

Considerable attention was focused upon the problem of the composition of such group factors. Spearman, in 1927, regarded group factors as rather exceptional cases, but conceded that group factors of "appreciable magnitude" did exist for "what may be called the logical, the mechanical, the psychological, and the arithmetical abilities," and that the same might be said for ability to appreciate music (66, pp. 241–242). A year later, Kelley published his important *Crossroads in the Mind of Man*. Using the same statistical method as Spearman, the method of tetrad differences, Kelley studied the performance of several groups of school children and concluded that the following traits are independent categories of mental life from a very early age (probably from birth): (1) facility with verbal material, (2) manipulation of spatial relationships, (3) memory. (45, p. 149). He felt that his results were essentially in harmony with those of Spearman, even as to the existence of a general factor, though the two of them interpreted the general factor differently. There was disagreement, however, as to the importance and extent of a verbal factor, and as to a mental speed factor. In his review of factor analytic studies to 1940, Wollfe (94, p. 7) observed that whenever the tetrad criterion is satisfied each test score can be divided into a general and a specific factor, but that it cannot be proved that it must be so divided, for there are always many other possible methods of division.

but there was not long to wait. In 1931 Thurstone (79) suggested a technique for obtaining independent multiple factors from a complex of variables having any number of general factors—the centroid method—and two years later described a modification of the method (80). Hotelling (38) in 1933 developed another method—the method of principal components. But it is not our purpose to trace the development of methods of factor analysis. Rather, we shall attempt to sketch a few developments in the identification of various abilities by means of examples.

In 1936 Thurstone (81) administered a battery of 59 tests of intelligence to 240 college students and factor analyzed the intercorrelation matrix. Nine factors emerged which were named number, visualizing, word fluency, verbal relations, memory, perceptual speed, induction, deduction, and another factor heavily loaded with mathematical reasoning and judgment. With further work by Thurstone, several modifications of this list developed. *The Chicago Tests of Primary Mental Abilities* (82), published in 1938, reduced the list to seven: perception, number, verbal, spatial, memory, induction, and deduction. In a briefer edition of the test which was published later (84), the list was still further reduced by omitting memory and perception, using one reasoning test, and adding word fluency. During World War II a great number of factorial studies were carried out by the armed services. Some of the factors so identified, along with the 1938 Thurstone list and a number of factors found in studies summarized by Shartle, have been reported in a table by Super (69, p. 63). The longest list (28 factors) was that resulting from studies supervised by Guilford for the Air Force.

Current batteries show considerable agreement with each other as to factors selected for measurement (Table 16). Of course, the fact that two factors may be given the same name does not mean that the tests employed are actually measuring the same factor. Some test manuals report correlations on the various factor scores with the scores on factors included in other batteries. For example, the verbal reasoning, number ability, abstract reasoning, and space relations tests of the *Differential Aptitude Tests* correlate in the .40's with verbal meaning, number, reasoning, and space factors of the *Primary Mental Abilities* (1938 edition). However, the same *Differential* tests yield coefficients in the .60's with similarly named tests of the *General Aptitude Test Battery*. In a recent study, Wolking (96) administered three tests of both the *Differential Aptitude Tests* and the *Primary Mental Abili-*

TABLE 16. Names of Scores Yielded by Some Multifactor Tests

(1) <i>Aptitude Survey</i>	(2) <i>Differential Aptitude Tests</i>	(3) <i>General Aptitude Test Battery</i>	(4) <i>Unifactor Tests</i>
Verbal	Verbal	Intelligence	Verbal
Comprehension	Reasoning		
General	Numerical	Verbal Aptitude	Spatial
Reasoning	Ability		
Numerical	Abstract	Numerical Aptitude	Numerical
Operations	Reasoning		
Perceptual	Space	Spatial Aptitude	Reasoning
Speed	Relations		
Spatial	Mechanical	Form Perception	
Orientation	Reasoning		
Spatial	Clerical Speed	Clerical Perception	
Visualization	and Accuracy		
Mechanical	Language	Motor Coordination	
Knowledge	Usage		
		Finger Dexterity	
		Manual Dexterity	

Authors and publishers of above multifactor tests:

(1) J. P. Guilford & W. S. Zimmerman. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sheridan Supply Co., 1956.

(2) G. K. Bennett, H. G. Seashore, & A. G. Wesman. New York: Psychological Corp., 1952.

(3) Beatrice J. Dvorak, & others. (2nd ed.) B-1002. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Employment Service, 1952.

(4) K. J. Holzinger & N. A. Crowder. Yonkers, N.Y.: World Book Co., 1955.

ties to eleventh-grade students. For boys and girls taken together, the scores for apparently corresponding factors correlated .74 for verbal, .47 for number, and .63 for space. Data are not available for examining relationships between all the factors involved in the tests listed in Table 16, but the examples noted above demonstrate that similarity or even identity of names is no basis for assuming that two tests are measuring the same variable. Relationships can be judged only on the basis of empirical data, and such data are as yet very incomplete.

Let us pause now to review the general considerations regarding the nature of abilities which we have briefly noted. It will be recalled that simply as a matter of convenience the term *ability* was adopted as a generic one to include both *aptitude* and *proficiency*. *Aptitude* was

reserved for situations in which prediction of future performance is intended. The basic concept is *ability*, and the basic question concerns the nature of ability or abilities. We noted briefly some of the early interpretations of general intelligence and some examples of studies which sought to identify independent measurable abilities. We suggest that any concept of ability as a single, all-pervasive something common to all proficiencies is scarcely tenable. Some kind of a concept of multiple abilities seems necessary, but any attempt at a definitive statement would certainly be premature.

The search for a more complete understanding goes on, but there are many unresolved questions. One of these is the very old one as to whether abilities are functions of "nature" or "nurture." Into this controversy we shall not enter. For practical purposes in guidance we are more concerned with whether or not present performance is indicative of future performance than with attempting to decide whether the present performance is a function of genes or of learnings. A second and closely related question is concerned with the stability of the test scores. By stability we mean, not the maintenance of a static condition, but rather a stability of growth in much the same way that a child who is found to have an IQ score of 110 at age 9, and again at age 12, may be said to have a constant IQ score, or stability of mental development. Mental age has increased, but he has retained his same relative standing in the chronological age group. As Segal (61, p. 16) has pointed out, the argument for stability rests on the developmental or growth trends, not on what specific proportion of the growth comes from innate characteristics and what proportion is a function of the environment.

The question of stability then, although related to the nature-nurture question, is a question in its own right. There seems to be considerable stability of measures of global ability, in spite of major challenges made to the notion of the constancy of the IQ score, such as that made by Wellman and associates in the Inwa studies (92). But the question has been raised again in more recent studies. Bayley (4) studied the development of 40 children from 1 month to 18 years, using several developmental scales and two global measures of intelligence. After age 5, variations in IQ as much as from 116 to 132 were found. For the measures used, the standard deviations of mental ages did not increase at the constant rate which would be necessary for IQ's to remain constant during growth. Some day there may be available to the guidance worker instruments of measurement which will reflect accurately whatever changes in pace may occur in the development of abilities;

but until that day comes we must keep clearly before us the fact that we are working with very approximate measures—that although the IQ score seems to be relatively constant, we must suspend final judgment.

The coming of multifactor tests posed again the question of stability, and this time there were two facets of the problem. There is, first, the question of whether or not any one measured ability remains stable and, second, whether the differential pattern of abilities is stable. The evidence is mixed, and it is yet too early to draw any general conclusion. Some examples may help to indicate the complexity of the problem. Traxler (87) reported data from the administration of the *Primary Mental Abilities* tests (1938 edition) to three small groups of high school girls on two successive years. With one exception, coefficients ranged from .578 to .917, indicating "considerable, but not exceptional stability." Traxler concluded that the number, verbal, spatial, and deductive factors seemed fairly adequate for guidance purposes, but that the perceptual, memory, and inductive factors might be rather limited in their usefulness. Swineford and Holzinger (71) administered 28 tests to 457 high school freshmen, and then readministered 14 of the tests to 385 of the same pupils a year later. Correlations between scores from the two administrations ranged from .665 to .805. The tests were selected to measure both a general factor and four special abilities: spatial, verbal, speed, and memory.

Doppelt and Bennett (20), using the *Differential Aptitude Tests*, retested a group of ninth-grade students after three years. Coefficients were calculated separately for boys and girls; and of the 16 coefficients, 3 were over .80, and 9 were .70 or higher. The three highest were for verbal reasoning, spelling, and sentences. It is interesting to note that two of the three scores showing greatest stability were straightforward measures of achievement—spelling and sentences. The Doppelt and Bennett study is one of the few which has dealt with the problem of persistence of differences between scores for the various special abilities. These authors found that the chances were two out of three that a difference of 10 standard score points (significant for the tests used) in Grade 9 would appear in Grade 12 within the score range of -4 to 14. But the chances were 71 out of 100 that the differences would be in the same direction.

From such studies as the above it appears that scores yielded by some of the tests of special abilities display stabilities which compare not too unfavorably with the stabilities of scores from global measures

of intelligence over short periods of from one to three years. But the persistence of patterns or differences between abilities as measured by multifactor tests, remains to be established on a level useful for individual prediction for longer periods of time.

The matter of stability of growth of abilities is closely intertwined with a third important question, that of differentiation with age. Burt (12) has recently cited again his original data of 1919 and reasserted his belief that with increasing age intellectual ability tends to become more and more specialized. He had concluded from his original data that, whereas at age 8 a general factor contributed 52 percent of the variance, by age 12 the general factor accounted for not quite 28 percent. This decrease in the general factor was accompanied by a corresponding increase in the importance of three group factors, the verbal, the arithmetical, and the manual. A number of later investigators were concerned with this problem and rather frequently noted that correlations between various abilities decreased with age. Garrert, Bryan, and Perl (28) found this to be true for 9-, 12-, and 15-year-old children. Reichard (55) also studied 9-, 12-, and 15-year olds, but was unable to confirm a continuous decrease in the general factor; rather, she found an increase from 9 to 12 and a decrease from 12 to 15. Another study in the same year, however, by Clark (16), found a definite decrease of intercorrelations with age. Clark used the *Chicago Primary Mental Ability* tests, but worked with boys 11, 13, and 15 years of age.

And so the studies went, not always in complete agreement, but in general supporting the idea of differentiation of abilities with age. In 1946, Garrett reviewed the evidence on this point and found support for the hypothesis that "Abstract or symbol intelligence changes in its organization as age increases from a fairly unified and general ability to a loosely organized group of abilities or factors" (27, p. 373). Two years later Segel (60) reached essentially the same conclusion. Since these two reviews, newer studies have dealt with the same problem, and again have not been in complete agreement. Doppelt, (19) working with the *Differential Aptitude Tests* and subjects ranging in age from 13 through 17, failed to find support for a decrease of the general factor with increasing age. Rather, he found that the general factor maintained its importance when derived from tests of reasoning under power rather than speed conditions. Clark (17) analyzed scores made on the *California Test of Mental Maturity* and found that approximately the same number of factors was required to account for the variance in mental abilities at the primary and elementary levels as at the high

school age. Without attempting to note all recent studies pertinent to the question of differentiation of abilities with age, it seems fair to say that studies made since the reviews by Garrett and Segel have refined rather than refuted the hypothesis that specialization of abilities occurs with increasing age, at least within adolescent years. As yet we are far from being able to isolate all the factors associated with the differentiation of abilities with age. One promising lead is the hypothesis offered by Segel (61) that differentiation may be related to general ability level: ". . . as brightness increases, differentiation among traits becomes more pronounced." After reviewing the evidence, Segel suggested that such a relation would be logical since it would be the "same type of change in the organization of the mind for increasing brightness as for general growth."

The student may well wonder why we have devoted so much attention to the development of intellectual abilities and paid no heed to other kinds of abilities. There are several answers. First, most of the efforts toward understanding abilities have been devoted to studies of intelligence; this is the area about which we know most. A second answer is that, although substantial knowledge has been accumulated about various specific abilities of a manipulative and dexterity sort and of physical strength, these are not especially useful in guidance because they have little predictive effectiveness for performance in broad terms. Skill in typing, for example, has little relation to overall success in a program of commercial studies. Although it is generally recognized that in the broad sense abilities may be thought of as including not only intelligence and manipulative abilities but ability in getting along with people, leadership ability, and the like, the truth is that we do not yet have any general theory of ability broad enough to encompass such performances.

There are some promising signs. For example, Baldwin (3) has suggested an approach to ability in terms of effectiveness of adaptive behavior. Into this more general framework various kinds of abilities, including social skills, can be fitted. Baldwin distinguishes three varieties of adaptive behavior: (1) unguided, which when once begun proceeds rather automatically, as in the instinctive behavior of animals, (2) directly guided behavior, as in motor skills such as driving a car, in which the guidance toward a predetermined result is achieved through negative feedback, and (3) cognitively guided behavior in which voluntary acts are integrated into an adaptive pattern. In the latter variety of behavior, cognition serves two functions, that of providing feedback

from the environment and of providing an internal guidance "schema."

The application of this point of view leads to some interesting notions. For example, the analysis of social skills becomes a different process from the analysis of other sorts of ability because we must recognize that the social effect produced by a person in interaction with others depends to a considerable extent on the personal characteristics which his behavior communicates, and also because a part of the communication process is the perception of his behavior by others. One way of describing abilities would be to arrange all situations in order of difficulty, and to arrange people in order of amount of ability, making it possible to describe ability in terms of the level of difficulty at which an individual can succeed. But the hope of finding a single dimension of difficulty is remote. As we move from the description of directly guided behavior to that of cognitively guided adaptive behavior, we are confronted with the new problem of "the description of the cognitive and intellectual abilities underlying the organization of these elements into adaptive behavior" (3, p. 218). Earlier in this chapter we noted examples of studies employing factor analysis; this is one method. Baldwin discusses other possible methods, their differing basic assumptions, and their difficulties. The preceding very brief discussion is certainly an oversimplification of the carefully reasoned presentation of Baldwin, perhaps so much so as to be unfair. But the point we wish to make is that old assumptions are being critically re-examined and that there are definite reachings toward a more general and adequate "ability construct"; Baldwin's searchings constitute one example.

But we must leave any further consideration of questions which plague the problem of assessment of abilities. We have perhaps gone far enough to stress the necessity of a continued attitude of caution. We turn now to a very old concept, that of interindividual and intra-individual differences. Quite early, Hull (39) stressed the difference in these two aspects of measurement, though using somewhat different terminology. Differences between individuals he called simply individual differences, but differences among various abilities within the same individual he termed trait differences. Hull administered 35 tests to a group of high school freshmen and concluded from his analysis of the data that the variability of traits within the individual was about 80 percent as great as the variability between individuals. Unfortunately, his tests were of such a nature that comparisons can hardly be made with scores of present multifactor batteries. Several other studies

of the problem have been made since, but suffer from the same limitations as that of Hull. Owens (52) agreed with Hull that the distribution of trait differences seems to be normal, but concluded that differences in traits within the individual are greater than differences among individuals. The importance in guidance of discovering which of an individual's abilities are his best is obvious. We have noted above that the stability of differences in the various part scores on multi-factors, though encouraging, remains to be established. But even if ability patterns were known to be stable within the individual, there would not seem to be any necessary relationship between the level of these abilities and the level on which a particular ability might fall in comparison with others. For example, one of the very best abilities of a boy might be verbal reasoning, and yet his ability level might place him almost anywhere along the continuum of this ability when placed against the norms of various groups.

THE PROBLEM OF PREDICTION

The goal of prediction for guidance purposes is of course a desirable one, though as yet somewhat illusory. If it were possible, for example, to determine at the junior high school level whether or not a given individual would succeed in college, planning would be greatly simplified—although perhaps somewhat less challenging. Of course any such predictive efforts always involve two aspects: the criterion or criteria to which one hopes to predict, and the predictor or predictors to be employed. Two areas of prediction with which guidance traditionally has been concerned are success in school and success in occupation. But before we enter upon a consideration of either of these problems, it may be well to recall briefly several statistical aspects of the undertaking.

Almost all attempts at prediction from test scores or school grades are made on the basis of coefficients of correlation, and our problem becomes therefore largely one of interpreting these coefficients. Still more specifically, the coefficients typically employed are of the product-moment variety. It is not our purpose to develop the underlying statistical theory; presentations of this are easily available in any standard textbook on statistics. It is our purpose to provide a minimum framework for understanding the discussion of prediction which follows, and to raise warning signals against a loose and naïvely optimistic hope on the one hand, or a hurried and ill-considered rejection of evidence on the other hand.

One means of evaluating prediction based on coefficients is to approach the problem through the use of the standard error of estimate. Suppose, for example, that we administer to a group of students two tests, one of vocabulary and one of achievement in English, and find that the two sets of scores correlate .60. We now wish to know with what accuracy we can predict achievement scores on the basis of the vocabulary scores. If there were no correlation between the two series of scores, any prediction would be based on nothing better than chance. If on the other hand there were perfect correlation we could make perfect predictions. Neither of these situations occurs in actual work in the measurement of abilities or achievement. Predictions made from coefficients less than perfect always involve some error, the extent of which may be calculated as the standard error of estimate. This statistic may be visualized as the band of error about the predicted scores. To narrow this band is to increase accuracy of prediction, and this happens when coefficients increase in size. In our example, the coefficient of .60 leads to a reduction of the error of estimate by only 20 percent. Had the coefficient been .50 the error would have been reduced by about 16 percent, while a coefficient of .30 reduces error of estimate by only 6 percent. In order to reduce the error by 50 percent a coefficient of .87 would be needed, and a coefficient of this size rarely occurs in practical work. These facts are both important and discouraging, for most coefficients of correlation between test performance and achievement, or between earlier and later achievement, fall in the range of .40 to .60, and a coefficient of .70 is close to what can presently be achieved. And for the counselor, a further important consideration is that these estimates are made in terms of group averages, not for the individual. As the counselor is confronted with the task of evaluating the test scores of Jane Smith, he has no way of knowing for this particular individual whether the predictive error may be at the minimum or maximum of the range to be expected.

If the situation is as we have described it, the student may well ask, "Is this the best we can do? If so, why bother?" Part of the answer lies in the *kind* of prediction to be attempted. How precise do we need or wish to be? In general, it is possible to predict to a coarsely scaled criterion more successfully than to a finely scaled criterion. "The standard error of estimate refers to the band of error around predictions of precise, specific rankings of each individual on the criterion" (93). Many purposes of guidance may be served with less refined predictions. For example, it may be more important to form a judgment as to the

probability that Bill Jenkins will be able to achieve scholastically on a level which will enable him to graduate than to predict the grade point average he will earn. Or it may be important to estimate the chances that Charles Newton has of being admitted to medical school, in view of the fact that at the midpoint of his junior year his grade point average stands at 2.5. Wesman (93) gives an illustration of predicting success or failure from decile standings on test scores. Suppose that the test scores correlate .60 with the criterion, and that failure rate in the school in question is 20 percent. Under these circumstances 94 percent of the individuals whose scores fall in the eighth decile may be expected to succeed. This is certainly an improvement over prediction by chance. As the failure rate goes up, however, the test scores become less predictive. But we are still confronted with the fact that as a given student whose score falls in the eighth decile confers with the counselor, the latter has no way of knowing whether this particular individual will be one of the 94 percent who succeed, or one of the 6 percent who fail. As Rothney, Danielson, and Heimann point out, the counselor is in a real dilemma. "He is faced with the problem of attempting individual prediction from statistics based upon the average performances of groups. . . . He must preface his answer to his counselee's question about his probable success in college with ' . . . that depends.' . . ." (59, p. 235).

But let us turn now to the first of the two predictive problems of major importance to guidance, that of predicting success in school. Now few thoughtful persons contend that school marks constitute a complete and satisfactory criterion of educational achievement, but grades are readily available and have commonly been used in one way or another as criteria. Moreover, school marks are exceedingly important to the individual who continues in school; they may determine his chances for admission to certain curricula, or to particular institutions, or may be the basis for deciding whether or not he is to remain in school at all. It has long been recognized that many factors other than actual achievement are involved in the assigning of school marks. These other factors are variously referred to as nonintellectual, nonacademic, nonscholastic, and the like. Probably some of these factors are more or less unique to a specific school situation, whether or not included in a consciously formulated grading policy. Some doubtless are personality traits of a sort not closely linked to specific school settings. For example, Gough (33) developed a personality questionnaire on the basis of responses from students in four high schools in Minnesota.

When selected items were cross-validated on a group of seniors in Rock Island, Illinois, substantial results were still obtained; the correlation with grades was .47, while only .26 with intelligence test scores. A multiple R of .62 was obtained between grades and a combination of intelligence test scores and scores on the Achievement Scale (the personality questionnaire). Probably, also, there is greater likelihood of intrusion of subjective factors into the assigning of grades in some subjects than others. Algebra would seem to be a subject less susceptible than most to the influence of such subjective factors in grading. But Carter (14) found that when multiple R's were calculated between teachers' marks and six other factors the R for boys taught by men was .81, but for boys taught by women R was .56. This differential grading of boys and girls by men teachers and women teachers has been noted by others. Douglass and Olson (23) found differences in average grades and that women teachers assigned twice the percentage of failing grades to boys that men teachers assigned. Johnson (43) found that, although about 60 percent of the boys and 40 percent of the girls were in the upper half of the graduating class in the high schools of St. Louis, the percentages were reversed on the basis of standardized achievement tests, while sex differences on the *Ohio State Psychological Examination* were practically negligible. We have used the one factor of sex to illustrate, but surely there must be a whole complex of factors involved in the interaction of students and teachers which enter into the assigning of grades.

In the previous chapter we suggested the concept of the psychological habitat as a framework within which to seek to understand conflicting values of teacher and student. It seems not improbable that the differing values in the psychological habitat may enter into the assigning of grades, but at present little empirical evidence can be offered in support of this hypothesis. It is possible, however, to reinterpret the findings of some earlier studies from this sort of orientation. For example, in 1930 Turney (89) studied achievers and nonachievers among high school students in the training school at the University of Minnesota. Although no specific information was given as to the socioeconomic backgrounds of the students, it seems a reasonable conjecture that such a school would draw rather heavily from middle-class homes. But be that as it may, the striking thing about the study for our present purpose is that the nonintellectual traits which were found to correlate with success in school as judged by grades were industry, cooperativeness, perseverance, ambition, and dependability. Teachers ranked their

students on a longer list of traits, but these were the five which were found to be significantly related to achievement. It would be difficult to find a set of characteristics more thoroughly middle-class in their flavor. We are not, of course, justified in concluding that the teachers in the Turney study were grading their students in part on the degree to which they seemed to manifest the middle-class values, but this is at least an interesting hypothesis.

When scores on standardized achievement tests are used as the criterion for achievement the influence of subjective and interactional factors are doubtless reduced. For purposes of comparing one group with another the advantages of standardized tests are obvious. It is the use of such tests which has made possible our knowledge of regional, rural-urban, social class, ethnic, and other group differences in achievement. Such data are of great value in educational sociology. But comparisons made possible by standardized tests are also of importance when the focus is upon the individual, as in guidance. We are better able to understand the individual if we are acquainted with the typical achievement of the group or groups from which he comes. And in planning, when an element of prediction is involved, we can obtain a better estimate of the achievement level of the group with which he will be competing in pursuit of a given objective.

But at the moment our concern with standardized tests is to emphasize that when scores of these tests are taken as the criterion for achievement we have a rather different situation than when teachers' marks constitute the criterion. Whereas the content of teacher-made tests is, or should be, determined by the objectives of the particular course, the content of standardized achievement tests is necessarily something of a compromise gleaned from the content and objectives of a number of courses in the subject. Under these circumstances, prediction to standardized test scores is prediction to a very composite sort of criterion, and we should expect that teachers' marks would correlate only modestly with scores earned on standardized achievement tests, depending in part on the degree to which the content as determined by the objectives of a particular course happens to coincide with the content on which the standardized test is based. On the other hand, both achievement test scores and teacher-given grades correlate substantially with intelligence test scores and should therefore be reasonably closely related. In fact, Traxler (86) found a median of .72 for coefficients between teacher-given grades and scores made on 20 cooperative achievement tests. However, when the influence of aptitude scores was

partialled out, the median r fell to .57. Partialling out the influence of reading scores had little effect on the r 's for mathematics, but reduced the English r to .27. Lobaugh (48) gave some interesting examples of discrepancies in rank on the basis of school marks and achievement test scores: the valedictorian ranked 36th, and the salutatorian 105th, on a standardized achievement test out of a senior class of about 250.

In choosing a criterion of scholastic achievement, then, we are confronted with an unwelcome choice between teachers' marks very probably loaded with subjective and interactional factors and scores on standardized tests which, although less complicated by the sort of troubles besetting teachers' marks, are at best a compromise with the content which the student was expected to master in a particular course, unless indeed the objective of the course becomes preparation for the particular standardized achievement test involved.

But if the criterion part of the predictive effort is entangled with difficulties, the selection of appropriate predictors is no less freighted with troubles. Many kinds of predictors have been tried—previously earned school marks, ratings of various characteristics by teachers, personality "tests," and the like—but by all odds the greatest amount of attention has been centered upon tests of intelligence or scholastic aptitude. In the historical sketch with which we began this chapter we found that in the early stages of the development of intelligence tests the quest was for some global, overall measure of ability, some general factor. The tests formulated in this quest, however, actually sampled a hodgepodge of a number of abilities. With a little of each of many things in the predictor stew, it is not surprising that enough elements could be found having something in common with a criterion stew such as teachers' marks so that substantial correlations resulted. Global measures of intelligence correlate not only with scholastic achievement, whether the criterion be teachers' marks or standardized test scores, but also with a number of community variables.

Thorndike (77) tried 24 community variables as predictors and found significant relations between a number of these and IQ's as measured by the Pintner Intelligence Tests, Verbal Series. Subjects were in Grades 2 through 9, and the data were collected in 154 communities ranging from large cities to communities of less than 2500 population. The variables positively and significantly related to intelligence test scores were: percent of native-born whites, median adult school grade reached, percent of adults graduated from high school,

professional workers per 1000 population, percent of homes owner occupied, and median home rental value in dollars. Variables negatively and significantly related to the scores were the percent of adults illiterate, percent of employed females 14 years of age and over, percent of homes tenant occupied, and percent of homes overcrowded.

If, then, global measures, by reason of their composite nature, have such ramifying relationships, what of the multifactor tests? It is too early to say, but one would expect a somewhat neater pattern because factorially derived tests are more specific and precise. By weighted combinations of various scores of the factorial type, however, multifactor tests can serve much the same function in scholastic prediction as have traditional measures, as Anastasi has pointed out, and with two advantages. "First, they provide composite scores based upon empirically determined selection and weighting of component part scores. Secondly, they can provide a different composite score for different types of criteria" (2, p. 167). The task, then, so far as educational prediction is concerned, is to utilize the potential of multifactor tests by working out weighted score composites for different criteria, such as various curricula, various institutions, and others.

In the choice of predictors of scholastic success for guidance purposes, both theoretical and practical considerations are necessarily intertwined. A battery of tests sampling nearly pure factors may be less usable than a battery which is frankly a compromise of pure and composite factors. And although certain socioeconomic community factors such as those studied by Thorndike may be known to have significant relations to test scores in general terms, such community factors may not be very practical predictors for the counselor in a given school and community. And once again we must remind ourselves that validity is specific. No blanket recommendation of any one measure can be made for all situations. For example, a particular test given at the close of ninth-grade algebra may have considerable value in predicting probable success in third-semester high school algebra, but may be almost useless in predicting success in commercial subjects. The length of time over which prediction is to be made is certainly an important factor. Predicting average scholastic success in the eleventh grade on the basis of a scholastic aptitude test given late in the tenth grade is comparable to predicting grade point average in college on the basis of tests given in the third or fourth grade in only a very loose way. Ideally, in a further consideration of prediction in guidance, we would examine the probable effectiveness of a number of

available measures in predicting to each of a number of specific criteria; but such an undertaking would be inappropriate here, even if the necessary data were available. We have chosen the much less ambitious course of trying to summarize some of the findings pertinent to prediction at several scholastic levels and some of the results of attempted longer-range prediction. Although our focus will be on the secondary school, we shall for the sake of perspective give some limited attention to prediction within the elementary school and some brief consideration to prediction to and within the college level.

Prediction Within the Elementary Level

The general pattern of relationships between global measures of intelligence and achievement at the elementary school level may be illustrated by the findings from a study made a number of years ago by Gates (30). The tests used were the Stanford-Binet scale, and 15 group tests of intelligence—all global measures. Subjects ranged from pupils in the first through the eighth grade. A composite criterion of achievement was employed, consisting of a number of achievement tests. In general, the more verbal tests proved to be the better predictors of achievement. Gates found that this better predictive efficiency of verbal tests became noticeable at about Grade 3. When a verbal group test was used, the addition of the Stanford-Binet scores did not seem to make any great independent contribution to the correlation with achievement test scores. Coefficients varied not only with the verbalness of tests but also with grade level, and from school subject to subject. When more completely verbal tests were used, the highest coefficients were obtained with reading scores, and somewhat lower coefficients with arithmetic and spelling scores were found. At the level of Grades 1 and 2, the r between group test scores and composite achievement scores was .27. For the higher grades, r 's between composite achievement scores and the more verbal group tests ranged from .65 at Grade 3 to a high of .79 in Grades 5 and 6, and then dropped to .60 in Grades 7 and 8, while the least verbal tests yielded r 's of .22, .46, and .10 at corresponding grade levels.

The results of the Gates study indicate that there is no simple pattern of relationships between global measures of intelligence and achievement, even at the elementary level. Gates himself questioned the validity of the use of a composite criterion of achievement since the intercorrelations between scores in the various school subjects were generally rather low. Nevertheless, there have been many studies re-

ported, especially during the third and fourth decades, which sought to establish the correlation between global measures of intelligence and average achievement. The range of coefficients reported is more impressive than the agreement. The search for some median r which might be taken as an expression of the relation between intelligence and achievement has rather gone out of fashion, and as Travers (85, p. 376) has noted, the trend in elementary school testing has been toward an emphasis on the diagnosis of causes of specific learning difficulties. Surely such an emphasis is more promising for guidance as well as for instruction. If one must seek some expression of the relationship between intelligence and average achievement, it is probably better to express the relationship as a range of most probable r 's rather than as a median coefficient, and the range in which such r 's appear to cluster is approximately .50 to .60. This is a bit lower than would seem to be indicated by the Gates studies.

Guidance is inevitably concerned with intraindividual as well as interindividual differences, and it is consequently of some interest to note the correlations between measures of ability and achievement in different school subjects. In 1936 Louttit (49, p. 185) summarized the results of a number of studies then available. Median r 's obtained between achievement in various subjects and global measures of intelligence were .60 for reading, .55 for arithmetic, .50 for spelling, and .10 for handwriting. In a chapter contributed to the 1957 edition of the Louttit text, Powell (53, p. 159) used the same coefficients. This pattern of the relation of global measures of ability to various achievements raises again the matter of differentiation of abilities with age which we discussed earlier. At that time we concluded that differentiation does occur from a rather general ability to considerable differentiation of abilities, at least through adolescence. The limited range of coefficient size from .50 for spelling through .60 for reading may perhaps reflect a limited differentiation of the kind of abilities measured by global tests in elementary school years. Achievement in the skill of handwriting bears little relationship to global measures of ability because handwriting involves a minimum of symbolic manipulation, and manipulation of symbols, especially those of the verbal type, seems to be what is chiefly measured in global tests of intelligence.

Prediction for Secondary School

In secondary school years we find somewhat lower relationships between global measures of intelligence and overall achievement than

we do at the elementary level. In 1930 Ross and Hooks (58) summarized the results of a dozen studies and found that the 33 r 's reported ranged from .12 to .69, with a median r of .48. In the same year, Turney (89) reviewed available studies. Of the 31 r 's reported, 27 were from studies employing group tests, and 4 were from studies using the Stanford-Binet scale. The median r from the group tests was .48. Not all of these studies used the high school average as criterion; some of the coefficients were obtained by correlating test scores with achievement in specific subjects. It is interesting to note, however, that the most extensive study included in the review by Turney was that by Odell (51), in which 1892 twelfth-grade subjects were included, and that in the Odell study the coefficient between a group test and high school average was also .48. The Odell study also used the Stanford-Binet scale, and the r between IQ's so obtained and high school average was .54.

Not much change has occurred in the pattern of results obtained since these earlier studies. As at the elementary level, the most obvious characteristic of coefficients obtained between global measures and averages of grades in the secondary school is their wide range. Since this is the case, it is perhaps misleading to attempt an estimate of a "true" coefficient. But there is some clustering of coefficients. Travers (85, p. 379) estimates the most probable range of coefficients obtained between intelligence tests and grades in academic subjects to be between .4 and .6. When the criterion is shifted to average grades in particular subjects the situation is somewhat changed. In a summary given by Stephens (68, p. 229), median r 's between intelligence tests of the traditional type and achievement in various subjects were .46 for English, .45 for mathematics, .40 for science, .29 for Latin, and .10 for commercial subjects, while the r with high school average was .44.

Validity is, of course, specific, and therein lies the hazard of placing too much confidence in median coefficients obtained from varied samples under different testing situations. Maximum predictive efficiency ought to result from a test tailor-made to the demands of a specific situation, with norms developed for a particular population. Obviously a global measure of intelligence or scholastic aptitude is something of a compromise and is usually standardized against a composite population. The quest for pure factors through the development of multifactor tests brought some hope that various combinations of tests of pure factors might permit a better fitting of the test battery to the requirements of specific situations, and consequently increase

the effectiveness of prediction; but results have only partially justified the hope.

In our earlier discussion we pointed out that we cannot assume that two factors having similar or even identical names are measuring the same factor. And often the results of correlating test scores with external criteria are not according to seemingly reasonable expectations. For example, a test of number or numerical ability may correlate higher with grades in English than does a test of verbal ability. In reviewing this situation, Cronbach (18, p. 177) concludes, "Group factors serve only when regression equations are constructed about the criterion in a single institution." Super, however, is more hopeful as to the usefulness of multifactor tests in guidance. He points out that one of the results of aiming at factorial purity is the loss of some predictive success in a given subject or occupation, as compared to tests of the miniature situation or work sample type. In his words, "This lessened predictive value of the multifactor test is the price of versatility. Apparently one cannot eat one's cake and have it too, at least not in aptitude testing . . . the battery of tests which aims at versatility tends to miss some relatively specific factors and to lose some specific validity" (70).

Since all multifactor tests have been developed by factor analytic methods all are to some extent concerned with factor purity, but in some this is more emphasized than others. An example of a test battery in which factor purity seems to have been a primary consideration is the *Primary Mental Ability Tests*. How, then, have these tests fared as predictors of scholastic success in secondary school? In the manual of the SRA edition (84) correlations are reported between the various factors and scores made on the *Iowa Tests of Educational Development*. The factor correlating highest with most parts of the Iowa tests was verbal meaning, with r 's ranging from .432 to .696. Total scores on the PMA correlated .492 with composite scores on the Iowa tests. A study by Shaw, also cited in the manual, correlated PMA scores with the *Iowa Tests of Educational Development*, the *Cooperative English Test*, and a reading comprehension test constructed for the study. Subjects were ninth-grade students in two Iowa school systems. Again the verbal-meaning test proved to be the most useful single indicator. Multiple R 's were calculated, using from two to four of the factor scores, and were found to range from .443 to .783. An R with the composite of the Iowa Tests was .823. Shaw concluded that optimum combinations of primary mental abilities scores accounted for from one-fifth to

we do at the elementary level. In 1930 Ross and Hooks (58) summarized the results of a dozen studies and found that the 33 r 's reported ranged from .12 to .69, with a median r of .48. In the same year, Turney (89) reviewed available studies. Of the 31 r 's reported, 27 were from studies employing group tests, and 4 were from studies using the Stanford-Binet scale. The median r from the group tests was .48. Not all of these studies used the high school average as criterion; some of the coefficients were obtained by correlating test scores with achievement in specific subjects. It is interesting to note, however, that the most extensive study included in the review by Turney was that by Odell (51), in which 1892 twelfth-grade subjects were included, and that in the Odell study the coefficient between a group test and high school average was also .48. The Odell study also used the Stanford-Binet scale, and the r between IQ's so obtained and high school average was .54.

Not much change has occurred in the pattern of results obtained since these earlier studies. As at the elementary level, the most obvious characteristic of coefficients obtained between global measures and averages of grades in the secondary school is their wide range. Since this is the case, it is perhaps misleading to attempt an estimate of a "true" coefficient. But there is some clustering of coefficients. Travers (85, p. 379) estimates the most probable range of coefficients obtained between intelligence tests and grades in academic subjects to be between .4 and .6. When the criterion is shifted to average grades in particular subjects the situation is somewhat changed. In a summary given by Stephens (68, p. 229), median r 's between intelligence tests of the traditional type and achievement in various subjects were .46 for English, .45 for mathematics, .40 for science, .29 for Latin, and .10 for commercial subjects, while the r with high school average was .44.

Validity is, of course, specific, and therein lies the hazard of placing too much confidence in median coefficients obtained from varied samples under different testing situations. Maximum predictive efficiency ought to result from a test tailor-made to the demands of a specific situation, with norms developed for a particular population. Obviously a global measure of intelligence or scholastic aptitude is something of a compromise and is usually standardized against a composite population. The quest for pure factors through the development of multifactor tests brought some hope that various combinations of tests of pure factors might permit a better fitting of the test battery to the requirements of specific situations, and consequently increase

the effectiveness of prediction; but results have only partially justified the hope.

In our earlier discussion we pointed out that we cannot assume that two factors having similar or even identical names are measuring the same factor. And often the results of correlating test scores with external criteria are not according to seemingly reasonable expectations. For example, a test of number or numerical ability may correlate higher with grades in English than does a test of verbal ability. In reviewing this situation, Cronbach (18, p. 177) concludes, "Group factors serve only when regression equations are constructed about the criterion in a single institution." Super, however, is more hopeful as to the usefulness of multifactor tests in guidance. He points out that one of the results of aiming at factorial purity is the loss of some predictive success in a given subject or occupation, as compared to tests of the miniature situation or work sample type. In his words, "This lessened predictive value of the multifactor test is the price of versatility. Apparently one cannot eat one's cake and have it too, at least not in aptitude testing . . . the battery of tests which aims at versatility tends to miss some relatively specific factors and to lose some specific validity" (70).

Since all multifactor tests have been developed by factor analytic methods all are to some extent concerned with factor purity, but in some this is more emphasized than others. An example of a test battery in which factor purity seems to have been a primary consideration is the *Primary Mental Ability Tests*. How, then, have these tests fared as predictors of scholastic success in secondary school? In the manual of the SRA edition (84) correlations are reported between the various factors and scores made on the *Iowa Tests of Educational Development*. The factor correlating highest with most parts of the Iowa tests was verbal meaning, with r 's ranging from .432 to .696. Total scores on the PMA correlated .492 with composite scores on the Iowa tests. A study by Shaw, also cited in the manual, correlated PMA scores with the *Iowa Tests of Educational Development*, the *Cooperative English Test*, and a reading comprehension test constructed for the study. Subjects were ninth-grade students in two Iowa school systems. Again the verbal-meaning test proved to be the most useful single indicator. Multiple R 's were calculated, using from two to four of the factor scores, and were found to range from .443 to .783. An R with the composite of the Iowa Tests was .823. Shaw concluded that optimum combinations of primary mental abilities scores accounted for from one-fifth to

two-thirds of the total variance in the academic achievement scores (62, p. 248). The manual does not summarize any studies relating PMA scores to actual grades. The rather high coefficients with tests of educational achievement seem encouraging, but in general the promise has not been realized.

Ferguson (24) administered the PMA short form to students enrolled in classes in English III, mechanical drawing, physics, bookkeeping, and speech in a secondary school in Colorado. English grades correlated highest with verbal-meaning scores (.515), but they also correlated significantly (at the 1 percent level) with number and word fluency. Mechanical drawing grades correlated about equally with verbal and space factors, .548 and .540 respectively. Physics showed no correlations significant at the 1 percent level with any of the factors, although all the factors except word fluency yielded coefficients significant at the 5 percent level. The correlations with bookkeeping grades constituted the neatest case, with only one coefficient significant at the 1 percent level, .565 with number. Speech grades were related at the 1 percent level to three factors: verbal-meaning, reasoning, and word fluency, .604, .574, and .609 respectively.

Our purpose is not to offer a complete criticism of the PMA or of any other multifactor battery. Extensive criticisms of the several batteries are easily available to the interested reader. We chose the PMA as an example of a multifactor test in the development of which the attainment of purity of factors appears to have been a primary objective. Let us now turn to an example of a different emphasis.

In the development of the *Differential Aptitude Tests* factorial purity has been deliberately sacrificed to predictive usefulness. Tests of language usage and of mechanical reasoning were included which were known not to be factorially pure. Many validation studies are available for this test; the manual (5) reports several thousand validity coefficients. When correlated with grades in each of the subject areas of English, science, and social studies and history, three or four of the tests yield median r 's in the mid .40's and low .50's. For English the highest coefficients occur with verbal reasoning, spelling, sentences, and (interestingly enough) numerical ability. In the science area, three of the same four tests turned up as best predictors, the exception being spelling which dropped to .36. Grades in social studies and history were more closely associated with verbal reasoning, numerical ability, and sentences. The only test which was found to yield a median coefficient with mathematics grades above .40 was numerical ability

(median r .47), although for girls, r with verbal reasoning was .45, and with sentences .40. Associations were definitely lower with grades in languages and in commercial subjects. In all subject areas coefficients were typically slightly higher for girls than for boys. The *Differential Aptitude Tests* seem to have some value as predictors not only of school grades but also of later performance on standardized achievement tests. Doppelt and Wesman (21) administered the DAT to two groups, and then one year later one group was given the *Iowa Tests of Educational Development*, and three years later the tests of *Essential High School Content* were administered to the other group. Some of the coefficients between DAT scores and achievement scores after three years reached the middle .60's, and for boys the verbal reasoning factor correlated .75 with total scores on the *Essential Content* test. In a recent study by Wolking (96) in which both PMA and DAT tests were administered to eleventh-grade students, the DAT yielded the consistently higher validity coefficients. The policy of frankly compromising the ideal of factor purity in the interests of practical usefulness seems to have borne fruit.

What, then, can we conclude as to the relative usefulness for prediction of global measures as against multifactor tests at the secondary level? If our interest is in predicting average scholastic achievement, then composite scores from multifactor tests seem to be about as effective as the scores from global measures of intelligence or scholastic aptitude; the coefficients from either type of test may be expected to cluster in the range of .40 to .50. The differential prediction of success in different subjects is yet to be established, though probably within a given school system a set of factor scores might be optimally weighted so that it would be possible to achieve predictions greater than the .40 to .50 commonly expected from global measures. However, even if coefficients of .60 to .70 could be achieved, the greater part of the variance in secondary school grades would still be unexplained.

Of course, aptitude tests are by no means the only basis for the prediction of scholastic success in the secondary school. Most conspicuous among other contenders are records of past achievement, either school marks or standardized achievement tests. Ross and Hooks (58) in 1930 found that the correlation between average grades in the grade school and in the ninth grade was .60. By combining five factors and correlating with ninth-grade marks they obtained an R of .67. The factors were: age at end of Grade 8, the number of days present, an estimate of effort, and marks in English and arithmetic. Six years later

Lee and Lee (47, p. 79) concluded that achievement in the second year of junior high school could best be predicted from achievement in the first year. Bond (11) found that reading vocabulary and comprehension were about as useful indicators of tenth-grade achievement as scores on the Stanford-Binet, and that vocabulary was a more important factor than reading comprehension in achievement in English, literary acquaintance, spelling, and biology. Later studies afford no substantial basis for questioning the conclusion of these earlier investigators that grade school achievement is a better predictor of high school achievement than are scores on global measures of intelligence. In 1955, Travers (85) concluded that once high school is reached, a student's grade in a particular subject matter field can be best predicted by his previous grade in the same or related fields.

Prediction for College

There has certainly been an abundance of studies dealing with the problem of prediction from high school to college, and these have been rather frequently reviewed. There would be little point in our duplicating the general sort of review made by Garrett (29) in 1949. Rather, we shall follow our usual plan of seeking to illustrate trends by representative examples.

One of the earlier and more extensive studies was made by Douglass (22). The subjects were 811 freshmen who entered the University of Oregon in 1926 and 385 who entered in 1927. A wide range of predictive factors was included in the study: general high school average, high school grades in various subjects, the number of semester credits earned in various high school subjects, intelligence test scores, principals' quartile ratings on scholastic ability, principals' quintile ratings on the traits of industry, leadership, and citizenship, and various other measures. Douglass found a coefficient of .56 between average high school grades and average college grades for the 1925 group after five terms of college, and .50 for the 1926 group after three terms. These r values were very similar to the median r of .55 which Douglass found in a review of 28 previous studies made from 1921 to 1930. Coefficients between intelligence test scores and college grades for the Oregon group were .45 and .41 for the five- and three-term groups respectively. Here again the r 's of the Oregon study were very similar to the median coefficient of .45 reported in 44 previous studies. Among the more important conclusions reached by Douglass were that the best single type of prognostic data is the average high school

mark, that very little could be gained by including any of the variables studied other than high school marks and intelligence test scores, and that no significant correlation existed between the number of units of credits earned in high school in any subject matter field and scholastic success in college (22, pp. 55-56).

In 1934 Segel (60) concluded from a very extensive review of the evidence that the typical coefficient between general achievement tests at the close of high school and college achievement was .535, while the typical coefficient for college grade averages and "general mental tests" was .44. On the basis of a later review of studies Garrett in 1949 compared the predictive effectiveness of high school average, high school rank, achievement test scores, and intelligence test scores. The median r between college grades and high school average grades was .56, while the median r with rank in high school graduating class was .548. Some difference was noted in median r 's reported in earlier summaries made in 1931 to 1934, in which median r 's with achievement tests were very similar (.54 to .56), as compared with a 1942 summary which found a median r of .48. Coefficients between intelligence test scores and college grade averages were typically .47. Garrett concluded: "In general, general aptitude tests other than intelligence tests or psychological examinations are useful means of predicting scholastic success as a whole, but according to the present summary of studies, ranks fourth with high school rank or average, general achievement tests, and intelligence tests ranking above it" (29, p. 110).

The general pattern of conclusions reached by Douglass, Segel, and Garrett are still acceptable today with only minor changes and refinements. Chauncey and Frederiksen (15) find rank-in-class to be a better predictor than high school average, since the former helps to eliminate errors due to variation in grading practices, though not errors due to differences in instruction or in quality of students. Typical coefficients to be expected, these authors say, are about .55 between rank-in-class and college achievement, and can be increased to about .60 when corrected for specific school or type of school. Correlations from a battery of achievement tests may be expected to be of the same order—.55—and coefficients from scholastic aptitude tests about .45. Henry (36) places the correlation between school marks and first-year college grades at .50 to .60, and correlations with college aptitude tests at an average of about .50. That there is a probable ceiling to predictive efficiency with presently available tests is indicated by Chauncey and Frederiksen:

Those working in the field of predicting scholastic success in college have felt that there are definite limitations to the use of scholastic aptitude and achievement tests. It has been estimated by those who work under conditions as nearly ideal as we can expect that their highest potential predictive value is represented by a coefficient of around .75. And in fact, even when the best of present achievement and aptitude tests whose reliability is known to be high, are combined to predict grades, it is seldom possible consistently to attain coefficients of more than .70.

From the foregoing it is apparent that even when the most valid measures of aptitude and achievement are used there still remains an unpredicted variance in average college grades which amounts to approximately one-half of the total variance (15, p. 92).

Factorial-type tests have been somewhat disappointing in their application to the practical problems of prediction of scholastic success in college. One of the first of these tests to be given an extensive tryout was the *Primary Mental Abilities* tests. The results of a number of studies involving these tests were reviewed by Goodman (32). As might be expected, since the samples came from a number of different school situations, the findings varied considerably. The multiple R's reported between combinations of the subtests and general scholastic average were mostly in the .40's—though one study found R's from .59 to .62 between various combinations of the subtests and two-year college grade averages for a group of women in the Department of Home Economics at Pennsylvania State College, and another study obtained an R of .640 by using all seven subtests. The best single predictor was the verbal.

Unquestionably the most widely used test which emerged from factorial backgrounds was the American Council on Education Psychological Examination. This instrument has now been withdrawn from the market and replaced by the *College Aptitude Test*, but because of the great influence of the earlier test on college testing it may be instructive to note very briefly several examples among the multitude of reports of studies involving this test. Wallace (90) used as subjects entering freshmen at the University of Michigan in three areas—languages, social studies, and sciences. Correlations with achievement in the three areas were generally low, and correlations with first-semester grade averages were .286 for Q-scores, .360 for L-scores, and .400 for total scores. The highest R of .486 was obtained by combining Q and L scores and correlating with English grades. There were no marked differences in the predictive value of Q and L scores. Wallace concluded that "Assurance is slight indeed that an individual

obtaining a low score on the ACE cannot profitably engage in a university curriculum, particularly if other indications, such as grades in his preparatory work, are in his favor" (90, p. 24). Frederiksen and Schrader (25) reviewed the results of investigations at twelve institutions. The median correlation of the ACE Psychological Examination scores with first-year college grades was .47, while the correlation with high school standing was .57. An interesting difference in the prediction for veterans and nonveterans emerged. ACE scores proved to be slightly more valid for male veterans than for male nonveterans, while for nonveterans high school standing was a better predictor than ACE scores were for veterans. By using a weighted composite of ACE scores and high school standing, multiple R 's of .60 and .68 were obtained for veterans and nonveterans respectively. Bolton (10) reported the findings typical of so many studies with the ACE test, that L scores predicted academic achievement better than Q scores and that the total scores better than either part. Somewhat less typical was Bolton's report that scores made on the ACE tests during the freshman year had very little predictive value for junior and senior years. Jackson (42) used as subjects 1687 freshmen men and 1296 freshmen women at Michigan State University. Four tests were administered: the ACE Psychological Examination and three achievement tests constructed at Michigan State University covering reading, English usage, and arithmetic proficiency. For men the coefficient of the *Psychological Examination* with grade point average was .43, but for women the r was .52. For men, all of the achievement examination scores correlated slightly higher with grade point average than did the ACE test scores, the r 's ranging from .46 to .50. For women, however, the r with reading scores was higher (.64); with arithmetic proficiency the r of .49 was slightly lower; and the r with the English usage test (.52) was the same as between grade averages and the *Psychological Examination*.

Of course many other aptitude tests have been used as predictors of college success. We have selected the PMA and the ACE Psychological Examination for illustration because they were among the first of the tests developed by factorial methods to be widely used. The PMA tests were not especially intended to be tests of scholastic aptitude, but rather a general aptitude battery of the pure factor type. The ACE *Psychological Examination* was definitely constructed as a scholastic aptitude test. Our purpose has been to show in a general way how tests of the factorial type have measured up under the test of practical use.

Let us pause now and review our discussion of college prediction, not only from tests, but in broader terms. As in secondary school, so in college, the best single predictor of average grades seems to be previous achievement. If grades are the predictor, then better results are obtained from rank-in-class based on grades than from the average high school grade. An obvious exception to this generalization is the case of the very small high school in which the graduating class is so small that the rank-in-class lacks meaning. Achievement tests can be about as effective predictors as rank-in-class; high school average yields slightly lower correlations. Tests of intelligence or of general scholastic aptitude are less effective predictors of college grades than rank-in-class, high school average, or achievement tests; correlations between college average and such tests are typically in the middle .40's. However, validity coefficients can be increased by sharpening the criterion, as, for example, predicting to a particular curriculum in a specific institution. Even so, there seems to be a practical limit on what can be reasonably expected of prediction from tests even under optimal conditions; somewhat less than half the total variance in college grades can be predicted from tests.

One question of great importance in prediction for guidance purposes is the level of competition which the individual may be expected to encounter in a particular school. This consideration, of course, focuses upon criterion rather than on predictors. As a matter of common sense it has long been observed that colleges and universities differ greatly in standards of achievement and as to the intellectual capabilities of students enrolled in them. Moreover, within the same university various courses of study probably differ in their demands and attract to them students of varying abilities. It would be rather less than delicate to attempt to discuss the differences in standards within and between institutions, but the widespread use of tests of scholastic aptitude have made possible some comparisons for the other side of the coin—the matter of differing abilities of various student populations. One of the most widely used tests has been the ACE Psychological Examination which we discussed above.

A report by Thurstone and Adkins (83) demonstrates the differences the differing levels of performances of students in several types of institutions. In Table 17 several examples selected from the longer table in the report are given. The three gross scores of 75, 95, and 110 were chosen for illustration because they correspond approximately to the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles for four-year colleges. Reading

across the table, it will be seen that a student who made any one of these scores would place relatively higher in the junior college or the teachers college group. For example, a score of 95 would place a student at about the middle of the 4-year college group (55th percentile), or in the upper third of the junior college group, or in the upper 30 percent of the teachers college group. Doubtless, differences might be even greater if an individual's score were set against the scores made by students in various specific institutions. Variability of college groups from school to school can also be illustrated from the report of the Commission on Human Resources and Advanced Training (95,

TABLE 17. Percentile Ranks of Several Gross Scores on the 1938 Psychological Examination in Different Student Populations

Gross Score	Four-Year Colleges	Junior Colleges	Teachers Colleges
75	.262	.389	.422
95	.545	.685	.713
110	.766	.868	.871

SOURCE: L. L. Thurstone, T. G. Thurstone, & Dorothy C. Adkins. The 1938 psychological examination. *Educ. Rec.*, 1939, 20, 263-300.

p. 147). The test involved was the *Army General Classification Test*. In these data a score falling at the 25th percentile of the highest-ranking institutional group of graduates would be above the mean of graduates of the majority of the 41 colleges in the sample. Still another example, this time on the basis of a test designed as an aid in the selection of graduate students, can be seen in the mean scores of seniors in various institutions on the *Aptitude Test* of the Educational Testing Service. Individual institutions are not identified, of course, but the range of institutional means suggests very considerable differences in performance of students in various colleges and universities (41, p. 18).

The obvious implication for guidance of such findings as these is that an individual's chances of success in college are greatly influenced by the particular institution in which he undertakes his college career. Unfortunately, information regarding the ability level of students in a specific institution and curriculum are not usually available to the secondary school counselor. But colleges will often supply a high school with the grades earned by the graduates of that school,

especially during the freshman year. If a high school sends any considerable number of graduates to a given college or university, the high school counselor can, over a period of years, accumulate the data necessary to make a reasonably satisfactory estimate of the chances of success for graduates entering a particular curriculum in a specific institution. An estimate thus made has the virtue of prediction to a highly specific criterion and is much more promising than any sort of blanket prediction of "success in college." The predictors may be: rank in high school class, average high school grade, standardized achievement test scores, scholastic aptitude test scores, or, better, some optimal combination of these. This type of approach to the problem, as seen in reverse from the college point of view, is illustrated in a report by Hoffman (37), who found that prediction of college success from rank in class could be improved by examining the scholastic achievement of former students who came from the same high school as the applicants, and whose ranks in class were similar to theirs.

Long-Range Predictions to Secondary School and College

In the United States a relatively large proportion of those completing the elementary grades continue on into the secondary school. Perhaps because of this situation, there has been less interest in our country in predicting from elementary school than in other countries such as Great Britain, for example, where important choice points as to type of school occur earlier in the life of the student than is common in our schools. In general, of course, the bright pupil in the elementary grades is apt to be the bright student in secondary school, and the slower student is apt to continue as the slower student and will, if anything, drop still further behind in relative standing because of the selection occurring from early grades through high school. Probably the best single basis for prediction of grades in secondary school consists of previous grades in the same or related subject matter fields, as was noted earlier. Tests of general intelligence do have some limited value for prediction. Byrns and Henmon (13) found that IQ's obtained during Grades 4 to 8 correlated .397 with tenth-grade achievement as indicated by school marks and .426 with the four-year high school average. Adams (1) reported a similar coefficient of .46 between IQ's obtained in Grades 4, 5, and 6 and the high school average. Both investigators used the same measure of intelligence (National Intelligence Test), but the groups studied were as far apart as Texas and Wisconsin. Coefficients of this order are about what we would expect

between intelligence tests administered in high school and first-year grades in college. But everything considered, it would seem that testing efforts in the elementary school years can be more fruitfully devoted to appraisal of achievement and diagnosis of learning difficulties rather than prediction of success in the secondary school.

Prediction of success in college from evidence obtainable during the elementary school years has long been a guidance dream, but it is still little more than a dream. There is, of course, a consistency of development, as noted before, and it would be surprising indeed if the dull youngsters in grade school regularly turned out to be the bright students in college. But when it comes to predicting that an individual grade school pupil will or will not succeed in college, the only justifiable posture is one of genuine modesty and caution. Good evidence is sadly lacking, but if we are willing to move the starting point up to the junior high school, we can find reason for the same belief expressed regarding the prediction of college success from high school records—that previous achievement is the best single indicator. Billhartz and Hutson (7) followed 282 eighth-grade graduates through two years of college, and found a r of .561 between junior high school and college averages. About half the group attended the University of Pittsburgh, and the others scattered among 47 other institutions. For the scattered group the coefficient was .563. For the total group, junior high school grades other than science and mathematics .512, while science and mathematics grades correlated .482 from junior high school to college.

As opposed to these relationships between earlier and later grade averages, Billhartz and Hutson found that college grade point averages correlated .369 with IQ's. The correlation found by these investigators seems to be rather typical of those found in other studies, even though the IQ's were obtained at differing grade levels. Rosenfeld and Nemzek (57) found a coefficient of .31 between first-grade IQ's and college grade average, as compared with .46 for IQ's obtained during the twelfth grade. Adams, in the investigation noted above (1), studied the relation between scores on the National Intelligence Test, Scale A, administered in the fourth, fifth, and sixth grades to pupils in a college community in Texas, and later achievement. All subjects were Anglo-American pupils. The coefficient found for the early IQ's and college freshmen grade point averages was .38, while high school averages and freshmen grades correlated .67 and scores on the Ohio State Psychological Examination administered during the freshman

year and college grades correlated .57. The early IQ's proved to be rather good predictors of scores made on this Psychological Examination; an r of .68 was found. Byrns and Henmon (13), who also used the National Intelligence Tests, found a somewhat higher relationship of .454 for pupils in Grades 3 to 8 in Madison, Wisconsin, and achievement in the University of Wisconsin.

The evidence is too scattered to justify any final conclusions regarding the prediction of college success from elementary school data, but the following generalizations seem reasonably probable:

1. At least in the later years of elementary school, achievement as indicated by school marks is a better predictor of college success than scores on intelligence tests.
2. The relationship between test intelligence and college achievement is definitely lower from elementary grades to college than from high school to college.
3. Long-term relationships between early IQ's and college success is at best modest, probably under .40.
4. The use of IQ scores obtained during elementary school years as the single basis for predicting success in college of an individual is without justification.

PREDICTION OF SUCCESS IN OCCUPATIONS

We have been considering some of the possibilities and difficulties involved in attempts to predict scholastic success. We cannot leave the problem of prediction without paying some heed to the related matter of prediction of success in occupations, but we shall not delay long with this topic because in this particular gravel bed there seem to be very few nuggets of gold of any worthwhile size. First of all, we must be clear as to the limitations intended when we use the phrase "prediction of success in occupations." We do not mean selection for immediate employment. If prediction is to be meaningful in guidance at the secondary school level, or even at the college level, the predictions must be dependable over a period of years. This is particularly true if the occupational goal requires a prolonged period of training. Next, we do not mean merely prediction on a group basis. It is helpful in understanding the relation of abilities to occupation to be able to rank occupations according to mean scores on some aptitude test. But usually, as in the case of the data resulting from the *Army General Classification Test* during World War II, the overlap is so

great as almost to preclude clear-cut individual predictions (35). For example, accountants ranked first and teamsters last among 74 occupational groups on the basis of median scores, but the highest-ranking teamster scored only 12 points below the highest-ranking accountant and 17 points above the median score of accountants. All occupational groups contained some individuals who scored above the median scores of the highest groups. Often prediction of scholastic success amounts to prediction of the early stages of success in occupation, simply because the student must succeed in school before he may enter certain occupations. This is true of such professions as the law, medicine, engineering, teaching, and others. Even occupations for which there are no specific licensing or certification provisions may require the completion of a certain level of general education, such as high school graduation, so that here too prediction of the minimum scholastic success essential to graduation becomes the prediction of the possibility of entering such occupations.

One further limitation is intended: we mean prediction on the basis of abilities, and at this point we will arbitrarily exclude from consideration any attempts at prediction of success in occupations on the basis of motivation and personality characteristics. What, then, do we mean by prediction of success in occupation as we shall here briefly discuss it? We mean the establishing of the degree of probability that a given individual who possesses certain measurable abilities will or will not succeed in a given occupation, when success is judged according to some chosen criterion or criteria.

Thorndike investigated the predictive effectiveness of certain data as indicators of vocational success for 2225 children who had been tested in 1921-1922. The criterion of success was earnings at ages 20 to 22. He concluded that, although grade reached, scholarship marks, intelligence test scores, or any combination of these predicted success in school after age 14 fairly well, the highest correlation obtainable with earnings by combining such data did not produce a correlation over .30 for boys, or over .40 for girls, for those employed in clerical work. For those engaged in mechanical work the predictors were valueless; r 's ranged from .00 to .14. School conduct marks and attendance had no predictive value (76, p. 114).

At the time of the Thorndike study (1921-1922) multifactor tests were not available, and therefore the question immediately arises as to whether or not these modern tests may not be considerably more effective for prediction of occupational success than were the rela-

year and college grades correlated .57. The early IQ's proved to be rather good predictors of scores made on this Psychological Examination; an r of .68 was found. Byrns and Henmon (13), who also used the National Intelligence Tests, found a somewhat higher relationship of .454 for pupils in Grades 3 to 8 in Madison, Wisconsin, and achievement in the University of Wisconsin.

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2. The relationship between test intelligence and college achievement is definitely lower from elementary grades to college than from high school to college.
3. Long-term relationships between early IQ's and college success is at best modest, probably under .40.
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We have been considering some of the possibilities and difficulties involved in attempts to predict scholastic success. We cannot leave the problem of prediction without paying some heed to the related matter of prediction of success in occupations, but we shall not delay long with this topic because in this particular gravel bed there seem to be very few nuggets of gold of any worthwhile size. First of all, we must be clear as to the limitations intended when we use the phrase "prediction of success in occupations." We do not mean selection for immediate employment. If prediction is to be meaningful in guidance at the secondary school level, or even at the college level, the predictions must be dependable over a period of years. This is particularly true if the occupational goal requires a prolonged period of training. Next, we do not mean merely prediction on a group basis. It is helpful in understanding the relation of abilities to occupation to be able to rank occupations according to mean scores on some aptitude test. But usually, as in the case of the data resulting from the *Army General Classification Test* during World War II, the overlap is so

of .27, and around .16 for proficiency criteria. For training criteria, seven tests have average validity coefficients of .30 or greater; these are: intelligence, .38; arithmetic, .41; spatial relations, .31; perceptual speed, .39; mechanical principles, .34; hand dexterity .38; and arm dexterity .30. There were no tests which had validity coefficients as high as .30 for proficiency criteria, the highest being .27 for perceptual speed.

But once again we must remind ourselves that validity is specific. As Ghiselli points out, a test with low validity for one job or criterion might be considerably more valid for another job or criterion. Moreover, any classification of jobs is apt to throw together into the same group jobs requiring rather different abilities. It is important, therefore, to ask "What is the maximum predictive efficiency of a particular type of test for some one specific job?" To answer this question Ghiselli determined the highest validity coefficient reported for any one job, using only coefficients based on 100 or more cases.

The column heading "General Occupational Classification" refers to a simplified classification developed by Ghiselli for the study and based upon the *Dictionary of Occupational Titles*. The second pair of columns includes jobs as classified by the *Dictionary*, and the "Entry occupations" classification is also taken from the *Dictionary*. In all three classifications the groupings are broad, being based upon the first digit of the code numbers. In comparing coefficients reported in Table 18 with those we found in the prediction of scholastic success it must be remembered that we were discussing for the most part *median* coefficients, and that the coefficients summarized by Ghiselli are *maximum*—the highest found in some one study for a given job. As was noted above, typical coefficients with training criteria clustered about .27; comparing the value .27 with the maximum values of Table 18 clearly illustrates the gain made by predicting to specific criteria. Also worthy of note is the finding suggested by the data of the table that a wide variety of tests may be useful. For some one job, a highly specific test—such as tapping or finger dexterity—may yield coefficients of .40 or more. On the other hand, for some specific jobs, tests of intellectual abilities—particularly intelligence and arithmetic—seem to be the best predictors to training criteria for entry occupations, while tests of understanding of mechanical principles yield higher coefficients with proficiency criteria than with training criteria.

One of the most extensive sets of data to be analyzed for value in predicting occupational success is that reported by Thorndike and

tively primitive instruments available to Thorndike. Evidence is not yet available for any complete answer as to how effective multifactor tests are, but a recent study by Hall (34) is of particular interest because of the approach taken to the problem. Six groups of male subjects who took the *Differential Aptitude Tests* at age 17 were followed up at age 21. At that time, 66 were in liberal arts colleges; 22 in skilled trades; 49 employed in clerical work; 59 in mechanical, electrical, and building trades; and 71 in unskilled work. Using multiple discriminant analysis, the investigator found two statistically significant discriminants, but nearly 80 percent of the within-group variance could be accounted for by only one discriminant. The separation among the six groups was largely in terms of verbal ability plus a clerical speed and accuracy factor which seemed to be speed of perception at routine tasks. Moreover, the six groups tended to arrange themselves in a hierarchy as a function of verbal intelligence, with the liberal arts students at the high end and the unskilled workers at the low end. But the six groups were not equally separated from each other. The liberal arts students tended to maintain their integrity as a group, while the clerks, salesmen, and skilled workers formed one cluster and the electrical, mechanical, building trades, and unskilled groups constituted another cluster. It may be, as Hall suggests, that the multiple discriminant analysis affords a systematic way of defining occupational families. The method of analysis employed by Hall is a far cry from the simple correlational analysis used by Thorndike three decades earlier; yet one is struck by the similarity of results of the two studies. Thorndike found that grade reached, scholarship marks, and intelligence test scores were the best predictors; probably all of these contained high verbal loadings. The more refined analysis by Hall again focuses on the verbal factor. And in both cases the context is employment—not school.

A recent and very thorough review of the evidence relating to prediction of occupational success from aptitude measures has been made by Ghiselli (31). One of the important points demonstrated in this study is the importance of the distinction between training criteria and proficiency criteria. By the former is meant such items as grades in training courses and instructors' ratings of learners; proficiency criteria may be some measure of production, supervisors' ratings of proficiency, sales, and the like. Ghiselli has shown that aptitude tests correlate higher with training criteria than with proficiency criteria (31, pp. 134 ff.). For training criteria, coefficients clustered about a value

who were single, between the ages 18 and 26, and had passed a physical examination and the Qualifying Examination. The qualifying score was such that those selected represented about the upper half of high school graduates. The predictors were of two kinds, the test scores and certain items of biographical data. Since it was known that most of the common-factor variance of the tests making up the Examination could be accounted for by five factors, the separate test scores were grouped into five composites termed the General intellectual, Numerical, Perceptual-spatial, Mechanical, and Psychomotor. Seven criterion scores were devised on the basis of information obtained from questionnaires returned by the men in 1955 and 1956, 12 or 13 years after the original testing. The seven scores, which were taken as rough indexes of success and job satisfaction, were based upon (1) monthly earned income, (2) number supervised, (3) self-rated success, (4) self-rated job satisfaction, (5) vertical mobility, (6) lateral mobility, and (7) length of time in occupation. "Lateral mobility" gave some indication of the dimension of job stability as against "jumping around," and "length of time in occupation" was included for what help it might offer in interpretation rather than as a real criterion measure.

The data were analyzed for differences both between and within groups for 124 occupational groups used in the study. Between-group differences were real and sometimes substantial, and "most of the group patterns and profiles were consistent with what our a priori predictions would have been" (78, p. 49). Some occupations such as accounting, chemical engineering, or surveying seemed to demand rather distinctive ability patterns, as reflected in the ability profiles for these groups. Other occupations were not characterized by special ability demands but rather by relatively flat group profiles; examples of these were laboratory technicians, sales managers, and high school teachers. The general average of ability demands of such groups might be above or below the average for all groups. Although occupational groups could be differentiated by mean scores, the authors emphasized that the variability within any given group for any given aptitude dimension was quite marked. Occupational groups also differed with respect to personal background variables, and although recognizing the difficulty of comparing these data with test scores, it was the judgment of the investigators that items of personal background differentiated the groups about as sharply as did the aptitude scores. Analyses of within-group differences led to quite different conclusions which are best summarized in the words of the investigators.

TABLE 18. Maximum Validity Coefficients for Each Test for Any Job

	General Occupational Classification		Dictionary of Occupational Titles		Entry Occupations		Maximum Validity Coefficients
	Train.	Prof.	Train.	Prof.	Train.	Prof.	
Intellectual abilities							
Intelligence	.50	.47	.61	.56	.61	.55	.61
Immediate memory	.32	.36	.34	.43	.34	.39	.43
Substitution	.34	.26	.44	.35	.36	.40	.44
Arithmetic	.59	.41	.54	.53	.61	.37	.61
Spatial abilities							
Spatial relations	.42	.43	.45	.56	.42	.56	.56
Location	.29	.28	.34	.30	.29	.46	.46
Perception of details							
Number comparison	.35	.33	.35	.40	.40	.35	.40
Name comparison	.40	.34	.41	.45	.41	.38	.45
Cancellation	.48	.36	.59	.51	.24	.40	.59
Pursuit	.28	.35	.22	.38	.22	.35	.38
Perceptual speed	.43	.38	.46	.29	.51	.42	.51
Mechanical comprehension							
Mechanical principles	.41	.57	.49	.66	.41	.66	.66
Motor abilities							
Tracing	.24	.42	.31	.26	.29	.26	.42
Tapping	.23	.32	.24	.40	.25	.40	.40
Dotting	.22	.28	.23	.34	.23	.40	.40
Finger dexterity	.44	.30	.57	.42	.57	.42	.57
Hand dexterity	.50	.29	.50	.38	.50	.38	.50
Arm dexterity	.54	.24	.54	.55	.54	.30	.55
Personality traits							
Personality		.37		.37		.50	.50
Interest		.34		.38		.34	.38
Personal data	.60	.58	.60	.60	.61	.60	.61

SOURCE: E. E. Ghiselli. *The measurement of occupational aptitude*. Berkeley: Univer. of California Press, 1955. P. 140.

Hagen (78). The subjects were 10,000 men chosen to be representative of the 75,000 applicants for Aviation Cadet training in the Army Air Force in World War II who had taken the same Aviation Cadet Qualifying Examination during a five-month period. As compared with the general population, these men constituted a selected group

will discard it and concentrate on appraising abilities for immediate steps in training required for the general area in which lies the student's intended occupation.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE TALENTED

In recent years we have been witnessing a striking upsurge of Jeffersonian thinking in regard to college education. We are hearing less about college for all who wish it, and more and more about selection for college. One of the interesting nuances of this developing point of view, and one which ties it still closer to Jeffersonian ideas, is that the more able should be identified and prepared at public expense if need be, not for the fuller development of the individual, but to meet national needs. The National Defense Education Act of 1958 (54), stated as its purpose the providing of "substantial assistance . . . in order to insure trained manpower of sufficient quality and quantity to meet the national defense needs of the United States." One important step toward meeting this goal was to be the provision of guidance services, and state plans were to provide for testing "to identify students with outstanding aptitudes and ability," for the development of guidance and counseling services in secondary schools to assist students with educational planning, and to encourage outstanding students to complete secondary school and to continue on to higher education. Obviously, the Act grew out of a feeling of defense urgency, and the focus was upon identifying and preparing the more able students in the fields of science, mathematics, languages, and certain areas of vocational training. But in a larger perspective the Act represents a major shift from an emphasis on mass education almost as an end in itself—and perhaps as a right of all individuals—to a screening and education of the able because the nation needs them. This is the spirit of Jefferson.

Although it may be popularly supposed that the current interest in the identification of the gifted or talented dates from the first Russian "Sputnik" this of course is not the case. The use of intelligence tests early led to a concern for the education of the more able, which continued, as evidenced by such studies as those by Terman and associates (72, 73), and by many others. During World War II the acute need for specialized personnel became a matter of grave concern, and appeals were made to various professional groups for assistance in locating capable persons. Four groups specifically involved

As far as we were able to determine from our data, there is no convincing evidence that aptitude tests or biographical information of the type available for us can predict degree of success within an occupation insofar as this is represented in the criterion scores that we were able to obtain. This would suggest that we should view the long-range of prediction of occupational success by aptitude tests with a good deal of skepticism and take a very restrained view as to how much can be accomplished in this direction. It is possible that data for a more heterogeneous group of applicants would lead to different conclusions in this respect; however, our suspicion is that increased success would have shown up primarily in an increased sharpness of differentiation among occupations rather than in improved ability to predict within a single occupation . . . (78, p. 50).

In view of evidence such as we have been reviewing, especially the summary by Ghiselli and the investigation by Thorndike and Hagen, what can we say of the role of prediction of occupational success in guidance? Let us recall first of all the framework in which we began this discussion. We were to consider only prediction based upon abilities, with success defined according to some criterion or criteria, and prediction was to mean the degree of probability that a given individual would succeed or fail in a given occupation. In this sense, there seems to be little justification for attempting long-range prediction of occupational success on the basis of either aptitude scores or the kind of personal background data thus far investigated. Tests of abilities may offer some assistance in making judgments of the immediate, short-range variety as to probable success in training for a specific job, but not much help for even short-range prediction of success on the job. Here we should recall that Ghiselli found the median validity coefficient for prediction of success in training was .27, and the median coefficient with proficiency criteria was .16. Such a general statement should of course be qualified by the recognition of somewhat better predictions for some specific jobs, but even the maximum coefficients reported by Ghiselli do not offer much basis for effective prediction on the basis of tests alone. In the present state of affairs, secondary school counselors and other guidance personnel would seem to be extremely ill-advised if they undertake to predict success or failure of an individual in a particular job for the long range on the basis of presently measurable abilities. Clearly there are differences in abilities between various occupational groups, but these differences furnish no adequate basis for the prediction of individual success or failure. The purposes of guidance will best be served if any counselor who may now have a crystal ball for predicting occupational success

best predictor. But when the subjects are limited to a few at the top, intelligence becomes less useful as a predictor for differentiating among these few. Coefficients shrink with a limited range of talent. It has often been suggested that the relation of intelligence to outstanding success might best be conceived in terms of a minimum or threshold. Beyond the minimum intelligence essential to success in a given field of endeavor, motivational and situational factors loom larger. In the follow-up study of the gifted children studied by Terman (73), two groups of the more and less successful could be distinguished, but the differences in intelligence were slight. In her study of biologists, Roe (56) failed to find significant differences in intelligence as between the eminent and less eminent. It is at this point of seeking to understand the importance of factors beyond intelligence that the studies of the Committee on Identification of Talent (50) make important contributions.

In his discussion of "The Role of an 'Ability' Construct in a Theory of Behavior," Baldwin (3, p. 198) suggested that "the study of actual talent is logically and strategically prior to the study of potential talent," although he made it clear that he did not propose "delaying empirical research on the identification and development of potential talent until the problems of measurement of ability are solved." Baldwin's remarks apply with peculiar force to the situation in which the counselor finds himself when confronted with the problem of the identification of the talented. He has available precious little knowledge of "actual" performance of talent in various fields, but he is confronted with all the problems of identifying "potential" talent (that is, making an assessment of aptitude); and although the knowledge of the logically prior "actual" is lacking, he is expected somehow to identify "aptitudes." Moreover, we know relatively little about what happens developmentally in the individual in the process of actualizing potential abilities. We are, however, becoming increasingly aware of environmental factors which seem to place roadblocks in the actualization of potential. Some of these we discussed in the framework of the psychological habitat and more generally in our consideration of contexts and limits.

For many youth the actualization of aptitude means successful completion of prescribed courses in college. However potentially able, the youth is not going to have a chance to demonstrate his ability as a physician or lawyer, for example, without college attendance, as was pointed out earlier. Failure to enroll in and complete college by those

were the American Council of Learned Societies, the American Council on Education, the National Research Council, and the Social Science Research Council. After the war, interest continued in the problem of assessing our national resources of highly able and trained personnel. By 1949 the Commission on Human Resources and Advanced Training was formed, and before long various investigations were under way under the general leadership of Dael Wolfe. Many other studies and series of studies were undertaken, often with financial support from various foundations. One of the most recent of such reports to come from the press is that by the Committee on Identification of Talent (50).

The problem of identifying the talented or more able is one special aspect of the more general problem of assessment of abilities. Many of the problems involved are simply specialized extensions of those already noted in our previous discussion. There is, first of all, the problem of conceptualizing the nature of ability. It will be recalled that we arbitrarily decided to use the term *ability* in a genetic sense, including both aptitude and proficiency. The adoption of a usage for a term does not, of course, supply us with any theory of the nature of ability or abilities; the truth seems to be that we simply do not have any theory of ability which is generally accepted as adequate. The special part of the ability concept with which we are most concerned is that of potential ability or aptitude, since this is the heart of the problem of identification of the talented. Our concern in the preceding general discussion was with empirical findings as to the effectiveness of prediction, rather than with the incomplete fragments of theory. The results of our brief summary seemed to support an attitude of pronounced modesty rather than one of rosy hope. When we turn to the upper ranges of ability—to the talented—the situation is much the same. The same problem of criterion or criteria again confronts us.

By what standards or manifestations can we judge talent? By scholastic success while in school? If so, how shall we account for the success of some persons, especially in the creative arts, who seem to warrant classification among the talented in spite of indifferent success in school? Surely the criterion of scholastic success is too narrow. Again, even if we could arrive at some acceptable criteria of talented performance, what predictors can we use? In our review of predictors of scholastic and occupational success we found that correlations involving a considerable range of measured intelligence have been high enough to be helpful, although test intelligence is not the

nishes estimates based on these two factors is of considerable interest. High school graduates who rank in the upper 20 percent on intelligence tests, and whose grades place them in the upper 40 percent of graduates may be considered well qualified for college. Of the students meeting these criteria in the groups studied, 47 percent graduated from college. There were estimated to be 96,000 such students, but there were more than these (106,000) who met the criteria but did not graduate from college. In addition, there were estimated to be 9,000 of comparable intelligence who did not graduate from high school. Whether or not one wishes to consider students meeting these criteria of intelligence and achievement to be "talented" is a matter of arbitrary decision, but in any event less than half of those very probably capable of college were not going to be able to realize their potential in those specialized fields for which college is prerequisite. If the two criteria of intelligence and class rank are applied in more stringent fashion we find, as we would expect, that the percentage of graduates increases and the loss in realized ability is somewhat lessened. Among the very top group, those who rank in the upper 2 percent in intelligence and in the top 20 percent of graduates as to grades, 15,000 (62 percent) graduate from college. There were estimated to be 300 of comparable intelligence who did not complete high school. On the basis of facts such as these it is abundantly clear that a very considerable portion of the more able are not continuing on to college and graduation and hence are blocked from actualization of abilities in those areas requiring college training.

It is of considerable interest for the guidance effort to ask, "Into what fields do the more able go?" And, "Are choices expressed during high school years indicative of later fields of specialization?" Again the studies of the Commission offer help. Among the conclusions reached are two of especial interest: (1) students in some fields are more highly selected in terms of test intelligence than are those in other fields, and (2) the differences among the fields as to the frequency with which they attract or admit students of higher intelligence are "about the same regardless of the educational level at which the students are studied" (95, p. 197). Three notable exceptions to these findings are the fields of psychology, the social sciences, and physical education. Let us examine these generalizations in more detail.

Again, the measure of ability consists of *Army General Classification Test* scores, or their equivalents. Scores were available for high school juniors, college graduates, graduate students, and college graduates employed in the field of specialization. Students were classified

who apparently have the ability to succeed in college is therefore a matter of great importance to both the individuals and to the nation. The Commission on Human Resources and Advanced Training (95, p. 149) made estimates of the percentages of high-ability students who graduate from college. The measure of ability was scores on the *Army General Classification Test* and on other tests converted to AGCT scores. Of the top 20 percent who made scores of 117 or higher, 34 percent or about one in three graduated. Among the top 10 percent, 42 percent graduated. Percentages of those graduating increased with increasing scores, but even among the very highest 0.1 percent, only about 2 out of 3, or 69 percent graduated. A study by Berdie (6, pp. 101 ff.) permits an approach to the problem in terms of future plans of high school graduates rather than record of actual graduation. The scholastic aptitude test used was the ACE Psychological Examination. On this test, a raw score of 120 indicated that, for the Minnesota High School graduates who were the subjects, the student would be in the upper 15 to 20 percent of his high school class, and in the upper quarter of Minnesota college freshmen. There were 18 percent of the 22,516 students for whom scores were available who scored above 120. Of these high-ability students, 32 percent of the boys and 28 percent of the girls planned to enter college.

It will be recalled from our discussion of prediction of success in college that the best single predictor of success appeared to be academic achievement in high school, and it is therefore important to see what proportions of high-achieving students graduate from or plan to enter college. Studies made by the Commission (95, p. 150) show that of the upper 20 percent on the basis of percentile rank in the high school graduating class, 53 percent enter and 43 percent graduate from college. In the Minnesota study, comparable data are given as to the percentile rank in high school class. Converting these data to percentages to facilitate comparisons with the Commission results, we find that of those who ranked in the upper 20 percent, almost 63 percent planned to enter college—71 percent of the boys and 55 percent of the girls. The follow-up study (6, p. 193) did not provide information for groups at various percentile ranks in graduating class, but for all those who planned to go to college, of whatever rank, 74 percent actually entered college within the year following high school graduation. How many graduated is not reported.

A combination of intelligence test scores and rank in high school class constitutes a better indicator of ability than either factor alone, and consequently the report of the Commission (95, p. 179) which fur-

proficiency. The term *proficiency* refers to present performance, and the term *aptitude* to inferences from present performance as to ability to perform in the future. There has been a long series of controversies centered about the nature of intelligence. Among the issues involved were those of the single-factor, two-factor, and multifactor interpretations. With the development of various methods of factor analysis, much attention was centered on the isolation and interrelations of various factors in abilities. Aptitude tests based upon factor theory have not proved to be as superior to global measures as was hoped, and some confusion arises from naming and interpreting the factors measured. Intellectual ability as indicated by either scores on global or factorial type tests taken as a composite seems to be relatively stable, but the evidence as to the stability of differential abilities inferred from multifactor tests is not clear. Both individual differences and differences within the individual are important to guidance, but we know relatively little about the latter.

Although the prediction of scholastic and occupational success has long been a hope of guidance, the present state of affairs in this undertaking suggests that such predictions for the individual are still more hope than accomplishment. In general, more success is possible in predictions of a crude than refined nature, and predictions to coarse criteria may serve some useful purposes in guidance. Although commonly used as criteria of scholastic success, school marks probably reflect a variety of factors other than scholastic achievement as such. Many different kinds of predictors of scholastic success have been investigated. By the time the individual reaches early years of secondary school, some of the better predictors, in order of efficiency, are previous scholastic achievement in the same or related areas, standardized achievement tests, and tests of intelligence or scholastic aptitude. Global measures of intelligence and multifactor tests seem to be about equally efficient for prediction of overall scholastic success.

Some differences in prediction can be distinguished at different grade levels. In the elementary grades intelligence test scores may be expected to correlate slightly higher with grades than in high school or college. The range of coefficients to be expected appears to be from about .50 to .60 during elementary school years, while in the secondary school the expected range is about .40 to .60. The median coefficient from correlations of intelligence test scores with high school grade averages is probably .50 or a little less, and coefficients with specific subject grades will vary. The best predictor of college grades is prob-

into quintile groups, and for each of the testing times, juniors in high school through employed college graduates, the percentage of persons in each of the quintile ranges was determined. Here we shall be interested only in those persons in the upper group who received AGCT scores within the percentile range 81 through 100. It is evident from the analysis made that certain of the fields receive larger proportions of the more able students. Chemistry, physical science, engineering, and law draw heavily from the upper group of students at all periods, from high school through employment. Social science and the humanities and the arts groups do not seem to be particularly attractive to the top students during the high school period, but by the time of graduate work and employment the fields have become quite selective. The most extreme example of this increasing selectivity is psychology; four-year graduates include only a moderate number of upper quintile students, but in graduate schools and employment the field is fully as selective as the physical sciences. Biological science attracts about as many of the able students at the high school period as chemistry, but by the time of college graduation and above has lost a goodly number of these. Physical education represents the extreme of this situation; in high school about half as many of the upper students are planning to enter physical education as expect to become chemists, but by graduate and employment years less than 5 percent are drawn from those who originally scored in the upper 20 percent. The fields which receive relatively small shares of the top students are agriculture, home economics, business and commerce, and general education. Moreover, the relatively low attraction of these fields to the high-ability students seems to change little from high school to employment.

Such facts as the above do not of course provide us with any explanation as to why high-ability students originally chose and then continued in or changed out of the various fields. And there are difficulties in the use of the AGCT scores and derived equivalents as a measure of talent. But a student who can score in the upper 20 percent on such tests does have a considerable amount of the ability necessary for success in school, and information telling us something about the fields into which such persons go is certainly of importance to guidance.

SUMMARY

One of the persistent problems is that of terminology. Rather arbitrarily the term *abilities* was adopted to cover both aptitude and

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ably rank in high school graduating class; other predictors in order of efficiency are high school grade averages, scores on standardized achievement tests, and scholastic aptitude test scores. In general, prediction to college from high school can be made most validly if made to a specific criterion, such as grades in a particular college major in some one institution. Even under ideal conditions, with the most valid measures of aptitude and achievement, it is probably not possible to account for more than about half of the variance in college grade averages. Long-range predictions to college made during elementary school years, either on the basis of grades or intelligence test scores, are impractical and ill advised.

The prediction of scholastic success, though leaving much to be desired, can be done more effectively than prediction of success in occupation. A major problem in prediction of occupational success is that of establishing a criterion of success. Somewhat more successful predictions can be made to training criteria than to proficiency criteria, but even in the latter case coefficients are typically low. Guidance purposes would seem to be served better by concentrating on efforts to estimate the chances of success in the next stage of training than upon efforts to make long-range predictions of success in occupation.

The problem of the identification of the talented or more able is simply a specialized aspect of the general problem of assessment of abilities. If the assessment is made for the purposes of prediction, the same problems of predictive validity arise. The problem of identification of those who not only can but will achieve at a relatively high level brings into focus the inadequacy of existing theories of ability, motivation, and development. It is clear that a considerable number who have ability to succeed in college do not now attend and so are unable to realize their potentials in those occupations for which college attendance or graduation is a requirement for entry into the occupation.

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CHAPTER 10

The Desired and the Desirable

Too often interests and values are treated as though they were one and the same thing. In this chapter we shall deal with these topics, but we shall seek to discover whatever differences may exist between them, and to explore any possible relationships. Essentially, as we consider interests and values, we are dealing with aspects of motivation, and few areas are more important to guidance than is the matter of motivation. We shall not be dealing with systematic theories of motivation as such. Rather, we shall begin by reviewing some of the efforts made in measurement, some of the ideas set forth in the shifting conceptions of interests and values, and some of the findings which seem pertinent to understanding the nature of these much-discussed topics.

THE NATURE OF INTERESTS

During the nineteenth century a number of philosophers and psychologists offered varying conceptions of interest. The roster of participants in these discussions included such illustrious names as James Mill, John Stuart Mill, Johann Herbart, Carl Stumpf, and John Dewey—to name only a few. After reviewing early statements Arnold concluded that "interest is most generally considered as a feeling that is closely connected in some manner with attention" (6, p. 291). Arnold then offered his own theory of interest. Stripped of the verbal period-pieces, his statement in its essentials amounted to conceiving of interest as attitude, or, more specifically, as "Felt bodily attitude" guided by future-oriented ideas or "systems of ideas." The "systems of ideas" probably reflects the influence of Herbart's apperceptive systems. A pleasure-pain conception of interest was explicitly rejected

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was careful to distinguish between the two. It was the method of study which was to determine the designation of interests as subjective or objective. Objectively studied, "Interests are the objects and activities that stimulate pleasant feeling of the individual" (33, p. 15). But attention turned more and more to subjective considerations. "During the last ten years of research subjective interests have come to be regarded as complex configurations of feeling experience, and the driving force of the experiences is no longer considered to be a part of the interest factor being measured. The motivation factor in experience is considered separately. The criterion of interest is thought of as feeling" (33, p. 463). No longer was there need for quite the despair expressed by Arnold in 1906: "Whether the discussion is dealing with instincts, impulses, feeling, attention, will, the term interest seems broad enough to cover them all" (6, p. 221). But the clarification was only partial, and not universally practiced. The problem of motivation and interest, however neatly bypassed by some of the earlier investigators, could not be kept indefinitely in the dead file.

It is convenient to do as Super (99) has done and distinguish between four kinds of interests: expressed, tested, inventoried, and manifested. The distinction obviously derives from the sources from which interest data are gathered. Expressed interests are simply those stated by the individual, either orally or in writing. For instance, a person says that he likes horses, or fishing, or that he is interested in becoming an engineer. Much of the early concern with expressed interests centered about statements of occupational choice, and these we have already considered in Chapter 9. Tested interests are inferred from a person's responses to a test of knowledge. Suppose that we administer a test of wide range of knowledge of tools, machine parts, and so on, but on an elementary level rather than on a level requiring specialized knowledge and specific training. The subject demonstrating a wide acquaintance with such objects might be considered to have an interest in things mechanical. Interests may also be said to be manifested by the person's activities. For example, if a student prepares for college during high school, then enters a pre-dental program of studies and continues on into dental school, he may be said to have manifested an interest in dentistry. Inventoried interests are measured by asking the subject whether he likes, is indifferent to, or dislikes each of a wide range of interest objects; or which of several he prefers over the others, as in the *Strong Vocational Interest Blank* or the *Kuder Preference Record*. Because of the large place in guidance practice which has been accorded

by Arnold, although he conceded that the pleasure-pain principle was closely connected with the development of interests. Arnold objected, also, to the equating of interest with attention, but recognized a relationship. In commenting on Arnold's theory, Berlyne (10) observed a similarity of Arnold's theory to Tolman's definition of pleasantness and unpleasantness as sign-Gestalt-expectations of indeterminate satisfying or dissatisfying things to come, and also to Mowrer's conception of anxiety as a drive-producing response attached to stimuli which have habitually preceded danger.

In the first decade or two of the present century, conceptions of interests frequently reflected an author's allegiance to the structural or to the functionalist school of psychology. The structuralists, with their devotion to the method of introspection, were prone to think of interest as manifested in clearness or vividness of experience, and such clearness might exist with or without feeling (33, pp. 460-461). Adherents of the functional school were less concerned with subjective aspects of interest, and more apt to espouse a dynamic approach. Since functional psychology also reflected to a considerable degree the impact of Darwinian evolution on the emerging science of psychology, the Darwinian influence is evident. Interest, it seemed, ought to serve some adaptive purpose, and for the individual, selection from among many impinging stimuli seemed to be such a purpose. Thus James wrote: "My experience is what I agree to attend to. . . . Interest alone gives accent and emphasis, light and shade, background and foreground—intelligible perspective in a word" (46, p. 402). Both structuralists and functionalists debated the problem of the priority of interest or attention, but this hen-or-egg question has little to offer toward current conceptions of interest. In general, with the single exception of a suggestion made by Dewey to which we shall return later, the period up to about 1920 seems rather sterile as we look back from our present vantage point.

Ten years of efforts toward the investigation of interests were carefully reviewed by Fryer in 1931 (33). The research materials available at that time were fragmentary and often lacking in orientation to any theoretical framework, and yet, as Darley and Hagenah observe, "Fryer touched on nearly all the problems with which interest theory must sooner or later deal." In spite of this, however, Fryer's book "seems to have achieved the status of a rather widely unread classic" (19, p. 139). Among the problems considered by Fryer was the persistent one of subjective and objective aspects of interests. He

form, found relationships not completely in agreement with those of Triggs—for example, the physician scale correlated with the Persuasive $-.06$ as against the $-.532$ found by Triggs for the Scientific and the Persuasive. But the Peters findings came from only 24 college freshman women. Thus, in the use of the Strong and Kuder inventories as examples, we shall be dealing with two instruments which, though bearing some relationships to each other, are also tapping to a considerable extent different interest factors.

INTERESTS AS A BASIS FOR CLASSIFYING OCCUPATIONS

If an interest inventory is to be useful for counseling, two major tasks must be accomplished: (1) the discovery and measurement of interests which differentiate various occupational groups from each other and from men-in-general, and (2) the evaluation of an individual's interests against the interests of differing occupational groups. The second of these tasks of course implies the accomplishment of the first. The logic of the Strong inventory is that the interests of persons employed in certain occupations differ measurably from the interests of men-in-general, or women-in-general. Strong used two methods in developing a classification of occupations on the basis of interests, the intercorrelations of various scales and factor analysis (91, chap. 8). The result is the familiar grouping of occupations as seen on the Strong profile sheets. Sometimes the occupations included within a given group appear related at first glance, as in the case of mathematician, physicist, engineer, and chemist of group II. Sometimes the common interest core is less obvious, as in the grouping of artist, psychologist, architect, physician, and dentist. A few occupations do not fit into any of the groups (production manager, musician, certified accountant, and president of a manufacturing concern), and consequently each remains in a one-occupation group. Some important differences were found in the classifications of men's and women's occupational interest groups, though Strong found "much more agreement than disagreement between the two classifications of occupations among men and women" (91, p. 168).

Darley (18, p. 12) developed a modification of the classification used by Strong. For Darley the major groups were the technical, verbal or linguistic, business contact, business detail, certified public accountant, and welfare or uplift. The last of these was divided into two groups: (1) minister and teacher, and (2) personnel manager; city

interest inventories we shall begin with these, and then consider more briefly expressed and manifested interests. We shall not pause to consider tested interests.

Inventoried Interests

Since the publication in 1921 of *The Carnegie Interest Inventory* (33, pp. 66-70) many inventories have been introduced and reached greater or lesser stages of development. Many of the earlier forms are no longer in use, and there would be little point in examining them except for historical purposes. The historical story has been told by Fryer in his *Measurement of Interests*. From among those currently in use we shall select two, the Strong and the Kuder, which will serve to illustrate two somewhat differing approaches to the measurement of interests, and for which extensive validating studies are available. Some common ground can be found for these two.

A study by Wittenbott and others (114) related various of the occupational scales of the Strong to the Kuder scales. Although correspondences were far from complete, some of the Kuder scales were apparently measuring interests common to some of the occupations comprising the various occupational groupings of the Strong, and in general, agreements were such as might have been expected. For example, the Computational scale of the Kuder was positively related to group VIII of the men's form of the Strong (purchasing agent, office worker, accountant, and banker). There was, however, no indication of any close relationship between Computational scores on the Kuder and the mathematician and certified public accountant scales of the Strong. Triggs (106) examined scores on the various Kuder scales and on the group scales of the Strong (Creative-Scientific, Scientific, Social Service, Business Detail, Business Contact, and Linguistic) and found evidence of relationship between the two inventories. Relationships were not high enough, however, to justify predicting one from the other for an individual. The Creative-Scientific scale for the Strong correlated .626 with the Persuasive; the Scientific .539 with the Kuder Mechanical and .614 with the Kuder Scientific, but -.532 with the Persuasive; Business Detail .591 with the Clerical; Business Contact .693 with the Persuasive, but -.536 with the Kuder Scientific; and the Linguistic .500 with the Literary and -.521 with the Mechanical. Most of the intercorrelation coefficients, though, were less than .30. Peters (62), using four single scales of the Strong for the women's

was chosen so as to be comparable to the groups used for forms A and C (48, p. 10). Scoring keys were devised for a number of specific occupational groups; at present writing there are 42 such keys, thus far all for male groups. One of the interesting features of these recent developments of the *Preference Record* is the provision of keys for special groups within broader occupational groups. The most developed case of this is the number of keys for Psychologist—there is not just one key for a composite group of psychologists; there are separate keys for Clinical, Industrial, and Counseling psychologists, and for Professors of Psychology.

The problem of classifying occupations on the basis of interest is of course bound up with the broader problem of developing criteria for classifying occupations. Roe (69) presented a plan for a two-dimensional classification. One dimension was based on level of responsibility and skill, and the other on focus of activity. The latter was derived largely from factorial studies of interest. We noted above the results of some of these factorial studies, as illustrated in the categories used by Strong and modified by Darley; later we shall note more carefully some of these investigations. The classification of occupations proposed by Roe was used by Moser and others (59) in a part of the Career Pattern Study; and certain modifications were suggested, most of which were adopted in the revised form of classification presented by Roe in her book (70, pp. 145-147). In its revised form, the categories used in the focus-of-activity dimension can be summarized as:

1. *Service*—occupations primarily concerned with attending to the personal tastes, needs, and welfare of other persons
2. *Business contact*—primarily sales occupations in which the selling involves personal persuasion in face-to-face situations
3. *Organization*—the managerial and white-collar jobs in business, industry, and government
4. *Technology*—occupations involving the production, maintenance, transportation of commodities and utilities
5. *Outdoor*—this is a broad group including occupations in agriculture, fishing, forestry, mining, and similar
6. *Science*—occupations primarily concerned with scientific theory; applications as found in medicine, biology, chemistry, and others are included, but not applications in the sense of technology
7. *General cultural*—focused on the preservation and transmission of the general cultural heritage; included here are occupations in education, journalism, the ministry, and the humanities generally
8. *Arts and entertainment*—occupations primarily concerned with the use of special skills in the arts, both as creators and as performers

school superintendent; YMCA general secretary, boy's secretary, and physical director. Public Certified Accountant stood alone as a single-occupation group.

With the older form of the *Preference Record* the delineation of the interest pattern of a single occupational group was a complex matter. One of the earlier extensive collections of data for the Kuder was that by Mathewson and Hebert (55), who reported scores for 1473 veterans counseled at the Guidance Center of Cambridge, Massachusetts. Forty-eight occupational fields were involved, which were judged to fall into six major patterns: the business group, the scientific-engineering group, the verbal-social group, the skilled trades group, the artistic group, and the music group. But the classification of occupations was based upon choices made by the veterans, and not on groups of men known to be successful in the various occupations. Holland, Krause, Nixon, and Trembath (42) sought to develop a means of classifying occupations on the basis of Kuder scores by grouping occupations on the basis of intercorrelations. The occupation which showed the greatest number of coefficients of .70 or more was taken as the core occupation for the group. The result of the analysis was eight groups for men and five for women. For men the groups were labeled skilled and technical, managerial, scientific, drugstore managers and pharmacists (a one-occupation group), welfare, clerical, and expressive. For women the groups were computational, scientific and technical, clerical, linguistic, and expressive. Some of the "core" occupations are a bit surprising in view of the names given the groups; for example, the core occupation for the managerial was production manager, while for women the core occupation for the scientific and technical was high school teacher of home economics. Others of the core occupations were about what might have been expected: for welfare (men), high school teacher of social studies; for clerical (men), general office clerks; and for linguistic (women), journalists. The samples, however, were small, consisting of only 45 men and 45 women.

With the development by Kuder of form D, the *Preference Record Occupational*, comparisons of the interests of occupational groups with those of a general reference group were greatly facilitated. The group taken as the base or reference group consisted of 1000 men employed in various occupations at different levels. This norm group was not intended to be a strict men-in-general group, and included rather an overrepresentation of professional workers and an underrepresentation of unskilled workers, on the basis of census classification. The group

was chosen so as to be comparable to the groups used for forms A and C (48, p. 10). Scoring keys were devised for a number of specific occupational groups; at present writing there are 42 such keys, thus far all for male groups. One of the interesting features of these recent developments of the *Preference Record* is the provision of keys for special groups within broader occupational groups. The most developed case of this is the number of keys for Psychologist—there is not just one key for a composite group of psychologists; there are separate keys for Clinical, Industrial, and Counseling psychologists, and for Professors of Psychology.

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The problems of developing a classification of occupations on the basis of interest are many, and the plan proposed by Roe has at least the merit of having been developed with due consideration for our present knowledge of the structure of inventoried interests as derived from factor analytic studies. Each of the primary focus groups extends through the various levels. For example, in the science group we find the range from research scientists, through nurses and technicians, to nontechnical helpers in scientific organizations.

THE PERMANENCE OF INTERESTS

In our earlier discussion of abilities we found that one of the basic questions centered about the stability of measurements. The same question arises in regard to inventoried interests. In 1942 Burnham reported a study in which he had administered the Strong inventory, then retested one group after one week, and another after three years. He concluded: "A college student's interests are more stable than his classroom grades, but less stable than his intelligence test scores" (13, p. 332).

The next year, Strong summarized the evidence in *Vocational Interests of Men and Women*. We must note the specific definitions of terms as used by Strong (91, p. 353). *Stability* refers to "the shifts from liking to indifference to disliking, and the reverse, that are found in individual interest items," while "Permanence means persistence in time without change." The term *permanence* is further delimited to refer to "a larger sampling of interests over a considerable period of time," and not to single interest items. Shifts in responses to single items do occur, but since some of these shifts operate to increase the total score on a scale, and some to decrease it, the net effect on the total score for a given occupational interest is small (91, pp. 671-672).

Evidence on permanence was summarized under five general methods of dealing with the problem; at this point we shall concern ourselves with only the first four. The first of these methods was that of test and retest. Coefficients were found to decrease with time; for college freshmen the r 's ranged from .90 after three weeks to .56 after nine years. And the younger the men tested, the lower the degree of permanence. The second method was a comparison of mean scores as an indication of direction of change. In very general terms, the findings indicated that changes of mean scores with time were significant for some scales, but not for others, and again, the changes were greater for men who were younger at first testing. The third approach to the problem of

permanence as reviewed by Strong is bound up with the interpretation of scores as letter grades, which is unique to the Strong inventory. We shall pause only to note that one part of Strong's summary stated: "Roughly there are 45 chances that the same rating or one just above or below it will be received, and 90 chances that the second rating will be within two steps of the first rating" (91, p. 366). The fourth aspect of permanence was that of the comparability of interest profiles after a period of time. The first three methods of dealing with permanence focused upon permanence or changes in individual scales for particular occupations, but this fourth method involves the question of how closely the scores on all of the scales for a single individual agree on test and retest. The usual procedure is to calculate a rank-order coefficient between the two series of scores. Few such studies were available to Strong in 1943, and therefore it may be more helpful to turn to a more recent summary by Darley and Hagenah who reviewed not only the original data of Strong but also the recent studies, particularly those of Powers and Stordahl.¹ Powers had found coefficients ranging from .44 to .82 for adult males retested after 10 years, with a median coefficient of .69. Stordahl found an interesting difference between metropolitan and non-metropolitan males retested after two years, the median coefficients being .72 and .67 respectively (19, pp. 40-41). These coefficients are not appreciably lower than the .75 reported by Strong (91, p. 372) in 1943 as the correlation between profiles secured during the college senior year and those obtained 10 years later. In 1955 Strong (95, p. 65) reported that interest profiles based on 34 occupational scores correlate on the average .88 for a one-year interval, .85 for five years, .84 for 10 years, and .74 after 22 years.

In summarizing the matter of permanence of scores on the *Vocational Interest Blank*, Strong said in 1943:

"Interests as measured on our interest scales are highly permanent. The correlation between occupational-interest scores when there is an interval of ten years between test and retest is .75. When the interest profile of a college senior is correlated with a second profile secured ten years later, the average of such correlations is also .75. Permanence measured in these two ways for younger students is slightly less, but such correlations compare favorably with the permanence of ability and achievement test scores. They are certainly high enough to warrant prediction based upon interests. It must not be overlooked, however, that these measures represent the average person—for some, permanence is much greater; and for some, it is much less. We can never be certain.

¹ Darley and Hagenah refer to unpublished studies, but published articles have since appeared. See references (66) and (90).

in the case of any one individual, that his interests will be as permanent as these figures suggest" (91, p. 51).

In 1955 Strong was able to add data extending the test-retest interval to 22 years, as noted above, and he again stressed the high permanence of inventoried interests as measured by the SVIB. In the same year, Darley and Hagenah pointed to our lack of really good evidence for understanding "those individual cases whose test-retest performance shows impermanence or disorderly and unexpected change," but they nevertheless felt that "Meanwhile, the burden of evidence, as we read it, stresses permanence of vocational interests in the great majority of individuals" (19, p. 53).

The degree of permanence of scores on the *Kuder Preference Record* seems to compare favorably with results obtained from the *Strong Vocational Interest Blank*, when measured over short periods of time. Since the Kuder was first published in 1939, it has not yet been possible to check on permanence over an extended period of years. There is first of all the question of how scores made on single scales correlate with scores made on the same scales at a later administration of the inventory. Traxler and McCall (105) found that for a group of high school students retested after one month coefficients ranged from .838 to .907. Herzberg and Bouton (40) readministered the Kuder to two groups who had taken it during high school; one group repeated the inventory after two years, and the other after four years. As can be seen in Table 19, the correlations for boys on the Persuasive scale over two- to four-year periods dropped from .73 to .51. This is a difference significant at the 5 percent level. There were also significant sex differences in the Mechanical and Clerical correlations. In this particular study the scores of boys on the Mechanical scale resembled the initial scores somewhat more closely after four years than after two years, while for girls the opposite was true; but it must be recalled that the two- and four-year groups were separate. On the Clerical scale, a better resemblance of scores to the original ones is maintained by girls than by boys. Rosenberg (72) found somewhat lower correlations as between ninth- and twelfth-grade administrations. For boys the coefficients ranged from .47 to .68, and for girls from .53 to .69. From another study comes the suggestion that for a short time in the ninth grade the Kuder scores are not much affected by some kinds of guidance activities. Fox (31) readministered the *Preference Record* to a group in the ninth grade after eight weeks. During the interim period the group studied occupations, and individual counseling was provided. For boys, the retest coeffi-

cients ranged from .422 to .855; and for girls, from .537 to .847. We should note also that the Fox subjects were informed of their scores after the first administration.

During college or early-adult years the stability of scores on the scales over short terms is if anything somewhat better than during high school years, as might be expected. In the Traxler and McCall (105) study noted above, a group of college freshman was retested after two

TABLE 19. Stability Coefficients for Groups Studied

	Two-Year Follow-up Males N = 101	Four-Year Follow-up Males N = 62	Two-Year Follow-up Females N = 48	Four-Year Follow-up Females N = 68
	r	r	r	r
Mechanical	.75	.84 ^b	.78	.66 ^a
Computational	.59	.57	.64	.69
Scientific	.68	.68	.59	.68
Persuasive	.73 ^a	.51 ^a	.71	.64
Artistic	.72	.74	.82	.79
Literary	.67	.63	.70	.65
Musical	.64	.70	.61	.75
Social Service	.61	.58	.60	.61
Clerical	.66	.55 ^b	.71	.75 ^b

^a Difference between two- and four-year follow-up significant at 5 percent level of confidence.

^b Difference between sexes for four-year follow-up significant at 5 percent level of confidence.

SOURCE: F. Herzberg, & A. Bouton. A further study of the stability of the Kuder preference record. *Educ. Psychol. Measmt.* 1954, 14, 328.

months, and a small group of adults after 15 months; the ranges of coefficients were, respectively, .588 to .871, and .611 to .933. Reid (67) administered the Kuder to 145 entering freshmen, 63 men and 82 women, and then retested after 15 months. Test-retest coefficients ranged from .72 to .84, with a median r of .77. Results for a somewhat longer interval (two years) and for a larger group of 267 men and 250 women are reported by Silvey (85). Coefficients ranged from .49 to .83 for men, and from .57 to .82 for women. Stability over the two-year period appeared to be greatest on the Literary and Musical scales for men, and on the Computational, Artistic, and Social Service scales for women. A selected group of adult males consisting of 100 rehabili-

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interests on initial and subsequent administrations. Of course, interpretations of such data reveal changes in an imaginary average person, but may nevertheless afford a background in understanding the specific, actual individual.

The men in the Silvey (85) study showed significant gains in artistic and clerical interests, and a decrease in Musical and Clerical interests. Women's interests in the Mechanical, Artistic, and Social Service interests increased significantly, and decreased in the Computational, Literary, and Clerical fields. For both men and women the greatest increase in mean scores was in Social Service interests, and the greatest loss in the Clerical. It should be recalled that these changes occurred during two years of college experience. Pollan (65) found that over a two-year period, as judged by groups differing in age by about that amount, there was a significant increase in Social Service scores, and there were significant decreases in Outdoor, Scientific, Literary, and Musical scores. Women also showed a significant increase in Social Service scores, and significant decreases on all other eight scales. The difference between the changes in men's and women's scores from one age level to another was not significant. With sex groups combined, the change in mean scores from one age level to another was significant for only one scale, the Literary. With age groups combined, the changes in mean scores as between sexes were significant for three scales, the Computational, the Scientific, and the Persuasive. Only one change within sex from age to age was significant, the change on the Scientific scale for women. Thus it appears that at the college level, for the Pollan sample at least, the changes on some scales are related to sex; and the change on at least one scale (the Literary) is related to age, but the interaction between age and sex is not significant. DiMichael's group of rehabilitation counselors (21) showed only one significant change over the five-month period—mean scores for Social Service increased. This is particularly interesting because the group on initial testing was well above average on this scale. On the high school level Herzberg and Bouton (40) found some significant changes in mean scores. For males Social Service and Persuasive scores increased, while Scientific scores lowered. For females, Artistic and Musical scores lowered. Rosenberg (72) found that from Grades 9 through 12 boys' Persuasive and Musical interests increased while girls' Computational, Persuasive, and Social Service scores increased and Mechanical and Scientific interests decreased.

The pattern of these changes may be seen in Table 20. The changes of women's scores for two scales, the Mechanical and Artistic,

tation counselors was retested after five months by DiMichael (21). The coefficients ranged from .70 to .89, with seven of the nine r 's being .83 or above.

It is difficult to draw conclusions from such scattered findings as those just noted. Probably some of the test-retest coefficients for shorter periods should be regarded as indications of reliability rather than as evidence of permanence of interests. But tentatively it appears that for a time lapse of up to two years for college students and adults, and up to four years for high school students, the stability of scores on most of the Kuder scales is slightly less than the stability of the broader range of items sampled by one of the *Strong* scales, but high enough to be of some value in guidance. Conclusions as to the stability of the Kuder scales over longer periods of time must wait upon further evidence.

A second aspect of stability of interests as measured by the *Preference Record* is that of profile stability, or the persistence of the relative strength of interests. Mallinson and Crumrine (54) studied the scores of 250 high school students to whom the Kuder had been administered during the ninth grade and again after at least three years, with no intervening testings. Test-retest coefficients were not calculated; the analysis was in terms of the percentages of students who maintained the same or similar rankings of the interest fields. Considerable indication of stability was found. From the ninth to the twelfth grades, the highest area of interest remained the highest for 52 percent of the students; the second highest remained the second highest for 34 percent, and the third highest continued to be third highest for 28 percent. For 74 percent of the students the two highest areas at the ninth grade were among the three highest at the twelfth grade. There was also evidence of stability of rejection; for 76 percent the lowest interest area at the ninth grade was among the three lowest at the twelfth grade. Reid (67) calculated ρ 's for each of 145 college freshmen, as between the rank-order of interests on initial testing and after 15 months. The range was from $-.71$ to 1.00 , with a median of $.80$ and a marked negative skewness of the distribution of ρ 's. The type of profile analysis represented by these two studies has been rather generally neglected.

Correlations of test-retest scores on the various Kuder scales can tell us something about the stability of responses to the clusters of items comprising the various scales, and correlations between initial and later ranks of the interest fields can help us judge stability of profiles; but we need to inquire further as to the direction of interest change. One method of doing this is to compare the means of groups for the various

men—the Computational and Persuasive. It is perhaps noteworthy that Scientific interests have been found to decrease for both sexes and in both high school and college years. On the positive side, there seem to be more fields in which interests increase during high school than during college years. And again there is a single scale—the Social Service—on which scores seem to change (and in this case increase) for both sexes during both periods. And one final note: the decrease in Outdoor scores does not come until college years, but when it does come it is found among both sexes.

Why these changes? As of now we can only guess. But it is interesting to speculate that the increase in Social Service interests and the decrease in Scientific and Outdoor interests are in some way related to a pattern of increasing maturity. In the case of the decrease in Scientific interest, perhaps the meaning of science is changing from a preadolescent or early-adolescent, adventure-related, Buck Rogers concept of science to a more mature concept; and as meanings change, likes and dislikes change in such a way that fewer find science as reconceived to their liking. Perhaps the upswing in Social Service is related to the adolescent's increasing concern with social relations—a projection of need, possibly. And it may be that the changes in both Scientific and Social Service interests reflect a changing in the substratum of values which support interests. The greater number of areas in which declines occur in college than in high school suggests a narrowing of interests so that older adolescents come to have more interest in a few things and to scatter their likings less than formerly. This too may be a part of maturation. But there is little point in pursuing further such speculation, for that surely is what it is.

THE STRUCTURE OF INTERESTS

Earlier we noted briefly the problem of classifying occupations according to the interests of persons found in those occupations, or on the basis of the primary focus of activities as suggested by Roe. Here we are dealing with a closely related problem, but this time with primary attention upon interests themselves rather than upon occupations. Again we have a problem which is a counterpart of one encountered in our consideration of the nature of abilities, and in both cases answers have been sought through the applications of methods of factor analysis.

Large numbers of intercorrelations between the various scales of the *Strong Vocational Interest Blank* can be reduced to a relatively

during college years were omitted because of conflicting evidence; Silvey reported gains from the freshman to sophomore years, but Pollan found that a younger group scored higher than an older group. Such a tabulation of results as given in Table 20 can easily be misleading since

TABLE 20. Directions of Changes of Interests as Measured by the Kuder Preference Record

Males		Females	
Scores Increase	Scores Decrease	Scores Increase	Scores Decrease
During High School Years			
Persuasive Musical Social service	Scientific	Computational Persuasive Artistic Social service	Mechanical Scientific Musical
During College Years			
Artistic Social service	Outdoor Scientific Literary Musical Clerical	Social service	Outdoor Computational Scientific Persuasive Literary Musical Clerical

SOURCES: S. G. DiMichael. The professed and measured interests of vocational rehabilitation counselors. *Educ. psychol. Measmt*, 1949, 9, 59-72. F. Herzberg, A. Bouton, & Betty Jo Steiner. Studies of the stability of the Kuder preference record. *Educ. psychol. Measmt*, 1954, 14, 90-100. W. D. Pollan. Stability of interests of college students. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, North Texas State Coll., 1957. Pp. 70-73. Microfilm Publ. No. 19,451. Univ. Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Mich. N. Rosenberg. Stability and maturation of Kuder interest patterns during high school. *Educ. psychol. Measmt*, 1953, 13, 449-458. H. Silvey. Changes in test scores after two years in college. *Educ. psychol. Measmt*, 1951, 11, 494-502.

it involves combining of results from scattered samples in varied settings. We may not be adding apples and oranges, but it is entirely possible that we are at least adding oranges and grapefruit. Yet after allowing for due precautions, there do seem evident some fragments of a pattern. The most obvious suggestion is that more declines of interest seem to occur during college years than during high school. Moreover, women show declines in two areas in which declines do not occur for

In the present state of development of evidence only limited generalizations can be drawn as to the structure of interests as measured by interest inventories. Both general and vocational interests can be identified, and the vocational seem to possess considerable integrity and are able to survive analysis without being absorbed into general interests; but whether these factors actually have much psychological meaning, or are simply mathematical factors, is still open to question. Super (100, p. 381), after reviewing the factor analytic studies of the Strong, Kuder, and the Allport-Vernon *Study of Values*—and prior to the Guilford study—developed a synthesis of eight factors, though recognizing that “The naming of statistically isolated factors is a highly subjective and arbitrary process.” The names suggested were scientific, social-welfare, literary, material, system, contact, artistic, and musical. The “material” category was derived from the things vs. people of the Strong and from the mechanical of the Kuder. The “system” comes from the clerical and the computational of the Kuder, from a “system” factor of the Strong, and from a materialistic factor extracted from the economic and political values of the Allport-Vernon. The other names used by Super will doubtless be clear to the student from previous discussion. The inclusion of factors derived from the *Study of Values*, however, raises a question: should factors derived from values inventories be regarded as interest factors? The question becomes one of how we conceptualize interests and values. Later we shall examine the relationships between inventoried interests and values and explore a possible basis for differentiating the two.

THE POSSIBILITY OF GENETIC FACTORS IN INTERESTS

Interests have usually been regarded as learned. Fryer (33) did not make a flat statement to this effect, but he placed so much stress upon the individual's developmental history of interests, especially as revealed through the autobiography, that it is difficult to reach any conclusion other than that he regarded interests as learned. Strong was quite definite: “Since interests involve reactions to specific things, they must all be learned” (91, p. 10). Yet in further discussion he raises the question of “how far it may be possible to develop a given interest in all people.” He notes the tenacity with which many students insist on being artists, lawyers, and others, and the relatively early age at which some seem to have established definite interests. “Either these interests are expressions of their abilities and therefore inborn characteristics, or else they result from social forces not yet recognized in this connection”

few factors, but after this is done there remains the question of whether or not these factors are really functional unities capable of meaningful psychological interpretation, or "merely mathematical co-ordinates" (91, p. 315). In his 1943 summary Strong appeared to regard this question as open, but he inclined to the view that interest, like personality, is likely to be a complex of interrelated traits. In 1949 he commented that "Since interests are liked-disliked activities, it is difficult to see how there can be general interests in the sense of psychological entities . . ." (92). The first factor analysis of interest scores was made by Thurstone (104), using 18 of the Strong scales. He extracted four factors which he named interest in science, in language, in people, and in business. Strong later made five factor analyses using more scales, the results of which showed substantial agreement with the Thurstone study.

The *Kuder Preference Record* was constructed by a procedure of item analysis which yields interest fields somewhat comparable to interest factors as extracted by factor analysis, in the sense that the Kuder interest fields have considerable internal coherence and minimal relations to others. In form C of the Kuder there are nine scales: the Outdoor, Mechanical, Computational, Persuasive, Artistic, Literary, Musical, Social service, and Clerical. The recent form D provides for scoring for various occupations in something of the manner of the Strong.

In an extensive study by Guilford and others, 1000 interest items were factor analyzed. Six definitely vocational factors emerged: mechanical, scientific, social welfare, aesthetic expression, clerical, and business. There was also a seventh factor termed an outdoor-work-interest factor which was less clearly vocational. In addition, 19 basic interest factors were identified. The vocational interest factors not only survived the analysis, but seemed "to attract into their orbits variance that should perhaps have gone to nonvocational factors." For example, the mechanical interest factor was related to interest in construction and manipulation, to interest in outdoor activities and manual labor, and to interest in precision work. "The structure of the domain of interests, therefore, seems to include a limited number of vocationally oriented variables superimposed upon or differentiated from a broader base of general interest variables that have nonvocational implications as well" (36, p. 36). In commenting on this study, Strong (95, p. 167) expressed confidence that vocational differentiation of interests results from more than seven factors, but felt that the existence of other than definitely vocational interests should be considered.

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age, and that patterns of interest are related to various factors, for example, interest in science to mental age and reading achievement. More to the point of our present discussion, however, was the finding that reading age, height age, and mental age are more important indicators of occupational interest than carpal, organismic, weight, strength of grip, dental, and developmental ages. Had some of the more specific physiological characteristics—such as weight and carpal development—been found to be useful indicators of interest development, there might have been some basis for arguing that such characteristics carry a large measure of genetic determination and, consequently, that genetic factors are indirectly important in interest development. But such was not the case. We should, of course, add that the Hulslander study was obviously not designed to focus upon genetic factors, but the implications are nevertheless interesting.

Our very brief comment on the possibility of genetic factors in interests has been largely a restatement of opinions and the noting of some indirect evidence. Investigations of this matter are very few, though of course we have not exhausted the list of possibly relevant studies. But we shall content ourselves with the conclusion of Darley and Hagenah that, "The possibility of genetic determination of interests is intriguing, but the evidence is inconclusive" (19, p. 189).

THE IMPORTANCE OF REFERENCE POINTS

One of the major breakthroughs in interest measurement was the discovery by Strong that the interests of men in particular occupations are measurably different from the interests of men-in-general. The original men-in-general group which served as the reference point for the old scales, however, was made up largely of men drawn from occupations in the upper socioeconomic levels. Interestingly enough, though, the need of different reference groups emerged, not from the early work with men's scales, but during the development of occupational scales for women (91, pp. 554 ff.). The original women-in-general group was composed entirely of married women. When eight scales were developed based on this group the intercorrelations among the scales seemed to indicate no great difference between the interests of women in the eight occupations. But when another reference group was used, including both married and unmarried women, different intercorrelations between the occupational scales were obtained. Moreover, when a factor analysis was made based on intercorrelations for the married-women-in-general group, only trifling residuals remained after

(91, p. 13). Carter (15) studied 120 pairs of twins, 43 of whom were identical, and 77 fraternal. Most were in the junior and senior high school. He used the *Strong Vocational Interest Blank*, scored for 23 scales. Average correlations of .50 were found between the interests of identical twins, and of .28 between fraternal twins. Since age was shown not to be an important factor, and there was no greater similarity between like-sex fraternal twins than between unlike-sex fraternal twins, he concluded tentatively that hereditary factors were more important than environmental factors in determining the differences. Carter's study was made in 1932. In 1949 Super, after reviewing the Carter study and several other investigations of family resemblances, noted that "the interests of fathers and sons resemble each other just as closely as those of fraternal twins. . . . It seems necessary, then, tentatively to conclude that the greater similarity of the interests of identical twins, as contrasted with those of fraternal twins, is not due to the *potentially* greater similarity of their environments, but rather to the *demonstrably* greater similarity of their heredities" (100, pp. 396-397). There is the possibility that genetic factors operating through the endocrines may influence the development of interests. Sollenberger (86) related hormone activity of two groups of boys to observations as to maturity of behavior, and to scores on several other measures. Hormone activity correlated .90 with judgments of maturity of behavior, .65 with scores on the *Fursey Test of Developmental Age*, .20 with the *Lehman Play Quiz*, and -.10 with scores on the *Pressey Interest-Attitude Test*. These findings, though interesting, scarcely afford a basis for supposing that hormone activity is related to scores on vocational interest inventories.

A more recent study by Hulslander is marginally relevant to the problem of genetic bases of interest development. The general hypothesis was that there is a relationship between certain measures of growth and occupational interests, and the findings did provide some support. The subjects were high school students (35 boys and 37 girls), all at the chronological age of 132 months, but ranging as to grade level from the ninth through the twelfth. Interest was defined, in part, as "a complex of dynamic forces within the developing personality derived in part from inherited reaction patterns which become individuated through cognitive and satisfying experiences . . ." (43, p. 11). The instrument used in measuring interests was the *Lee-Thorpe Occupational Interest Inventory*. Among the findings were that level of interest is related to carpal development and reading achievement

environment, contact with a personality or personalities who suggested a line of development, the motivation to be recognized by his fellows, and the intrinsic factors of an interest. With the exception of the last, all of these factors might be expected to vary considerably from one social class or minority group to another. The differences in the economic factor are obvious. The "chance stimulation of the environment" is certainly not all chance, however, for subcultural groups provide the individual with social and cultural contexts circumscribed by boundaries beyond which it is difficult for the individual to go. In like manner, the stimulating personalities with whom the individual is most apt to come into early contact are those of his own subcultural group or groups. And as to the fourth general cause, the motivation for recognition, this too will be influenced by the subcultural group, both in strength and in mode of satisfaction. We saw earlier, for example, that among the social classes it is the middle class which places highest value on success and achievement, and there are, moreover, restrictions on the avenues through which the middle-class individual is expected to achieve success.

Early in his work with the *Vocational Interest Blank*, Strong recognized that there were probably differences in the vocational interests of men in higher- and lower-ranking occupations. The Occupational Level scale was developed to contrast the interests of unskilled men with those in business and professions (91, chap. 10). Business and professional men were considered to be those earning \$2500 a year or more. At that time about one-seventh of families had incomes of \$2500 or over. An extensive literature has grown up about the Occupational Level scale, and a variety of hypotheses have been advanced concerning it. Among these are suggestions that occupational level may be related to level of aspiration or status drive, to staying power in college, to educational background, and the like. A summary of findings is given in a monograph by Barnett, Handelsman, Stewart, and Super. These authors concluded that "The evidence so far warrants our interpreting OL as a measure of status of interests. If it is a measure of drive further research will have to so demonstrate" (8, p. 208). Among the more specific conclusions noted was that OL is related to officeholding and hence may reflect middle-class values. Also, OL is slightly related to ratings of students' drive, and such ratings may indicate the way in which middle-class people approve of others whose values correspond to their own. But OL is not related to immediate

the first factor was extracted. Thus it appeared that the differences between married women and professional women were so great as to overshadow differences in interests associated with participation in occupations. It was clear that the composition of the group used as a reference point was exceedingly important.

When the revised form of the SVIB for men was developed, and new scales based upon it, three new groups were selected, known as P_1 , P_2 , and P_3 . The first of these, P_1 , represents the upper socioeconomic levels. The P_2 group consisted of 1000 men chosen to be representative of the various occupational levels on the basis of the census, with the average falling at the level of the skilled workman. The P_3 group represents lower socioeconomic levels, with the average occupational level falling below the average for semiskilled workmen. When the Occupational Level scale was developed, it was found that P_1 fell at a standard score of 60, P_2 at 50, and P_3 at 46. One of the most important applications made possible by the use of different reference points was the better differentiation of skilled and semiskilled occupational interest groups (91, chap. 22). The principle of different reference points has been extended to the development of scales for the differentiation of subgroups of an occupation. For example, subscales have been constructed for distinguishing between the interests of mechanical and electrical engineers, and between clinical, experimental, guidance, and industrial psychologists. In commenting on these developments in 1955, Strong (95) suggests that with existing scales businessmen are not as well differentiated among themselves as are professional men, and that a plausible first step may be to develop a scale which will differentiate businessmen from professional men. The second step would then be the development of scales to differentiate subgroups of businessmen.

INTERESTS OF CULTURAL GROUPS

The possible existence of cultural factors in interests has long been recognized. Once again we turn to Fryer for a starting point. Commenting on the development of interests as seen in "estimated interests" he noted that vocational interests appeared to be influenced by "social status, age, experience, father's occupation, and professional achievement, among other things" (33, p. 176). In interpreting his own data from the autobiographies of superior adults, he suggested five general causes of interests: the economic, the chance stimulation of the

environment, contact with a personality or personalities who suggested a line of development, the motivation to be recognized by his fellows, and the intrinsic factors of an interest. With the exception of the last, all of these factors might be expected to vary considerably from one social class or minority group to another. The differences in the economic factor are obvious. The "chance stimulation of the environment" is certainly not all chance, however, for subcultural groups provide the individual with social and cultural contexts circumscribed by boundaries beyond which it is difficult for the individual to go. In like manner, the stimulating personalities with whom the individual is most apt to come into early contact are those of his own subcultural group or groups. And as to the fourth general cause, the motivation for recognition, this too will be influenced by the subcultural group, both in strength and in mode of satisfaction. We saw earlier, for example, that among the social classes it is the middle class which places highest value on success and achievement, and there are, moreover, restrictions on the avenues through which the middle-class individual is expected to achieve success.

Early in his work with the *Vocational Interest Blank*, Strong recognized that there were probably differences in the vocational interests of men in higher- and lower-ranking occupations. The Occupational Level scale was developed to contrast the interests of unskilled men with those in business and professions (91, chap. 10). Business and professional men were considered to be those earning \$2500 a year or more. At that time about one-seventh of families had incomes of \$2500 or over. An extensive literature has grown up about the Occupational Level scale, and a variety of hypotheses have been advanced concerning it. Among these are suggestions that occupational level may be related to level of aspiration or status drive, to staying power in college, to educational background, and the like. A summary of findings is given in a monograph by Barnett, Handelsman, Stewart, and Super. These authors concluded that "The evidence so far warrants our interpreting OL as a measure of status of interests. If it is a measure of drive further research will have to so demonstrate" (8, p. 208). Among the more specific conclusions noted was that OL is related to officeholding and hence may reflect middle-class values. Also, OL is slightly related to ratings of students' drive, and such ratings may indicate the way in which middle-class people approve of others whose values correspond to their own. But OL is not related to immediate

postgraduate plans of high school students, although the vocational objectives involved in these plans may be affected by the social status of occupations.

In a study reported after the monograph by Barnett and others (8), Darley and Hagenah (19, pp. 110-118) found that occupational level scores are related to primary interest types. Among the specific findings was that high OL scores are associated with business-contact and verbal-linguistic families of occupations while low scores are associated with technical interests. This is oddly reminiscent of the *Middletown* cleavage between the business and working classes, but any attempt at a firm statement along these lines on the basis of OL scores would be a fanciful overgeneralization. Although OL scores do seem to be complicated with middle-class values, the relationships are not particularly impressive; and why should we expect any clear separation of OL scores along social class lines? There is much common cultural participation, especially in business contacts and in mass media of communication. And interests as measured by inventories are simply likes and dislikes. It may be more reasonable to expect differences in values than in interests; and although OL findings do seem to reflect value differences, the OL scale was not designed as a measure of values.

A rather more fruitful approach to the matter of interests and social class is represented by the studies of McArthur (52) and McArthur and Stevens (53). The first of these studies was concerned with differences in responses to the Strong inventory by boys in public and in private schools. Public school boys were regarded as products of "American success culture," while boys in private schools were thought of as examples of a variant orientation tending to perpetuate a "preferred personality," with occupational role subordinated to family pattern. The hypothesis was suggested that for private school boys prediction of interests would matter less and that therefore the Strong would be less valid when applied to private school boys. Criteria of validity were varying degrees of "hits." A "good hit" was scored if a man entered an occupation for which he had scored "A," or if the occupation entered had been one of the three highest-ranking interests on the Strong. A "poor hit" was scored if he entered an occupation for which he had scored "B plus," and if the occupation entered had been outranked by other scores on the inventory. A "clean miss" was anything below these. More than twice as many good hits were scored by boys in public schools, and definitely more clean misses by boys in pri-

vate schools. The overall distribution of hits was significantly different from chance at the .01 level. The McArthur and Stevens study was (in part) a 14-year follow-up of Harvard students who had taken the Strong while sophomores. Again the predictive accuracy of inventoried interests was much greater for public than for private school boys. The authors concluded that the Strong was more applicable to men reared in the middle-class success culture, and less applicable to upper-middle and upper-class groups possessing an alternate culture.

Two other investigations employing different approaches to the problem are of particular interest. Erlandson (27) studied the relationships of scores on the Strong inventory to various socioeconomic factors. The subjects were 1121 senior boys who graduated from Minnesota high schools in 1953. Fifteen factors were found to be significantly related to primary interest patterns. Among these were father's occupation, mother's occupation prior to marriage, father's and mother's education, and source of family income. It is interesting to note that these are essentially three of the factors included in Warner's Index of Status Characteristics. Included also among the significantly related variables were some which might perhaps be considered as aspirational factors: curriculum taken in the high school, plans for the year after high school graduation, family's feelings concerning son's going to college, vocational expectations for the year 1960, and parents' wishes for son's future occupation. High school achievement and scholastic aptitude were also found to be significantly related to primary interest patterns. A study by Hyman (44) affords an illustration of examination of social status in relation to broad interest areas as measured by the *Preference Record*. Social status was indicated by occupational status. The subjects were 137 high school senior boys whose fathers were employed in various occupations, ranging from the unskilled to the professional and managerial. When the boys were grouped according to occupation of their fathers, no significant relations to Kuder scores were found; but intelligence test scores were significantly related to interest scores in three *Preference Record* areas: Computational, Scientific, and Artistic. However, when status groups were subdivided according to level of intelligence, significant differences were found in all but three of the interest areas. These three exceptions were the Computational, Musical, and Clerical. Thus, status was not found to be related in a simple manner to interest, and was related to intelligence in only three interest areas; but there were significant interrelationships among social status, intelligence, and interests.

Studies such as these may eventually enable us to picture with more photographic exactness the relations of these and other variables, but at present our picture of the relationships is more like an impressionistic painting. It seems reasonable, as Erlandson (27) has hypothesized, that, within the limits imposed by heredity, home and family background factors may be the most important determinants of interest. To this we would add that social class is an important part of these background factors, a basic part of the cultural milieu in which the individual develops.

Another aspect of the relation of cultural factors to interests is seen in the interests of ethnic groups within our own society. There are, of course, many besetting difficulties in studies in this area. One of these is the semantic one of whether or not words and items of an interest inventory carry the same connotations to individuals in an ethnic group as to those comprising another group used for comparison. Because of these difficulties studies of the interests of Negroes in the United States are of particular interest, since presumably we can assume a common language. The only study available at the time Strong published his *Vocational Interests of Men and Women* was one in which it was reported that a group of young Negro women in training for nursing scored higher on the women's scale for nursing than did the criterion white group (91, p. 679). Later Hartshorn (93) found differences in white and Negro scores for lawyers, physicians, and life insurance agents, and that Negroes made more "like" responses than whites. Hartshorn's explanation of the latter finding, as reported by Strong, was not a semantic one. Hartshorn suggested that Negroes have been denied many experiences open to whites and so tend to make many "like" responses, not so much because they really like such activities on the basis of having experienced them, but because they would like to have the opportunity to experience them. In contrast to this idea that Negro interests may be intensified by frustration, Williams noted that from childhood on the limitations of opportunities are repeatedly pointed out to Negroes, and that consequently many Negro youth, although aware of definite interests and abilities, "may repress and ignore them because of the conviction that they will not be utilized in the labor market" (111, p. 609). Williams was not writing with specific reference to responses on the Strong, but was considering the broader question of whether or not special information and methods are needed in counseling Negroes. But to return to the question of differences in responses to the *Vocational Interest Blank*: Strong questioned that

interests of Negroes are really different from those of whites, and offered several alternative explanations of the Hartshorn data. He added that if the interest differences are real then norms should be established for a Negro men-in-general group, in order that the particular vocational groups may be measured from a Negro and not from a white point of reference. In a later study of scores made by medical students, Strong did find differences on some of the occupational scales, and also on the medical specialist scales. But the differences were small, and he pointed out that "It is quite possible that white students from two different medical colleges would differ as much" (94, p. 64). All in all, then, differences obtained on the Strong have not been impressive, and guesses as to the reasons for possible differences seem more interesting than the obtained differences in scores.

Another approach to the problem of cultural differences in interests is to compare the interests of persons in the United States with those of other national groups using the English language. In such cases semantic difficulties should be minimized. In 1943 Strong (91) reported a study by Pallister and Pierce made in Scotland. The differences between Scottish and American journalists were found to be significant, while the differences of ministers approached significance, and differences with policemen and artists were found to be negligible. Strong concluded that in the case of artists and policemen differences in language usages did not seem to affect the scores, and that for the other groups the differences were probably due to differences in sampling. More recently, Tyler (107) has reported a comparison of English and American children, mostly ages 10 and 11, using the Dreesse and Mooney *Interest Inventory for Elementary Grades*. The most important finding was the high degree of similarity between the interests of English and American children; as was noted in Chapter 8 in the discussion of the self concept and occupational preference.

The study of the interests of second-generation immigrants who have been in this country long enough to acquire the English language affords still another approach to the problem of cultural differences in which language difficulties should be to some degree alleviated, although the individual is still participating to considerable extent in another culture in his home. The early study is that by Strong and Bell (96), of the interests of Japanese. The outstanding generalization is that the interests of second-generation Japanese high school boys, born in this country, are very similar to those of American boys. The same was true of college students, although the sample of Japanese college

students was somewhat less satisfactory than was the sample of Japanese high school boys. But in general correlations between Japanese and whites ranged from .71 to .94. The lower of these coefficients is about that between the interests of physicists and architects, and the higher coefficient is comparable to that between physicists and chemists. There were some differences, but they were significant for only five occupations. Do these findings mean that there are no racial differences in interests as between Japanese and whites? Strong and Bell were careful to point out that their comparisons were limited to Japanese and white boys in the schools of California and to Japanese and white young men found in the colleges of the United States. And of course, the interests sampled were limited to those tapped by the *Vocational Interest Blank*.

Let us note now several examples of studies involving an actual translation of a measuring instrument. Sarhan (80) compared the interests of Egyptian children in groups equivalent to the fifth through eighth grades in American schools with the interests of American children at corresponding grade levels. The instrument used was of the incomplete sentence variety, rather than a completely structured inventory, and the responses suggest that both interests and values were involved. But whether interests or values, the differences seem to reflect some interesting cultural differences. Among the findings were that larger percentages of American than Egyptian children expressed interest in material things, in living quarters, in out-of-school play, in arts and crafts, in chores out of school, in people outside the family, and in vocations. On the other hand, greater percentages of Egyptian than American children expressed interest in independence for girls, in schoolwork, in a national language, in health and happiness and benefits for self, in patriotic wishes, and in social and religious values. The difference in expressions concerning religion is striking: less than 1 percent of American children expressed wishes pertaining to religious qualities, as against 12.9 percent of Egyptian children. A study by Roca (68) affords an interesting supplement to Sarhan, not only because a different culture is involved, but also because a structured inventory was used in which the semantic difficulties might be expected to come more sharply into focus. Roca developed a number of parallel interest items in English and in Spanish, designed to yield interest scores in a number of areas. The categories surviving the tryout of the instrument were: working in the fine arts, in science, with numbers, with things, with details of clerical work, and to help people. Matrices of intercorrelations of the part scores were judged to be similar. Roca

seems to have demonstrated that it is possible to surmount the difficulties posed by two languages to the extent of identifying some common interest areas. Whether or not these identified common interest areas are especially representative of the total interest patterns characteristic of each culture is another question which was not within the intended scope of the Roca study, but a question which must be answered before we can draw meaningful comparisons of the two cultures.

In view of the scattered nature of the evidence it is impossible to suggest any firm generalizations as to the relation of cultural factors involved in the interests of social class and ethnic groups. It does seem clear that vocational interests of boys in differing socioeconomic groups, as represented by boys from private and public schools, are different. Apparently boys in public schools show interests characteristic of middle-class "success" culture, and boys in private schools reflect in their interests the family-oriented culture of the upper classes. A variety of socioeconomic factors are doubtless related to vocational interests, but the relationship is complicated by the interrelations of status, intelligence, and values. The semantic difficulties involved in varying language usages by differing national groups speaking the same basic language are apparently not too serious, and even different languages do not constitute an impenetrable barrier to the comparison of interests of various cultural groups. There is no evidence that differences in interests are associated with the race factor per se. It seems possible that differences in interests of whites and Negroes, if indeed such differences are real, are better understood as reflecting social class differences. National and other cultural groups not living in the United States do display interests different from those found among individuals native to this country, and it seems reasonable to conjecture that in both cases the characteristic interest patterns are acquired through cultural learnings during childhood and youth.

INTERESTS, ABILITIES, AND ACHIEVEMENT

There has been a right-about-face over the past four decades or so on the matter of the relation of interests and abilities. Between the years 1910 and 1930 the prevailing opinion seemed to be that interests and abilities were so closely related that one could predict one from the other. It seemed to be a matter of common sense that one would develop interests in the activities one could perform well. Moreover, there were some early studies to which one could point.

Thorndike in 1912 (101), and again in 1917 (102), reported a very close relationship. In the earlier of these studies he asked 100 students to rank certain subjects according to their interest in them as they remembered their interests in the last three years of elementary school, and again in high school, and to rank themselves on ability in these subjects. From the analysis of the reports Thorndike concluded, "Interests are shown to be symptomatic to a very great extent of present and future capacity or ability. . . . interest and ability are bound very closely together. The bond is so close that either may be used as a symptom for the other almost as well as for itself" (101). Now the point of recalling this frequently quoted study is not to suggest an ungracious comparison between 1912 and 1960, but rather to indicate a then prevailing opinion. And later, in 1928, Fordyce was doubtless speaking for many in addition to himself when he said: "One of the first clues to specific ability is found in one's persistent interests. Thorndike, Bridges, Hartman, and other investigators have demonstrated the fact that an interest that abides from early youth up to the age of, say, fifteen or sixteen is an index of ability on the ground that we do well the thing that we like, or that we like the thing we can do well" (30).

The turning away from such beliefs came with the more widespread use of interest inventories and tests of scholastic aptitude. Doubtless there are still some who hold to a belief in a close relationship between interest and ability; somehow it seems that there *ought* to be such a relationship. But if by ability we mean tested ability, and by interest inventoried interest, the accumulated evidence is so overwhelmingly in the negative that there is little to be gained by laboring the point. We shall note quickly a few examples of investigations.

Segel and Brintle (83) used a general measure of scholastic aptitude, the *American Council on Education Psychological Examination*, and found coefficients with six of the Strong scales ranging from $-.32$ to $.10$. Strong, in his latest book, found no essential change since his 1943 summary: "Most correlations range between $.30$ and $-.30$ with a few higher coefficients" (95, p. 146). And he repeated his comment of 1943, that it is better to talk about relationships between interests and achievements than between interests and abilities, because abilities are in large part inferred from achievements. Studies involving the *Preference Record* give much the same impression. Triggs (106) found a few coefficients in the $.30$'s and $.40$'s between the *ACE Psychological Examination* and certain of the Kuder scales. For example, the Literary scale correlated $.383$ with L scores for men, and $.437$ for

women. For women, the Persuasive and Artistic scales also correlated .371 and .286 respectively with ACE total scores. For the Social Service scale, however, small negative coefficients were obtained for both men and women with total scores, and with both Q and L scores. In general, relationships were somewhat closer for women than for men between the Kuder scores and the scholastic aptitude scores. Phillips and Osborne (63), using the *Ohio State Psychological Test* as a measure of scholastic aptitude, found coefficients ranging from $-.24$ to $.39$ with the various Kuder scales. The r of $.39$ (which was the only positive r greater than $.03$) was with the Literary scores, while the $-.24$ was with Social Service scores. Thus, the results of Triggs and of Phillips and Osborne agree in indicating positive relations between the Literary interests and scholastic aptitude, and a negative relation between Social Service interest and scholastic aptitude, even though two different measures of aptitude were employed. Neither relationship, however, is close enough to be of much value for predictive purposes.

But if inventoried interests are not appreciably related to measured abilities, it would seem that surely interests and achievement must be related. We cannot give a categorical "No" as an answer to this possibility, although the evidence seems to be predominately negative; however, with only some spotty and positive suggestions, there is need for suspended judgment. In the study by Segel and Brintle (83) noted above, six of the Strong scales were correlated with first-year college marks in English, languages, mathematics and science, and history. With one exception the r 's fell in the range $-.22$ to $.27$. The exception ($-.47$) occurred between history grades and scores on the Engineer scale. Triggs (106), using the *Preference Record* rather than the Strong, correlated interest scores with achievement as measured by the Iowa High School examination and found relationships "not out of line with those found by Segel and Brintle." Rothney used an interest inventory devised especially for his study of the interests of high school boys. Although coefficients from $.49$ to $.58$ were found with the experimental group, when the instrument was applied in cross validation, coefficients shrunk to a range of $-.08$ to $.21$. The greatest yield in forecasting success in any of the school subjects from the interest scales was less than 2 percent. But in interpreting his results Rothney cautioned, "The findings reported in this paper do not, however, indicate that there is no substantial relationship between interest in and achievement of a particular school task. . . . The difference between the interest 'observed' by the teacher and 'expressed' by the student appears to be so great that

testing procedures have not been devised which makes it possible to determine one from a knowledge of the other" (74).

Perhaps it is not reasonable to expect more than slight relationships between achievement and inventoried interests. In seeking an explanation for the typically low correlations, Strong in his 1955 book (95, pp. 148 ff.) questioned whether the data now available are adequate for the purpose. For one thing, there are not apt to be many students in specialized curricula who make low interest scores, and hence the restricted distribution lowers the correlation. To use Strong's illustration, few engineering students with low engineer interest scores are enrolled in engineering. A second consideration is that interest and achievement scores are not really comparable in any thorough way. Grades reflect many elements of motivation other than sheer liking or disliking for the subject. And third, in contrasting the interests of successful members of an occupational group with those of men-in-general there is necessarily involved some contrasting of successful with unsuccessful men. This last observation is, of course, especially pertinent to studies involving the Strong inventory.

There does not seem to be any simple relationship of any consequence between Kuder interest scores and measures of achievement such as grades. In his 1947 review of the *Kuder Preference Record*, Super summarized the seven studies then available which dealt with the matter of prediction of achievement from interests. He commented, "These results, taken as a whole, are essentially in agreement with those reported for Strong's Blank. . . . Grades tend to be related to appropriately measured interests in some respects, but not in others, usually depending on whether or not there is sufficient range of interest in the group in question. The predictive value of the Kuder, for educational achievement, is probably slightly greater than that of the Strong Blank. More consistently, there is a relationship between interest and continuing in a field of study" (98). Super noted that no studies were available relating Kuder scores to continuing in vocation. Studies made since this summary do not seem to provide a basis for any major modification of views. Hake and Ruedisili (37) found that Kuder scores were only a minor factor in predicting college achievement. Phillips and Osborne (63) reached essentially the same conclusion as to prediction of college grades and found, further, that Kuder scores for those on scholastic probation and those not on probation did not differ significantly. Frandsen and Sessions (32) using high school seniors as subjects, found a median *r*bo of .27 between the rank orders of Kuder

scales and of achievements in high school subjects. Perhaps techniques can be devised in the future which can tease out more clearly the fragile strands of relationship which seem to exist, or perhaps the problem can be conceptualized in other terms; but for the present suspended judgment seems to be in order.

THE VALIDITY OF INTEREST INVENTORIES

Thus far we have presented a brief historical sketch of the more positive side of experience with interest inventories, using the Strong and Kuder as two well-known examples. We have found that inventory scores do seem to reflect considerable stability of whatever it is that is measured, and that the scores are related to a variety of factors: age, sex, cultural, and probably others. The reference point from which a base line for measurement is established seems to be of great importance. Probably about the maximum of stability which can be claimed over any considerable period of time is represented by the .75 reported by Strong for a 10-year period when first testing occurred during the senior year of college. At first thought this coefficient seems impressively high, but we must recall that a coefficient of this magnitude accounts for only about half the variance, and that therefore predictions for a given individual must certainly be made with considerable caution and crossing of fingers. Furthermore, from a practical standpoint, predictions made from the senior year in college are a little late to be of much help to most students. Predictive validity of scores decreases as we move toward the time when prediction is most needed, the younger years. Strong reported .56 for college freshmen retested after nine years; a coefficient of this size accounts for only 32 percent of the variance. Test-retest data are not available for the Kuder over such extended periods, but it will be recalled from the earlier discussion that over the four-year high school period most coefficients fall within the .56 to .75 range noted for the Strong.

We reported a number of stability coefficients in the preceding sections in order to help the student gain an impression of the variety of results obtained, but no such recital of coefficients can give a complete account of the difficulties and shortcomings of interest inventories for individual prediction. It seems reasonable to inquire first of all as to how good the original scores are. One of the more obvious problems is that of vocabulary. Steffire (89) analyzed the vocabulary difficulties of a number of inventories in terms of grade placement. Vocabulary difficulty for the Kuder and Strong fell at grades 8.4 and 10.4,

respectively; polysyllabic word difficulty at grades 6.2 and 14.7; vocabulary diversity at grades 16.1 and 15.9, and vocabulary mass at grades 6.4 and 14.6. Christensen (17) found that certain key words in the Kuder occurred as infrequently as two or three times per million words according to the Thorndike and Lorge count (103). Christensen constructed a vocabulary test of some of the key words and found that ninth-grade students had many erroneous ideas about their meanings. Roeber (71) also examined the vocabularies of interest inventories with special reference to use at the ninth-grade level, using as reference point the same Thorndike and Lorge list. He found that 10.6 percent of the different words used in the Kuder, and 16.1 percent of those in the Strong, were above the ninth-grade level in difficulty. From these studies it seems clear that considerable doubt is cast upon inventory scores in the lower high school grades and, probably, for students lacking in vocabulary skills, even at the earlier college years.

Closely akin to the vocabulary difficulty existing in the use of inventories is that of requiring the subject to make choices or indicate likes or dislikes whether or not he has had any experience with the particular elements involved. Suppose, for example, that a tenth-grade boy is asked to respond to being an expert in cutting jewels. Aside from the probability that he has only a vague notion of what "expert" means, he almost certainly has no experience in cutting jewels. But jewels do seem to be glamorous, and so he may choose this activity over another commonplace one about which he does know (77, p. 297). And whether or not as a result of deglamorizing by familiarity, it is possible that none of the choices presented may evoke a liking response. What counselor has not heard the question "What do you do if you don't like any of these?"

Another and a major shortcoming of interest inventories is that they can be faked. Bordin (11) asked a group of students to retake the Strong after a previous administration of the inventory had shown this group to have, for the most part, "welfare" patterns of interests. This time they were divided into small groups, and each group was instructed to simulate the interests of some one of the following: physicians, engineers, accountants, salesmen, and lawyers. There was a predominant number of A scores for the interests simulated. The results were interpreted as showing that the simulated scores had been achieved by responding in terms of occupational stereotypes. Benton and Kornhauser (9) used as subjects a group whose occupational objectives were in education and the social sciences except for three who planned to

study medicine. On a readministration of the inventory they were asked to respond so as to obtain the highest possible score on the physician scale. The median letter grade on the first "normal" administration was B—, but on the retest was B+. On the first administration three made A and three B+, but the faking resulted in 13 A's and 6 B+'s. Garry (34) found that it was possible to significantly increase scores by faking on four of the Strong scales: physician, lawyer, minister, and president of a manufacturing concern. Reliabilities of the faked scores ranged from .56 to .89, with reliability coefficients for three of the scales exceeding .75. Faking seemed to be specific to the scales, since intercorrelations were low, ranging from $-.05$ to $.35$.

Since all of the examples we have given are of studies which employed the Strong, let us note one more in which both the Strong and Kuder were used. Longstaff (50) found that both inventories could be faked. A rather complex set of instructions was given which directed the subjects to lower their Kuder scores on the Computational, Persuasive, Social Service, and Clerical scales, and their Strong scores on the accountant, life insurance salesman, personnel director and office man scales. The subjects were to raise their scores on the other Kuder scales, and on carpenter, mathematician, engineer, physicist, chemist, artist, author-journalist, and musician scores on the Strong. Even under these complex conditions, faking was in general successful, although women were less successful than men. The Strong scores were easier to fake upward, while the Kuder scores were more easily faked downward. Over 49 percent of the male subjects were able to fake upward scores on four of the Strong scales by two letter grades or more. The examples which we have cited are, of course, deliberate efforts to fake scores. It certainly does not follow that such deliberate faking would occur in a good counseling situation. What has been demonstrated by such studies is that faking *can* be done, not how frequently it does in fact occur. On the other hand, it would be naïve to assume that even the best of counseling relationships responses will be free from unconscious efforts toward distortion. Herein lies the danger of accepting at face value interest inventory scores.

In addition to the predictive aspect of validity, there are serious questions which can be raised as to the interest concept. The word "construct" is purposely being avoided because of doubts that the present amorphous notions about interests should be so dignified. As the term *interests* is used in relation to inventories it is taken to mean likes, dislikes, or preferences. These "interests" are commonly conceived

atomistically, and as Rothney and Schmidt (76) point out, various items and categories of items are simply "christened." There may be differential weighting for predictive purposes, but when the question of the nature of interests is raised there seems to be implicit a curious kind of quantum theory. The boy who likes, dislikes, or prefers six items "christened" as mechanical, for example, is regarded as having more mechanical interest than the boy who responds positively to three such items. Apparently there are assumed to be elementary units or quanta of "interest" which are somehow additive regardless of how the items are perceived. We have already noted difficulties of vocabulary, and that perception can be so structured by directions that faking is possible.

In spite of whatever serious reservations we may have as to the current concept of interest, and whatever doubts as to validity of prediction for the individual, we are nevertheless confronted with empirical evidence of some irreducible stability of inventory scores. What does this stability reflect? Is it the context in which the individual lives which provides the basis for stability? Probably most persons do not make drastic changes of cultural context, such as moving from an American city to a European village. There is some mobility from one social class subculture to another, and some movement from rural to urban subcultures, or vice versa. But it is not difficult to suppose that most people, at least during the years when they are apt to take interest inventories, probably continue to live in pretty much the same context. Such continuity of context may provide a basis for understanding the observed stability of inventoried interests.

An alternative line of speculation is that the person himself is the source of the stability reflected, however inadequately, in the masses of atomistic likes, dislikes, and preferences to which responses are made in inventories. Tyler (108) has found that the number of likes and dislikes on the Strong showed considerable stability for a group of 71 physicians over a period of 22 years. The number of likes correlated .54, dislikes .62, and predominance of dislikes over likes .46. Seeking to explain stability of inventoried interests as a reflection of stability of the person takes us immediately into questions of the self and self concept. Before proceeding along this line it will be helpful to consider expressed and manifested interests as well as something of the nature of values.

Expressed and Manifested Interests

A person makes the statement that he likes to play chess, or that he enjoys skiing, or that he is interested in bird dogs. How much significance should be attached to such expressions? Do they reflect merely

passing whims, or are they perhaps small talk in a social situation? They may be either or both of these. But we all know persons who do continue to play chess or to ski over a period of years with apparent enjoyment; and when such persons say that they like chess or skiing, certainly their expressions of interest are, to them, factual statements. And what of the boy who says that he would like to be a lawyer? Must we regard his statement as merely boyish fancy until he has proved himself by preparing for and actually seeking admission to a school of law? Are expressions of interest worthy of consideration in their own right, or must they always be supported by some associated manifestation before we can take them seriously? If we choose the latter alternative, there are serious difficulties in the path of seeking to support expressed interests by evidence from manifestations. Many if not most of us have known persons who entered law school and may even have graduated, not so much because of an interest in becoming lawyers, but because of parental or other pressures, or because training in law seemed a desirable route to some other ultimate goal.

EXPRESSED INTERESTS

Many of the earlier studies of vocational interests were concerned with expressed interests. Fryer reviewed many of these studies, and in his terminology expressed interests were included under the category of "estimated interests" (33, pp. 175-177). He found that, although there was a relationship between specific vocational interests expressed from time to time over a short period of life, the relationship was not sufficient for prediction for longer than a year during early and later adolescence. Vocational interests during early adolescence seemed to be exceedingly impractical, removed from reality, and subject to "enormous fluctuation." Vocational interests appeared to be influenced by "social status, age, experience, father's occupation, and professional achievement, among other things, in various degrees." Implications for guidance were not particularly encouraging. "Specific interests, estimated by the subject, are not permanent more than 50 percent of the time over a period longer than a year. These specific interests cannot be used as exact guides or as guides of any kind except in a suggestive capacity. . . . The vocational interest estimate is of little significance for prediction. It is only important when linked with other significant criteria of selection and guidance." At the time of Fryer's review, studies of inventoried interests were just well started, and Fryer therefore felt that conclusions regarding the permanence of inventoried interests must be "most tentative." Such studies of permanence as were available

dealt most often with the college period, while studies of estimated interests were numerous for elementary and high school periods. On the basis of the then-available evidence, Fryer commented that "The suggestion is present, however, that estimated and inventoried interests have a similar degree of permanence" (33, p. 184).

One of the most extensive studies of expressed interests is that by Mitchell (58). In three different stages covering a total time span of 25 years, data were collected from approximately 16,000 University of Michigan freshmen men, and 9,000 freshmen women. The manner in which the data were gathered carries a practical implication for guidance, for the information was secured from the Freshman Application Entrance Forms sent to prospective students from the Office of the Registrar. The prospective freshmen were asked to indicate their interests in various activities, which were later grouped into four areas: academic subject interests, physical recreations, cultural and scientific interests, and social interests. Group profiles were then developed for each of 14 fields of specialization for men and 17 fields for women. For example, of the men intending to enter the sciences, the percentage who reported interests in mathematics, physics, chemistry, collecting hobbies, and experimental hobbies was 10 percent or more greater than the mean of the rest of the student body, while the percentage of prospective men science students interested in English, history, and basketball was 10 percent or more less than the mean of other men students. In general, prospective students in literature, law, dentistry, business, engineering, and physical education showed the greatest variety of interests, and those in architecture, medicine, science, and music had the fewest interests. There were a number of other interesting findings which we cannot pause to detail. One generalization from the profiles, however, seems particularly worthy of note: ". . . the boy who is entirely undecided about the vocation he wishes to select is invariably without strong leanings in his subjects or in his out-of-school activities. . . . The decided student shows a decided pattern very early" (58).

EXPRESSED AND INVENTORIED INTERESTS

Zenti compared the results obtained from expressions of interest on the Mitchell check list and inventoried interests as measured by the Kuder *Preference Record*. The Clerical and Computational scales of the Kuder were treated as one, and comparisons were made with nine areas on the Mitchell check list thought to be comparable with nine Kuder scales. Zenti found the greatest agreement of Kuder scores with the Mitchell categories termed Science, Law, Forestry, Education, and

Engineering, and least agreement with Architecture, Business Administration, Music, and Literary. Each freshman was also asked to state his choice of a future profession or to name the college in which he was enrolled. Comparisons were made of these expressions with indications on the Kuder and on the Mitchell check list. For the Mitchell list and stated choices, highest agreement was found for Law and Science, and the lowest for Architecture and Business Administration. The Kuder scales which agreed best with stated choice of vocation or of college program were the Music and Artistic, and those which agreed least were the Literary and Mechanical (116, p. 85). It is difficult to evaluate the results of this study, in part because of some of the judgments made as a basis for scoring. For example, the combined Clerical and Computational Kuder scales were equated to the Mitchell Business Administration category, and the Kuder Mechanical to the Engineering. Zenti's conclusion that the evidence does not warrant an interchangeable use of the Kuder and the Mitchell instruments can be accepted easily, but we do not gain much of an understanding of the relationships between expressed and inventoried interests.

There is strong evidence that social class factors may be involved in the differences in expressed and inventoried interests. McArthur and Stevens (53) have reported on a follow-up study of 63 sophomore men at Harvard. In 1939-1940 the *Strong Vocational Interest Blank* was administered to them, and their expressed vocational interests were also recorded. In 1953, a total of 60 of the group were available for follow-up study. In general, inventoried interests were found to be more predictive of vocational pursuit for middle-class boys of public school background than for upper-class boys who had attended private schools.

After all, there seems to be little reason to expect any very close relationship between expressed and inventoried interests. In the case of expressed vocational interests, the person is indicating a vocational goal, and many, many influences have gone into the establishment of that goal. The interest inventory, on the other hand, yields a score which gives a rough index of how the person's likes and dislikes correspond to or differ from the likes or dislikes of persons engaged in various occupations. Goals involve much more than likes and dislikes.

MANIFESTED INTERESTS

The line between expressed and manifested interests is not a very clear one. If one were to observe activities in which individuals participate without apparent compulsion, as, for example, in the play

activity of children, such activity might be regarded as a manifestation of interests. Such was the concept of interests employed in a study by Rothney, who defined interests as "behavior exhibited by students in situations where no apparent compulsion was being applied to make them exhibit such behavior" (75). Rothney visited the boys in their classes several times each week over a period of three months and asked them to list the activities they had carried on during the week "just because they wanted to." From the list of activities thus accumulated, an activity inventory was developed. There seems to be no difficulty about regarding such reports as reports of manifested interests for the original group. But when an interest inventory is once developed and applied to another group, it seems doubtful that we are any longer dealing with manifestations of interest. In any event, Rothney found a marked decline in correlations between interests and achievement in school subjects as between the original and second group. Coefficients dropped from a range of .49 to .58 to a range of $-.08$ to .21. The latter range is about what is typically found between measured abilities and inventoried interests. Some shrinkage of coefficients would of course be expected in the cross-validation process, but here the difference is so marked that perhaps the drop may reflect also a difference between manifested and inventoried interests.

If we think of activities which manifest interests as activities in which a person engages without outer compulsion, then hobbies should qualify as manifestations of interest. For this reason a study of avocational interests by Super is of considerable interest. The sample of hobbyists included both adult males and high school boys. Four hobbies were represented. The Strong inventory was used as a measure of interests. The model engineering enthusiasts resembled in their interests those in technical occupations. The amateur musicians resembled those engaged professionally in music and, to a lesser extent, the interests of those in several technical and nontechnical occupations; thus a general cultural factor seemed to be suggested. Amateur photographers possessed interest patterns similar to those in photographic, technical, and artistic occupations. The interests of those whose hobby was stamp collecting were not clear, but seemed to resemble those in journalistic and technical occupations. Super concluded that "adolescent avocational interest patterns are essentially similar to those of adults but are more apt to be affected by extraneous factors and are less clear-cut" (97, p. 114).

One way of studying manifested interests is through the develop-

ment of activity inventories. Fryer reviewed the various inventories available in 1931 and the efforts which had been made to improve them. With reference to vocational activity inventories, he concluded that "The validity of the estimate will be in proportion to the knowledge of the individual making the estimate of interests in the activity under consideration" (33, p. 41). He pointed to the need for investigation of the knowledge that "people of various ages have of the occupations, their functional relations, their monetary, educational, and experience requirements, and so on." The situation, he felt, was much the same as in the early days of the child study movement, when investigators were bent on investigating the "content of the child's mind to find out what a child really had learned at certain ages. We need to know what is the occupational content of the adolescent's mind at different ages, to see what informational basis there is for a valid estimate of interests." Fryer's terminology may seem to the current reader to carry a note of too much emphasis on the intellectual. We should, perhaps, prefer an emphasis on experience more broadly conceived, to make more room for elements of attitudes and values. With this modification, however, we can well accept the warning implicit in Fryer's comments, that any activity inventory can be interpreted by the subject only in terms of his own experience.

Recently there has been a revival of activity in the development of activity inventories. Ewens (28) has reported on the development of an *Activity Experience Inventory*, using the interest areas of the Kuder. The instrument seems to possess considerable short-range stability. After six months, scores correlated with the original scores from .75 to .91 with a mean r of .83 for males, and from .60 to .79 with a mean r of .73 for women. Experience profiles after six months yielded a median retest ρ of .82 for men, and .77 for women. But the most completely reported recent study of an activity inventory at present writing comes from a series of studies at Michigan State University. Dressel and Matteson (23) first used the *Preference Record*, asking their subjects to respond to it in two ways, as an interest inventory, and as an experience inventory, but this approach proved unsatisfactory. An activity list of 200 items was then developed and administered, and on the basis of the responses 10 categories of interest-experience were delineated. The *Activity List* was then readministered to groups at both Michigan State University and at Boston University. The median of the obtained coefficients was .515 (Table 21). On the basis of total scores there was seldom a balance of interest and experience. For 59 percent

activity of children, such activity might be regarded as a manifestation of interests. Such was the concept of interests employed in a study by Rothney, who defined interests as "behavior exhibited by students in situations where no apparent compulsion was being applied to make them exhibit such behavior" (75). Rothney visited the boys in their classes several times each week over a period of three months and asked them to list the activities they had carried on during the week "just because they wanted to." From the list of activities thus accumulated, an activity inventory was developed. There seems to be no difficulty about regarding such reports as reports of manifested interests for the original group. But when an interest inventory is once developed and applied to another group, it seems doubtful that we are any longer dealing with manifestations of interest. In any event, Rothney found a marked decline in correlations between interests and achievement in school subjects as between the original and second group. Coefficients dropped from a range of .49 to .58 to a range of $-.08$ to $.21$. The latter range is about what is typically found between measured abilities and inventoried interests. Some shrinkage of coefficients would of course be expected in the cross-validation process, but here the difference is so marked that perhaps the drop may reflect also a difference between manifested and inventoried interests.

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One way of studying manifested interests is through the develop-

differentiating factors, and sex was an important factor in only 2 of the 10 categories. There were, however, differences as to college major. In Agriculture, Home Economics, and Engineering, two-thirds or more of the students made above-average gains. Individuals who made greater-than-average gains were neither very high nor low in college achievement; rather, they were most apt to be in the middle group as to achievement. And finally, there was no evidence that an increase of interests over the two-year period was related to survival in college beyond the first two years.

On the basis of present evidence it is difficult if not impossible to offer any one generalization regarding expressed and manifested interests. Certainly expressed interests are not always the passing fancies they seemed to be in the period reported by Fryer. Their predictive value for individuals seems to be related to social class factors and to a number of other not very well identified factors. Groups intending to enroll in various majors in college seem to have distinguishing patterns of expressed interests, but how these expressed interests are related to inventoried interests is not at all clear. Neither is it clear to what degree—and how—expressed and manifested interests may be related. Manifested interests as measured by an activity inventory are receiving fresh consideration, and this area of investigation seems to be promising.

THE NATURE OF VALUES

We have gone to some length to show that interest inventories measure something which seems to be moderately stable, nearly independent of abilities, and related to various cultural factors. Interests as measured by inventories, or as expressed or manifested, are regarded simply as likes-dislikes or preferences. From this point of view, when we are dealing in interests we are dealing hedonistically in enjoyments or satisfactions, but is this all? It does not seem so. Interests of the more enduring sort would seem to need roots deeper in the personality. Or, put another way, interests are rather "peripheral" in the personality, yet somehow related to deeper or more "central" strata. One of these more central strata may well be values. Now the notion of values as the concept of the desirable implies some kind of a standard or norm by which a thing is felt or judged to be desirable. This element is lacking in a rigidly empirical view of interests. So seen, interests are simply feelings of liking or preference, and the objects of interests are the things

of the subjects, experience exceeded interest, while for 38 percent interest exceeded experience. Only 3 percent had interest and experience scores exactly equal. The greatest preponderance of experience-over-interest responses occurred in the clerical and societal categories, while the greatest excess of interest-over-experience scores was found in the personal relationships, recreational, and aesthetic categories. The tendency to score higher on interest than on experience was significantly associated with less favorable socioeconomic status, and with freshman status as against upperclassman standing. There was some suggestion that the direction of interest or experience preponderance might be as-

TABLE 21. Correlations Between Experience and Interest as Shown by the Activity Check List
(N = 693)

Area	r	Area	r
Aesthetical	.64	Communicative	.50
Mechanical	.62	Personal relationships	.48
Computational	.59	Societal	.41
Scientific	.55	Recreational	.24
Political	.53	Clerical	.07

SOURCE: R. W. Matteson. Experience-interest relationships as measured by an activity check list. *J. counsel. Psychol.*, 1955, 2, 15.

sociated with scholastic aptitude, although the null hypothesis could be rejected at only the .10 level (57).

After this developmental work, the *Activity List* was considered ready for further attack on the problem of the relation of interests to experience, and four hypotheses were formulated (56). The first hypothesis, that interests will be increased with experience in a program of general education, appeared to be confirmed. The second hypothesis, that changes in students' interests will vary according to the nature and extent of their experiences, received some support. The third hypothesis was that gains in interest will vary inversely with the extent of initial experience and interest; this was not confirmed. The fourth hypothesis also failed of confirmation—that experience-interest disparity will tend to narrow with increased experience. Some very interesting findings emerged regarding the characteristics of students whose gains in interests over the two-year period were above or below average. First of all, the negative results: high or low academic aptitude scores were not

which we like or prefer. By contrast, values are attitudes or judgments that certain things are desirable, whether or not they are interesting.

The existence of a relation between interests and evaluative attitudes has long been recognized, although usually values have not been defined in the manner which we have accepted. In reviewing the materials available to him in 1931, Fryer found no need for considering such a relation; in fact, the term *values* does not occur in the index to his book. He stressed the changing nature of interests, rather than their stability, as an offset to the then-prevalent notion of predicting future interests for vocational guidance purposes—a practice he considered quite unwarranted on the basis of available evidence (33, p. 185). But Fryer noted that progress was being made in measurement in five areas: abilities, interests, motivation, emotions, and general habits. Attitude measurement he regarded as a subjective approach to general habits "with an inclusion at times of the influence of interests and emotions" (33, pp. 351–352). When Carter reviewed studies of interests in the decade following the report of Fryer, however, he noted that a few authors had stated views in which vocational interests were identified with stable and important personality developments based upon evaluative attitudes (16, p. 10). Currently it is common to recognize interests as an aspect of personality and as more-or-less closely related to values or evaluative attitudes, but the manner of relationship is far from clear. In any serious discussion of interests and values we must sooner or later face up to the difficult question of the meaning of these in personality, but for the moment let us defer these considerations and seek to gain some understanding of the background of empirical studies of values which have constituted the most conspicuous facet in current discussions of values.

Inventoried Values

The most influential single source of thinking about values which has thus far been reflected in a measuring instrument has been the work of Spranger (87). On the basis of an a priori analysis Spranger proposed six "Types of Men" and defended the thesis that the personalities of men are best known through an understanding of their evaluative attitudes. The types described were the theoretical, the economic, the aesthetic, the social, the political, and the religious. Allport and Vernon (4) developed *A Study of Values* as an instrument by which to test some of the ideas of Spranger. Briefly, the inventory consisted of a number of items to which the subject reacted by indicating his prefer-

ences for various activities, ideas, or objects. The scoring was arranged in such a manner as to yield only relative scores, and as the authors recognized, the problem of comparing individuals with regard to value strengths or "value energy" was left untouched. However, a number of interesting findings emerged from applications of the instrument to various groups. Several other inventories of values were developed, but *A Study of Values* remained the focus of attention. Several reviews are available of studies of values (24, 26, 35). There is no point in reiterating here any substantial portion of these reviews; rather, we shall note only some examples of certain findings to provide an introduction to the area.

VARIOUS GROUP DIFFERENCES

One of the most substantial findings is that there are sex differences in responses to *A Study of Values*. Cantril and Allport (14) reviewed a number of early studies and found that men scored higher on theoretical, economic, and political values, while women scored higher on the aesthetic, social, and religious. Later studies have repeatedly confirmed these findings. Hartmann (39) found that the rank-order of values for men was political, theoretical, economic, religious, social and aesthetic, while for women the order was religious, aesthetic, social, political, economic, and theoretical. These particular rank-orders are often disturbed by various factors operating in special groups, but some pattern of sex differences is always found.

The existence of differing value patterns among students who are enrolled in various college majors seems to be well established, and in general, the differences are about what might be expected: students in the natural sciences score highest on the theoretical, while those in applied sciences score high also on the social, and often on the religious. Majors in the social sciences tend to score high on both theoretical and social, although in one study (81) those in history scored highest on aesthetic values. Students in literature and the languages found their highest value in the aesthetic. Several studies included groups majoring in health and physical education. In the Seashore (82) study, these majors were about equal in political and religious values, while social values fell in third place. In a study by Arsenian (7), majors in health and physical education made their highest scores as freshmen in religious, theoretical, and political values, but for seniors the order was social, theoretical, and religious. Harris (38) found definite differences for students in arts, engineering, and

business curricula. Satisfactory comparisons cannot be made with other studies, however, because Harris found it necessary to omit the social and economic scores due to low test-retest reliability. Doubtless some of the differences which are observed between majors reflect differences among student populations in various institutions, for there are such differences. Differences found with the new form of *Study of Values* are summarized for a number of college populations in the manual (5). A special summary for both old and new forms was prepared for the Jacob report (45, p. 104). Some examples will serve to illustrate some of the kinds of differences found. Senior women at Bennington College displayed relatively high theoretical and aesthetic values, and relatively low religious values. Radcliffe college women scored low as compared to the norm group on economic values. At Woman's College of North Carolina the students placed high value on religion. At George Peabody College for Teachers and Southwestern College at Memphis both men and women scored above their norm groups on religion, but at the College of the City of New York both men and women scored low on religious values. There seem to be both regional and urban-rural factors involved in the differences, as well as institutional factors.

VALUES, ABILITIES, AND ACHIEVEMENT

From time to time the question has been raised as to possible relationships among these three variables. As early as 1933 Pintner (64), using as subjects men and women in a class in educational psychology, found mixed and modest correlations between values scores and a scholastic aptitude test. Positive coefficients of .38 and .24 were found with social and theoretical scores respectively. The correlations with the political and economic were negative: $-.28$ with the former and $-.41$ with the latter. Correlations with aesthetic and religious values were negligible. Duffy and Crissy (25) found that correlations of values scores with intelligence averaged .29 and with average freshmen grades .28 when intelligence was partialled out. Their subjects were all women. Almost all such studies employed college students as subjects, but Rothney (74) studied the relationships of values to school grades of eleventh-grade boys in public schools. He devised a revision of the *Study of Values* more suitable for the high school level. A discrepancy score technique was used to eliminate the effects of scholastic aptitude and age. Coefficients were low, ranging from $-.13$ to .24 for one group, from $-.19$ to .17 for another, and the greatest obtained fore-

casting efficiency of value scores was less than 2 percent. However, the reliabilities of the revised instrument were low, averaging only .42 for the six values. In commenting on these and other studies Dukes (26) observed that, in view of the way in which most tests of general intelligence are constructed, it is not apparent why one should expect any relationship between values and intelligence, or between composite class marks and values. As to a possible relation of values and class marks, Dukes suggests that what the investigator would need to know is the meaning of the marks to the individual student.

THE STRUCTURE OF VALUES

Considerable interest developed in the application of factor analytic methods to measurements of values. Whisler (110) applied the technique to the responses of undergraduates to 46 items. He extracted six factors, which he described as acceptance of conventional ethical principles, enjoyment of momentary pleasures, interest in conflicts and controversies, desire to be an effective agent, participation in casual relations, and criticalness and an interest in the "truth." Duffy and Crissy (25), analyzing the responses of freshmen at Sarah Lawrence College to *A Study of Values*, found three factors: an interest in immediate problems of utility, power, or prestige (the "Philistine" factor); interest in human relationships—a social factor; and an interest in abstract questions of truth or beauty—a theoretical factor. In another study Lurie (51) isolated four factors: a social factor, "clearly social and altruistic, valuing human relations as such;" a "Philistine" factor, a complex of Spranger's political and economic types—aggressive, utilitarian, and anticultural; a theoretical factor; and a religious factor, "probably more closely connected with doctrine and practice than the vague mystical unity with the cosmos that Spranger envisaged." In addition, three "minor temperamental and attitude factors" were found: an open-mindedness, practicality, and an aesthetic factor of another sort, "somehow anti-idealistic, even if the ideals be aesthetic ones." In an effort to develop scales for the measurement of the factors found by Lurie, Wimberly constructed seven scales: power, commercial, aesthetic, intellectual, ameliorative, religious, and personal. But some high intercorrelations were found, and he concluded that "Three scales of pragmatic usefulness have been developed: Socio-religious, Commercial, and Intellectual" (112, p. 32). None of these proved to be pure measures of the evaluative attitude involved. In a second try (109), five scales were used: economic, theoretical, social, religious,

business curricula. Satisfactory comparisons cannot be made with other studies, however, because Harris found it necessary to omit the social and economic scores due to low test-retest reliability. Doubtless some of the differences which are observed between majors reflect differences among student populations in various institutions, for there are such differences. Differences found with the new form of *Study of Values* are summarized for a number of college populations in the manual (5). A special summary for both old and new forms was prepared for the Jacob report (45, p. 104). Some examples will serve to illustrate some of the kinds of differences found. Senior women at Bennington College displayed relatively high theoretical and aesthetic values, and relatively low religious values. Radcliffe college women scored low as compared to the norm group on economic values. At Woman's College of North Carolina the students placed high value on religion. At George Peabody College for Teachers and Southwestern College at Memphis both men and women scored above their norm groups on religion, but at the College of the City of New York both men and women scored low on religious values. There seem to be both regional and urban-rural factors involved in the differences, as well as institutional factors.

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and aesthetic. Only one of the intercorrelations was significant—that between the social and religious.

Glaser and Maller (35) developed a revision of the *Study of Values* which was modified so much that it was practically a new inventory. The political and religious value scales were eliminated as separate measures, and only the theoretic, aesthetic, social, and economic remained. In a later study Wimberly (113), following the lead of Glaser and Maller, combined his original personal (or social), ameliorative, and religious into a single socioeconomic scale. On the other hand, the original intellectual scale was differentiated into three—the scientific, the literary, and the artistic. The power and commercial values remained as in the earlier studies. Reliabilities were high, even with rather small numbers of items in the various scales; but intercorrelations ranged from $-.51$ to $.49$, and thus some overlap remained. Probably the most definitive analysis of the Allport-Vernon instrument is that by Brogden (12). He attacked the problem of the internal relations among the test items in a thoroughgoing manner. From a factor analysis of the 60 variables used he extracted 11 first-order and three second-order factors. The first 10 of the first-order factors were named as follows: (1) general aesthetic interest, (2) interest in the fine arts, (3) belief in "Culture," (4) antireligious evaluative tendency, (5) antiaggression, (6) humanitarian tendency, (7) interest in science, (8) tendency toward liberalism, (9) theoretic interest, and (10) "rugged individualism." The eleventh factor was not interpreted because it seemed to be residual in nature.

A review of the results of the various studies noted above will show that there is considerable agreement on some factors, although described under various names. For example, all the investigators reported some kind of theoretic factor, and Brogden split the factor into two—a theoretic interest and an interest in science. Another factor variously described as Philistine, utilitarian, commercial, practical, or economic was found by Duffy and Crissy, Lurie, Wimberly, and Glaser and Maller; and the "rugged individualism" found by Brogden seems to be related. Again, from the findings summarized above, one gets the further impression that there is considerable overlap between values as measured by *A Study of Values* and interests as measured by inventories. To cite just one case in point: it will be recalled from our earlier discussion of inventoried interests that Thurstone found four factors in the responses to the *Vocational Interest Blank*. These were interest in people, in science, in language, and in business. All but the

tive associations are somewhat stronger for women than for men. A quite different set of values is associated with Social Service interests, which are positively related to social and religious values. An interesting sex difference can be noted in regard to the Social Service interests. For men, this interest is negatively related to economic values, while no significant relation exists for women; and for women political values are negatively related to Social Service interests, although a significant relation is lacking for men. Another way of reading the table is to note the interests associated with some one value by reading down a column. For example, aesthetic values show positive relations with Artistic, Literary, and Musical interests, as might be expected, and negative relations with Mechanical and Persuasive interests. It should be stressed that the coefficients, though statistically significant, are for the most part rather small. However, the two largest of .542 and .552 between Persuasive interests and economic and political values are of about the magnitude that one might expect for correlations between a test of general scholastic aptitude and first-semester grades in college.

There were some interesting differences found in the intercorrelations for the two institutional populations. First of all, there were 39 significant coefficients for the Peabody group (not shown here), as compared with 32 for the Vanderbilt group. Most of the differences in the presence or absence of significant relations between the two institutional groups occur in the economic and aesthetic values for men and the theoretical value for women. The investigators commented that in no Kuder subtest were there marked relations for both men and women of Peabody, while Vanderbilt men and women had two in common—the Persuasive and Social Service interests noted above. There is no very apparent explanation as to what factors present in the two student groups might have produced the different pattern of relationships of values and interests; perhaps differences result simply from sampling fluctuations. But in any event the obtained differences warn us against expecting any fixed and uniform relation between interest and value scores. As judged by Kuder and Allport-Vernon scores, we do have evidence of overlap of factors reflected in interest and values inventory scores, although the typically rather low coefficients suggest a rather limited degree of overlap.

Sarbin and Berdie (79) asked the question, "Do individuals who show given patterns of interest on the Strong have distinctive profiles on the *Study of Values*?" Both instruments were administered to college

TABLE 22. Intercorrelations of Allport-Vernon Study of Values and Kuder Preference Record Scores, Significant at or Above the 5 Percent Level, for Students in General Psychology at Vanderbilt University
(N = 84 men; 39 women)*

	Theoretical M	Theoretical W	Economic M	Economic W	Aesthetic M	Aesthetic W	Social M	Social W	Political M	Political W	Religious M	Religious W
Outdoor				-403	-328							
Mechanical			392						-254		-350	
Computational									345	552		
Scientific	536	477	322	542	-217			-316				
Persuasive	-273	-263		-329	360	443	-334					
Artistic					224							
Literary					537				-217			
Musical						-425					451	356
Social Service			-366				329	562		-419	-225	
Clerical			297	459								

* All decimal points preceding coefficients omitted.

* All decimal points preceding coefficients omitted.
SOURCE: J. C. Stanley & R. S. Waldrop. Intercorrelations of study of values and Kuder preference record scores. *Educ. psychol. Measmt.*, 1952, 12, 714. [All coefficients at less than 5 percent level omitted from table.]

fied public accountants, and office workers, and mildly opposed interests of the sort possessed by physicians. The investigators suggested that it corresponded to the "interest in people" of Thurstone, but more clearly so to Strong's factor B.

Factor III. On the positive side this factor is best described by its high loadings in the interests of chemist, although there are also positive loadings for the interests of physician and teacher and for theoretic values. On the negative side there are strong loadings for the interests of life insurance salesmen, and smaller negative loadings for political values. Probably this factor is similar to the "science" of Thurstone and to corresponding factors isolated by Lurie, and by Duffy and Crissy.

Factor IV. This is predominantly a values factor, the strongest loading for which is in religious values, and a secondary loading in social values. As we saw in our earlier discussion of the structure of values, religious and social values tend to be positively associated. At the negative end of this fourth factor are aesthetic values.

Factor V. The last factor is almost exclusively a values factor, positively loaded with political values, and negatively with economic.

The three studies we have noted employed only two interest inventories and one values inventory, and consequently we cannot make any sweeping assertions as to the relation of inventoried interests and values. But within this delimitation, we do seem to be justified in emphasizing that some common factors may be reflected by either interest or values inventories. It seems reasonable, then, that to a limited extent interest scores might be interpreted as indicators of values, and values scores as indicators of interests. We cannot accurately treat the values inventory as simply another interest inventory. On the other hand, there seem to be some factors involved which are relatively unadulterated interest factors, and some which are nearly unadulterated reflections of something else which we may conveniently call values.

The Response of Youth to Values of the Culture

In our earlier discussion of contemporary American culture (Chapter 3) we described in broad terms the characteristic value patterns of both general American culture and of some subcultures, the social class system, and certain of the ethnic group value systems. We found the concept of values a particularly useful concept as a focus for such descriptions. Now we turn to the impact of the values of the culture upon students and their response to these values. We shall no

men, and the Strong was scored for 26 scales. Occupational interest groupings were based on a modification of Darley's schema:

- Group I—artist, psychologist, architect, physician, and dentist
- Group II—mathematician, engineer, and chemist
- Group III—farmer, and high school mathematics and physical science teacher
- Group IV—YMCA physical director, personnel manager, YMCA secretary, city school superintendent, minister
- Group V—certified public accountant
- Group VI—accountant, office man, purchasing agent, and banker
- Group VII—sales manager, real estate salesman, and life insurance salesman
- Group VIII—advertising man, lawyer, and author-journalist

Comparisons were made of the values scores of persons having and those not having interest patterns in the eight groups. Here we shall note only those cases in which the values scores for the two have and have-not groups were different at or above the 5 percent level. No significant differences at all were found for interest groups III, V, and VI. For group I, there were differences in theoretical, economic, aesthetic, and political values. For group II, differences occurred in theoretical and political values. For group IV, the only difference was in religious values, and for group VII, the only difference was in the theoretical. It appears, then, that the pattern of values might be helpful in discriminating between those who do and do not have interests similar to those of artists, psychologists, architects, physicians, and dentists, and in a limited way for those having social welfare or uplift interests and sales interests.

A study by Ferguson, Humphreys, and Strong (29) employed another method. The Strong inventory and the *Study of Values* were administered to a group of male students at Stanford University, and a factor analysis was made of the matrix of intercorrelations. Five factors were extracted. We shall describe these briefly.

Factor I. Both interest and value loadings occurred in this factor. Most prominent were positive loadings in the lawyer and physician interest scales, although a somewhat lesser positive loading of theoretical values was also present. Negative loadings consisted of office worker interests and economic values. Apparently then, one who has the interests of lawyers and physicians and who values the theoretical is apt to dislike the things liked by office workers and not place a high value on the sort of economic considerations tapped by the *Study of Values*.

Factor II. This seems to be a straightforward interest factor, with positive loadings in the interests of teachers, YMCA secretaries, certi-

and escape from boredom. Security is not the dominant motivation. A happy family is a part of the full life, but most have little concern with larger social problems. Third, religion is important. Most students (and especially women) express a "need to believe," but the religion desired apparently has little to do with practical, everyday living, or with social responsibility. Fourth, morality is a value. The moral standards are "thoroughly conventional" despite the apparently nonconformist veneer of college life. Moral standards, however, are considered a personal matter, and permissiveness in regard to the conduct of others is a definite part of the code. There must be "elbow room" in morals. Fifth, "privitism" is important. "Most American students desire to separate themselves from their political and social context. They shun civic responsibilities and have little personal interest in public affairs." There is a "bland belief in the political process of popular democracy," but a shying away from personal political participation. Sixth, American students value tolerance. There are "pockets of intolerance" towards some other groups, but taken as a whole, students value tolerance. Seventh and last, college itself is a value. The high value placed on a college education, however, stems from different motivations. But college is good—and especially the student's own college.

Is there, then, within the larger culture a subculture of college students in which common values are shared? Is this the response of college students to the larger culture, to create their own uniquely collegiate pattern of values, quite apart from the larger culture? On the basis of the Jacob report, the opposite is more nearly true. "The overall conclusion of this study is that college does make a difference—but not a very fundamental one for most students. Basic values remain largely constant through college" (45, p. 38). There is a development of some conformity to the value system the student finds operative on his campus, but the development is more nearly one of socialization than of liberalizing of values. "If anything, the 'typical' college graduate is a cultural rubber stamp for the social heritage as it stands rather than the instigator of new patterns of thought and new standards of conduct" (45, p. 38). Changes in the values of the general culture are, however, reflected in the climate of values found in the colleges. The ferment and reorientation of values of the 1930's, for example, did have an impact on the climate of values found in the colleges.

We must not leave the impression that the Jacob report found all college students to be utter conformists, or that no college seemed to have any effect upon the values of its students. Students did evidence

longer be so exclusively concerned with the few value inventories which served as illustrations in the preceding section. There we were interested in examining the relations between value and interest inventories. We shall continue to be interested in the findings from value inventory studies, but as part of a broader approach including various measures of attitudes and beliefs. Studying values only by means of a few highly structured instruments is a little like trying to observe the panorama of the Grand Canyon through a telescope firmly anchored so that it cannot be turned either to right or left, up or down. Although we shall seek to swing our telescope about, we must place some limits; and we shall confine ourselves to that portion of the canyon in which we find the responses of college and high school students in the United States to the values of their cultures.

THE COLLEGE LEVEL

Fortunately we have in the recent report by Jacob a synthesis of a wide range of investigations. Under the sponsorship of the Hazen Foundation, the study by Jacob's committee began as an investigation of the effect of general education in the social sciences upon the attitudes of college students. But the study broadened in scope as it progressed. Among a number of interesting findings are two especially pertinent to our topic. "First, most American students share many values in common. *There is a striking homogeneity of basic values throughout the country.*" And, "Second, on issues where students do differ, they split in about the same proportions at most institutions. *The patterns of value tend to be similar at American colleges, regardless of location, administration, size and background of the student body, or character of the educational program*" (45, pp. 12-13). There are in these generalizations profound implications for college teaching which we must pass over since a consideration of teaching is not within the scope of our purpose.

But let us note what these common values are. Not all students subscribe to all these values, but about three out of four or more were found to do so. First, there is self-confidence. This found expression in such beliefs as the following. One must determine one's own destiny; the most important things in life are the result of one's own efforts; anyone can succeed by hard work. This last, however, was tempered by the recognition of one in three students that "who you know" is important in getting ahead. Second, self-interest is a strong value. Students hope for a "rich, full life" with variety, interest, perhaps excitement,

The broad sweep of the Jacob report certainly gives us important findings, but its purpose leaves little room for inquiry into the more specific responses of students to the various subcultures in which they participate. We know in a general way that the middle classes are over-represented in college, and that various institutions enroll differing proportions of the socioeconomic groups (60). But we know very little about the persistence or modification of the subcultural values which presumably students bring with them to college. What about the one in four or five students who do not fit the general pattern described in the Jacobs report? Do they represent subcultural groups, and if so, how do they respond to the values of their own groups? We do not have the answer, but we may illustrate specific aspects of the general problem. In one part of a larger study Woodruff (115) contrasted the values of mobile and nonmobile students. The instrument was one devised for the study, in which the student was presented with problems of choice as to vocational, social group participation, and a place to live. Small groups of mobile and nonmobile students were also interviewed. Mobile students were found to place society and political power significantly higher, and comfort and security significantly lower than the nonmobile. The mobile group also placed wealth and personal attractiveness higher, and social service, home life, and religion lower than the nonmobiles, although the differences were not definitely significant. When the subjects were divided on the basis of parental income, society, social service, and friendship dropped as values in relation to the total group, and political power and personal attractiveness rose. All this sounds like the "striving" middle-class pattern.

An interesting study of the success value in relation to social class was reported by Sarason and Mandler (78). A group of Yale undergraduates were classified as to social class on the basis of four factors: occupation of father, scholarship grants (since these were awarded partly on the basis of need), father's education, and whether the student's previous schooling had been in public or private schools. A questionnaire for measuring test anxiety was administered to the total group, and on the basis of these scores students were divided into two high- and two low-anxiety groups. The investigators found that a significantly higher percentage of the fathers of high-anxiety than of low-anxiety students had middle-class occupations. Also, significantly more of the high-anxiety than of the low-anxiety students held scholarships. Differences as to fathers' education and previous schooling of students were not significant but were in the expected directions. However, "The

differences among themselves, but the differences were often upon issues reflecting conflicts in the general culture. Student opinions as to discipline and permissiveness in child rearing reflected confusion and the "prevailing social and ideological cleavages and the diversified philosophies of life in American society" (45, p. 33). There are also differences centering about government—"free enterprise" and the "welfare state"; differences and confusion as to the role of power or force in international affairs; and differences as to the treatment of political nonconformists and the measures necessary against subversion in a time of cold war. And when we turn from differences among students to differences among colleges we find in the report some striking findings. There seem to be more or less enduring and distinctive profiles of values found in the student groups of certain institutions (45, pp. 103 ff.). Sometimes it is personal autonomy and open-mindedness which are distinctive values, sometimes community-mindedness, sometimes religious and social service values, while the students of some institutions seem to be unusually conservative and conforming, and in one institution at least, success seems to be an overwhelming value.

Of course, we must not too hastily conclude that these distinctive value patterns are entirely the result of the acculturation of students during their years in college. At least in private schools, a good bit of more-or-less conscious selection of students probably helps to gather a group of students somewhat similar in their values and different from the average run of students. An interesting example of what appears to be selection on the basis of values is reported by Arsenian (7). For three years the entering freshman classes at Springfield College were given the *Study of Values*. The rank-order of values was consistent over the three-year period with one exception, and in that case the difference between the means in question was not statistically significant. Moreover, Arsenian found that retention in the college was related to agreement or disagreement of the values of individuals with the dominant pattern of values characteristic of the student group. Differences between those who left college before graduation, and those who completed occurred especially in social, economic, and political values; critical ratios of the differences ranged from 2.14 to 6.07 for these three values. Springfield College is a professional school emphasizing preparation in recreation, health and physical education, social group work, and teaching. Those whose economic and political values were high, and whose social values were low, apparently did not find themselves in a congenial values climate.

cept of values seemed to be so intangible as to be beyond the pale. If so, the substitution of an electronic crank for a mechanical one will hardly change the situation. Whatever the reason, the values of the non-delinquent, normal student who continues in high school have not received anything like the amount of attention devoted to his collegiate counterpart. Most of the more recent studies have been devoted to some aspect of social class and values, and among these are some yielding interesting insights.

A part of a larger study by Kahl (47) throws considerable light on the value patterns of the mobile and nonmobile. Twenty-four boys were selected from a larger sample, and they and their families were interviewed. All the boys appeared to be capable of college work, as judged by IQ scores, and all were members of families in the upper-lower class. Twelve were in the college preparatory course; 12 were not and did not plan to go to college. On the basis of interviews it appeared that the main factor in the plans of those expecting to enter college was parental pressure. When the families were interviewed it appeared that 15 accepted their social status as morally proper and legitimate; 8 felt that they had not risen as high as they should have, and one man questioned the moral justice of the general social scheme of things. The core value of those families who apparently accepted their social status was characterized as "getting by," and the core value of those who did not accept seemed to be one of "getting ahead."

In an earlier discussion of context and limits we developed the idea that there are limitations imposed on the life expectancy of the individual by the world in which he lives. These limits may result from objective factors, such as lack of opportunity, or from his subjective experiencing of his world. A part of both the objective and subjective is the social class culture. Does the person as a result of his experiencing of his social class culture internalize limits on his aspirations and expectations? A study by Hieronymus could be interpreted as supporting the idea of limited expectations, as could also the "getting by" values which Kahl found in his interviews with parents. Hieronymus (41) devised a scale for measuring socioeconomic expectations, in which he was careful to ask for expectations rather than aspirations. The scale included items relating to a wide range of matters: expected participation in social and community life, expected residential areas and types of homes, home conveniences, expected extent of formal schooling, occupation, and income. Socioeconomic status was judged by a modified Sims Score Card. The correlation between socioeconomic status and

within-group analysis tends to support the conclusion that the distribution of anxiety scores does not represent a social class continuum. It could support the conclusion that although there is an overall relationship between anxiety and social class factors, the complexity of the relationship is of such a nature as to preclude a simple explanation" (78, p. 812).

THE SECONDARY SCHOOL LEVEL

In our earlier consideration of youth groups and youth culture (Chapter 3) we found considerable reason to believe that youth groups develop their own culture, often in the crevices of adult society, and that much of middle-class youth culture has been adopted into American schools in a more-or-less institutionalized fashion. Lower-class youth culture, of course, has not been so accepted by the schools, and only with considerable effort tolerated by predominantly middle-class teachers. In fact, it was suggested that the conflict of values experienced by the lower-class youth may be genuinely related to dropping out during secondary school years. This is one response of high school youth to the dominant culture found in secondary schools. Another and increasingly important response to the values of the culture as some youth perceive them is delinquency. Delinquency is certainly not a phenomenon of the schools alone, but it is an important though deviant response to values by youth of secondary school age. Probably, though, the great majority of high school youth come to accept the values of their cultures through normal processes of enculturation, and live with them with greater or lesser degrees of stress.

With the exception of delinquency and various other kinds of deviant behavior studies, psychological studies of values on the secondary school level are notably lacking. Unfortunately there is no counterpart of the Jacob report; nor is there the range of material out of which could be built a comparable study. Why this should be is a matter for speculation. Perhaps the lack of readily available inventories discouraged values studies in high school. There were several adaptations of the *Study of Values*, but somehow these never attained wide use. Perhaps secondary school counselors have been so obsessed with measurements of interests that they felt little concern about appraisal of values, or even about the possibility of interpreting interest inventories as indicators of values. Perhaps our programs of counselor preparation have inadvertently developed in counselors a kind of turning-of-the-crank approach to individual analysis by means of test scores, so that the con-

social class differences in the eight areas may well be the result of the small sample (only 28 in each social class group) or the inappropriateness of some of the instruments used, or both.

VALUES AND DELINQUENCY

In recent years a number of studies have explored the possibility of relations between cultural values and various kinds of deviant behavior popularly grouped together under the name delinquency. Here we shall note only one significant recent summary statement, the report to the National Education Association by the Juvenile Delinquency Project, directed by William C. Kvaraceus (49). Delinquency was defined as norm-violating behavior. The norms violated may be those of any of the institutions: the home, school, or the legal system. But of course the first robin does not necessarily mean spring, and a single offense does not make a delinquent. Offenses differ in frequency and in seriousness. More precisely, then, juvenile delinquency means "behavior by nonadults which violates specific legal norms or the norms of a particular societal institution with sufficient frequency and/or seriousness so as to provide a firm basis for legal action against the behaving individual or group" (49, p. 54). "Delinquency" is useless as a diagnostic concept; "the youngster who violates norms can fall into any diagnostic category or into none at all, and there is no diagnostic category of 'delinquent' . . ." (49, p. 91). Probably the majority of juvenile delinquents show little or no emotional disturbance. For our purposes probably the most pertinent conclusion from the study is that "the preponderant portion of our 'delinquent' population consists of essentially 'normal' lower-class youngsters" (49, p. 55). The implication of this is that if the counselor is to understand the majority of delinquents, he must understand the values of the lower-class culture from which they come.

In general, little attention has been given to the study of values of the "normal" high school youth who neither drops out of school nor gets into trouble through norm-violating behavior. There are suggestions, however, that his values resemble those of his social class subculture as far down the age scale as the ninth grade. His expectations are related to his social status, but the relationship is far from perfect. His response to the cultural values he finds seems to be one of acceptance. The opposite kind of response to the dominant middle-class values is found in the norm-violating behavior of the "delinquent," and this response is found predominantly in lower-class groups. Norm-violat-

socioeconomic expectations was found to be .63 for boys and .61 for girls. With test intelligence partialled out the coefficients were still .52 and .53. There is then a relationship between socioeconomic status and expectations, but certainly not a relationship close enough to predict very convincingly for the individual from status to expectation. There is always the possibility of mobility orientation to be considered.

Douvan (22) reasoned that middle-class students would have a need to achieve just for the sake of success, and that material reward would have little effect upon this need. On the other hand, working-class students were expected to respond to the promise of an immediate material reward, and be little affected by failure to reach an abstract norm in the absence of an immediate and tangible reward. The subjects were high school seniors in the two newest high schools in the city, so located that they drew about equally from the middle class and working class. Need achievement was measured by an adaptation of the *Thematic Apperception Test*. In general, Douvan's expectations were fulfilled. For the working-class students, there was a significant difference in need to achieve in two failure situations, one related to material reward and one not related to any immediate material goal, while middle-class students showed a more consistently high need to achieve in both situations.

Rothman (73) took an indirect approach to the problem of values and social class in his study of ninth-grade pupils. One group was judged to be lower-middle class, and another upper-lower class, on the basis of the *Index of Status Characteristics*. The study was intended "to investigate the underlying factors which presumably lead to such values." The areas investigated were thinking, attitudes, interests, feeling, action, purposes, aspirations, and beliefs. No differences significant at the .05 level were found in any of the areas studied. However, there was "one thread of difference":

1. Upper-lower class boys are more apt to have a part-time job, and to be thinking about going into military service. The upper-lower class girl is more likely to be engaged in sport activities.
2. The lower-middle class student is more likely to spend time attending meetings and taking music and dancing lessons; has more plans for the immediate future and for adult life; more frequently indicates intention to attend college; and has more aspirations involving the use of money.

These differences reported by Rothman fit well the way of life of the two social classes; they also suggest differences in expectations—especially plans for college. The failure to find statistically significant

War, and the time when it found it again, shortly after World War II" (3, p. 453). Also about this time sociology and social psychology were seeking to create an integrating structure out of the scattered planks of attitudes. Let us try to relate some of these meteorological phenomena to notions of interests and values.

In his classic paper on interest and the will in 1895 Dewey (20) felt no need to apologize for use of the concept of self. In fact, the self was the central concept against which he developed his notions of interest and effort. The self was conceived as dynamic—"always already doing something, intent on something urgent"—and interest was therefore dynamic, a matter of self-expression. Interest had both objective and subjective aspects. The object of an interest supplied means and ends to an impulse in need of expression, thus bringing the impulse to consciousness and transforming the impulse into interest. On the subjective side, interest signified an internal realization of feeling of worth. Value was thus not only objective but also subjective. In the original thought of Dewey, the emphasis seems to be that value is essentially the subjective side of interest, and interest necessarily involves the self—"... is the accompaniment of the identification of the necessity of that object or idea for the maintenance of self-expression." When there is not involvement of the self, there remains only effort, which "implies a separation between the self and the fact to be mastered or the task to be performed."

As a part of the "interregnum" came also the ultraempirical period. This was the heyday of the makers of interest inventories. The self or ego was not regarded as an essential part of the picture in the sense in which Dewey used the concept. Rather, the effort was to discover items and constellations of items which could distinguish groups from each other and the individual from a group. We have seen how, in the field of vocational interests, Strong began by demonstrating the differences between a given occupational group and men-in-general, while Kuder began by differentiating interest areas and then moved to the development of occupational scales. Rather typically, though more or less implicitly, interests were interpreted as traits not bearing any very clearly conceived relation to the self or ego as an integrating and dynamic principal. In practice, values too were accorded much the same treatment, although the *Study of Values* was engendered by a rather explicitly stated philosophical or at least quasi-philosophical conception of *Lebensformen*. When it came to the interpretation of the results of inventoried interests, however, there were sometimes deviations from

ing behavior is not to be confused with emotional disturbance, for the majority of juvenile norm-violators are not seriously emotionally disturbed.

INTERESTS, VALUES, AND THE SELF

Thus far in our consideration of the desired and the desirable we have sought to keep close to the purpose of setting before the student in a descriptive way reviews of studies and interpretations. We have noted that inventoried interests seem to have considerable stability over a period of years. We have found that values, too, seem to display stability; but because they have not been measured over such long periods of time, our conclusions must be more modest. At least through the college years, however, values seem quite stable, and in fact do not seem to be much affected by college experiences. Inventoried interests and values overlap to a moderate degree, but interest inventories and values inventories each reflect factors not operating in the other. Both interests and values reflect cultural factors. But what is lacking through all this is some kind of integrating principle. We need a concept by which to relate these and other findings in a meaningful way. This principle is, it seems to us, the self, or ego, or person—the choice of name is of secondary importance. And once such an integrating principle is accepted, it may be easier to distinguish interests and values.

As the various psychological storm centers moved across the land, first one and then another structure of integrating principle was badly wrenched from its foundations. Before the turn of the century the self concept seemed sturdy, and the existence of self was taken for granted. But then came several developments. Occam's razor was recalled from the fourteenth century, dusted off, and reappeared as Lloyd Morgan's canon, or the law of parsimony. This injunction against the multiplication of entities beyond necessity seemed to apply to the self, and so the self was consigned to limbo. About this time psychoanalysis was attracting an increasing degree of attention—psychoanalysis in the earlier or classic sense. Freud and his cohorts had no particular compunctions about the multiplication of entities, and so the self reappeared as the ego accompanied by the id and superego, all in rather colorful trappings. But at least the concept of an integrating principle was preserved. As Allport puts it, "I am inclined to believe that history will declare that psychoanalysis marked an interregnum in psychology between the time when it lost its soul, shortly after the Franco-Prussian

of a fixed and immutable entity, and that he did not mean ego in the psychoanalytic sense. Rather, the ego is inferred from behavior and is regarded as genetically developed. He stressed particularly the development of ego involvements.

In brief, the ego consists of many attitudes which from infancy on are related to the delimited, differentiated, and accumulating "I," "me," "mine" experiences. These attitudes, which may be designated as ego-attitudes, are constituent components of the ego. Apart from the constellation of these ego-attitudes, there is no such entity as the ego. In fact many attitudes are not discrete affairs in the psychological make-up of individuals. They are attitudes that define and qualify an individual's relative standing to other persons or to institutions in some more or less lasting way. They are attitudes that determine the more or less enduring character of one's personal identity with the values or norms incorporated in him. When these attitudes are situationally called for, when they are at any time consciously or unconsciously involved in a psychological function, we become personally involved. And when we do become personally involved, then our discrimination, judgment, perception, remembering, thinking, and explicit behavior are accordingly modified or altered (84, p. 4).

It appears then, that at least in some quarters, the use of the self or the ego as integrating principle or principles is again respectable. We shall not pause here to consider the various distinctions drawn between the ego and the self. But how are interests and values differentially related to this principle? Murphy has a helpful suggestion. In his discussion of values he stresses that the values within an individual are never fixed, that values are continually developing, fusing, and so overlapping. Nevertheless, he suggests, classifications of values such as that by Spranger are useful in that they can be used to demonstrate the continuity of values and the relatively greater permanence of values than of interests. Interests and values can be distinguished on the basis of the type of learning process involved. "Interests change rapidly as the mode of satisfying needs varies. . . . Interests, we suggest, are conditioned stimuli pursued because of their relations to goal objects which are valued. Interests in turn are extinguished, as all other conditioned responses are extinguished, when the relations to the drives involved are destroyed" (61, p. 283).

What, then, shall we say of the appraisal of interests and values in the practice of guidance? Are interests so transitory that they are useless in guidance, as Fryer seemed to feel in 1930? Casually expressed interests of children are probably not to be taken too seriously. But we have seen that inventoried interests of a person of some

the parsimoniously empirical theme. One of the notable exceptions was the interpretation of interests as expressions of the self concept by Bordin (11), who presented the basic hypothesis that "In answering a Strong Vocational Interest test an individual is expressing his acceptance of a particular view or concept of himself in terms of occupational stereotypes." From this he derived a number of other hypotheses concerning relations of father and son, personality and interest type, social status of father's occupation, and so on. Bordin's hypotheses possessed the great virtue of being testable, and in recent years the matter of the self and interests has commanded increasing attention.

Another development during the "interregnum" was the turning toward attitude as an integrating principle. Since the days of Herbert Spencer the concept of attitude has occupied an important place in sociology and social psychology. Some representatives of these disciplines have considered attitudes as the crucial subject matter and problem of either or both of these disciplines, and some have regarded attitude as the key concept in understanding personality. It is not surprising, therefore, that when Allport reviewed attitudes in 1935, he subsumed both interests and values under this term: "Interests are a special type of enduring attitudes, rich in ideational content, and involve a recognition and understanding of objects which have satisfying properties. Subjective values are essentially the same as interests, except that they are more properly spoken of when the individual is mature and has reflected upon and organized his interests within a comprehensive and consistent system of thought and feeling" (1, pp. 808-809). Both interests and values are "dynamic attitudes," but Allport felt that much of the dynamic psychology of the time was overly concerned with motives in general, and "fails to provide a foundation solid enough to bear the weight of any *single* full-bodied personality." He proposed, therefore, a dynamic psychology of motivation based upon the principle of functional autonomy which would conceive of "adult motives as infinitely varied, and as self-sustaining, *contemporary* systems, growing out of antecedent systems, but functionally independent of them." Such a psychology, he believed, would clear the way for "A completely dynamic psychology of *traits, attitudes, interests, and sentiments*, which can now be regarded as the ultimate and true dispositions of the mature personality" (2).

Sherif has developed a concept by which the ego becomes the integrating principle of attitudes. It was with some reluctance that he retained the name *ego*, but he made it clear that he was not speaking

in an atmosphere of empiricism in which the notion of a self received little or at best very reluctant attention. Although some of the measurements of values adopted the methods of interest inventories, the concept of values is much less atomistic. A basic difference in the concepts of interests and of values is that interests regarded as likes or dislikes carry no element of a norm or standard, whereas the notion of values as a conception of the desirable necessarily implies a norm or standard by which objects may be judged or felt to be desirable. As components of the personality, values lie deeper and furnish the support for interests which are "conditioned stimuli pursued because of their relations to goal objects which are valued."

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CHAPTER 11

The Fruits of Guidance

We begin by asking the apparently simple question, "What are the results of guidance?" But unfortunately the impression of simplicity very quickly becomes a forlorn illusion. First of all, if we are to have any adequate basis for communication, we must decide what we intend to include in the term *guidance*. Probably for the purposes of our discussion we could agree to limit the word to guidance as it occurs in a school situation, though agreeing that guidance may and does occur in many other settings. But do we mean guidance as a process, or are we thinking of the more formalized organization of a program of guidance services? In either case, do we mean the total guidance process or program, or are we seeking to find the results of one part of the total—counseling? Again, what do we mean by results? Are we speaking of results for the individual student, or do we have in mind the total effects of guidance on a school, or, even more broadly, on the total on-going educational effort of a school in its community setting? Clearly, we must frame our question much more specifically if we are to have any hope of ever reaching an answer.

Before attempting a restatement of our question, let us raise still another. Shall we be content only to identify the fruits of guidance, or do we wish to pass judgment on whether the fruits are good or bad? Suppose, for example, that School X has a carefully developed program of guidance services, while School Y has little of what we could call guidance even by the most liberal of interpretations. We find that a much higher percentage of graduates of School X enter college. After careful study and analysis we feel justified in concluding that the higher percentage of graduates of School X attending college is clearly associated with the guidance services in School X. We have then identified what seems to be one of the fruits of guidance in School X. But is

this greater attendance at college necessarily good? Here we are confronted with a value judgment. We cannot answer this question except as we relate it to some standard by which we can judge the result to be good or otherwise. If simply entering college is accepted as good, then School X has produced a desirable fruit. But if we qualify our answer and say that for one of the seniors, Jane Smith, entering college was good, but that the same action on the part of Jerry Jones was a mistake, then we are obviously employing some other value judgment in our answer.

Let us suppose for the moment that we have agreed upon some value judgments as to good and proper developmental goals for children and adolescents, and on the basis of these have established some objectives for guidance. We might, for example, say that helping the individual to achieve his own best potentials in development or to reach a suitable occupational choice and plan are proper objectives of guidance services. What are the evidences that the person has achieved his best potentials? Or on what bases are we to judge that an occupational choice and plan is "suitable" or not? In a word, what are the criteria to be employed in making such judgments? Once we have agreed upon criteria we can then proceed to consider ways and means of making appraisals. Repeated appraisals may place us in position to assess the degree of progress toward whatever objectives have been accepted as proper for guidance. It is obvious that many subjective judgments are involved in attempts to evaluate the outcomes of guidance. Let us examine some of the subjective questions which lie in the background, and we shall then move on to the problem of criteria. After this we shall review briefly some examples of evaluative studies and finally shall consider briefly some possible new directions in evaluation.

THE OBJECTIVES OF GUIDANCE

The objectives of guidance which a given individual accepts are intimately related to his concept of guidance. If his conception of guidance is so broad as to make education and guidance almost if not quite synonymous, then the objectives of guidance must be broad enough to serve as objectives of education. A statement by Wilson illustrates this broad concept: "Guidance includes the sum total of efforts and influences of those who assist an individual, through association, counsel, dissemination of facts, employment of appropriate special techniques

and control of environment, to reach his optimum personal, social, vocational, cultural, and spiritual development" (40, p. 3). If one undertakes to establish objectives for guidance so conceived, then it would seem that one is establishing objectives for all of education, if not indeed for most of living. As Kefauver and Hand have said, "The guidance service is concerned with all phases of education, which in turn tends to be broad as life itself" (20, p. 19). This is further illustrated in the study of objectives reported by these two authors. A total of 345 principals, counselors, and professors were asked to rate a number of objectives of guidance drawn from the literature. For convenience of analysis the objectives were grouped under vocational, social-civic, health, and recreational guidance. In reviewing the 40 objectives rated by these groups at that time, the early 1930's, it is very clear that guidance was "concerned with all phases of education."

If on the other hand, one begins with a more limited view of guidance, then the objectives will quite naturally be more restricted. Hinderman (17) also employed an opinion poll method, but his results reflect a somewhat less expansive view of guidance on the part of those replying. He asked 378 school executives and guidance specialists to rank 25 statements representing "standards" which should comprise a scale for evaluating guidance services. The respondents were in 259 cities of 20,000 or more population. Among the items which fell in the first 10 as rated by the judges are some which are rather specifically vocational: pupils should enter industry according to some organized plan, and the demand by industry for students trained in the schools should increase. Several of the standards were concerned with the college-bound: fewer pupils should be expected to fail, and college grades would be expected to be higher. Others of the standards or criteria dealt with effects on pupils while in school: pupils should be assisted with adjustment, and "functional adjustment" should be expected to increase as indicated by a reduction in truancy and tardiness. Still others of the criteria reflected evaluation of the guidance services and staff: the staff should be improving the services through research and undertaking experimental problems, and an increasing number of pupils should be making use of the guidance services. Perhaps the differences in point of view reflected in the Kefauver and Hand study as compared with the Hinderman study are in part a function of the two questionnaires; perhaps the results reflect actually different views held by those in the two samples. In any event, it is clear that rather definite differences in views were reported as to the scope of guidance.

described by Havinghurst, as one of the objectives of both the general process of education and of guidance in particular, he would be recognizing both subjective aspects (feelings of ambivalence) and external or sociological factors (for example, social class differences); and at the same time he would be placing some limits on the responsibility of education and guidance for the process. Of course, objectives of guidance might reflect a midway position as to subjective and external emphases and yet, lacking the limitations, be so broad as to seem to make guidance an effort to take over complete responsibility for the individual. The two dimensions of the guidance concept which we have noted, the broad-narrow, and the subjective-external, seem to be relatively independent of each other.

One's overall philosophy of education is probably reflected in the objectives which seem to him desirable for guidance. And if the various statements of objectives for guidance appear to be confused, this confusion is at least in part a reflection of confusion as to purposes and meaning of the total educational enterprise. Guidance in the modern sense has developed in a half-century in which educational philosophy has shared the uncertainties of the times. To put the matter in the most generous terms, educational thought has been in a state of flux.

Public secondary schools have been dominated during a major part of this half-century by progressivism, which in its more pristine form derived from the pragmatism of Peirce, James, and Dewey, on the one hand, and from a naturalism which had roots in both modern science and Rousseau's faith in the goodness of human nature as seen in the unspoiled child. Pragmatism itself is a kind of unstable equilibrium. In the apt observation of Rusk, "Pragmatism thus evidently seeks to combine two incompatible standpoints, and in doing so typifies the contradiction inherent in American Life . . . of industrial efficiency and material success on the one hand, with idealistic tendencies on the other" (31, p. 33). In earlier chapters we described some of the characteristics of American culture and found considerable confusion in the contemporary scene. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that a popular educational philosophy should reflect this confusion. Brameld (4, pp. 97-100) has emphasized four cultural influences important to progressivism: (1) the industrial revolution, (2) modern science, (3) the rise of democracy, and (4) a favorable (in the sense of generous or ample) environment.

Of course, progressivism was not all of a piece. As Brubacher

(6) has described the internal differences, the romantic wing of the group followed Rousseau and Froebel in their view of natural development and the freedom of the child, and appropriated further support from the ideas of G. Stanley Hall and Sigmund Freud—rather mistakenly in the case of the latter. The more sober wing of progressives followed Dewey, grounding their theory in a pragmatic theory of knowledge, with intelligence viewed as clearly instrumental, to be cultivated as a tool for problem solving.

It would probably be overintellectualizing, however, to suppose that any large portion of guidance practices in public secondary schools came as a result of reasoning from any carefully wrought systematic position, be it realism, idealism, pragmatism, or some other. Guidance workers are busy and practical people. Questions of metaphysics and epistemology seem rather remote from the day's activities. The influence of educational philosophies is probably exerted more through the general climate of a school, which has only a rather tenuous relation to a few principles derived from systematic philosophy. One of these principles seems to be the democratic worth of the individual. In commenting on the various philosophies discussed in *Philosophies of Education*, Brubacher (5) noted that on one ground or another each philosophy held that the individual was the primary aim of education and that the claim of society or the state was subordinated. (This is obviously an acceptable tenet for guidance in our culture. But granted the worth of the individual, on whatever philosophic basis, what can and should the individual become? Is this not a legitimate consideration in seeking to frame the objectives of guidance? Any answer or answers will necessarily reveal some implicit philosophical predilection.

THE SEARCH FOR CRITERIA

If there is so much confusion regarding the objectives of education and of guidance as a part of education, it would be surprising indeed if we should find any generally accepted set of criteria for evaluating guidance. The lack of clearly defined and generally acceptable criteria has frequently been noted. To attempt to list the authors who have made the point would almost be to list those who have seriously considered the problem. In 1949, Froehlich, after reviewing the literature, commented, "The lack of suitable criteria has been the greatest single difficulty of evaluation to date" (11). In

1953 O'Dea and Zeran (28) reached the same conclusion on the basis of 80 references reviewed. These authors then selected from the literature 10 criteria which had been used in studies of counseling and asked fellows in Division 17 of the American Psychological Association to select the five they considered most useful and to indicate their order of preference. The 48 usable replies were assigned weighted scores. On this basis the rank-order of preference was as follows.

1. Counselor satisfaction (student opinion)
2. Counselor understanding of opportunities, test data, "advice," at termination of sessions
3. Before-and-after tests of personality and changes of self-attitude
4. Judgment of an "outside-expert" counselor (from case records)
5. Social adjustment
6. Congruence of objectives (counselor and counselee)
7. Grades; academic achievement
8. Continuance in college training
9. Counselor's judgment of progress
10. Observations of student training (28)

Wide diversity of opinion was evident as to ranks. And if variety of opinion exists as to criteria for evaluation of one part of guidance (counseling), it seems probable that even greater range of opinion must occur as to suitable criteria for evaluating the outcomes of the total undertaking of guidance. In 1942 Wrenn and Darley said: "There is probably no existing set of criteria for evaluating a personnel program, or counseling functions in particular, that will fit all evaluative efforts. Either they are so broad that they must be broken down into specifics against which appraisal can be made, or they are so specific as to fit only a given situation" (43). Although some interesting developments have taken place in the nearly two decades since these authors made their comment, there is little to suggest much basis for any fundamental revision of this 1942 statement.

A useful distinction is sometimes made between two general methods of evaluating guidance services: (1) a survey of student needs and of services offered, with an attempt to judge the adequacy with which the needs are being met, and (2) the defining of objectives to be achieved, selecting criteria thought to be suitable as indicators of progress toward these objectives, and the appraisal of the extent to which the criteria are satisfied. Actually, these two general approaches are not as clearly separable as this statement may suggest. Objectives and criteria may be involved in both, but in the first method criteria seem to be stated more often in terms of the program

of services, while the second method seems to lend itself more easily to statements of criteria in terms of changes in the individual. In any event, it will be convenient to organize the following discussion about two general kinds of evaluation thought of as differing in focus. We shall turn, first, to evaluative surveys of guidance programs and, second, to the kind of evaluation which seeks to find criteria against which to appraise changes in the individual. We shall abide by several delimitations. Chief attention will be given to evaluation at the secondary school level, although this will mean that we shall be dealing primarily with a less-developed portion of the area of evaluative studies. On the basis of subjective impression at least, it seems that more efforts have been directed toward evaluation at the college level—and with the result that not only are more studies available, but also more of the available studies meet desirable research standards than in the case of studies directed toward the secondary level. Some incidental use will be made of the literature on college-level personnel studies in discussion of problems of criteria and method. Secondly, we shall keep primary focus on the broad question of evaluation of guidance services. This delimitation will result in passing over many important studies of the evaluation of special methods or techniques in particular areas such as counseling, the use of occupational information, and others. Further, we shall not be dealing with the general problem of research methodology, but shall be interested primarily in illustrating one aspect of the problem of research as applied to evaluation—the problem of criteria.

Program Evaluation by Survey and Self-Study

As reported by Kitson and Stover (22), the first recorded proposal for evaluation of a program of vocational guidance in a city school system was made by Myers (26) in 1926. Four criteria were suggested: (1) completeness, as measured by the number of activities carried on, (2) distribution of emphasis, as shown by the time and attention devoted to each activity, (3) thoroughness, as shown by the kinds and quality of work done, and (4) consistency of organization.

From this modest start by Myers we have moved through a host of surveys of guidance programs. Rather typically in surveys one or more of three types of criteria have been employed: certain external standards, expert opinion based on more-or-less subjective judgments, or student opinion and feeling as reported by students or pupils themselves. In his review of literature Froehlich (11) organized the

studies reviewed into categories according to the method employed by the investigator. Three of these methods he termed external criteria, expert opinion, and client opinion. The three kinds of criteria suggested above obviously derive from the categories used by Froehlich. Whatever criteria or combination of criteria may be employed in the survey, there is ever present the danger of making an unwarranted assumption that the mere existence of guidance services is somehow producing desirable changes in the pupils the services are intended to serve. This assumption is the more insidious because it is so often implicit or unrecognized. A survey of services may or may not tell us anything about effects upon the individual. But surveys are not in themselves guilty of imposing this fallacy. The important thing is the kind of claims made on the basis of survey data.

Surveys of guidance services may accomplish desirable ends other than evaluation. For example, the faculty of a school may become interested in and stimulated toward more adequate planning for guidance services. Looking back over 10 years of experience in evaluating schools in Connecticut, Mahoney (24) lists 12 purposes served by evaluation; among them are providing in-service training, accumulating data for research, and developing public relations and understanding of the guidance program. These and other outcomes of the evaluative survey may certainly constitute desirable accomplishments, and because of the importance of these by-products, we shall give some attention to them in the following examples of evaluative surveys, even though our principal interest is in the appraisal of progress toward the avowed—nor the accidental or instrumental—objectives of guidance.

One of the most extensive series of surveys of guidance practices is that undertaken by the Subcommittee of the Commission of Research and Service of the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools (27). This study was of the self-study variety, in which high school principals were asked to rate their own schools as to a number of characteristics on a five-point scale: inadequate, toward essential practice, essential practice, toward optimal program, and optimal program. In the 1947-1948 study 2312 principals returned the Self-Study Guides, a 76.1 percent return. Such a study doubtless provides very real and constructive stimulation for the participating schools toward a careful and thoughtful examination of their guidance programs, and is worthwhile for this reason alone. But data from such a study provide no basis for evaluating the effects of the various guid-

ance programs upon the individual. This statement is not intended to be derogatory, for no such claim was made by the investigators. Our purpose in calling attention to this limitation is simply to stress the need to avoid confusing appraisal of status of programs with an evaluation of results accomplished for the individual. It is interesting to note in passing that the distribution of percentages of schools on the five-step scale for each of the characteristics looks remarkably like the grade distributions of 15 classes. For 11 of the 15 rated characteristics the modal percentage is in the middle step of the scale, "essential practice," the percentages varying from 36.3 to 45.3. One might almost say that there seemed to be a strong tendency for most principals to assign their schools a "C" grade on most of the characteristics.

An earlier study more limited in scope but containing an important additional element was reported by Alstetter (1). The schools participating were both public and private, large and small, accredited and nonaccredited—a total of 200 drawn from six regional associations. Again self-study was used, the schools responding to 210 "criterial" and 57 "evaluative" items. The important additional element was that each school was appraised by a visiting committee, and thus a criterion of expert opinion was introduced. Three of the findings were of particular interest. More than twice as many private as public schools ranked in the upper quartile, and definitely fewer private schools ranked in the lowest. One cannot, of course, take these findings as indicative of present status, since this study was made more than 25 years ago. We have mentioned it because this study illustrates rather neatly the use of self-study with an external criterion represented by the check list and expert opinion given by the visiting committees.

A particularly comprehensive *Criteria for Evaluating Guidance Programs in Secondary Schools* (2) was prepared by a committee as a report to the Eighth National Conference of State Supervisors and Counselor Trainers in 1949, and was later edited and published by the U.S. Office of Education. The document includes a series of check lists, provisions for evaluative summaries on a five-point scale, and explanatory comments. The whole was organized under seven headings: administrative bases for guidance services, guidance staff, guidance services, services complementary to the guidance program, guidance services as an influence on total school development, outstanding characteristics of the guidance program, and general evaluation of the guidance program. In an accompanying manual the purposes were stated as twofold: evaluation, and stimulation to improvement. In the

suggestions for use of the *Criteria* stress was placed upon both preparation for and follow-up of the evaluation project (36). It was recommended that the evaluative study first be carried out by the local school, and that a re-evaluation then be made by a visiting committee, in much the manner employed in the Alstetter study noted above. Emphasis was placed upon evaluation of the program against local needs and in relation to the total school program, rather than against an inflexible, generalized standard. In the *Criteria* we have an example of an instrument for self-study use, but intended to be supplemented by expert opinion of a visiting committee. When used in this manner genuine contributions can be made by way of stimulation toward self-examination and improvement, but such an evaluation cannot possibly produce data as to the effects of guidance services on individuals; nor was it intended to do so.

There has been a continuing interest in the evaluation of guidance programs almost since the first programs were organized, but the interest in the years shortly before and after 1950 seems to have been particularly strong. Perhaps some of this increased attention to evaluation of programs came as a result of stimulation from surveys such as that conducted by the Commission of Research and Service of the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, and the development of the *Criteria for Evaluating Guidance Programs in Secondary Schools*. About this time many of the states were issuing series of bulletins designed to help the local schools develop guidance programs, and often these publications included check lists or other suggestions for evaluation. The California publication, *Improving Guidance Programs in Secondary Schools* (21), is an example of such publications. Typically the approach to evaluation was the pattern we have just been discussing, self-evaluation against an external criterion (for example, a check list), supplemented by the expert opinion of a visiting committee. These evaluations were made to serve a number of purposes. In Colorado, for example, a revision of the *Criteria* was made by the state supervisor and a group of counselor trainers, and used as a part of a program of in-service training in the local schools (10). As an example of evaluations made in local schools during these years we might note a study of the high schools of Fresno, California, by Kremen (23). In the familiar pattern, a check list was employed with items drawn in part from the *Criteria*, and the self-study made by committees from the schools was followed by visits by consultants who discussed programs with administrators and committees. A

final evaluation was then reached jointly. The Fresno County study is noteworthy not only for the results achieved, but also because the report provides a particularly clear statement of purposes for such an investigation:

1. To identify strengths and weaknesses in individual school programs
2. To present constructive suggestions concerning the next steps which might be undertaken
3. To identify areas of guidance services which might be emphasized in an in-service training program and to set up such a program
4. To stimulate and to motivate school administrators and guidance personnel to further improve upon the services offered (23).

The criterion of student opinion or satisfaction has often been used, and with several meanings. Williamson and Botdin (39) interpreted the criterion in a broad way to include the student's satisfaction with his educational and vocational objectives, with the counseling assistance he received, and his ultimate satisfaction on the job. Usually the criterion has been used with some one of a number of narrower meanings, such as feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction regarding counseling help received, opinions as to the guidance activities of the school, the help which students feel they receive in relation to their felt needs or problems, and the like. There are numerous difficulties in the use of student satisfaction as a criterion, as has been frequently pointed out. For one thing, there may be a tendency for students to respond positively to please the counselor. When students are asked to judge guidance services or activities, serious questions can be raised as to their competency for such judgments. It has been pointed out too, that felt needs tend to be more frequently expressed in schools having active guidance programs than in situations where services are undeveloped. And when students are asked to evaluate counseling procedures, the comments of Travers are pertinent. "However, it can hardly be conceded that feelings of satisfaction with counseling can be considered either a major goal of the procedure or evidence of its success. The mere fact that the counselee feels satisfied is not evidence of the desirability of the process. People tend to be remarkably well satisfied with fortune tellers and other charlatans and tend to feel that they have derived much from the association" (35). The skepticism of Travers finds some indirect support in a study made by Froehlich (12) of persons who had used the counseling services of the State Consultation Service at Richmond, Virginia. Of a total of 740 clients, 279 (37.7 percent) were reached for follow-up interviews. After prelim-

inary tryout, questions were chosen for use which were arranged in four criterion groups: occupational adjustment, personal adjustment, clients' attitudes, and changes in status. Personal and occupational adjustment were found to be rather closely related, but both client attitudes and status changes were largely independent of the two adjustment criteria.

The first example of evaluation by student satisfaction which we have chosen is a study of 29 schools and 4445 high school seniors in New York State, reported by Hartley and Hedlund (15). Two questionnaires were used, one to students asking for statements regarding felt needs and the amount of help received, and another to counselors for the purpose of evaluation of the guidance program. We shall discuss the results of only the student questionnaire. Here student satisfaction was taken to mean the degree to which students felt that their needs were being met. Items used covered four broad areas of needs: educational guidance within the school, educational guidance for further education, vocational guidance, and social-emotional guidance. A typical item asked, "Have you needed help while in high school?" "Did you receive help?" "If so, did you get as much help as you wanted?" Of course, the actual items were more specific and were directed to areas of need such as getting along better in schoolwork, understanding interests and abilities, choosing an occupation, and the like. The investigators were careful to point out the limitations of the method (15, pp. 29-30). In general, student needs seemed to be better served in the area of educational guidance (both within high school and toward further education) than in areas of vocational and social-emotional guidance. Hartley and Hedlund commented: "It is fairly evident that these guidance programs are better geared to serve the needs of the academic, college-bound youth than they are to serve the needs of the less academic group, those who are in doubt about the desirability of completing high school and will need jobs while in school and after graduation" (15, p. 19).

As a second example we shall use a study made in the Phoenix high schools by a committee of administrators and counselors under the direction of Jenson (19). Data were gathered for a 20 percent sample drawn from approximately 8000 boys and girls in Grades 9 through 12. For our purposes the study is particularly interesting because a part of it was devoted to relating feelings about help received to counseling objectives which had been established for the district. These were essentially:

- A. Better understanding of abilities, interests, ambitions, and personality
- B. Discovery of things best suited to do or be happiest doing both while in school and after finishing school
- C. Making progress toward realistically chosen while-in-school and after-school goals
- D. Learning to get along better with friends and others at school, at home, or in the community
- E. Increasing capacity and self-confidence in making decisions and solving adjustment problems both now and in the future

Students were asked to express their feelings as to the help received by rating the degree of help on a five-point scale. The clearest expression of feeling of help received from counselors was in response to objective A, the better understanding of abilities, interests, ambitions, and personality; 31 percent felt that they had been "Helped very much," and 50 percent that they had been "Helped some." Responses to objectives B, D, and E were very similar; about two-thirds felt that they had been helped (either very much or some), and about 15 percent were unhelped. As to objective C, making progress toward realistically chosen goals, about 60 percent felt that they had been helped; but 19 percent were not sure, and 19 percent reported no help. In commenting on this Jensen suggests that this response may reflect inadequate school-community opportunities as much as inadequate counseling, and that this objective may also represent the level of help which adolescents are least capable of using.

It should be noted that the part of Jensen study discussed above was directed toward student feelings about help received specifically from counselors, not just any kind of counseling help. In a second part of the study data were gathered as to student preferences for help from various kinds of persons: parents, counselors, teachers, deans, friends. These feelings as to preference have real importance for the guidance program, and we shall therefore note them briefly. On the matter of understanding abilities, students seemed to prefer parents and counselors about equally, teachers somewhat less frequently, and friends still less frequently. Only 7 percent would seek such help from deans who, in the Phoenix system, were responsible for discipline. Throughout the other categories of help, which roughly are restatements of the objectives noted in the paragraph above, we find the frequency of choice about evenly divided between parents and counselors, except for the matter of "Finding out how to make progress toward selected goals in school and work," in which the order of preference is counselors, teachers, and parents. Teachers fall behind counselors in

all problem areas, but teachers are looked to more frequently than parents for finding how to make progress toward goals and for discovering the most promising kinds of school activities and work. (In the last case, however, the difference is only 2 percent). Especially interesting is the finding that friends are preferred almost as often as parents or counselors, and definitely more frequently than teachers, in learning how to get along with others. Deans fall into fourth or fifth place as sources of help in all areas.

Many criticisms can be made of the use of student satisfaction, opinion, or feeling as a criterion for evaluation of a guidance program. Some of these we have noted. But studies such as the two we have just briefly reviewed suggest that when carefully planned and executed, with full awareness of the limitations of the method, student satisfaction investigations may nevertheless yield worthwhile results on a practical level. Areas of needed emphasis may be brought to attention. Administrators, counselors, teachers, and others concerned with guidance services may be stimulated to reconsideration of existing practices. And although students are hardly in position to pass professional judgment on guidance services and programs, still the program exists for the benefit of students; and surely students on the secondary school level or above can tell us something of importance about their own perceptions of their needs and their feelings as to how well the guidance service is meeting these needs.

Evaluation of Effects upon the Individual

It seems rather obvious that the ultimate justification for guidance must be that the behavior and experience of the individual are influenced in desirable ways. We have already discussed some of the difficulties in arriving at clear objectives. But even if we succeed in defining the "desirable" by a statement of objectives, we are still confronted with one of the most knotty problems in all of evaluation as we search for appropriate criteria against which to judge outcomes. This search is both most crucial and most frustrating. For one thing, there are so many variables involved that merely to identify them, not to mention measuring them, will probably require more years of investigation. As we proceed to a consideration of the matter of effects on the individual our purpose will continue to be primarily that of illustrating the criterion problem. We shall not deal with the methodology of research as such. We shall make no attempt to review in a

comprehensive manner the results of investigations in the area. And we shall continue to delimit our undertaking by using illustrations involving subjects at the secondary school level. Our plan is to consider each of a number of criteria which have been used, and to point out some of the values and some of the difficulties involved.

ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT

There can be no doubt that achievement in academic pursuits is important to the student. Judgments of achievement, usually expressed in grades, may determine at least in part: promotion, sometimes the opportunity to take certain restricted courses, opportunities to secure scholarships or other financial aid, entrance into some colleges, even the probability of completing high school, and probably a number of other opportunities or lack of them. At first thought it may seem that helping the student to succeed academically might well be a major purpose of guidance, but such a generalization demands careful scrutiny. A given individual may have needs more urgent than improving his academic achievement. He may, for example, be so driven to keep pace academically with an older brother or sister that his most immediate need is to achieve a better acceptance of himself and his own abilities so that he can relax from this intersibling rivalry and seek his own best development. We must also carefully distinguish between academic achievement and grade getting. Here, for example, is the high school boy who clings tenaciously to the goal of becoming an engineer, although his grades in mathematics suggest little probability that he will ever gain admission to a school of engineering. Moreover, the best estimate of scholastic aptitude that can be obtained for him indicates little probability of ability to succeed in this area. It would be poor counseling indeed to encourage him toward this seemingly un-realistic goal and to seek to help him by devious tricks and devices to inflate his grades. Assistance in academic achievement by legitimate improvement of study skills and by helping him to fill in needed background is one thing, but coaching in artificial tricks of grade-getting is quite another. It is evident that if sheer improvement in grades were taken as the criterion of counseling for either of these two students, the resulting evaluation would be very misleading. It seems clear then, that the improvement of grades, even if the grades represent genuine achievement, is not always an appropriate criterion. Certainly it can never be the sole criterion.

MAKING EDUCATIONAL PLANS

Probably most would accept the idea in one form or another that one of the purposes of guidance is to assist the student in making his plans for education, both immediate and long-range. Presumably this is one of the reasons for the many efforts made toward appraisal of achievements, abilities, and interests. There is much talk about helping the student establish realistic educational goals. Why not, then, use the existence and quality of such plans as a criterion of the effects of guidance? There are numerous difficulties. Obviously, this criterion would not be applicable until the pupil is far enough along in school to have some choice as to what subjects he will take. Probably this begins during the lower secondary school years in most cases. There may, of course, be opportunities to choose various activities all along the way. But even if sufficient opportunity for choice is offered, the mere existence of an educational plan is scarcely evidence of the operation of guidance. The plan may have been imposed by parents, or the student himself may have worked it out for himself with no appreciable help from organized guidance efforts. More important questions would seem to center about the appropriateness of the plan. How realistic is it for the particular student in view of his abilities, interests, values, and larger life goals? To attempt to answer such a question involves an appraisal undertaking of no mean proportions, and any answers forthcoming seem to rest on clinical judgment—clinical in the sense that the judgment is made against the unique needs of the individual, rather than against any generally applicable criteria.

One of the most disturbing difficulties involved in attempting to use educational plans as a criterion of the effects of guidance in the schools is the assumption which seems to be implicit in the process. This assumption is that those concerned with guidance in the schools—counselors, teachers, and various specialized workers in pupil personnel—really have a great deal of control over the factors which enter into the making of the educational plans of an individual. Such an assumption seems overly sanguine. The matter of dropping out of school is a case in point. In our discussion of contexts and limits we pointed out that both external socioeconomic factors and subjective factors are involved in continuing in or dropping out of school. In like manner, both kinds of factors operate as influences in selection of curriculum. Educational plans of the individual student, then, probably reflect the impact of a whole complex of family and community factors, and to

use such plans as a criterion for evaluating guidance can easily become a bit fanciful. We shall return to this point in a later discussion of a follow-up study of high school graduates in Minnesota (3).

REACHING OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE

Much of what we have said regarding the probably multiple causation of educational planning can be applied with equal or greater force to occupational decision. As we stressed earlier, the series of occupational preferences which normally occur and the later narrowing down and commitment to an occupational choice constitute a long developmental process in which many, many factors are involved. To these difficulties we must add the consideration that the need for occupational choice is not a universal need among students. It does seem to be practically universal among middle-class boys and men. But in the upper class, occupational choice may not be a real need at all. Family tradition is strong, and often the son is expected to continue in the occupational pattern of the family. If the son is unable or unwilling to accept this ready-made occupational role, then the need for occupational choice occurs. In the lower social classes, on the other hand, there may be very little opportunity for actual occupational choice. Practical necessity may dictate that the boy enter whatever job is available at the time he leaves school, whether this be before or after high school graduation. At least in the earlier years, employment may consist in moving through a series of available jobs without much opportunity for exercising choice. Occupational choice for girls in all social classes is apt to have a different meaning than it does for boys. The great majority of boys look forward to some kind of occupation for most of their lives, but for girls occupation is more apt to mean a source of security either before or after marriage, perhaps as full-time employment, or perhaps as part-time work to increase the family income. There are, of course, those who deliberately plan for a career rather than for marriage, but these are the minority. In view of these considerations which we have outlined—the complex causation of occupational choice, the lack of universality of need for choice, and the probably different meaning of occupation for boys and girls—the reaching of occupational choice seems to have limited usefulness as a criterion of the effects of guidance. Surely the mere counting of those who have made choices at any particular age has little meaning for evaluation; the age differences in the reaching of choice are too great. And if we undertake to assess the appropriateness of choice on the basis

of realism or some other criterion, we are forced back to a kind of clinical judgment as in the case of assessing educational plans.

EMOTIONAL ADJUSTMENT

More or less clearly stated concepts of emotional adjustment have often been suggested as criteria of the effects of guidance. Sometimes emotional adjustment is regarded very loosely as a part of life adjustment. Sometimes the influence of the mental health movement is apparent, and emotional adjustment is made to be almost if not completely a synonym for mental health. Some suggestions have been couched in sufficiently operational terms to be actually usable for research. One example is "Before-and-after tests of personality and changes of self-attitude," included in the list noted above as reported by O'Dea and Zetan (28), which was suggested as a criterion for counseling. Wrenn and Darley (43) mentioned as a possible criterion the decrease of incidence of known adjustment problems; this too is concrete enough to be usable and might perhaps be further narrowed to known adjustment problems of a kind which might be called emotional.

It is exceedingly difficult to find investigations of the effects of participation in a guidance program studied in a carefully designed experimental situation, but one excellent example is the work of Worbois (41). In this study, emotional adjustment was conceived essentially as tension reduction in conflict areas. Operationally, the criterion was scores from the Luria technique. Very briefly, this technique makes use of motor responses when verbal stimuli are presented. Stimulus words were presented, including some words thought to be related to possible conflict areas, such as petting, flush, teacher, home life, sin, dirty story, timid, and others. Subjects were instructed to respond with the first word that came to mind and to press a tambour with the preferred hand. However, the movements of both hands were recorded, as well as motor reaction time and the time between the spoken stimulus and the verbal response. The entire ninth grade was divided into experimental and control groups, and from these were selected at random the subjects studied. The experimental group was given special counseling over a three-year period, while the controls received only the assistance accorded through the routine guidance activities of the school. Worbois concluded: "The results of this study indicate that emotional adjustment to things represented by the stimulus words can be modified over a three-year period by an appropriate guid-

ance program." This study seems to indicate the possibility of attacking at least some problems of evaluation on the level of highly refined techniques.

SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

Obviously the term *social adjustment* expresses a broad area or goal, rather than a criterion specific enough to be useful for appraisal purposes. The criteria which we have mentioned up to this point have at least some tangible quality about them, whether or not they may be thought to be appropriate as criteria. We do have measurements of sorts of academic achievement; we can determine whether or not an individual has developed an educational plan; and we can at least find whether or not an individual expresses or manifests an occupational choice. Even in the case of emotional adjustment it is possible to set up a criterion in the manner of Worbois. But what meaning can possibly be assigned to social adjustment which will make possible the selection of criteria against which such adjustment can be evaluated? Is the socially adjusted person a good citizen? Or does he meet people easily? Or does he have "good" relations with others? If the last, does this mean that he is well accepted by others, or that he accepts others, or both? Such questions are perhaps enough to indicate the amoeba-like nature of the concept of social adjustment—lacking in definite form or structure, and yet somehow possessing enough organismic integrity to persist.

Perhaps the crux of the difficulty in selecting criteria in the area of social adjustment is that values are so intimately and immediately involved in any choice of specific criteria. It is possible to derive a statement of purposes of guidance from the general objectives of education, as Hand (14) has done. The purposes of guidance so stated dealt with orientation, wholesome and satisfying personal relationships, healthful living, recreational participation, vocational competence, and citizenship. Probably all of such purposes might be regarded as related to social adjustment in the broad sense. But even if we could evolve satisfactory criteria for these broad purposes, there remains the question of whether or not the purposes reflect faithfully the values of the culture in which the schools exist. This question is particularly pertinent in the area of social adjustment because the norms for social adjustment are to a considerable extent defined by the culture. For example, wholesome and satisfying personal relationships may have rather different meanings for the individuals participat-

ing in a rural subculture in the midwest, those in a highly urbanized culture of an industrialized area, those in an upper-middle class suburban community, or those in a community in which the dominant subculture is that of some ethnic group. The term *social adjustment* may be useful as a loose name for a broad area of guidance services, or as a convenient label for a cluster of criteria which seem to have something in common in that they are concerned with relations with people, rather than with less people-related areas (for example, academic achievement), but as a name of a criterion the term is meaningless.

INTERMEDIATE CRITERIA

A number of criteria have been suggested, not because they are regarded as means of judging the final outcomes of guidance, but because they are thought to be indicators of conditions which are essential to the success of guidance or to the counseling part of guidance. Some are quite specifically concerned with the quality of counseling. In the sense of being criteria of means to an end rather than criteria of ends or objectives, these criteria seem to be intermediate. Williamson and Bordin (39) suggested some criteria which might be regarded as falling in this category: cooperation with the counselor, quality of casework, and predictive efficiency. One of the 10 criteria most frequently favored by the group of experts whose preferences were reported by O'Dea and Zeran (28) was congruence of objectives of counselor and counselee. This too might well be considered an intermediate criterion, since congruence can hardly be regarded as reflecting a major goal of counseling. Student opinion, which we discussed earlier, might in some cases be regarded as intermediate, depending upon whether or not one is willing to accept the proposition that the counselee as the consumer of counseling is an appropriate judge. Student satisfaction, in the broad sense in which Williamson and Bordin (39) used the term—as including satisfaction with educational and vocational objectives, job satisfaction, and satisfaction with counseling assistance received—becomes almost a generalized adjustment criterion. We have no intention of lodging any general indictment against intermediate criteria such as those mentioned, but the admonition by Dressel (9), that we should be slow to replace long-term goals by intermediate criteria without first making a critical examination of the latter, is certainly well taken.

Earlier we noted that in the assessment of the appropriateness to the individual of educational plans and vocational choices we seem to

be forced back to some kind of clinical judgment, since the application of generalized criteria in any mechanical fashion does not permit sufficient flexibility in determining effects upon the individual. Strang (33) suggests that one of the major limitations in evaluation studies is the mass rather than individual treatment of data, and that the case study seems to be the only adequate way to appraise changes in students. In practice, clinical judgment typically means counselor judgment, and there are technical difficulties of reliability which arise. It was at this point that Froehlich (12), for example, encountered troubles in evaluation of services of the State Consultation Service at Richmond, Virginia. But aside from the matter of technical shortcomings in the use of counselor judgment, it may be useful to distinguish two kinds of purposes. One is the use of counselor judgment as an intermediate criterion for the appraisal of quality of counseling. Another is the use of counselor judgment as a criterion of effects of guidance or, more narrowly, counseling upon the individual. Shoben raised the question of how to make a decision as to which judge is more correct when judges disagree, as in the case of Froehlich's study, and suggests that the question can be answered only by "relating the conflicting criteria to the extracurricular behavior of the client, struggling to come to grips with a real world in which community values substantially define his psychological health. Thus . . . research in counseling effectiveness must be concerned with the valuations the client makes of his experience of counseling and the valuations placed upon the client before and after his counseling experience by what Sullivan calls his 'significant others' . . ." (32).

And so we are back to the problem raised in our discussion of social adjustment as a criterion. But this time, in addition to the importance of cultural factors noted in our earlier comment, we have also the impact of valuations by individuals, the "significant others" of Sullivan (34) to which Shoben referred. The problem raised by Shoben is fundamental, but clearly goes well beyond the use of counselor judgment as an intermediate criterion.

COMPLEX CRITERIA

Problems such as that raised by Shoben point clearly to the need for something less simple than a single criterion, however neat. The futility of attempting to evaluate the results of guidance by any single criterion was recognized early. Speaking in the context of vocational guidance, Viteles (38) urged that it was necessary to elaborate meth-

ods of experimental studies of vocational success to permit a study of the dynamic interrelationships among the diverse factors making for occupational success or failure. And in the broad context of student personnel, Wrenn (42) pointed to the need for a complex criterion of adjustment after leaving school, by which it might be possible to take into consideration the meaning of adjustment and change in the total personality. Although the need for formulating some complex criterion has been rather generally recognized, this is still one of our unsolved problems. As Williamson and Bordin (39) point out, various specific criteria have different significance for different individuals. A complex criterion will not be reached by simply summing up an array of more specific, atomistically conceived criteria.

Evaluation by Follow-up Studies

A traditional method of evaluation in guidance has long been that of following-up graduates or school leavers to learn of their later state. In a review made by Kitson and Stover (22) in 1932 of studies in evaluation of vocational guidance, it was noted by these authors that most of the investigations had been follow-up studies. In his 1949 review of evaluative studies, Froehlich (11) noted that most of the evaluative follow-up studies had been made for the purpose of determining the accuracy and effectiveness of counseling. Follow-up studies have continued to occupy a conspicuous place among evaluative studies, and have exerted a very appreciable influence on thinking about guidance.

There are, of course, both advantages and disadvantages to this method of evaluation. Since it has been frequently pointed out that some of the effects presumably resulting from guidance and especially of counseling may come to full fruition only after some considerable time—perhaps years—the follow-up study would seem to offer an advantageous method of making a more complete assessment. Then, too, the follow-up study avoids the necessity of employing only those criteria which would be appropriate to the stage of development of adolescents during school years. School surely differs from the adult world, and an investigation made some years after leaving school opens the way to the use of criteria suited to adults. Follow-up studies should, therefore, yield not only a more comprehensive assessment as suggested above, but an assessment in real-life situations. A third advantage may be realized if the follow-up procedure is such as to permit study of the same individuals over a period of time; we should be

able to identify developmental trends in a way not possible in the cross-sectional study.

On the disadvantage side of the tally sheet we note first of all several practical considerations. Follow-up studies are expensive and time-consuming, especially if they undertake some degree of continuity for the sake of developmental findings. Because of these troubles, resort is frequently made to questionnaires, and the shortcomings of these instruments are, if not legion, at least abundant and frustrating. When more intensive means of data gathering are attempted, such as interviews, retesting, and the like, the twin factors of time and expense become really important in any extensive effort. But such practical difficulties are not the most basic. As Froehlich (13) pointed out, the real problem is one of interpreting findings. So many factors operate between the time of school leaving and the time of follow-up that to establish even a reasonable presumption of causal relation is extremely difficult. Nor does a follow-up study escape any of the difficulties with criteria such as we have just discussed.

But rather than continuing with a general discussion of the virtues and vices of the follow-up study we may find a more fruitful basis for judgment in examining several examples. Laying aside for the moment the basic question raised by Froehlich as to the interpretation of data, let us ask the elementary question "How valid are the data yielded by a questionnaire type of survey?" We choose as our example a follow-up study made on a state-wide basis in Virginia (37). The subjects of the study were graduates and drop-outs of the school year 1939-1940, and the follow-up data were gathered during 1948-1949. A total of 22,190 questionnaires was sent out, and about 50 percent of the graduates and 25 percent of the drop-outs responded. In discussing the representativeness of the group responding (37, pp. 35 ff.), the investigators made several interesting observations. First, the occupational distribution of the former students was roughly comparable to the distribution of employed workers according to the 1949 census. In the employed population the two categories of skilled and semiskilled workers and of clerical and kindred workers, taken together, accounted for about 48 percent of the employed population; for the respondents these two categories accounted for 53 percent. Second, whether a man was a high school graduate or one who did not complete high school would seem to be a factor of little importance so far as military service during a war period was concerned, assuming that the drop-outs were able to pass the literacy test for service. It was found that among

both male graduates and male drop-outs the incidence of military service was 83 percent. Third, the range of responses seemed to suggest the cross-sectional character of the sample. These facts and other bits of evidence were interpreted by the investigators as supporting the belief of representativeness of the respondents. A number of clichés regarding the difficulty of securing representative samples in follow-up studies have appeared in discussions of such surveys: respondents who have "succeeded" respond in disproportionate numbers; white collars respond in disproportionate numbers; only those who liked school respond, and the like. The results of carefully conducted studies such as the Virginia investigation at least offer serious challenge to such easy generalizations. Findings *can* be sufficiently representative to be worthwhile.

But suppose we do achieve a representative sample; of what use are the results in evaluating guidance services? We cannot, on the basis of such data, draw conclusions as to causal relations between guidance services offered to the students while in high school and their later characteristics, as we have emphasized before. Such studies are simply descriptive of what we find on the occasion of the follow-up. But, as was also pointed out before, a survey may serve a number of purposes useful to guidance other than seeking to establish cause-and-effect relationships. One of these is to secure consumers' opinions of the services available to them. There is always the danger of "the old oaken bucket" distortion—a tendency to regard school days through the mists of pleasant memories. But if the time between school days and the gathering of the follow-up data is long enough, these former students should be able to speak to us with a maturity not possible while they were still in high school.

In the case of the Virginia study this period was 10 years, and most of the boys had included in their experiences service in the armed forces. It is worth our time to listen, then, when about 20 percent of both graduates and drop-outs tell us that their present jobs are not at all related to the jobs they thought during their high school years that they would obtain after leaving school, and when 20.4 percent of the graduates and 14.9 percent of the drop-outs say they have jobs exactly like those they thought they would obtain (37, p. 15). We may well listen, too, when both graduates and drop-outs, and both men and women, after 10 years out of school, say that if they were to complete high school or repeat it, they would place high on their list of desired subjects mathematics, business subjects, English, and natural sciences, while the

girls would also include home economics. And in passing let us note that these opinions were expressed long before Sputnik. Many other examples might be cited from the Virginia study. There is, of course, no intention of suggesting that the results from this study made more than 10 years ago should be generalized to present situations, but we do mean to say that this kind of survey can yield findings well worth consideration as one aid toward the planning or revision of programs of guidance services.

As our second example let us turn to another state-wide investigation, but one quite different in its purposes. Berdie (3) analyzed factors related to the post-high school plans of some 25,000 seniors graduating from Minnesota high schools in 1950, and then followed up a 10 percent sample of these one year later. The study was not intended as an evaluation of the guidance services of the high schools from which they came; nor did it seek to determine the effects of guidance upon the individual. Rather, the study was focused upon the utilization of manpower represented in these graduating seniors.

Four hypotheses were framed (3, pp. 48-49). The evidence developed in the testing of these hypotheses we can summarize in only very general terms (3, pp. 57-73). The first hypothesis was that a great waste of talent characterizes our educational system. Approximately 35 percent of all graduating seniors planned to attend college. However, of those who on the basis of test scores seemed to have superior ability for college work, about two-thirds planned to attend. The second hypothesis was that ecological factors are related to waste of talent. Place of residence was found to be directly related to chances for attending college. Those living in metropolitan areas were most apt to enter college, and those coming from farms least apt to do so, although the proportions of high-ability persons living in metropolitan, farm, and nonfarm areas were nearly the same. The third hypothesis was that psychological differences—more specifically sex differences—were related to college attendance. In spite of the fact that sex differences in college aptitude were unimportant, boys more often than girls planned for college, but the picture was complicated by ecological factors. Only among farm youth was there a tendency for more girls than boys to attend college. The fourth hypothesis was that both economic level and cultural level are closely related to plans for college. Although support was found for this hypothesis, the relationship proved to be a complex one. First of all, economic and social status are themselves related; in the Minnesota study the correlation

was .65. Cultural level of the home correlated .32 with plans to attend college; but with the effect of economic status partialled out, the correlation dropped to .17. Although students from homes of high-economic status did more frequently plan for college than those from homes of lower-economic resources, other factors were certainly involved. Occupation of parent was one of these. Particularly among high-ability students, cultural status was as important or more important than economic status.

But how many of the graduates actually realized the plans which they had as high school seniors, whether for college or employment? There were 2059 for whom complete information was available as to plans as high school seniors, and their actual activities one year after graduation. Of these, 887 had indicated as seniors that they planned to enter college, and 723 had planned to enter employment upon graduation. But some who planned on college did not actually enter, and some who expected to enter employment did other things. Taking the two groups together, almost two-thirds (64 percent) actually realized the plans which they had as high school seniors (3, pp. 196-197). Some interesting differences were found between those who did and those who did not realize their plans. We shall note only a few of these, selecting our examples from only one of the groups, the metropolitan boys. Age seemed to be a factor in carrying out plans; the younger boys who planned on college more often actually entered than did the older boys with similar intentions; but the older boys who planned on entering employment were more apt to follow their plans than the younger boys who expected to work. There was direct relationship between realizing plans, whether for college or work, and level of fathers' occupations. Among the sons of professional workers, 80 percent followed original plans, as against 75 percent of business owners and managers, 72 percent of sons of office workers, 66 percent of skilled tradesmen, and 71 percent of sons of factory workers. Curriculum pursued in high school was also an indicator of probability of realizing plans. Of those who planned to enter college, 79 percent had taken the college preparatory course, 17 percent the general course, and 4 percent had followed a vocational curriculum. Other differences were found, and there were somewhat different patterns of differences for metropolitan boys and girls and for nonmetropolitan students; but the examples given will perhaps be sufficient to suggest something of the differences found between those who did and those who did not realize the plans which they had had as high school seniors.

At the outset of our discussion of the Minnesota study we noted that this investigation was not directed toward either an evaluation of guidance services in the home schools of the students or toward an attempt to evaluate the effects of guidance upon the individual. The question may well be raised, then, as to why we have introduced this investigation into a consideration of the problem of evaluation. We wish to use the results of this study in a way which is frankly not within the original manpower emphasis—to illustrate the variety of factors related to the formation and carrying out of educational and vocational plans by high school seniors. The existence of these factors is particularly relevant to the use of educational and vocational plans as a criterion for the evaluation of guidance. The ecological, sex difference, economic, and cultural factors found to be related to the post-high school plans are well beyond the control of either the high school counselor or the individual counselee. In like fashion, age of student and occupation of father, which were found to be related to realization of plans, are beyond counseling relationships. The exception is perhaps high school curriculum pursued. It may be recalled that in our earliest general consideration of context and limits we pointed out that socioeconomic factors have been found to be related to school marks, participation in activities, continuing on to graduation or dropping out of school, and others. We have recalled these considerations and stressed the factors found in the Minnesota study because there seems to be an ever present temptation to deduce from data of follow-up studies conclusions as to the effects of guidance, when very probably many of the "effects" observed at the time of follow-up were produced by factors which had no logical relation either to counseling or to the total guidance program. What possibly can guidance do about changing the occupation of the father, for example, or about the sex of the client? An observation by Berdie, although made in a different context, seems pertinent here: "To maximize the probability that an able student will go to college, have him born into the right home" (3, p. 57).

Let us turn now to several examples of follow-up studies which were conducted as actual experiments in guidance. The first of these was carried out in a small city about seven miles from Boston (30). When the study was begun in 1936 an experimental group was selected from the eighth grade by the principals of three junior high schools, including 60 students who were regarded as needing help for one reason or another and 69 who were considered to be superior students. A control group was created by matching another pupil with

each of the 129 *experimentals* with respect to school performance, chronological age, mental age, intelligence quotient, occupation of father, scores on the Sims socioeconomic scale, and religion. Looking back upon the completed study, the *investigators* expressed some reservations as to the matching procedure, but such was the plan adopted at the outset. Control pupils were given no assistance by counselors, but the *experimentals* were provided intensive assistance by counselors who served also as resource persons to other teachers, who also participated in the total guidance effort. The counselors also worked with parents. The study continued during the five years while the students progressed through the twelfth grade. A first follow-up was made shortly after graduation, a second from 8 to 18 months later, and contact was maintained with some students as much as 11 years after the initial counseling.

In a brief summary we cannot possibly convey a fair impression of the wealth of detailed information gathered during the five-year period, but perhaps we can give a general picture of the findings.

1. Students who dropped out of school to work as soon as legally possible were thought to constitute the most valid group for comparisons of drop-outs. So compared, the guided and unguided groups did not differ significantly as to school leaving.

2. Both the average number of subjects failed and the rate of subject failure were higher in the guided group, but both measures decreased faster in the guided group. The interpretation made was that the guided group did their adjusting earlier.

3. Fewer guided students made changes in curriculum, and the total number of changes by this group was less than in the case of unguided students. Especially, fewer guided students changed out of the college preparatory curriculum.

4. Mean scholastic average of the guided group during senior high school was higher than that of the unguided group; a higher percentage of the guided graduated from high school with honors, and a higher percentage were admitted to institutions of higher learning. The above findings, obviously of an objective nature, were obtained during or at the close of secondary school. Additional data were obtained during interviews from 8 to 18 months after graduation. In general, comparisons made on the basis of information so secured strongly favored the guided group. We shall report only two summary statements. In the area of education, 48 comparisons were made, and 24 significant differences were found. Of these, 23 favored the guided

group. In the employment area, 29 of 46 comparisons resulted in significant differences, and 27 of the 29 were in favor of the guided group. In the face of such findings there seems to be no reason to question the conclusion of Rothney and Roens, that "The evidence that counseled students were helped in the manner in which counseling is designed to aid individuals appears to be conclusive" (30, p. 241).

A still more extensive investigation was made by Rothney (29) over a period of eight years. The study was begun with 870 students in the sophomore class of four representative high schools in Wisconsin, two of them located in small cities, and two in towns of 5000 or less. The 690 students who remained in school through graduation were followed up at six months, two and one-half years, and five years after graduation. As in the earlier study noted above, the students were divided into experimental and control groups. Counseling was furnished individuals in the experimental group by the investigator himself and by a number of graduate students all of whom had already earned the master's degree. The counselors worked not only with students, but also with teachers and parents.

We shall make no attempt to give any complete summary of the findings; an adequate appreciation of the results of such a complex and extended undertaking can be gained only from the complete report. Our purpose is only to indicate the nature of the results, and for this purpose we shall confine ourselves to selected examples chosen from the findings of the five-year follow-up. These findings are based on a 100 percent response of the 685 subjects still living in 1956. Before turning to the matter of differences between experimental and control groups it may be well to note by way of description that at five years after graduation 78.5 percent of the women and 45.7 percent of the men were married. A general trend could be observed for girl graduates to marry men in occupations somewhat different (higher) than the occupations of the girls' fathers. Girls from farm homes and from homes in which fathers were employed in skilled occupations tended to marry men employed in their fathers' occupations more often than girls from other groups. And as to geographic mobility, after five years 87.0 percent of all graduates were living in their home state, and 57.2 percent in the town in which they attended high school.

Let us give first attention to the general areas of educational and occupational adjustment (29, pp. 321 ff.). The differences between control and experimental women were very small, but since almost

4 in 5 women were married by five years after graduation, the number in occupations was relatively small. Among men, the only significant difference between controls and experimentals was that more of the experimental group had attended college. Among those attending college, more of the experimentals won honors, fewer dropped out because of low grades, and more graduated in the usual time; but the differences were not significant at the accepted standard of the .05 level. When asked "Why did you choose the job you now have?" the reason most frequently given by each of the four groups (experimental men and women, and control men and women) fell in the category "Satisfactions with work conditions." In the experimental and control groups of men, there were enough cases to justify the use of the chi-square procedure, and the differences "just verge on the 5 percent level of significance." A general question was used in regard to satisfaction with status, broad enough for responses to include marriage as well as occupation or training, "Regardless of what you are now doing show how you like it by checking below . . ." (29, p. 191). Definitely more women than men reported satisfaction with their current status. Significantly more experimental than controls, both men and women, expressed satisfaction. When asked to consider satisfaction in retrospect, whether or not they would do the same things if they could live the last five years over again, no significant differences were found between counseled and uncounseled. No significant differences were found as to the total occupational mobility of experimentals and controls.

In considering consistency of vocational choice, it is necessary to distinguish between men and women, and between specific and general choices. As Rothney remarks, "Perhaps the women could generally be described as consistent if one assumes that most of them had only the major goal of marriage throughout and that their expressed vocational preferences were not choices in the same sense as those made by men. It seems likely that the assumption is a safe one . . ." (29, p. 341). (We noted above that after five years 78.5 percent of the women were married.) In the matter of specific choices, the record of consistency of boys does not seem impressive. For example, of all boys five years after graduation, 19.7 percent were doing what they expressed as their choices in interviews one month before graduation. The differences between counseled and uncounseled in this regard were not significant. In general, variability rather than consistency was the rule for specific choices. Somewhat more consistency is evi-

dent on the part of the counseled in choices of general areas or levels on a short-term basis, but in the long term, results were about the same for experimentals and controls. (Areas or levels as used in the investigation means professional, semiprofessional, managerial, clerical, sales, service, agriculture, skilled, semiskilled, and—for girls only—married.) Approximately three out of five entered the occupational area, or training for it, which was chosen one month before graduation, but five years after graduation one out of five was in that area. A number of other findings in regard to educational and occupational adjustment came from the investigation, but as we said before, we are using only selected examples, examples which we hope are fair to the total picture.

Among the information gathered in the follow-ups were considerable data bearing on the satisfaction or dissatisfaction which the graduates felt about their high school experiences, including counseling. Some of these examples will be noted briefly, and they are especially pertinent to our earlier discussion of the use of client satisfaction as a criterion. Five years after graduation the former students answered the question, "Looking back at your high school training, tell how it helped you most" (29, p. 366). The total group regarded the most valuable contributions as preparation for vocation and post-high school training, social adjustability, personal development, development of values, and preparation for marriage, in that order. More counseled than uncounseled thought that high school had helped most in social adjustability, but the difference fell short of significance at the .05 level. When asked the negative of the same question, more than half of both experimentals and controls left the question unanswered. Two significant differences appeared for those who did answer. Almost twice as many experimental and control men replied that high school did not fail to help, and more uncounseled than counseled said that high school had failed to prepare them adequately for a vocation. On the matter of satisfaction with counseling received in high school, the experimental group said that counseling helped them in personal development, in vocational choices, educational adjustment, future planning, and providing a chance to talk things over. The control group gave the same responses and in the same order; this group, it will be recalled, received whatever help they obtained from sources other than counselors. In all categories percentages were higher for the experimental than the control group, and the controls did not seem to be particularly happy about the

counseling they received. Less than half of both experimentals and controls responded to the question as to how counseling had failed them, and the responses which were obtained were difficult to evaluate, so that no single generalizing statement will be attempted here.

In commenting on the entire investigation, Rothney said:

It seems clear that the differences between the counseled and comparison subjects of this study after they had been graduated from high school were less than one would hypothesize in view of the claims frequently made by guidance workers. The size of the differences may be attributable to the failure of the counselors to make the most of their opportunities or inadequacies in the evaluation procedures and instruments. They may, however, indicate that counseling as it is commonly done with the heterogeneous populations in secondary schools has little relationship to the post-high school activities of youth and young adults.

There can be no doubt, however, that some important differences between the counseled and comparison groups did appear and that they could not be attributed to chance alone. When so many small and a few large differences in the directions hypothesized by guidance workers can be obtained under representative high school counseling conditions, it seems likely that greater differences would appear if counseling were done under more ideal circumstances . . . (29, pp. 482-483).

Rothney notes that the counseling in this study, done under conditions representative of the usual high school situation, contributed less than the more intensive counseling in the earlier Massachusetts study which we described briefly above, but that both studies offer some justification for the provision of counseling programs in high schools.

A FINAL WORD

We began this chapter by asking the naïve question, "What are the results of guidance?" Primarily we have sought to introduce the student to some of the problems and difficulties of evaluation in guidance, with particular emphasis on difficulty of finding suitable criteria. We have not sought to present any systematic discussion of methodology, nor have we offered any particular set of criteria which can be recommended as generally applicable. A secondary purpose of the chapter has been to provide for the student some examples of evaluative studies and, incidentally, some of the findings of these illustrative studies. Our examples have been chosen to include some of the older studies as well as some of the more recent and extensive investigations. Also, we have chosen examples to illustrate two general kinds of efforts that have been made, the evaluation of guidance

programs or services, and the more specific appraisal of changes in the individual. We have excluded studies of particular techniques and guidance activities, and of the counseling process as such. The evaluation problem is far from solved. As recently as 1957 Cottle, in reviewing the evaluative studies of the three years preceding, noted, "Most attempts to evaluate apply only to parts of the total program of guidance services; the experimental designs used rarely have any major features in common" (8, p. 229). We have no disposition to quarrel with Cottle's characterization of the three-year period to which he referred, but in the long range, some progress has been made. One might, for example, compare some of the earlier discussions of evaluation with some recent statements such as that by Jensen, Coles, and Nestor (18), in which the characteristics of a criterion variable and a criterion instrument are discussed and a model criterion presented.

In closing this chapter we shall indulge in a bit of speculation as to some possible new directions in the development of evaluation. The time-honored approach has been to seek first to define objectives of guidance, then to select criteria, and finally to appraise progress toward these criteria. The difficulties encountered in defining objectives are basic and, as we have seen, the source of much confusion because of the differing value judgments involved, and sometimes, indeed, because of the lack of *any* very clear value judgments on which to base objectives. Why not begin by defining the guidance services which we seek to evaluate, then investigate whether or not these services are significantly associated with any differences in the behavior of those receiving the services? If significant differences are found, then we can worry about whether the changes are in a "good" or "bad" direction, and persons of differing philosophical persuasions are free to make their own interpretations of the differences.

The traditional pattern of objectives, criteria, and appraisal has of course come from the methods developed for evaluation of achievement. There are those who insist that there is no essential difference between the procedure for evaluating the outcomes of guidance, and the outcomes of any other learning situation in the school, since the counselor like the teacher is trying to produce learning (35). But this claim would seem to merit closer examination. We appear to experience less difficulty in clarifying the objectives for the teaching of, say, English or industrial arts, than we experience in defining the objectives of guidance. Perhaps we can say that a more restricted segment of the student's life is involved in such teaching

than in the process of guidance, and so the objectives of English or industrial arts can be more specific and manageable. In fact, a major area of difficulty with objectives emerges in the zone of transition from more specific to more general objectives. Suppose that a teacher of biology is seeking to have his class develop an understanding of phylogenetic beginnings of the central nervous system through a study of the earthworm, fish, and frog. He can rather easily state specific objectives which define the learnings which he is trying to bring about. But suppose again that he is seeking to define more general objectives for the teaching of biology in high school; here broader value judgments are involved, and his difficulties increase tenfold. But guidance, beginning as it does with the learnings needed by the individual in a situation much broader than that appropriate to any one limited segment of experience, must start defining its objectives at an appropriately complex level of learnings.

A second difference between the learnings more characteristic of the classroom and those involved in the guidance effort is that of immediacy and remoteness. In a given class, evaluation must somehow be completed by the termination of the course, for it does end at a definite time. Even for achievement in a field in which classes may continue through much of school—as in English, for example—evaluation of achievement must be made while the student is in school. But as we are frequently told and as seems to be postulated in follow-up studies, at least some of the effects of guidance cannot be observed until some time after the student has left school. The counselor may reasonably argue that in the efforts he makes in assisting the student toward occupational choice, for example, he has in mind long-range objectives for such assistance. Progress toward such long-range objectives can be fully assessed, not while the student is in school, but only after he is well along the way in the process of occupational adjustment. The differing levels of complexity, and the more long-range nature of many objectives of guidance, may well be taken to challenge the assumption that the learnings sought in guidance and in teaching are the same and must therefore be evaluated in the same manner. In short, we question the necessity of accepting the pattern of defining objectives, establishing criteria, and then assessing progress toward the objectives as defined by the criteria. Let us first find if there are any changes which occur in significant association with guidance services, and then subject these changes, if any, to value judgment.

A second suggestion as to a possible new direction in evaluation is simply that we assume a posture of greater modesty in our expectations for guidance. It seems unfair and illogical to seek to evaluate guidance on the basis of expected changes in the individual unless we have some reason to believe that guidance activities can really bring about these expected changes, or at least exert a considerable influence in the direction of the expected changes. This idea was introduced earlier in our discussion of criteria and of the Minnesota follow-up by Berdie (3). Why, for example, should we expect guidance to reduce the drop-out rate in a school, unless and until we understand reasonably well the factors related to drop-outs and have some reasonable basis for believing that at least some of these factors can be altered by guidance efforts? It is pertinent to recall at this point that in the eight-year Wisconsin study Rothney (29) found no significant difference as to drop-outs between the guided and unguided groups. If socioeconomic factors are as important as they seem to be, this result may be expected again in further studies. Guidance may perhaps succeed in changing attitudes of some individuals and so help them to remain in school, but it is not within the province of guidance programs to bring about the fundamental changes in communities which would seem to be necessary to substantially reduce drop-outs. Much the same comment might be made in regard to other criteria which have been used in the evaluation of guidance, such as reduction in delinquency rates, or displaying consistency of occupational choice by entering and remaining in the occupation chosen in high school. There seems to be a tendency to expect that guidance should accomplish feats that other school and community functions have not been able to do much about. Perhaps some of these expectations have been encouraged by extravagant claims made by some proponents of guidance, with the result that evaluations of guidance are sometimes made with a stacked deck. This is why we say that a new modesty as to the goals we set might be a worthwhile new emphasis which would lead to more realistic evaluation.

Finally, one very specific suggestion may be in order. In recent years an increasing amount of research attention has been given to studies of the self concept. Perhaps the techniques developed in this area may be of use in evaluation of guidance. Traditionally we have talked much in guidance about increasing self-insight and self-acceptance. Many studies have been made directed toward the evalua-

tion of counseling techniques which have involved an assessment of changes of the self concept, but so far as the present writer knows, no extensive study has sought to evaluate the effects of a total program of guidance services at the secondary school level by employing changes in the self concept as one of the major criteria. For this reason we shall depart from our usual practice of avoiding illustrations concerned with specific techniques, and note a study by Caplan (7). This investigation was in effect an evaluation of multiple counseling of seventh-, eighth-, and ninth-grade boys. The experimental group consisted of boys who had long-term records of conflict with school authorities and regulations. One of the criteria was changes in the self concept. Significant changes occurred in the experimental group during one semester; no changes were found in the control group. This kind of approach might have much broader usefulness in evaluation of effects upon the individual of guidance services.

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CHAPTER 12

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Guidance Reconsidered

We have been exploring in first one direction and then another in quest of significant ideas and developments which seemed to give some promise of possessing basic importance for guidance. Sometimes we have approached these ideas through historical developments as these developments seemed to constitute parts of the background of guidance. Sometimes we have dealt more directly with the meaning of ideas and their implications for guidance. We have felt free to seek help from whatever source seemed available, without regard to boundaries of academic disciplines, and with little regard to guidance practices, except as such practices have seemed to reflect important concepts. Such an inquiry inevitably results in some lack of unity and fails in part to convey any very integrated point of view. The time has come to undertake some more organized and generalized statement. Perhaps the most suitable beginning may be made by looking back along the path over which we have come. After that we shall turn to a brief synthesis of a point of view, then to some consideration of the goals of guidance, and finally to a statement of a concept of guidance.

RETROSPECT

Guidance concepts have deep roots historically. The intellectual climate out of which guidance eventually grew can be traced back at least to the time of Comenius when the intellectual and social precursors of the modern world were only uncertainly established. We noted two of these: the development of modern science, and the beginnings of the rise of the middle class. Out of science, came the technology which made possible the industrial revolution with the attendant increased division of labor and occupational complexities

which in time made real the need for vocational guidance. Out of science, too, came the new spirit which much later imbued education with the desire to emulate the successes in science by the development of new methods and techniques and the disclaiming of tradition. Out of the industrial revolution came also the changes in the way of life which were associated with division of labor and the rise of industry. In Europe we saw these changes reflected in call for reform by the Commonwealth educators.

In the country to become the United States forces were at work leading to the development of democratic values which, when carried over into education, gave us a system of schools and some tenets in education quite distinct from those of Europe. Of course these democratic values as expressed in education required time for their full development, and European ideas were not immediately turned back at the water's edge of our eastern coasts. Jefferson's ideas about education furnish a convenient illustration of a blend of Old World aristocratic tastes with a social philosophy which for his time was truly democratic. Franklin symbolizes the point of view of the mobile, middle-class man for whom the classic interests of Jefferson were somewhat suspect and the utilitarian emphasis in education much desired. Jacksonian democracy, nourished on the frontier, gave still more impetus to the freedom of the individual and a feeling of need for practical education. In Frank Parsons we find full recognition of the worth of the individual, some of the utilitarianism of Franklin, but the rugged individualism of the Jacksonian West had been replaced by a social welfare motivation.

But the roots of guidance are not only deep historically; they are also widespread. In the days of Frank Parsons, guidance was a straightforward and limited attempt to assist the individual in the vocational area. As guidance developed in our schools, however, its concern was extended to include assistance with almost any manner of need which might exist for the individual; and so we heard talk of guidance in the social, emotional, citizenship, health, and other areas. Although usually not very explicitly recognized, this spreading of the purposes of guidance seems to imply that the roots of guidance extend horizontally to much of the social context, to matters of conflicting values of subcultures and the general American culture, to matters of stratification and prestige in occupations, to the broad field of social trends and economic developments. This is true because all these things enter into the world in which the individual lives and

must make his choices and plans. But it is, after all, the individual who must make the choices; this principle has been consistently accepted on the level of verbal statements, but whether or not practice has always been in harmony with the principle is of course another matter. Pointing to the breadth of the roots of guidance is not intended to imply anything as to the nature of the methods employed. Methods and techniques we have noted only incidentally, but for the most part methods, though sometimes oriented toward groups, have kept considerable focus on the individual. A case in point is that counseling has survived, although somewhat uncertainly at times, as the principal method of guidance, and in recent years we have seen a rising emphasis on the clinical approach, albeit in many and varied forms.

Guidance conceived as assistance to the individual makes certain assumptions, sometimes implicit rather than clearly stated. One of these assumptions has to do with the predictability of individual development. The matter of prediction has certainly been explicit enough in some areas of testing, as in tests of abilities and interests. A great deal of attention has been given to problems of aptitude, to the prediction of future achievement on the basis of past achievement, to the stability of interests, and others. We have reviewed some of these problems in our consideration of abilities and interests. The problem of prediction has received considerably less attention in aspects of personality development other than interest, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the problem of even one assessment of personality had been found so difficult that we are not ready to undertake prediction except in a most limited way. Prediction of development as illustrated in consistency of occupational choice affords a clear example of the temptation to leave implicit an assumption as to predictability. Too often proposals have been advanced for the planning of the student's program of studies on the basis of expressed occupational choices at the tenth-grade level or lower, with the implicit assumption that such expressions have considerable stability, when the data from follow-up studies suggest only a very modest stability of such preferences. A second aspect of prediction is that concerned with the prediction of broad social and economic trends, as, for example, in employment opportunities. Such predictions have been frequently involved in practices advocated in the use of occupational information, either for dissemination to groups, or for counseling purposes. We are not attempting to pass

judgment on the predictability of occupational trends; we seek only to make the point that the predictability of such complex trends has sometimes been rather naïvely assumed in some guidance practice.

A second major assumption often made in guidance is that guidance programs should accept and operate within the status quo patterns of values. It is not our purpose at the moment either to support or reject this assumption as a principle. Our intention, rather, is to point out that this assumption, when viewed historically, seems to have resulted in the domination of guidance (since it is a part of the total educational effort) by a set of middle-class values. In our discussion of contemporary American culture and its antecedents, we sought to develop the backgrounds for an understanding of the place of values in culture. More specifically, we pointed out that teachers tend to be drawn from the middle classes, although the public secondary schools serve students from all social classes. True, both upper and lower extremes are underrepresented in public schools. The result seems to be, rather typically, guidance efforts oriented toward the middle classes. But this assumption that guidance must operate within the status quo pattern of values has implications far broader than the social class imbalance we have just noted. Efforts toward evaluation of guidance have been greatly retarded by failure to find suitable criteria. This is more than a technical question of research procedure. We tried to point out that the criterion difficulty in part at least reflects a broader confusion as to the objectives of education in general and guidance in particular. Is it too much to suggest that guidance has been confused about its purposes, and hence about the criteria for evaluation, because guidance has assumed that it must somehow accept the status quo pattern of values, and that in this case the status quo to be accepted has often been that of general American culture with its built-in value conflicts?

The third assumption which seems to have been made by guidance is that the responsibilities of guidance can be broadened almost without bounds. Beginning as an effort to assist students in choosing and preparing for a vocation, guidance rapidly expanded its purposes. For a time and in some quarters guidance was practically equated with education, and as such shared fully the objectives of education. Moreover, these objectives themselves were broadened as the nature of secondary school populations changed, and more and more of those completing the elementary grades continued on into high school. The effort to meet more realistically the needs of youth became an effort

to meet *all* of the needs of youth. Guidance lost its original vocational orientation and ingested (but sometimes failed to digest) some of the activities of first one and then another field of endeavor: post-high school job placement; placement in the next stage of training; occupational surveys; research, especially through follow-up studies; improvement of study skills; counseling regarding personal adjustment problems; maintenance of mental health; furnishing data for curriculum revision; functioning as liaison with the home; attempting to deal with social pathology, with juvenile delinquency in particular; identifying the talented, and so on and on. The drive was toward expansion; few seemed to feel any need of defining boundaries for guidance. And consequently the assumption grew and gained rather wide acceptance, even in public secondary schools, that guidance should assume more and more responsibility for the individual. There seemed to be no tangible limits. Doubtless this development in guidance was but a counterpart of the acceptance in education generally of wider and wider responsibilities.

IN QUEST OF A SYNTHESIS

Surely one of the first essentials for effective guidance is to achieve an understanding of the individual—his abilities, his ambitions, his values, and his problems. But the individual is inseparable from the world in which he lives; consequently, if we are to understand him, we must understand also that world. There are at least two significant aspects of this world. One is the "objective" world made up of facts and conditions which existed prior to the individual and over which he, as an individual, has relatively little control: the home into which he is born, the pattern of economic organization in his time, the kind of schools which are available to him especially in his early years, the pattern of social organization existing in his community, and many others. All these facts of the context in which he lives place some limits on the probability that he will develop in this or that direction. But not only do such objective or external conditions establish probable limits; so do his own qualities, such as his physical make-up and his abilities insofar as these abilities represent stable qualities. A second aspect of the world in which the individual lives is the culture or way of life in which the individual is nurtured, for he must respond to this, although he may do so by varying degrees of acceptance or revolt. In the long run, many of his values and aspi-

rations are those of his culture and subculture, and he simply adopts and adapts them. But in addition to the facts of the external order in the world of the student, there is also his own unique world as he is able to perceive it. This consists both of the world of others, and himself, and in relating the two he learns roles for himself in relation to the roles of others, and he comes to perceive himself in part at least as he feels that others perceive him. In a word, the individual is a synthesis of his own and the external world, and it is this synthesis that guidance needs to understand.

Since guidance must deal with such a complex final synthesis as the individual represents, guidance practice is necessarily a most complex undertaking. No one formal discipline can possibly offer all the help needed for the guidance enterprise. Psychology, sociology, cultural anthropology, economics, philosophy—all these and probably more must be called upon to illuminate the individual in his world. But in a quest for a synthesis of understandings to correspond to the synthesis which is the individual there are serious problems. Not the least of these is the problem of sheer terminology. Sometimes it seems that the various disciplines almost speak different languages in dealing with related or even very similar concepts. This difficulty of terminology has been so often commented upon that there is little need to belabor the point here. Nor is there any need to stress the difficulty of terminology within the field of guidance practice itself. The problem of terminology is a special aspect of the broader problem of specialization of knowledge and the attendant tendency toward isolation of the various disciplines from each other, and we certainly have no ready solution for this situation. But if we are to achieve an adequate synthesis of understandings for guidance, it seems clear that we must somehow break through the barriers which make for isolation and build an interdisciplinary approach to guidance. One of the major purposes of this book has been to illustrate some of the kinds of understandings which are available from various fields and which await synthesis.

At a practical level, we may be able to start toward an interdisciplinary synthesis in programs for the preparation of counselors and other guidance workers. On the didactic side of preparation, courses can be selected from various fields as those courses give promise of supplying understandings important to guidance. Such an approach, of course, leaves pretty much to the student the task of achieving the hoped-for synthesis, but it is at least a start. There is much greater

opportunity in practicums and internships than in selection of courses to achieve an actual integration of understandings, along with development of skills in techniques, and there seems to be a definite increase in the use of such training in counselor preparation. The achievement of a genuine interdisciplinary orientation toward counselor preparation will, of course, be a long process. First we must reach a much more clear concept than now seems to exist as to just what should be the ingredients in the synthesis. What psychological concepts are most crucial? What sociological concepts? What does cultural anthropology have to offer? What is needed from philosophy? From education? What tool concepts, such as statistics, should be included in the whole? And we must certainly expect resistances to develop along the way, not only from tradition, but from feelings of proprietary interest which are to be expected from organizational segments of colleges and universities, and from interested professional groups.

Counselor preparation is rapidly becoming established as graduate level training (4). Both the institutions of higher education, and state departments of education operating through certification requirements, are assisting in the process. But thus far little attention has been given to the matter of undergraduate backgrounds. If graduate preparation is to be broad enough in scope to permit of approaching a synthesis of understandings, it would seem that undergraduate backgrounds need to furnish a broad base to support the graduate study. The student needs, at a minimum, some introduction to sociology, economics, cultural anthropology, and philosophy; enough psychology to furnish an adequate basis for pertinent graduate courses to be taken later; and enough mathematics and statistics to serve as a foundation for the study of tests and measurements. Since most counselors and guidance workers in secondary schools are or have been teachers, their undergraduate preparation has probably included substantial background in education. In short, breadth rather than narrow specialization seems to be in order for undergraduate backgrounds, in order that the student may become reasonably at home in enough areas to be able to get on with the problem of synthesis of understandings at the graduate level.

The quest for synthesis in guidance has implications not only for the conceptualization of the process and the preparation of counselors, but also for the organizational structure by which guidance is implemented. We have long talked about coordination of guidance

activities, about the implementing of the guidance point of view through coordination of activities, through developing a guidance team, and through the unification of pupil personnel services. But one of the sharpest shifts of emphasis to be observed in current opinion is that away from guidance as simply a point of view to the actual development of guidance programs. Conant does not spend time eulogizing the guidance point of view, but comes to grips immediately with the problem of recommendations for a counseling system and for providing students with individualized programs (1, pp. 44-47). The recommendation of the Educational Policies Commission is now quite specific on this point. In discussing the obligation of schools to place before its students such facts of the manpower situation as may be relevant to occupational choices, the Commission says: "To fulfill that obligation means much more than what has been called a 'guidance point of view.' The institution should have a definite and extensive program for 'guidance services.' . . . In this context the guidance program is not merely synonymous with, or coextensive with, all education—as some would say . . ." (2, p. 85). We seem at last to be moving toward concrete action rather than continuing a sentimental approbation of the aims of guidance. Many schools have long ago made the move, but now we seem to be entering upon a much more general movement. And let us hope that some synthesis can be achieved in action as well as thinking.

THE GOALS OF GUIDANCE

As we enter the 1960's we are witnessing a striking resurgence of Jeffersonian thinking about education. The emphasis of current discussion is upon the *identification of the able and their education* to meet manpower needs. The parallel with Jefferson's recognition of a "natural aristocracy" and plan for the education of the boys "of best genius" as a source of leadership for the nation is inescapable. The drive toward a practical, utilitarian education so close to the heart of Benjamin Franklin, and so conspicuous earlier in the century in American education, is no longer the principal rallying point. And although due deference is paid in most discussions to the maximum development of each individual, as a goal of guidance, it is abundantly clear that this is not really the dominant drive. The manpower problems posed for education, and hence for guidance, are placed in

sharp focus by the Educational Policies Commission publication *Manpower and Education* (2). The identification and encouragement of the able clearly constitute a major purpose, if not *the* major purpose of the National Defense Education Act of 1958. Just why this shift to Jeffersonian thinking about guidance should occur is not at all clear. The obvious answer that we as a nation have rather suddenly become aware of our manpower needs is too glib to be convincing. Super (7) has furnished a more illuminating perspective by discussing differing emphases on manpower in guidance against the background of various countries. He speculated that the relative emphasis on manpower needs and development of the individual in guidance might be related to the degree of dynamism of the cultures and the degree of need of manpower in development or maintenance of industrialization. This statement is probably an oversimplification of Super's theses, but for our purposes, the important thing in Super's suggestion is the idea that attitudes toward guidance reflect broad cultural qualities and socioeconomic conditions. This kind of explanation is much more satisfying than any more myopic approach.

It will be a major misfortune if the broad goal of guidance as assistance to the individual in development comes to be replaced by any part-goal, however commendable or expedient in itself. Guidance, probably more than any other aspect of education, has served and can continue to serve to keep a focus strongly and steadily on the individual. Our best hope of keeping this focus lies in the fact that American values—at least the basic or "sacred" values—give such large recognition to the worth of the individual. There have been and will be setbacks, temporary compromises with a more utilitarian set of values. But guidance, broadly interpreted, can help to keep the total educational process sensitized to some of the deeper values of our culture. That guidance has not always been aware of or single-minded in fulfilling this function is all too clear; sometimes the means to the end command more attention than the goal. Hobbs (3) noted that in 10 textbooks on guidance, about half of the pages were devoted to programs and organization, another third to techniques of securing, recording, and interpreting information, and only skimpy discussion was allotted to the nature of man and of the society in which guidance must be validated. The one exception noted among the texts by Hobbs was that by Mathewson (5). But these emphases on organization and techniques are themselves expressions of the smaller,

utilitarian values of the American culture. As we achieve maturity and become more comfortable with our methods, we may feel free to turn to larger issues.

Certainly the major goal of guidance is not to develop counselors or other guidance workers who are good technicians; after all, guidance is for the guided, not the counselors. Unquestionably, we need the best techniques we can develop, but we are inclined to agree with a further comment by Hobbs that "we are doing well on the technical front . . ." but that "we must not let preoccupations with technical skills obscure the nature of the ends to be served by the skills" (3). In Frank Parsons' day there was desperate need of tools and techniques, but what we need now is not so much more techniques as a deeper understanding and acceptance of the importance of values in the whole process. Speaking specifically of counseling, Williamson makes it clear that values cannot be excluded from the process. In his words: "It appears that to think of counseling as non-value-bound is contradictory so long as counselors function in facilitating an individual's development within the limits imposed by his social situation. We are, rather, in the business of helping each client to choose (his own choice) to become one kind of person rather than another, and to approximate an integrated concept of his universe which will correlate and give meaning to his life and that of others, and which will provide guiding principles or values to influence his daily behavior" (8).

And if values cannot and should not be excluded from the counseling process, neither can they be excluded from the broader undertaking of guidance. Even in guidance activities other than counseling there are subtle communications of values. In a class studying occupations, for example, the use of the usual scheme of classifying occupations—as professional, managerial, semiprofessional, skilled, and the like—may well convey to the student the message that persons in the upper brackets of the prestige hierarchy are somehow more important and better persons. Guidance necessarily involves people interacting, and although the interaction may be on a more superficial level than in some kinds of counseling, values are necessarily involved. As Murphy has phrased it, ". . . if he who offers guidance is a whole person, with real roots in human culture, he cannot help conveying directly or indirectly to every client what he himself sees and feels, and the perspective in which his own life is lived. Is it to be a technician's perspective, or are the techniques to be

subordinated to wisdom in living? If the guide is more than a technician, he will not be afraid to guide" (6).

A CONCEPT OF GUIDANCE

What are some of the characteristics of guidance which may furnish us some basis upon which to formulate a statement of a concept of guidance? First we must distinguish between guidance as process and guidance as a program of services. In the case of the latter, we think of guidance as one of the personnel services, the distinguishing functions of which are assistance to the individual in choices, planning, and development. But it is guidance as process to which we refer in the following discussion of characteristics. And to further delimit our purpose, we are considering only guidance in secondary school situations, though of course we do not mean to imply that guidance at secondary school level is completely different from and somehow insulated from guidance either in the elementary school or college.

Let us attempt, then, to summarize a concept of guidance from the point of view we have sought to develop in preceding chapters. Guidance so conceived is in part a reflection of current practice, but we hope also to reflect some of the emerging thinking in our statement.

1. Guidance is a continuous process. This has been often stated, and apparently there is quite general consensus as to this characteristic of guidance.

2. Guidance as it exists in American schools has deep roots in our culture and heritage. Guidance shares with the total educational effort participation in our basic American values and, by virtue of this participation, is also subject to the conflicts which exist in American values. Guidance cannot be a thing of the school alone, but must be conscious of its relation to the total contemporary scene and its historical backgrounds.

3. Guidance is assistance to the individual in the process of development, rather than a directing of that development. The balance of assistance and direction at any one time, however, must be chosen with due regard to the maturity of the individual. Moreover, those engaged in the guidance should recognize that in any interaction with others on a complex level some communication of values is probably involved. Elimination of all value communication during

guidance is neither possible nor desirable, but the person in a guidance role needs to be aware of and accept responsibility for the personal evaluations which he communicates.

4. The appropriate area of functioning of guidance lies between primary concern with subjective states on the one hand and primary concern with external social conditions on the other. Here we specifically follow Mathewson (5, p. 227). Or to put the matter in the terminology which we used in earlier chapters: guidance operates in the zone in which the individual's own unique world of perceptions interacts with the external order of events in his life context. It is here that the choice points and problems arise which are the distinctive concern of guidance.

5. Guidance is a function in which many people participate: the parents, the teacher, the counselor, the school psychologist, the nurse, the visiting teacher, the school social worker, and those who provide special forms of assistance, such as remedial teaching, or welfare assistance. Persons in administrative roles participate by providing guidance services.

6. Guidance draws insights and methods from many disciplines, but it is not a branch of any one of the disciplines as such; rather, it applies the results of research toward the solution of practical problems.

✓ 7. Guidance has limits. It must not undertake to be all things to all people. It has limits as to its area of appropriate functioning, such as we indicated in number 4 above. Guidance also has limits on what it can accomplish. These limits are imposed by the fact that many of the external factors in the life context of the individual are not amenable to immediate and substantial change by means within the scope of guidance. Guidance should therefore define its goals realistically and with appropriate modesty.

8. Ultimately, guidance is more nearly an art than a science. While guidance should always be alert to the maximum utilization of the tested results of science, guidance practice must often make decisions on the basis of best judgment in the absence of complete scientific verification. Moreover, since the individual is a unique and developing historical system, it is doubtful that his future course of development as an individual can ever be completely predicted.

Such are the characteristics of guidance as at present writing we conceive it. If we were to make one statement as to the general goal of guidance it would be something like the following. Guidance

seeks to aid the individual to develop according to his own emerging life pattern and expectancies by achieving a maximum self-realization in harmony with his own values and the values of the culture in which he will probably live.

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INDEX OF NAMES

- Abegglen, J. C., 105, 106, 119, 210, 215
 Abrahamson, Stephen, 192, 202, 213
 Achilles, P. S., 244, 245, 270
 Adams, F. J., 308, 324
 Adamson, J. W., 121, 125, 127, 128, 129, 142
 Adkins, D. C., 306, 307, 328
 Ainsworth, O. M., 126, 127, 128, 142
 Albertsoo, Ralph, 146, 147
 Allen, F. J., 149
 Allen, Richard, 144, 162
 Allport, F. H., 245, 249, 250, 272
 Allport, G. W., 195, 213, 370, 371, 388, 390, 394
 Alstetter, M. L., 409, 436
 Altus, W. D., 65, 77
 Anastasi, Anne, 180, 181, 213, 295, 324
 Anderson, H. D., 103, 104, 105, 118
 Anderson, W. A., 115, 117
 Angell, R. C., 45, 77
 Anonymous, 66, 68, 77
 Arensberg, C. A., 36
 Arnold, Felix, 329, 330, 394
 Arsenian, Seth, 371, 382, 394
 Ayers, L. P., 153, 171

 Bachrach, P. B., 269, 273
 Bain, Read, 225, 270
 Baldwin, A. L., 287, 288, 319, 324
 Ballou, R. B., 126, 127, 142
 Barker, R. G., 197, 213
 Barnett, G. L., 349, 394
 Barry, Ruth, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16
 Baudler, Lucille, 113, 114, 117
 Bayley, Nancy, 284, 325
 Becker, H. S., 109, 117
 Bedford, J. H., 235, 236, 249, 250, 270
 Beegle, J. A., 48, 78
 Beeson, M. F., 235, 237, 251, 270

 Bell, Howard, 144
 Bell, Reginald, 353, 398
 Bennett, G. K., 283, 285, 325
 Bensoo, A. L., 436
 Bently, J. H., 158, 171
 Benton, A. L., 360, 394
 Berdie, R. F., 252, 254, 270, 325, 377, 378, 416, 425, 426, 427, 435, 436
 Berlyne, D. E., 329, 394
 Best, J. W., 108, 117
 Billbartz, W. H., Jr., 309, 325
 Binet, Alfred, 152, 171, 278, 279, 280, 325
 Bingham, W. V., 277, 325
 Bloomfield, Meyer, 148, 150, 153, 161, 162, 171
 Boas, Franz, 38, 77
 Bogardus, E. S., 61, 77
 Boll, E. S., 175, 213
 Bolton, E. B., 305, 325
 Bond, E. A., 302, 325
 Bond, N. A., 344, 396
 Bordin, E. S., 360, 390, 394, 411, 420, 422, 438
 Bossard, J. H. S., 175, 213
 Bott, Elizabeth, 94, 95, 117
 Bouton, Arthur, 338, 339, 341, 342, 396
 Boyden, G. H., 150
 Boynton, P. L., 219, 241, 270
 Brameld, Theodore, 404, 436
 Breed, Warren, 203, 213
 Brewer, J. M., 6, 16, 144, 145, 148, 149, 151, 155, 171
 Brewster, R. E., 11, 16
 Brill, A. A., 268, 269, 270
 Brim, O. G., Jr., 209, 213
 Brink, W. G., 7, 17, 235, 238, 241, 274
 Brintle, S. L., 356, 357, 398
 Broughton, H. E., 374, 394

INDEX OF NAMES

- Abegglen, J. C., 105, 106, 119, 210, 215
 Abrahamsoo, Stephen, 192, 202, 213
 Achilles, P. S., 244, 245, 270
 Adams, F. J., 308, 324
 Adamson, J. W., 121, 125, 127, 128, 129, 142
 Adkins, D. C., 306, 307, 328
 Ainsworth, O. M., 126, 127, 128, 142
 Albertson, Ralph, 146, 147
 Allen, F. J., 149
 Allen, Richard, 144, 162
 Allport, F. H., 245, 249, 250, 272
 Allport, G. W., 195, 213, 370, 371, 388, 390, 394
 Alstetter, M. L., 409, 436
 Altus, W. D., 65, 77
 Anastasi, Anne, 180, 181, 213, 295, 324
 Anderson, H. D., 103, 104, 105, 118
 Anderson, W. A., 115, 117
 Angell, R. C., 45, 77
 Anonymous, 66, 68, 77
 Arensberg, C. A., 36
 Arnold, Felix, 329, 330, 394
 Arsenian, Seth, 371, 382, 394
 Ayers, L. P., 153, 171
 Bachrach, P. B., 269, 273
 Bain, Read, 225, 270
 Baldwin, A. L., 287, 288, 319, 324
 Ballou, R. B., 126, 127, 142
 Barker, R. G., 197, 213
 Barnett, G. L., 349, 394
 Barry, Ruth, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16
 Baudler, Lucille, 113, 114, 117
 Bayley, Nancy, 284, 325
 Becker, H. S., 109, 117
 Bedford, J. H., 235, 236, 249, 250, 270
 Beegle, J. A., 48, 78
 Besson, M. F., 235, 237, 251, 270
 Bell, Howard, 144
 Bell, Reginald, 353, 398
 Bennett, G. K., 283, 285, 325
 Benson, A. L., 436
 Bently, J. H., 158, 171
 Beaton, A. L., 360, 394
 Berdie, R. F., 252, 254, 270, 325, 377, 378, 416, 425, 426, 427, 435, 436
 Berlyne, D. E., 329, 394
 Best, J. W., 108, 117
 Billhartz, W. H., Jr., 309, 325
 Binet, Alfred, 152, 171, 278, 279, 280, 325
 Bingham, W. V., 277, 325
 Bloomfield, Meyer, 148, 150, 153, 161, 162, 171
 Boas, Franz, 38, 77
 Bogardus, E. S., 61, 77
 Boll, E. S., 175, 213
 Bolton, E. B., 305, 325
 Bond, E. A., 302, 325
 Bond, N. A., 344, 396
 Bordio, E. S., 360, 390, 394, 411, 420, 422, 438
 Bossard, J. H. S., 175, 213
 Bott, Elizabeth, 94, 95, 117
 Bouton, Arthur, 338, 339, 341, 342, 396
 Boyden, G. H., 150
 Boynton, P. L., 219, 241, 270
 Brameld, Theodore, 404, 436
 Breed, Warren, 203, 213
 Brewster, J. M., 6, 16, 144, 145, 148, 149, 151, 155, 171
 Brewster, R. E., 11, 16
 Brill, A. A., 268, 269, 270
 Brim, O. G., Jr., 209, 213
 Brink, W. G., 7, 17, 235, 238, 241, 274
 Brindle, S. L., 356, 357, 398
 Brogden, H. E., 374, 394

- Brookover, W. B., 109, 117
 Brooks, S. D., 149
 Brougher, J. F., 162, 171
 Brown, H. W., 188, 213
 Brubacher, J. S., 404, 405, 436
 Bryan, A. I., 286, 326
 Bryce, James, 23, 33
 Burma, J. H., 38, 61, 62, 63, 77
 Burnham, P. E., 336, 394
 Burt, Cyril, 286, 325
 Butler, N. M., 122, 142
 Byers, B. H., 116, 117
 Byrns, Ruth, 308, 310, 325

 Campbell, Edith, 144
 Cantril, Hadley, 91, 93, 118, 119, 371, 390, 394, 398
 Caplan, S. M., 436
 Carter, H. D., 267, 270, 346, 370, 394, 395
 Carter, R. W., 292, 325
 Caudill, William, 55, 77
 Cautela, J. R., 269, 270
 Centers, Richard, 82, 83, 91, 92, 93, 95, 98, 103, 110, 111, 112, 118, 258, 259, 270
 Chamberlin, Dean, 163, 171
 Chamberlin, Enid, 163, 171
 Chauncey, Henry, 303, 304, 325
 Christensen, P. R., 344, 396
 Christensen, T. E., 360, 390, 395
 Clague, Ewan, 161, 171
 Clark, M. P., 286, 325
 Clark, W. W., 286, 325
 Coles, George, 433, 437
 Combs, A. W., 195, 215, 229, 230, 273
 Comenius, J. A., 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 142
 Conant, J. B., 446, 451
 Cooley, C. H., 225, 226, 227, 270
 Cooley, E. P., 144
 Cooper, C. L., 242, 255, 270
 Cottle, W. C., 433, 436
 Counts, G. S., 111, 112, 118, 183, 184, 189, 213
 Cox, C. C., 39, 77
 Crawford, Albert, 156, 171
 Crissy, W. J. E., 372, 373, 379, 395
 Cronbach, L. J., 299, 325
 Crowder, N. A., 283
 Crumrine, W. M., 340, 396

 Darley, J. G., 159, 172, 330, 333, 337, 338, 347, 350, 395, 406, 418, 438
 Darrah, E. M., 231, 232, 270
 Davidson, P. E., 103, 104, 105, 118
 Davie, J. S., 190, 213
 Davis, Allison, 37, 54, 70, 71, 73, 77, 86, 118, 223, 270
 Davis, Ann, 144
 Davis, H. V., 148, 171
 Davis, Jerome, 114, 118
 Davis, J. B., 5, 17, 150, 171
 Dear, R. E., 189, 190, 213
 Deeg, M. E., 112, 113, 114, 118
 DeVos, George, 56, 77
 Dewey, John, 32, 330, 389, 395, 405
 Dillon, F. H., 259, 270
 Dillon, H. J., 188, 213
 DiMichael, S. G., 340, 341, 342, 395
 Doppelt, J. E., 285, 286, 301, 325
 Dorr, Mildred, 232, 271
 Douglass, A. A., 22, 33, 235, 238, 244, 248, 251, 270
 Douglass, H. R., 292, 302, 325
 Douvan, E. A. M., 209, 210, 213, 386, 395
 Drake, C. E., 184, 185, 189, 214
 Dreir, W. H., 188, 213
 Dressel, P. L., 367, 395, 420, 436
 Drought, N. E., 171
 Dubin, William, 335, 397
 Duffy, Elizabeth, 371, 372, 373, 379, 395
 Dukes, W. F., 371, 373, 395
 Dury, John, 123, 128, 129, 130
 Dvorak, B. J., 283

 Eckert, Ruth, 185, 186, 213
 Edwards, A. M., 103, 118
 Edwards, Newton, 131, 142
 Eells, Kenneth, 84, 119
 Elkin, Frederick, 177, 178, 213
 Elliott, R. M., 159, 172
 Ellis, Albert, 157, 171, 213
 Ellis, Evelyn, 211, 213
 Elsbree, W. S., 107, 118
 Engle, T. L., 191, 213
 English, A. C., 227, 271
 English, H. B., 227, 271
 Erikson, E. H., 28, 34, 59, 60, 77, 228, 271
 Erlandson, F. L., 351, 352, 395
 Ewens, W. P., 367, 395

- Failor, C. W., 410, 436
 Fauset, C. E., 112, 119
 Fay, Bernard, 136, 142
 Feder, D. D., 332, 399
 Ferguson, L. W., 378, 395
 Ferguson, M. Q., 300, 325
 Fitch, J. A., 151, 171
 Fordyce, Charles, 356, 395
 Forer, B. R., 268, 271
 Forer, Raymond, 209, 213
 Form, W. H., 217, 257, 271
 Fox, W. H., 119, 338, 395
 Frandsen, Arden, 358, 395
 Franklin, Benjamin, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 142, 143
 Frederiksen, Norman, 303, 304, 305, 325
 Freud, Sigmund, 167, 405
 Froehlich, C. P., 405, 407, 408, 411, 421, 422, 423, 436, 437
 Fromm, Erich, 32, 34, 228, 271
 Fryer, Douglas, 242, 243, 244, 271, 330, 331, 332, 345, 348, 349, 363, 364, 367, 370, 391, 395
 Fulmer, C. A., 235, 238, 271

 Galler, E. H., 260, 271
 Gallup, George, 92, 118
 Gardner, Burleigh, 84, 86, 118
 Gardner, M. R., 84, 86, 118
 Garfield, Sol, 235, 238, 241, 274
 Garnett, J. C. M., 281, 325
 Garrett, H. E., 286, 287, 326
 Garrett, H. F., 302, 303, 326
 Garry, R. J., 361, 395
 Gates, A. L., 296, 297, 326
 Getzels, J. W., 23, 34, 50, 77
 Ghiselli, E. E., 312, 313, 314, 316, 326
 Gibbs, P. K., 224, 272
 Ginzberg, Eli, 221, 263, 265, 267, 271
 Glaser, E. M., 371, 374, 395
 Goddard, H. H., 152
 Goldstein, Kurt, 228, 229, 271
 Goodman, C. H., 304, 326
 Gordon, C. W., 179, 213
 Gordon, M. M., 42, 77
 Gough, H. G., 291, 326
 Gragg, W. L., 187, 188, 214
 Gray, Susan, 241, 271
 Greenhoe, Florence, 107-108, 118
 Greenleaf, W. J., 161, 171
 Gregory, R. W., 7, 17
 Griggs, A. E., 223, 271
 Grunes, W. F., 261, 262, 271
 Guilford, J. P., 282, 283, 344, 396

 Hagen, Elizabeth, 152, 173, 314, 315, 316
 Hagenah, Theda, 330, 337, 338, 347, 350, 395
 Hake, D. T., 358, 396
 Hall, G. S., 167, 225, 271, 405
 Hall, R. C., 312, 326
 Hand, H. C., 6, 17, 193, 214, 419, 437
 Handelsman, Irving, 349, 394
 Harrell, M. S., 311, 326
 Harrell, T. W., 311, 326
 Harris, Daniel, 371, 396
 Harrison, E. C., 241, 271
 Hartley, David, 412, 437
 Hartlib, Samuel, 125, 126
 Hartmann, G. W., 112, 118, 371, 396
 Hartshorn, H. H., 352
 Hatt, Paul, 43, 77
 Havighurst, R. J., 9, 10, 17, 37, 38, 59, 60, 77, 101, 119, 223, 270, 271, 403, 404, 437
 Hayes, Mary, 144
 Hebert, Robert, 334, 396
 Hedlund, Paul, 412, 437
 Heimann, R. A., 291, 327, 360, 397
 Helper, M. M., 226, 233, 271
 Henmon, V. A. C., 308, 310, 325
 Henry, E. R., 303, 326
 Herzberg, Frederick, 338, 339, 341, 342, 396
 Hieronymus, A. N., 385, 396
 Hilgard, E. R., 226, 271
 Hill, M. C., 85, 118
 Hinderman, R. A., 402, 437
 Hirschcock, A. A., 239, 251, 271
 Hobbs, Nicholas, 226, 271, 447, 448, 451
 Hoffman, W. S., 308, 326
 Hofstoetter, P. H., 37, 77
 Holland, J. L., 334, 396
 Hollingshead, A. B., 1, 17, 84, 85, 118, 190, 191, 192, 193, 214
 Hollingworth, H. L., 153, 171
 Holzinger, K. J., 283, 285, 327
 Honeywell, R. J., 11, 17, 133, 134, 135, 143

- Hotelling, Harold, 282, 326
 Hsü, E. H., 37, 77
 Hull, C. L., 55, 171, 276, 281, 288, 289, 326
 Hulslander, S. C., 346, 396
 Humphrey, N. D., 63, 64, 77
 Humphreys, L. G., 378, 395
 Hurlock, E. B., 249, 250, 263, 271
 Hutson, P. W., 309, 325
 Hyman, Bernard, 351, 396
 Hyman, H. H., 94, 95, 98, 118, 207, 214
 Hyte, Charles, 241, 254, 271

 Jackson, Andrew, 19, 29
 Jackson, R. A., 305, 326
 Jacob, P. E., 372, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 396
 Jager, H. A., 163, 172
 James, William, 227, 228, 230, 271, 396
 Jansing, C., 249, 250, 263, 271
 Jefferson, Thomas, 11, 19, 132, 133, 134, 135, 317, 439, 446, 447
 Jensen, B. T., 433, 437
 Jenson, R. E., 412, 413, 437
 Jersild, A. T., 226, 272
 Joffe, N. F., 67, 78
 Johnson, C. S., 54, 55, 78
 Johnson, E. S., 189, 214
 Johnson, F. E., 32, 34
 Johnson, G. R., 292, 326
 Jones, A. J., 6, 17
 Jones, A. W., 27, 34
 Jones, Galen, 7, 17
 Jones, L. W., 280, 327
 Joslyn, C. S., 105, 106, 119

 Kahf, J. A., 385, 396
 Kane, J. N., 26, 34
 Kaplan, O. J., 245, 272
 Karon, B. P., 55, 78
 Katz, D. F., 245, 249, 250, 272
 Kay, L. W., 115, 118
 Kefauver, G. N., 144, 184, 185, 189, 214, 402, 437
 Kelley, R. W., 148
 Kelley, T. L., 279, 281, 326
 Kitch, D. E., 410, 437
 Kitson, H. D., 144, 151, 153, 172, 277, 326, 407, 422, 437
 Kittle, M. A., 193, 215
 Kluckhohn, Clyde, 35, 44, 50, 78
 Kluckhohn, F. R., 50, 78, 257, 272

 Komarovsky, Mirra, 36, 78
 Kornhauser, S. L., 360, 394
 Krause, A. H., 334, 396
 Kreithow, B. W., 188, 213
 Kremen, Benjamin, 410, 411, 437
 Kroeber, A. L., 35, 37, 44, 78
 Kuder, G. F., 156, 338
 Kuhlén, R. G., 181, 214
 Kuhlman, Fred, 152
 Kvaraceus, W. C., 387, 396

 Landsdowne, Marquis of, 143
 Lawtence, Isobel, 153, 172
 Leavitt, F. M., 5
 Lecky, Prescott, 229, 272
 Lee, B. J., 181, 214
 Lee, D. M., 302, 326
 Lee, J. M., 302, 326
 Legg, C. E., 189, 214
 Lehman, H. C., 112, 113, 114, 118, 220, 251, 272
 Lenior, J. A., 188, 189, 214
 Lesser, Alexander, 57, 58, 78
 Lewin, Kurt, 194, 214, 230, 272
 Lindsey, Gardner, 394
 Linton, Ralph, 57, 71, 78, 175, 176, 214
 Lipmann, Walter, 27, 34
 Lobaugh, Dean, 294, 326
 Locke, John, 129, 130
 Loeb, M. B., 84, 101, 118
 Longstaff, H. P., 361, 396
 Loomis, C. P., 48, 78
 Lorge, Irving, 360, 399
 Loutitt, C. M., 297, 326
 Low, J. O., 24, 34
 Lunt, P. S., 1, 17, 79, 84, 85, 119
 Lurie, W. A., 373, 379, 396
 Lynd, H. M., 1, 17, 25, 34, 78, 100, 119, 262
 Lynd, R. S., 1, 17, 25, 34, 78, 100, 119, 262

 McArthur, Charles, 257, 259, 272, 350, 351, 365, 396
 McCall, B. C., 85, 118
 McCall, W. C., 338, 339, 399
 McClelland, D. C., 210, 214, 318, 324, 327
 Maccoby, E. E., 224, 272
 McCreary, W. H., 410, 437
 McDonagh, E. C., 61, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 78
 McGuffey, W. H., 29, 30

- McGuffin, R. L., 172
 McGuire, J. C., 178, 214
 Mack, R. W., 207, 214
 MacKinnon, D. W., 228, 272
 MacMinn, Paul, 445, 451
 McMorries, J. C., 241, 272
 Mahoney, H. J., 408, 437
 Mahoney, P. H., 235, 246, 272
 Maller, J. B., 371, 374, 395
 Mallinson, G. G., 340, 396
 Mandler, George, 383, 398
 Mann, Arthur, 146, 172
 Marks, J. B., 201, 214
 Marshall, T. O., 185, 186, 213
 Marx, Karl, 81, 82
 Maslow, A. H., 228, 229, 272
 Mathewson, R. H., 161, 172, 174, 214,
 334, 396, 403, 437, 447, 450, 451
 Matteson, R. W., 367, 368, 395, 397
 Mead, G. H., 225, 272
 Mead, Margaret, 30, 31, 34, 175, 214
 Meadow, Lloyd, 267, 272
 Meeker, Marcia, 119
 Menger, Clara, 113, 114, 119, 217, 218,
 219, 220, 235, 236, 237, 238, 272
 Miller, C. H., 253, 254, 272
 Miller, D. C., 217, 257, 271, 273
 Miller, L. M., 168, 172
 Miller, Shirley, 180, 181, 213
 Miller, W. B., 387, 396
 Miller, William, 21, 34
 Mills, C. W., 51, 78, 85, 119
 Milton, John, 126, 127
 Mitchell, E. D., 364, 397
 Mook, J. R., 85, 101, 119
 Moser, H. P., 335, 397
 Mosier, C. T., 373, 399
 Mosier, R. D., 29, 34
 Moustakas, C. E., 226, 273
 Mulligan, R. A., 383, 397
 Murphy, Gardner, 26, 34, 231, 273,
 391, 397, 448, 451
 Murphy, R. J., 207, 214, 273
 Myers, G. E., 144, 407, 437
 Myrdal, Gunnar, 23, 34, 39, 54, 64, 78

 Neitz, J. A., 112, 119
 Nemzek, C. L., 309, 327
 Nestor, Beatrice, 433, 437
 Neugarten, B. L., 38, 59, 60, 77
 Nixon, M. E., 334, 396
 Noll, V. H., 184, 185, 189, 214

 O'Dea, J. D., 406, 418, 437
 O'Dea, T. F., 43, 78
 Odell, C. W., 298, 327
 Oden, M. H., 317, 319, 327
 Olson, N. E., 292, 325
 Opler, M. K., 58, 59, 78
 Orzack, L. H., 205, 214
 Osborne, R. T., 357, 358, 397
 Osgood, C. E., 116, 119
 Owens, W. A., 289, 327

 Parsons, Frank, 4, 5, 17, 144, 145, 146,
 147, 148, 166, 168, 171, 172, 448
 Parsons, Talcott, 175, 176, 178, 214
 Paterson, D. G., 112, 113, 114, 117,
 118, 159, 166, 172
 Perkins, H. V., 233, 273
 Perl, R. E., 286, 326
 Peters, E. F., 249, 250, 332, 397
 Petty, William, 123, 127, 128
 Phelps, H. R., 180, 214
 Phillips, W. S., 357, 358, 397
 Piaget, Jean, 226, 273
 Pintner, Rudolph, 372, 397
 Pointer, P. D., 244, 251, 273
 Pollan, W. D., 341, 342, 397
 Powell, H. F., 297, 327
 Powers, M. D., 337, 397
 Pressey, S. L., 27, 34
 Proctor, William, 144
 Prosser, C. A., 7

 Quigley, T. J., 53, 78

 Rae, S. F., 92, 118
 Raylesberg, D. D., 260, 273
 Redfield, Robert, 40, 78
 Reed, A. Y., 144, 149, 150, 172
 Reichard, S. K., 286, 327
 Reid, J. W., 339, 340, 397
 Reissman, Leonard, 206, 214
 Richards, E. S., 61, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68,
 78
 Richey, H. G., 131, 142
 Richey, R. W., 112, 119
 Rimel, E. G., 188, 189, 214
 Robinson, M. Z., 232, 271
 Roca, Pablo, 354, 355, 397
 Roe, Anne, 222, 223, 267, 273, 319,
 327, 335, 336, 343, 397
 Roens, B. A., 429, 437
 Roeber, E. C., 360, 397
 Rogers, C. R., 167, 172, 226
 Rose, A. M., 205, 214

- Rose, Edward, 26, 34
 Rosen, B. C., 209, 215
 Rosenberg, Morris, 219, 254, 273
 Rosenberg, Nathan, 341, 342, 397
 Rosenfeld, M. A., 309, 327
 Ross, C. C., 298, 301, 327
 Ross, R. G., 445, 451
 Rothman, Philip, 386, 397
 Rothney, J. W. M., 246, 247, 273, 291,
 327, 357, 358, 360, 361, 366, 372,
 397, 429, 430, 431, 432, 435, 437
 Ruedisili, C. H., 358, 396
 Rusk, R. R., 404, 437

 Sanctis, Sanctis de, 280
 Sarason, S. B., 383, 398
 Sarbin, T. R., 377, 398
 Sargent, S. S., 36, 78
 Sarhan, El-Demerdash, 354, 398
 Schaefer, B. R., 371, 398
 Schmidt, J. L., 246, 247, 273, 361, 397
 Schrader, W. B., 305, 325
 Schwarm, O. J., 187, 215
 Scott, I. D., 162, 172
 Scott, W. E., 171
 Sears, J. B., 22, 34, 235, 238, 273
 Seashore, H. G., 325, 371, 398
 Segel, David, 187, 196, 197, 215, 284,
 286, 287, 303, 327, 356, 357, 398
 Sessions, A. D., 358, 395
 Seward, Georgene, 74, 78
 Shannon, J. B., 193, 215
 Shartle, Carroll, 144, 282
 Shaw, C. A., 299, 300, 327
 Shelsky, I. M., 335, 397
 Sherif, C. W., 95, 96, 97, 119
 Sherif, Muzafer, 95, 96, 97, 119, 390,
 391, 398
 Shoben, J. J., Jr., 421, 437
 Sievers, F. L., 163
 Silvey, H. M., 339, 341, 342, 398
 Simon, Theophile, 152, 171
 Simpson, B. R., 280, 327
 Small, Leonard, 263, 267, 268, 273
 Smith, B. F., 206, 215
 Smith, E. R., 165, 172
 Smith, H. P., 193, 215
 Smith, M. B., 195, 215
 Snygg, Donald, 195, 215, 229, 230,
 273
 Sollenberger, R. T., 346, 398
 Sorokin, Pitrim, 102, 119
 Sparks, Jared, 143
 Spearman, Charles, 279, 280, 281, 327

 Spindler, G. D., 27, 34
 Spinka, Matthew, 121, 122, 123, 143
 Spranger, Eduard, 360, 391, 398
 Srole, Leo, 66, 69, 79
 Stagner, Ross, 115, 119
 Stanley, J. C., 375, 376, 377, 398
 Stead, William, 144
 Steffle, Buford, 360, 398
 Stendler, C. B., 84, 86, 119
 Stephens, J. M., 298, 327
 Stephensen, R. R., 263, 264, 273
 Stern, Wilhelm, 153, 172
 Stevens, L. B., 350, 351, 365, 396
 Stevens, R. B., 113, 114, 115, 119
 Stewart, L. H., 349, 394
 Stocking, Collis, 161, 172
 Stordahl, K. E., 337, 398
 Stover, E. M., 406, 422, 437
 Strang, Ruth, 9, 17, 189, 215, 421, 437
 Strong, E. K., Jr., 57, 78, 155, 173, 336,
 337, 338, 344, 345, 347, 348, 349,
 352, 353, 356, 358, 359, 398
 Strong, F. W., 378, 395
 Stroud, J. B., 191, 215
 Sullivan, H. S., 228, 273, 421, 438
 Super, D. E., 157, 173, 217, 263, 265,
 267, 269, 273, 276, 277, 278, 282,
 299, 327, 330, 345, 346, 349, 358,
 366, 394, 398, 399, 447, 451
 Sutherland, R. L., 54, 78
 Sutton, Marcella, 344, 396
 Swineford, Frances, 285, 327
 Symonds, P. M., 231, 273

 Taussig, F. W., 105, 106, 119
 Terman, L. M., 153, 173, 317, 319, 327
 Thomson, G. H., 280, 281, 327
 Thorndike, E. L., 156, 173, 280, 311,
 328, 356, 360, 399
 Thorndike, R. L., 152, 173, 294, 295,
 314, 315, 316, 328
 Thrasher, F. M., 177, 178, 215
 Thurstone, L. L., 281, 282, 306, 307,
 328, 379, 399
 Thurstone, T. G., 282, 328
 Tocqueville, A. C. de, 19, 34
 Tomars, A. S., 53, 78
 Tope, R. E., 235, 237, 251, 270
 Travers, R. M. W., 297, 298, 302, 328,
 411, 433, 438
 Traxler, A. E., 285, 293, 328, 338, 339,
 399
 Trembath, M. E., 334, 396
 Triggs, F. O., 332, 333, 356, 357, 399

- Trow, W. C., 263, 273
 Tryon, Caroline, 180, 181, 201, 215
 Tryon, R. C., 281, 328
 Turnbull, G. H., 129, 143
 Turner, R. H., 207, 215
 Turney, A. H., 292, 293, 298, 328
 Tyler, L. E., 221, 224, 225, 267, 273, 353, 362, 399
 Tyler, R. W., 165, 172
 Tylor, E. G., 35, 78

 Ulich, Robert, 123, 130, 132, 136, 143

 Valentine, E. C., 109, 119
 Van Dusen, A. C., 399
 Veblen, T. B., 82
 Vernon, P. E., 371, 394
 Viteles, M. S., 421, 438
 Vogt, E. Z., 44, 46, 59, 78

 Wade, D. E., 202, 215
 Waldrop, R. S., 375, 376, 377, 398
 Wallace, J. M., Jr., 93, 119
 Wallace, W. L., 304, 328
 Waller, Willard, 177, 178, 215
 Ward, Roswell, 144
 Warner, W. L., 1, 17, 23, 24, 34, 39, 66, 69, 79, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 91, 95, 101, 105, 106, 119, 210, 215
 Weaver, E. W., 149
 Weber, Max, 81, 82
 Wechsler, David, 278, 328
 Welch, M. K., 112, 113, 114, 119
 Wellman, B. L., 284, 328
 Wesman, A. G., 290, 291, 301, 325, 328
 West, James, 53, 79, 84, 86, 119
 Westley, W. A., 177, 178, 213
 Wheeler, D. S., 148
 Whipple, G. M., 152, 172

 Whisler, L. D., 373, 399
 White, R. W., 8, 17
 Whitmer, Lightner, 153, 173
 Whitney, F. L., 107, 119
 Whyte, W. F., 69, 79
 Whyte, W. H., Jr., 28, 34
 Williams, C. T., 352, 399
 Williams, F. W., 93, 119
 Williams, H. E., 410, 436
 Williamsan, E. G., 167, 173, 411, 420, 422, 438, 451
 Wilson, F. M., 401, 438
 Wimberly, S. E., 373, 374, 399
 Wissler, Clark, 37, 79
 Wittenborn, J. R., 332, 399
 Witty, P. A., 112, 113, 114, 118, 220, 235, 238, 241, 251, 272, 274
 Wolf, Beverly, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16
 Wolfe, Dael, 281, 307, 318, 320, 321, 322, 328
 Wolking, W. D., 282, 301, 328
 Wolley, H. T., 153
 Woodruff, A. D., 383, 399
 Woodruff, Katherine, 235, 236, 274
 Woods, F. J., 58, 62, 66, 79
 Worbois, G. M., 418, 419, 438
 Wray, Donald, 70, 79
 Wrenn, C. G., 145, 173, 406, 418, 422, 438
 Wright, H. F., 198, 213

 Yellin, Seymour, 207, 214
 Yerkes, R. M., 155, 173
 Yoakum, C. S., 155, 173

 Zelen, Seymour, 202, 215
 Zenti, R. N., 364, 365, 399
 Zeran, F. R., 406, 418, 437
 Ziller, R. C., 253, 274
 Zimmerman, W. S., 283

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

- Abilities, adaptive behavior, 287-288
 - differentiation with age, 286-287
 - inter- and intraindividual differences, 288-289, 297
 - occupational group differences, 310-311
 - nature-nurture, 284
 - stability of, 284-287
 - tests of, global, 278, 295, 301
 - multifactor, 282-283, 295, 299, 301
- Absolutes, 32
- Acculturation, 70-76
 - and guidance, 75-76
 - and school problems, 74
 - definition of, 70
 - factors in, 70-71, 73-74
 - phases of, 74
 - tensions of, 71-74
- Activity inventories, 367-369
- Adjustment Service, 158
- American life, transition in, 21, 24-28
- American Personnel and Guidance Association, 163
- Aptitude tests, American Council on Education Psychological Examination, 304-307
- Aptitude Survey, 283
- Army General Classification Test, 307, 311, 320-321
- California Tests of Mental Maturity, 286
- College Aptitude Test, 304
- Differential Aptitude Tests, 156, 283, 285-286, 300-301
- General Aptitude Test Battery, 156, 161, 283
- Pintner Intelligence Tests, 294
- Primary Mental Abilities Tests, 285-286, 299-300, 304-305
- Unifactor Tests, 283
- Aptitudes, *see* Abilities; Intelligence
- Boston Vocation Bureau, 145-148
- Career Pattern Study, 269
- Caste, 39
- Civilian Conservation Corps, 160
- Commission on Reorganization of Secondary Schools, 5-6, 153-154
- Commonwealth educators, 121, 125-126
- Context, limits imposed by, 196
 - two aspects, 174
 - See also* Life space; Psychological habitat
- Counseling, as a guidance service, 11, 13
 - clinical approach to, 166-169
 - of veterans, 161-162
 - values in, 391-392, 448
- Counselors, preparation of, 148, 168, 445
- Cultures, concept of, 35-37
 - definition of, 35
 - general American culture, 37
 - impact on individual, 42-44
 - See also* Subcultures; Youth culture
- Curriculum, relation to guidance, 14
- Delinquency, 384, 387-388
- Developmental tasks, 9-10, 403-404
- Dictionary of Occupational Titles*, 161
- Discipline, relation of, to guidance, 15
- Drop-outs, *see* Retention in school
- Ego, *see* Self
- Elmtown*, 84-86, 190
- Employment Stabilization Research Project, 159
- Evaluated Participation Method, 84

Evaluation, by follow-up studies, 422-432

concept of, 400-401

criteria for, 405-422

academic achievement, 415

complex criteria, 421-422

educational plans, 416

emotional adjustment, 418

expert judgment, 408-409

external standards, 408-409

intermediate criteria, 420-421

occupational choice, 417

social adjustment, 419-420

student opinion, 108, 410-411

incidental benefits of, 408, 410-411

instruments for, 409-410

methods of, 406-407, 422-423

of effects on the individual, 414-422

of programs, 406-414

possible new directions of, 433-436

value judgments in, 401, 404-405

Experimentalism, 32

Follow-up studies, examples of, Arlington study, 427-429

Minnesota study, 425-427

Virginia study, 423-425

Wisconsin Counseling Study, 429-432

George-Barden Act, 162

George-Dean Act, 162-163

Great Didactic, The, 121

Guidance, and the federal government, 158-164

and manpower, 11-12, 446-447

as personnel service, 10-11, 13

as process, 13

as vocational guidance, 4-6, 31, 145-148, 150-151

concept of, 13, 129-130, 449-451

definition of, 15

for adjustment, 7-9

for development, 9-10, 447

education as guidance, 6-7

historical backgrounds, in Europe, 131-139, 439

in the United States, 120-130, 149-151, 440

in depression years, 158-159

in nonschool settings, 158

integrated, 4

interdisciplinary nature of, 2-3, 444-445

Guidance (*Continued*)

need for synthesis, 443-445

objectives of, 400-405, 447-449

and concepts of guidance, 401-404

and democratic ideals, 140, 440, 446

and philosophy of education, 404-405

problem-centered emphasis, 4

Hobbies, 366

Horatio Alger myth, 21, 96

Ideal self, 231-234

Immigration, 20-21

Index of Status Characteristics, 84, 86, 351, 386

Intelligence, community variables and test scores, 294-295

theories of, group factor, 284

independent elements, 280

multiple factors, 277, 279, 282

two-factor, 279-280

Instruction, relation to guidance, 14

Interest inventories, Carnegie Interest Inventory, 332

Dreese-Mooney Interest Inventory for Elementary Grades, 353

Kuder Preference Record, 156, 240, 332, 334-335, 338-343, 351, 357-361, 364-365, 375-377

Lee-Thorpe Occupational Interest Inventory, 346

Strong Vocational Interest Blank, 156, 332-333, 336-338, 343-344, 346, 348-352, 354, 356, 358-361, 366, 375, 377-379, 390

validity of, 359-362

faking, 360-361

vocabulary levels, 359-360

Interests, age differences in, 341-343

early concepts of, 329-331

expressed, 362-365

inventoried, 332-362

occupational level, 349-350

permanence of, 336-343

reference points, 347-348

relationships among, 332-333

sex differences, 338-339, 341-342

socioeconomic factors, 349-352

structure of, 343-345

manifested, 331, 365-369

occupational classification by, 333-335

Interests (*Continued*)

- objective, 331, 389-390
- of cultural groups, 348-355
 - Egyptian, 354
 - English, 353
 - Japanese, 353-354
 - Negro, 352-353
 - Puerto Rican, 354-355
- relation to, abilities, 355-357
 - achievement, 357-359
 - self, 388-392
 - values, 369-370, 375-379, 391-393
- subjective, 331, 389-390
- theories of, as attitudes, 390
 - as conditioned stimuli, 391
 - as expressions of self concept, 389-390
 - genetic factors in, 345-347

Jacksonian democracy, 19-20

Jonesville, *see* Elmtown

Life adjustment, 8

Life space, applied to drop-outs, 196-197

- as hypothetical construct, 195
- concept of, 194-197
- reconstruction of, 195
- relation to psychological habitat, 197
- subjective elements, 195

McGuffey readers, 29-30

Mental health movement, 8

Middletown, 25-27, 83, 100, 183, 262, 350

Mobility, business elite, 21, 105-106

- changes in, 102-104, 106
- definition of, 82
- means to, 99-101
- occupational, 99-106
- patterns of, 104-105

National Defense Education Act, 4, 12, 164, 317

National Vocational Guidance Association, 162, 168

National Youth Administration, 160

Occupational aspiration, age trends in, 219-220, 236

- mobility aspiration, 22, 98, 238-242
- relation to expectation, 263-265

Occupational choice, factors in, child rearing practices, 223-224

Occupational choice (*Continued*)

- grade level, 236-237
- ideal self, concept of, 231-234
- knowledge of occupation, 220
- level of, 238-240
- perception of occupation, 234, 260-262
- personal needs, 259
- reality testing, 263-268
- rural-urban, 237-238, 258
- self concept, 225-234, 247, 265
- self reports of, 248-256
- sex differences, 219-220, 246
- social class, 257-258, 260
- status of occupations, 237
- values, 222, 252-254, 256-259, 268

of Negroes, 240-242, 254-255

social importance of, 217

stability of, 242-247

theory, elements of, compromise in, 268

congruence with self, 255, 268

Freudian concept, 268-269

interpersonal relations, 222

narrowing the field, 219-225

needs, 256, 259, 268

roles, 221-222

self actualization, 229

Occupational development, age in, 247

continuous, 218-219

stages of, 217, 267

Occupational Outlook Handbook, 161

Occupational preference, 216-217

See also Occupational choice

Occupational success, prediction of, 311-317

Old City, 84

Peer groups, *see* Youth culture; Youth groups

Persistence in school, *see* Retention in school

Personality inventories, 152, 156-157

Plainville, U.S.A., 84, 86

Prestige, definition of, 83

occupational, 109-116

factors in, 113-114

rank of occupations, 110-113

stability of rank, 112

Progressive education, 31, 164-166, 404-405

Prosser resolution, 7-8

Protestant ethic, 28, 207

- Psychological habitat, 194-211
 aspects of, 197-198
 channeling of motives, 208-211
 concept of, 197-198, 203
 definition of, 197
 level of aspiration, 205-207, 210-211
 limits imposed by, 204-206
 other youth in, 200-204
 reference groups in, 205-207
 standing behaviors, 198
 teachers in, 198-200
 values in, 205, 208-211
- Reference groups, and mobility, 97
 and perception of social class, 95
 and status, 94, 97
 and values, 96-97
 concept of, 94-95
 definition of, 95-96
 social classes as, 93-99
- Reformed School, The*, 129
- Retention in school, characteristics of
 drop-outs, 187-189
 curriculum, 185
 frustration, 196-197
 nationality differences, 184
 occupation of parents, 183-186, 189
 rural-urban differences, 185
 social class, 186, 190-191
 socioeconomic factors, 185, 189-190
- Self, behaviorism and the, 228
 development of, 225
 ego and, 228, 231
 neo-Freudianism, 228
 phenomenal self, 227, 229
 self-actualization, 229
 self-consistency, 230
- Self concept, 225-226, 229-230, 255, 270
- Scholastic prediction, criteria for
 achievement test scores, 293-294
 school marks, 291-293
 differences in college populations, 306-308
 prediction for or within, college, 302-310
 elementary school, 296
 secondary school, 297-302, 308-310
 predictors, achievement test scores, 302-303
 grade-point averages, 301-303
- Scholastic prediction (*Continued*)
 intelligence test scores, 302-303
 rank in class, 303
 scholastic aptitude test scores, 294
 sex differences in, 301, 305
 statistical limitations, 289-290, 303-304
- Social classes, and aspiration, 96-98, 209, 222
 and participation in school activities, 193
 and peer acceptance, 202-203
 and youth culture, 175, 177, 179-180
 as reference groups, 93-99
 ascribed status, 83-86, 96
 characteristics of, 86-91
 concept of, 81-82
 definition of, 82
 identification with, 92-93
 of teachers, 175-177, 179-180
 relation to interests, 350-351
 subjective class membership, 91-93
See also Reference groups
- Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, 130
- Status, and class, 81-82
 and hierarchies, 80
 definition of, 80
 education as symbol of, 100-101
 in schools, 179
- Study of Values*, 345, 371-379, 382, 384, 389
- Subcultures, ethnic groups, 37-39, 43
 rural-urban, 39-42
 social class, 43, 49-53
- Talented students, actualization of potential, 319-320
 college graduation of, 320-321
 college plans of, 320-321
 criterion problem in identification, 318
 high school graduation of, 321
 interest in, 317
 Jeffersonian concept, 317
 majors entered, 321-322
 problem of predictors, 318-319
 threshold of ability, 319
- Teachers, in psychological habitat, 198-200
 models of, 30-31
 mobility of, 107-109

Testing in guidance, 152-157

See also Aptitude tests; Interests, inventories of; Values, inventoried

U.S. Employment Service, 161

U.S. Office of Education, 162-163

Values, American, 46-49

ambivalent nature of, 22-23

basic clusters of, 46-48

concept of, 44-46

definition of, 46

in counseling, 391-392

in psychological habitat, 205, 208-211

inventoried, relation to interests, 369-370, 375-379

structure of, 373-375

of college students, college population differences, 372, 377

major field differences, 371-372

response to adult culture, 380-384

of ethnic groups, 53-70

American Indians, 57-61

European immigrants, 68-70

Hispanos, 61-63, 65

Japanese Americans, 56-57

Jews, 65-68

Mexican Americans, 63-65

Negroes, 54-55

of high school students, 384-388

Values (*Continued*)

of mobile persons, 385

of social classes, 49-53

upper, 51-52

middle, 29-30, 49-51, 121, 136, 383

lower, 50, 52

sex differences in, 371, 375-377

See also Acculturation; Interests; Self

Veterans advisement, 157, 161-162

Vocational aspiration, *see* Occupational aspiration

Vocational guidance movement, 145-151

changing leadership, 148

in the schools, 149-151

relation to vocational education, 149

See also Parsons, Frank

Yankee City, 24, 27, 84, 96

Youth culture, age-sex categories, 175 and the schools, 178

characteristics of, 175-177, 179

concept of, 175-177

developmental factors, 180-182

relation to adult culture, 177-180

Youth groups, 176-177

approved personality characteristics, 181-182, 201

youth needs, 178